Access Statistics for Johannes Hörner

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk 0 0 0 125 1 3 6 359
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 3 8 9 20
Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence 0 0 0 39 0 1 1 145
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 1 5 6 206
Belief-free Price Formation 0 0 0 19 1 4 7 92
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 17
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 36 1 2 4 144
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 36
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Biased Social Learning 0 0 0 49 2 3 4 181
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 7 1 1 3 116
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 39 1 1 1 85
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 53 0 2 3 135
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 10 0 0 2 116
Career Concerns with Exponential Learning 0 0 2 42 2 3 13 115
Collaborating 0 0 4 19 0 0 8 136
Collaborating 0 0 2 123 0 4 8 286
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 24 2 5 8 57
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 36 0 2 7 70
Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment 0 0 0 40 3 5 5 62
Dynamic sender receiver games 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 18
Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 11
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? 0 0 0 13 0 2 4 28
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games" 0 0 0 26 1 5 6 57
How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 29
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 1 3 4 67
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 3 0 2 3 31
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 1 31 1 1 2 49
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 3 5 5 162
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 9 2 5 8 63
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 1 5 8 9 25
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 58 1 3 3 69
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 32 2 3 5 51
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 23 0 1 3 47
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 1 2 3 64
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 44 3 3 3 52
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 3 3 3 93
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 5 2 9 9 69
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 51
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 26 0 1 2 75
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 55 0 2 3 142
Mediation and Peace 0 0 1 25 1 6 9 63
Motivational Ratings 0 1 2 53 2 6 9 91
On A Markov Game with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 92 1 1 1 169
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information 0 0 0 72 1 3 4 188
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 22
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 0 26 1 1 1 109
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 0 26 1 3 5 60
Optimal Design for Social Learning 0 0 0 22 2 4 5 83
Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions 0 0 0 80 1 6 8 264
Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence 0 0 0 4 0 2 7 34
Public Enterprises and Labor Market Performance 0 0 0 85 1 5 8 359
Public enterprises and labor market performance 0 0 0 2 1 5 7 44
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 3 7 8 237
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 29
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for ! ! 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 7 1 2 2 60
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 78 1 3 4 252
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 47
Reputation and Competition 0 0 1 45 4 8 10 132
Reputation and Competition' 0 0 1 541 1 1 3 937
Selling Information 0 0 0 22 0 1 4 173
Selling Information 0 0 0 39 0 2 2 184
Selling Information 0 0 0 5 1 4 6 121
Selling Information 0 0 0 77 0 4 8 114
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 0 17 1 2 3 74
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 1 10 2 5 7 113
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 125 0 3 5 42
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 30 1 1 3 125
Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit 0 0 0 181 3 3 3 845
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 52 0 1 1 65
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 77 1 2 4 64
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 19 1 3 4 119
Supervised Social Learning 0 0 0 9 1 2 4 48
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 46 1 2 6 149
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 18 3 5 7 61
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 44 0 3 3 50
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 9 0 1 1 50
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 25 2 4 5 102
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 6 1 1 1 39
The Wisdom of the Minority 0 0 0 106 2 3 6 273
The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring 0 0 0 43 0 2 5 269
The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 39
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 33 1 1 2 67
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 42 2 2 2 42
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 85 3 8 9 91
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 35
Total Working Papers 0 1 15 3,498 94 252 385 10,195

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 40
A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels 0 0 0 31 0 3 4 139
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 19 0 0 2 114
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 180 6 7 8 579
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence 0 0 0 12 0 3 5 64
Biased social learning 0 0 1 15 1 4 12 104
Career concerns with exponential learning 0 0 0 8 3 6 7 76
Coase and Hotelling: A Meeting of the Minds 0 0 0 14 0 0 2 200
Collaborating 0 1 1 84 2 8 11 320
Collusion with (almost) no information 0 0 0 6 0 1 1 30
Costly Signalling in Auctions -super-1 0 0 2 93 0 0 5 326
How Robust is the Folk Theorem? 0 0 1 22 0 2 11 199
How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? 0 0 0 3 1 1 4 35
Incentives for experimenting agents 0 0 1 7 0 0 4 73
Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation 0 0 1 7 0 5 8 73
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 1 81 1 4 9 436
Mediation, arbitration and negotiation 1 4 11 318 5 15 41 1,387
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 1 2 2 5 19
On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games 0 0 1 13 1 2 8 63
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE 0 0 0 52 1 3 4 224
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 1 1 1 60 1 3 3 235
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 0 3 3 4 182
Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 0 0 0 10 0 3 9 91
Reputation and Competition 0 0 0 484 6 6 15 1,303
Selling Information 0 0 3 107 2 7 21 420
Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders 0 0 0 66 2 2 6 180
Specialized Careers 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 42
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 139 1 3 3 331
The role of commitment in bilateral trade 0 1 1 18 0 4 8 78
The wisdom of the minority 2 3 4 95 5 7 10 263
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 12 1 3 7 94
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 19 0 3 4 92
Total Journal Articles 4 10 29 1,986 44 110 249 7,812

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Statistics updated 2026-01-09