Access Statistics for Johannes Hörner

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk 0 0 0 125 1 1 7 361
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 2 2 11 23
Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence 0 0 0 39 4 5 12 156
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 3 5 12 213
Belief-free Price Formation 0 0 0 19 2 2 13 98
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information 0 0 0 0 4 4 12 25
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 36 2 4 11 152
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 11
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 38
Biased Social Learning 0 0 0 49 0 1 6 183
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 39 0 2 7 91
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 7 2 4 13 126
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 53 4 5 9 141
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 10 0 2 10 124
Career Concerns with Exponential Learning 0 0 2 42 6 20 38 141
Collaborating 0 0 1 19 3 5 12 145
Collaborating 0 0 1 123 2 7 14 294
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 24 3 11 21 70
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 36 3 4 14 77
Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment 0 0 0 40 3 4 13 70
Dynamic sender receiver games 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 21
Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs 0 0 0 0 3 3 6 16
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? 0 0 1 14 2 5 12 37
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games" 0 0 0 26 3 5 19 71
How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect 0 0 0 7 2 3 4 32
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 1 31 4 4 10 57
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 1 3 4 14 30
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 2 3 12 169
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 4 7 14 78
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 3 1 2 6 34
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 9 2 4 14 70
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 32 4 6 11 57
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 58 1 2 8 74
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 44 2 2 11 60
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 1 5 13 75
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 23 2 3 8 53
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 3 4 9 99
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 5 0 3 15 75
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 55 0 2 11 150
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 26 0 2 5 78
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 4 3 10 15 65
Mediation and Peace 0 0 1 26 5 5 18 73
Motivational Ratings 0 0 2 53 4 6 18 102
On A Markov Game with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 92 1 3 5 173
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information 0 0 0 72 2 3 10 194
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 26
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 2 2 9 29
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 1 27 3 6 21 76
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 1 27 4 4 9 117
Optimal Design for Social Learning 0 0 0 22 1 9 19 97
Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions 0 0 0 80 2 3 13 269
Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence 0 0 0 4 5 12 20 49
Public Enterprises and Labor Market Performance 0 0 0 85 2 4 14 367
Public enterprises and labor market performance 0 0 0 2 3 7 18 57
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 32
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 3 4 12 241
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for ! ! 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 7 3 4 6 64
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 78 3 6 16 264
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 1 1 3 5 51
Reputation and Competition 0 0 0 45 3 5 20 144
Reputation and Competition' 0 0 0 541 0 10 49 985
Selling Information 0 0 0 77 4 12 29 136
Selling Information 0 0 0 5 0 1 10 126
Selling Information 0 0 0 39 1 4 13 195
Selling Information 0 0 0 22 1 1 9 178
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 0 10 4 5 13 121
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 0 17 3 4 9 80
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 30 3 3 6 128
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 125 2 5 13 51
Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit 0 0 0 181 2 3 10 852
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 77 1 9 21 81
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 19 4 4 11 126
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 52 3 8 12 76
Supervised Social Learning 0 0 0 9 1 2 9 54
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 46 3 3 7 152
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 9 1 2 5 54
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 18 2 4 24 79
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 25 1 2 7 104
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 44 3 6 11 58
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 6 2 3 9 47
The Wisdom of the Minority 0 0 0 106 1 5 17 284
The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring 0 0 0 43 0 3 9 274
The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 41
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 1 1 86 4 6 19 102
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 33 1 4 10 75
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 1 1 43 3 6 12 52
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 0 1 2 9 41
Total Working Papers 0 2 13 3,504 190 379 1,062 10,917

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead 0 0 0 5 3 3 10 46
A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels 0 0 0 31 4 4 9 144
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 19 3 3 7 119
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 180 2 4 16 587
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence 2 2 2 14 4 6 13 72
Biased social learning 0 0 1 16 2 3 13 110
Career concerns with exponential learning 0 0 0 8 2 6 16 85
Coase and Hotelling: A Meeting of the Minds 0 0 0 14 1 3 7 205
Collaborating 0 0 1 84 2 3 18 329
Collusion with (almost) no information 0 0 0 6 4 4 6 35
Costly Signalling in Auctions -super-1 0 0 1 93 1 2 8 331
How Robust is the Folk Theorem? 0 0 0 22 1 8 19 212
How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? 0 0 0 3 2 6 13 45
Incentives for experimenting agents 0 0 0 7 1 3 8 80
Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation 0 0 0 7 4 5 17 83
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 81 2 2 11 439
Mediation, arbitration and negotiation 0 1 12 320 4 5 49 1,400
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 1 2 2 12 26
On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games 0 0 1 13 3 5 14 73
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE 0 0 0 52 2 8 34 254
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 1 60 0 0 4 236
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 0 3 5 13 191
Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 0 0 0 10 2 3 11 94
Reputation and Competition 0 0 0 484 0 4 19 1,311
Selling Information 0 1 4 108 4 9 31 435
Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders 0 0 0 66 3 4 10 185
Specialized Careers 0 0 0 5 3 4 11 51
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 139 0 0 11 339
The role of commitment in bilateral trade 0 0 1 18 2 4 13 84
The wisdom of the minority 0 0 4 95 5 9 21 274
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 12 2 4 10 99
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 19 3 5 13 101
Total Journal Articles 2 4 28 1,992 76 136 467 8,075

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06