| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods |
0 |
0 |
4 |
134 |
3 |
5 |
23 |
577 |
| A note on seniority and political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
33 |
| A reformulation of the foundations of welfare economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
177 |
| Absence of Envy Does Not Imply Fairness: Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
10 |
15 |
| Advancing economic analysis beyond the equilibrium framework |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
93 |
| An Empirical Test of the Median Voter Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
406 |
| Andreas Bergh and Rolf Höijer, eds., Institutional Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
4 |
4 |
6 |
92 |
| Applied Fairness Theory: Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
130 |
| Are There Ratchets in the Growth of Federal Government Spending? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
4 |
7 |
21 |
70 |
| Are social contracts possible without actual negotiation? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
13 |
| Arye L. Hillman, Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of Government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
199 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
567 |
| Arye L. Hillman: Public finance and public policy: a political economy perspective on the responsibilities and limitations of government |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
54 |
| Arye L. Hillman: Public finance and public policy: responsibilities and limitations of government |
0 |
0 |
1 |
82 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
334 |
| Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government: Fiscal Choices and Economic Outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
79 |
| Barriers to Entry and Political Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
41 |
| Barry G. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
150 |
| Book Review: Explorations into Constitutional Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
43 |
| Book review |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
| Book reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
17 |
| Capital and labor, Past and present, in the context of Piketty’s Capital |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
94 |
| Checks and Balances: Enforcing Constitutional Constraints |
0 |
0 |
4 |
24 |
9 |
11 |
35 |
188 |
| Committees in Legislatures: A Property Rights Perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
86 |
| Conscious choice and economic progress |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
16 |
| Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions |
0 |
1 |
3 |
40 |
2 |
4 |
15 |
115 |
| Consumption Externalities and Economic Welfare |
0 |
0 |
1 |
89 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
365 |
| Contractarian ideology and the legitimacy of government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
30 |
| Contractarian model of the decline in classical liberalism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
27 |
| Corrective Taxes and Auctions of Rights in the Control of Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
13 |
| Corrective Taxes and Auctions of Rights in the Control of Externalities: A Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
18 |
| Corruption and destructive entrepreneurship |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
6 |
8 |
24 |
221 |
| Creative destruction: getting ahead and staying ahead in a capitalist economy |
0 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
3 |
5 |
22 |
58 |
| Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: the narrow corridor: states, societies, and the fate of liberty |
0 |
2 |
2 |
19 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
105 |
| David F. Prindle, The Paradox of Democratic Capitalism: Politics and Economics in American Thought. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. USD 49.95 (cloth) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
293 |
| David Reisman: James Buchanan |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
42 |
| Does restricting choice in referenda enable governments to spend more? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
4 |
5 |
10 |
85 |
| Does the invisible hand hold or lead? Market adjustment in an entrepreneurial economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
181 |
| Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast: Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
5 |
6 |
9 |
97 |
| Echoes of Henry George in Modern Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
79 |
| Economic Freedom and the Environment for Economic Growth |
0 |
1 |
4 |
693 |
3 |
7 |
28 |
2,527 |
| Economic Freedom, Institutional Quality,and Cross-Country Differences in Income and Growth |
2 |
3 |
7 |
208 |
5 |
8 |
25 |
554 |
| Economic Institutions and the Durability of Democracy |
0 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
3 |
5 |
14 |
71 |
| Elite Influence on General Political Preferences |
0 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
2 |
10 |
30 |
130 |
| Empirical Evidence on the Publicness of State Legislative Activities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
185 |
| Entrepreneurial Economies |
0 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
98 |
| Equilibrium versus the Invisible Hand |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
382 |
| Evidence on voter preferences from unrestricted choice referendums |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
