Access Statistics for Richard Holden

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 35
Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections 0 0 0 77 0 0 3 239
Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts? 5 50 50 50 18 69 69 69
Gaming and Strategic Ambiguity in Incentive Provision 1 1 4 49 1 2 9 107
Gaming and Strategic Ambiguity in Incentive Provision 1 1 1 44 2 2 6 89
Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision 1 1 1 53 1 3 7 80
Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision 1 1 2 37 1 5 12 72
Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited 0 0 2 19 0 0 6 67
Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans 0 0 0 3 0 1 6 32
Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans 0 0 0 47 1 1 4 211
Movers and Shakers 0 1 2 43 1 5 12 79
Network Capital 0 3 5 47 0 4 7 39
Optimal Primaries 0 0 0 26 0 0 1 29
Organizations with Power-Hungry Agents 0 1 18 18 0 6 10 10
Peer Effects on the United States Supreme Court 0 1 3 37 0 4 13 57
Peer Effects on the United States Supreme Court 1 4 12 12 1 7 16 16
Political Capital 0 32 32 32 2 32 32 32
Rational-Expectations Equilibrium in Intermediate Good Markets 0 0 1 16 0 0 2 71
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 35
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 1 39 0 1 5 144
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 34
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 1 1 12 0 3 9 66
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 43
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation 0 0 3 10 2 10 24 94
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation 0 0 2 36 0 1 6 42
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation 0 0 0 0 2 7 17 27
The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation 0 0 14 111 2 5 58 184
Timing Information Flows 0 0 1 19 1 1 6 51
Vertical versus Horizontal Incentives in Education: Evidence from Randomized Trials 0 1 2 72 0 1 10 193
When to Drop a Bombshell 0 1 5 56 0 2 16 126
Total Working Papers 10 99 162 972 35 174 379 2,373

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Nobel Prize for Property Rights Theory 0 0 3 8 1 3 12 34
A Theory of Rule Development 0 0 1 5 0 0 2 30
Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision 0 2 6 6 0 2 12 12
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years? 0 1 5 222 1 10 29 568
Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans 0 0 1 21 0 0 15 233
Movers and Shakers 1 1 5 26 7 19 58 214
Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack 0 1 2 79 1 2 16 520
Optimal primaries 0 0 1 5 0 0 6 96
Organization and Information: Firms' Governance Choices in Rational-Expectations Equilibrium 0 0 1 15 2 6 11 112
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty 1 1 1 24 1 2 7 98
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 3 27 2 8 19 171
The Original Management Incentive Schemes 0 0 0 333 0 1 4 1,639
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation 1 1 3 3 2 7 13 13
The nature of tournaments 0 0 1 18 0 3 8 96
When to Drop a Bombshell 0 0 3 3 5 13 47 47
Total Journal Articles 3 7 36 795 22 76 259 3,883

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Statistics updated 2019-07-03