Access Statistics for Johannes Hörner

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk 0 0 0 125 0 2 6 360
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 21
Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence 0 0 0 39 0 6 7 151
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 0 3 7 208
Belief-free Price Formation 0 0 0 19 0 5 11 96
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 21
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 36 0 5 8 148
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 37
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 10
Biased Social Learning 0 0 0 49 0 3 5 182
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 39 1 6 6 90
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 7 1 8 10 123
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 10 1 7 9 123
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 53 1 2 5 137
Career Concerns with Exponential Learning 0 0 2 42 11 19 30 132
Collaborating 0 0 2 19 1 5 9 141
Collaborating 0 0 2 123 4 5 12 291
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 36 1 4 11 74
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 24 7 11 17 66
Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment 0 0 0 40 0 7 9 66
Dynamic sender receiver games 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 20
Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 13
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? 0 1 1 14 1 5 9 33
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games" 0 0 0 26 1 11 16 67
How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 29
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 1 31 0 5 6 53
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 1 8 10 167
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 1 6 8 72
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 1 1 7 11 27
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 3 1 2 5 33
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 9 1 6 11 67
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 32 1 3 6 52
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 58 0 4 6 72
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 44 0 9 9 58
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 1 6 6 96
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 23 1 4 6 51
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 4 11 13 74
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 5 1 6 13 73
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 55 1 7 10 149
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 4 5 9 10 60
Mediation and Peace 0 1 1 26 0 6 13 68
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 26 0 1 3 76
Motivational Ratings 0 0 2 53 0 7 13 96
On A Markov Game with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 92 1 3 3 171
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information 0 0 0 72 0 4 7 191
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 27
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 25
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 1 1 27 0 5 5 113
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 1 1 27 2 13 17 72
Optimal Design for Social Learning 0 0 0 22 8 15 18 96
Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions 0 0 0 80 1 4 11 267
Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence 0 0 0 4 2 5 10 39
Public Enterprises and Labor Market Performance 0 0 0 85 1 6 11 364
Public enterprises and labor market performance 0 0 0 2 4 11 15 54
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 1 4 9 238
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 31
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for ! ! 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 7 0 1 2 60
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 78 2 9 12 260
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 49
Reputation and Competition 0 0 1 45 1 12 17 140
Reputation and Competition' 0 0 1 541 8 47 48 983
Selling Information 0 0 0 39 2 9 11 193
Selling Information 0 0 0 22 0 4 8 177
Selling Information 0 0 0 77 6 16 23 130
Selling Information 0 0 0 5 1 6 10 126
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 1 10 0 5 9 116
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 0 17 1 4 6 77
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 125 2 6 10 48
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 30 0 1 3 125
Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit 0 0 0 181 0 7 7 849
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 77 6 15 18 78
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 19 0 4 7 122
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 52 5 8 9 73
Supervised Social Learning 0 0 0 9 0 5 7 52
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 46 0 1 5 149
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 44 1 3 6 53
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 25 0 2 5 102
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 18 1 18 21 76
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 9 1 3 4 53
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 6 0 6 6 44
The Wisdom of the Minority 0 0 0 106 3 11 15 282
The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring 0 0 0 43 2 4 8 273
The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 39
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 85 0 8 14 96
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 33 0 5 6 71
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 42 0 6 6 46
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 0 1 5 8 40
Total Working Papers 0 4 16 3,502 115 552 812 10,653

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead 0 0 0 5 0 3 9 43
A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels 0 0 0 31 0 1 5 140
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 19 0 2 4 116
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 180 2 12 14 585
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence 0 0 0 12 1 3 8 67
Biased social learning 0 1 1 16 1 5 11 108
Career concerns with exponential learning 0 0 0 8 2 8 12 81
Coase and Hotelling: A Meeting of the Minds 0 0 0 14 0 2 4 202
Collaborating 0 0 1 84 0 8 16 326
Collusion with (almost) no information 0 0 0 6 0 1 2 31
Costly Signalling in Auctions -super-1 0 0 2 93 0 3 8 329
How Robust is the Folk Theorem? 0 0 0 22 5 10 17 209
How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? 0 0 0 3 2 7 10 41
Incentives for experimenting agents 0 0 1 7 1 5 8 78
Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation 0 0 1 7 1 6 14 79
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 1 81 0 2 10 437
Mediation, arbitration and negotiation 0 2 11 319 0 13 44 1,395
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 1 0 7 10 24
On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games 0 0 1 13 1 7 11 69
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE 0 0 0 52 2 25 28 248
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 1 1 60 0 2 4 236
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 0 2 9 10 188
Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 0 0 0 10 1 1 9 92
Reputation and Competition 0 0 0 484 2 12 20 1,309
Selling Information 1 1 4 108 1 9 27 427
Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders 0 0 0 66 1 4 8 182
Specialized Careers 0 0 0 5 0 5 7 47
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 139 0 9 11 339
The role of commitment in bilateral trade 0 0 1 18 0 2 10 80
The wisdom of the minority 0 2 4 95 1 8 13 266
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 12 1 3 8 96
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 19 1 5 9 97
Total Journal Articles 1 7 29 1,989 28 199 381 7,967

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04