122 |
| Factors Underlying the Growth of Local Government in the 19th Century United States |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
391 |
| Firms as knowledge repositories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
20 |
| Francesco Forte: Principles of public economics: a public choice approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
200 |
| Fred S. McChesney: In Memoriam |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
| Government By Contract |
0 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
33 |
| Government growth in the twenty-first century |
0 |
0 |
5 |
181 |
4 |
5 |
22 |
419 |
| Growth Management in Florida: Lessons for the National Economy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
45 |
| HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND LABOUR SUPPLY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
| Institutional quality and the tenure of autocrats |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
89 |
| Institutions and the Impact of Investment on Growth |
1 |
2 |
9 |
236 |
3 |
7 |
28 |
586 |
| Interest group support for non-group issues |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
31 |
| Interests Versus Ideology in the Ratification of the 16th and 17th Amendments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
4 |
6 |
9 |
925 |
| Is Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform Revenue Neutral? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
57 |
| Is institutional improvement possible? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
44 |
| James M. Buchanan and Liberal Political Economy: A Rational Reconstruction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
| James M. Buchanan’s constitutional project: past and future |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
16 |
47 |
| John Meadowcroft: James M. Buchanan |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
50 |
| Karl Wennberg and Christian Sandström (Eds.), Questioning the Entrepreneurial State: Status-quo, Pitfalls, and the Need for Credible Innovation Policy. Cham: Springer, 2022. xi + 367 Pages. USD 59.99 (hardback) |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
6 |
12 |
19 |
| Lawrence H. White: The clash of economic ideas: the great policy debates and experiments of the last hundred years |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
118 |
| Les fondations comportementales de l’analyse économique autrichienne |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
21 |
| Magnus Henrekson and Robin Douhan: The political economy of entrepreneurship, 2 vols |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
93 |
| Malinvestment |
1 |
2 |
3 |
26 |
11 |
22 |
73 |
238 |
| Market institutions and income inequality |
0 |
0 |
2 |
59 |
2 |
2 |
12 |
117 |
| Measuring the Growth and Variability of Tax Bases Over the Business Cycle |
0 |
0 |
4 |
100 |
4 |
7 |
19 |
255 |
| National Income Accounting and Public Policy |
0 |
1 |
1 |
101 |
3 |
10 |
19 |
531 |
| Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
363 |
| Non-optimal unanimous agreement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
13 |
32 |
| Non-optimal unanimous agreement under majority rule: Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
7 |
13 |
39 |
| Omar Azfar and Charles A. Cadwell (Eds.), Market-Augmenting Government: The Institutional Foundations for Prosperity; Stephen Knack (Ed.), Democracy, Governance, and Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
252 |
| On the distribution of federal taxes and expenditures, and the new war between the states |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
17 |
| Optimality and the institutional structure of bureaucracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
20 |
| Pluralism and heterodoxy in economic methodology |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
86 |
| Pluralism versus Heterodoxy in Economics and the Social Sciences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
3 |
5 |
15 |
119 |
| Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
90 |
| Political Capitalism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
4 |
17 |
59 |
428 |
| Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources |
0 |
0 |
2 |
78 |
2 |
5 |
18 |
323 |
| Political incentives for rent creation |
1 |
2 |
4 |
24 |
5 |
15 |
21 |
133 |
| Politics and Deficit Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
38 |
| Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
9 |
19 |
391 |
| Principles and politics: Like oil and water |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
63 |
| Progressive Democracy: the ideology of the modern predatory state |
0 |
0 |
4 |
22 |
3 |
7 |
24 |
104 |
| Public Policy Toward Pecuniary Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
6 |
13 |
26 |
159 |
| Public choice in a local government setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
86 |
| Rational choice and the taxation of sin |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
124 |
| Rational choice and the taxation of sin: Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
67 |
| Regulation and corruption |
0 |
1 |
2 |
49 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
160 |
| Review |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
| Reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
23 |
| Reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
7 |
29 |
| Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai A. Konrad (eds.): 40 years of research on rent seeking 1 and 2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
107 |
| Roger D. Congleton: Perfecting parliament: constitutional reform, liberalism, and the rise of Western democracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
70 |
| Rule of law and the size of government |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
148 |
| South Korea's economic future: Industrial policy, or economic democracy? |
0 |
1 |
1 |
69 |
5 |
7 |
22 |
410 |
| Specification Search and Levels of Significance in Econometric Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
272 |
| THE GROWTH OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1820 TO 1870 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
4 |
4 |
9 |
181 |
| THE NATIONAL DEBT CONTROVERSY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
594 |
| THE NATIONAL DEBT CONTROVERSY: A REPLY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
| Tax Policy From a Public Choice Perspective |
0 |
3 |
4 |
43 |
6 |
11 |
29 |
165 |
| Tax Referenda and the Voluntary Exchange Model of Taxation: a Suggested Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
26 |
| Tax shares and government spending in a median voter model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
43 |
| The Austrian Episode |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
27 |
33 |
| The Effect of Changes in the Tax Structure on the Reported Income of High-Income Individuals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
55 |
| The Effect of State Income Taxation on Per Capita Income Growth |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
188 |
| The Effects of Public Investment on Private Investment in Developing Economies |
0 |
4 |
11 |
142 |
6 |
16 |
44 |
363 |
| The Growth of the Federal Government in the 1920s |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
4 |
17 |
171 |
| The Impact of Population Density on Municipal Government Expenditures |
0 |
2 |
6 |
57 |
8 |
19 |
41 |
171 |
| The Linkage Between Public and Private Investment: A Co-integration Analysis of a Panel of Developing Countries |
0 |
1 |
2 |
269 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
678 |
| The New Urbanism Versus the Market Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
285 |
| The Origins of Entrepreneurial Opportunities |
1 |
1 |
2 |
269 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
1,082 |
| The Ramsey Rule Reconsidered |
0 |
1 |
2 |
38 |
7 |
12 |
31 |
240 |
| The Regulation of Lobbyists |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
11 |
203 |
| The Return To the Federal Government From Investment in Higher Education |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
23 |
| The Scope of Government and the Wealth of Nations |
0 |
0 |
5 |
198 |
2 |
3 |
19 |
487 |
| The Size and Significance of the Pareto Set in Spatial Voting Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
216 |
| The Stability of International Coalitions in United Nations Voting from 1946 to 1973 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
414 |
| The Unanimous Voting Rule Is Not the Political Equivalent to Market Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
518 |
| The appeal of minimum wage laws: A dynamic analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
18 |
| The behavioral foundations of Austrian economics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
101 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
248 |
| The cartelization of local governments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
71 |
| The common pool of transitional profits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
40 |
| The contractual alternative to patents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
75 |
| The economic theory of rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
5 |
10 |
46 |
724 |
| The median voter model in public choice theory |
0 |
0 |
4 |
52 |
3 |
10 |
24 |
245 |
| The social sub-optimality of competitive elections: comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
57 |
| The transformative impact of rent-seeking theory on the study of public choice |
1 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
6 |
24 |
53 |
86 |
| Thomas Piketty: Capital in the twenty-first century |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
5 |
10 |
17 |
86 |
| Transitional gains and rent extraction |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
4 |
7 |
24 |
96 |
| Unions, Economic Freedom, and Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
59 |
| Using Matched Border Counties for Policy Analysis: The Effects of Entitlement Programs on Female-Headed Households and Female Labor-Force Participation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
198 |
| Veterans Interests and the Transition to Government Growth: 1870-1915 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
168 |
| Vibert's vision: Constitutional theory in search of a constitution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
7 |
17 |
44 |
| What Stiglitz and Stockman Have in Common |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
72 |
| Why does government produce national defense? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
271 |
| Wilfried Ver Eecke. Ethical Dimensions of the Economy: Making Use of Hegel and the Concepts of Public and Merit Goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
95 |
| Total Journal Articles |
7 |
35 |
130 |
5,658 |
341 |
646 |
1,817 |
26,411 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.