Access Statistics for Johannes Hörner

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk 0 0 0 125 1 3 6 358
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 4 5 6 17
Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence 0 0 0 39 0 1 1 145
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 1 4 5 205
Belief-free Price Formation 0 0 0 19 3 4 6 91
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 16
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 36 1 1 3 143
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 36
Biased Social Learning 0 0 0 49 1 1 2 179
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 7 0 1 2 115
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 84
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 10 0 1 2 116
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 53 1 2 3 135
Career Concerns with Exponential Learning 0 1 2 42 0 2 12 113
Collaborating 0 0 2 123 2 4 8 286
Collaborating 0 0 4 19 0 1 8 136
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 36 0 3 7 70
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 24 2 5 6 55
Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment 0 0 0 40 2 2 2 59
Dynamic sender receiver games 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 18
Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 11
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? 0 0 0 13 2 2 4 28
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games" 0 0 0 26 4 4 5 56
How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 28
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 9 3 3 6 61
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 1 2 2 159
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 2 2 3 66
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 3 0 2 3 31
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 1 31 0 0 1 48
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 1 3 4 4 20
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 32 0 1 3 49
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 58 2 2 2 68
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 49
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 0 1 2 63
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 23 0 1 3 47
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 90
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 26 1 1 2 75
Mediation and Peace 0 0 1 25 4 5 9 62
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 5 4 7 7 67
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 51
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 55 1 2 3 142
Motivational Ratings 0 1 2 53 2 4 7 89
On A Markov Game with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 92 0 0 0 168
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information 0 0 0 72 2 2 3 187
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 21
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 108
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 0 26 2 2 4 59
Optimal Design for Social Learning 0 0 0 22 2 3 3 81
Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions 0 0 0 80 3 7 7 263
Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence 0 0 0 4 2 4 7 34
Public Enterprises and Labor Market Performance 0 0 0 85 2 4 7 358
Public enterprises and labor market performance 0 0 0 2 4 4 6 43
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 3 4 5 234
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 29
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for ! ! 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 59
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 78 0 3 4 251
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 47
Reputation and Competition 0 0 1 45 4 4 6 128
Reputation and Competition' 0 0 1 541 0 0 2 936
Selling Information 0 0 0 77 2 5 11 114
Selling Information 0 0 0 22 0 1 4 173
Selling Information 0 0 0 39 2 2 2 184
Selling Information 0 0 0 5 2 3 6 120
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 1 10 2 3 5 111
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 0 17 1 1 2 73
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 30 0 0 2 124
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 125 2 3 5 42
Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit 0 0 0 181 0 0 0 842
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 77 1 2 3 63
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 52 1 1 1 65
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 19 2 2 3 118
Supervised Social Learning 0 0 0 9 0 2 3 47
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 46 1 2 5 148
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 38
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 44 2 3 4 50
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 25 1 2 3 100
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 18 0 2 5 58
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 9 1 1 1 50
The Wisdom of the Minority 0 0 0 106 0 3 4 271
The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring 0 0 0 43 1 3 6 269
The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 39
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 40
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 85 5 5 6 88
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 33 0 0 1 66
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 35
Total Working Papers 0 2 15 3,498 107 181 304 10,101

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 40
A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels 0 0 0 31 1 4 4 139
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 19 0 0 2 114
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 180 1 1 2 573
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence 0 0 0 12 3 3 5 64
Biased social learning 0 0 1 15 3 3 11 103
Career concerns with exponential learning 0 0 0 8 2 3 4 73
Coase and Hotelling: A Meeting of the Minds 0 0 0 14 0 0 3 200
Collaborating 0 1 1 84 1 6 10 318
Collusion with (almost) no information 0 0 0 6 1 1 1 30
Costly Signalling in Auctions -super-1 0 0 2 93 0 0 5 326
How Robust is the Folk Theorem? 0 0 1 22 1 2 11 199
How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 34
Incentives for experimenting agents 0 0 1 7 0 0 4 73
Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation 0 0 1 7 5 5 8 73
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 1 81 2 3 9 435
Mediation, arbitration and negotiation 2 3 11 317 5 19 37 1,382
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 17
On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games 0 0 1 13 1 1 8 62
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE 0 0 0 52 2 2 4 223
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 59 2 2 3 234
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 179
Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 0 0 0 10 3 3 9 91
Reputation and Competition 0 0 0 484 0 2 9 1,297
Selling Information 0 1 5 107 2 7 24 418
Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders 0 0 0 66 0 0 4 178
Specialized Careers 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 42
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 139 1 2 2 330
The role of commitment in bilateral trade 1 1 1 18 3 4 8 78
The wisdom of the minority 1 1 2 93 2 2 6 258
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 12 0 2 6 93
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 19 2 3 4 92
Total Journal Articles 4 7 28 1,982 43 82 223 7,768

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06