Access Statistics for Johannes Hörner

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk 0 0 0 125 0 0 6 362
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 23
Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence 0 0 0 39 0 2 14 158
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 0 0 12 213
Belief-free Price Formation 0 0 0 19 1 1 12 100
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 26
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 36 0 0 11 153
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 42
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 12
Biased Social Learning 0 0 0 49 0 0 6 184
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 39 0 0 8 92
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 7 0 0 11 126
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 10 0 1 11 127
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 53 0 0 9 142
Career Concerns with Exponential Learning 0 0 0 42 0 1 34 146
Collaborating 1 1 1 124 1 2 15 297
Collaborating 0 0 1 20 0 0 10 146
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 24 0 1 23 75
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 36 0 1 11 79
Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment 0 0 0 40 0 0 14 71
Dynamic sender receiver games 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 22
Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 16
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? 0 0 1 14 0 1 12 38
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games" 0 0 0 26 0 0 19 71
How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect 0 0 0 7 0 0 4 32
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 0 1 14 171
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 3 0 0 5 34
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 9 0 0 12 70
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 1 2 3 16 33
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 0 0 14 78
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 31 1 1 10 58
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 32 0 0 9 57
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 58 0 0 8 74
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 0 0 15 77
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 23 1 2 10 56
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 44 1 3 14 63
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 0 0 10 100
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 26 1 1 6 80
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 55 0 3 13 153
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 4 0 0 15 65
Mediation and Peace 0 0 1 26 0 0 16 73
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 5 0 1 16 76
Motivational Ratings 0 0 1 53 0 0 18 103
On A Markov Game with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 92 0 1 6 174
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information 0 0 0 72 0 1 11 196
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 29
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 27
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 1 27 0 0 10 118
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 1 27 0 3 22 79
Optimal Design for Social Learning 0 0 0 22 0 1 20 99
Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions 0 0 0 80 1 2 14 272
Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence 0 0 0 4 1 2 19 51
Public Enterprises and Labor Market Performance 0 0 0 85 0 1 15 369
Public enterprises and labor market performance 0 0 0 2 0 3 22 61
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 34
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 241
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for ! ! 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 1 2 9 0 1 9 67
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 78 0 0 16 265
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 51
Reputation and Competition 0 0 0 45 1 2 23 147
Reputation and Competition' 0 0 0 541 1 1 52 988
Selling Information 0 0 0 77 0 0 27 137
Selling Information 0 0 0 5 1 1 10 127
Selling Information 0 0 0 39 1 2 15 197
Selling Information 0 0 0 22 0 0 6 178
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 0 10 0 1 15 123
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 0 17 0 0 8 80
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 30 0 1 6 130
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 125 0 0 12 51
Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit 0 0 0 181 0 0 10 852
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 19 0 2 14 130
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 52 0 0 14 78
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 77 0 0 19 81
Supervised Social Learning 0 0 0 9 0 1 10 56
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 46 0 2 8 155
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 9 0 0 5 54
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 18 2 3 27 83
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 6 0 0 9 47
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 44 1 1 12 59
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 25 0 0 6 104
The Wisdom of the Minority 0 0 0 106 0 1 15 285
The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring 0 0 0 43 0 2 9 276
The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 43
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 33 0 1 11 77
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 1 43 0 3 16 56
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 1 86 2 2 22 105
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 0 1 1 11 43
Total Working Papers 1 2 11 3,508 22 72 1,106 11,049

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead 0 0 0 5 0 0 9 49
A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels 0 0 0 31 2 3 12 148
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 19 0 0 5 119
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 180 0 0 15 587
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence 0 0 2 14 0 0 12 73
Biased social learning 0 0 1 16 1 2 12 112
Career concerns with exponential learning 0 0 0 8 2 3 18 88
Coase and Hotelling: A Meeting of the Minds 0 0 0 14 1 1 8 208
Collaborating 0 0 1 84 0 0 17 329
Collusion with (almost) no information 0 0 0 6 0 1 8 37
Costly Signalling in Auctions -super-1 0 0 0 93 0 3 8 334
How Robust is the Folk Theorem? 0 0 0 22 1 2 17 214
How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? 0 0 0 3 2 2 15 49
Incentives for experimenting agents 0 0 0 7 1 1 8 81
Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation 0 0 0 7 0 0 15 83
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 81 1 2 10 442
Mediation, arbitration and negotiation 0 1 9 323 3 8 42 1,414
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 1 0 3 12 29
On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games 0 1 1 14 0 3 16 77
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE 0 0 0 52 0 2 36 257
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 1 60 0 2 6 238
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 0 1 2 15 194
Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 0 0 0 10 0 2 8 96
Reputation and Competition 0 0 0 484 2 4 22 1,319
Selling Information 0 1 2 109 1 2 24 437
Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders 0 1 1 67 1 3 10 188
Specialized Careers 0 0 0 5 0 2 12 54
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 139 0 1 13 341
The role of commitment in bilateral trade 0 0 1 18 0 0 10 84
The wisdom of the minority 1 1 4 96 1 5 26 282
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 12 0 2 13 104
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 19 1 3 16 105
Total Journal Articles 1 5 23 1,999 21 64 470 8,172

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Statistics updated 2026-10-11