Access Statistics for Johannes Hörner

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk 0 1 4 120 0 2 10 329
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence 0 1 1 35 0 1 3 117
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 191
Belief-free Price Formation 0 0 4 14 1 5 23 36
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 35 0 1 1 121
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 16
Biased Social Learning 0 0 0 46 0 0 2 160
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 42
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 39 0 1 6 49
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 104
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 10 0 0 3 46
Career Concerns with Exponential Learning 0 0 0 36 0 0 5 23
Collaborating 1 1 2 9 1 1 4 60
Collaborating 0 0 2 114 1 2 10 193
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 21 0 0 2 34
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 3 34 1 3 12 50
Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment 1 2 2 39 1 2 4 47
Dynamic sender receiver games 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 9
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games? 0 0 1 24 0 2 10 38
How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 15
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 7
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 54 0 2 5 44
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 14
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 1 3 5 145
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 30 0 2 6 33
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 7 1 3 5 39
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 31 0 2 3 15
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 1 1 57 0 1 2 25
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 44 0 0 1 43
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 31
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 23 0 2 5 46
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 22 0 1 2 75
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 21 1 2 6 30
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 3 0 1 4 38
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 25 0 1 4 65
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 34
Mediation and Peace 0 1 1 55 0 1 4 120
Motivational Ratings 0 0 0 45 0 2 9 39
On A Markov Game with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 91 0 0 0 152
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information 0 0 0 72 0 0 2 174
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 12
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 0 25 0 0 4 46
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 0 21 0 0 1 94
Optimal Design for Social Learning 0 0 0 33 1 3 13 37
Optimal Design for Social Learning 0 0 1 14 0 1 5 50
Private Information in Repeated Auctions 0 0 1 110 0 0 2 243
Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions 0 0 0 74 0 1 4 217
Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence 0 0 1 3 0 1 2 18
Public Enterprises and Labor Market Performance 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 315
Public enterprises and labor market performance 0 0 0 2 1 1 4 25
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 193
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for ! ! 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 17
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 77 1 1 1 235
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 14
Reputation and Competition 0 0 0 38 0 2 3 79
Reputation and Competition' 0 0 0 535 1 3 4 887
Selling Information 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 24
Selling Information 0 0 0 35 0 1 3 133
Selling Information 0 1 1 70 0 2 6 55
Selling Information 1 1 1 19 1 2 5 96
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 0 17 0 1 1 58
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 1 5 2 3 10 86
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 28 0 1 2 108
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 1 122 0 1 2 28
Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit 0 0 1 178 0 1 5 829
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 1 16 1 3 13 93
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 1 50 0 1 5 47
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 1 77 0 2 4 50
Supervised Social Learning 0 0 0 8 0 2 7 31
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 129
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 44 1 3 6 35
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 18 0 0 2 38
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 8 0 2 3 44
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 25 0 1 6 82
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 1 5 0 2 6 29
The Wisdom of the Minority 0 0 0 104 0 0 4 233
The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring 0 0 0 42 0 1 4 251
The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 25
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 84 0 0 2 74
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 1 32 0 0 1 53
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 28
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 11
Total Working Papers 3 9 35 3,462 18 99 338 8,043

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead 0 0 1 3 1 1 3 12
A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels 0 0 0 23 1 1 6 112
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 19 0 1 2 98
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 179 0 0 2 549
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence 0 0 0 10 0 1 2 45
Biased social learning 0 0 0 7 2 2 3 47
Career concerns with exponential learning 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 26
Coase and Hotelling: A Meeting of the Minds 0 0 0 9 0 1 4 178
Collaborating 0 0 0 77 2 3 13 200
Collusion with (almost) no information 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 15
Costly Signalling in Auctions -super-1 0 0 0 89 0 1 2 294
How Robust is the Folk Theorem? 0 0 0 16 1 6 8 155
How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 19
Incentives for experimenting agents 0 0 1 2 0 3 7 48
Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation 0 0 0 5 0 1 6 26
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 67 0 2 4 366
Mediation, arbitration and negotiation 0 3 13 209 3 15 48 968
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 4
On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 39
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE 0 0 0 52 0 0 3 201
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 58 0 0 1 206
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 0 1 2 12 128
Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 0 1 2 6 1 5 23 42
Reputation and Competition 0 0 0 473 1 10 20 1,193
Selling Information 1 4 9 51 3 11 42 202
Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders 0 0 0 63 0 0 4 153
Specialized Careers 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 25
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 136 0 0 1 308
The role of commitment in bilateral trade 0 0 2 15 0 1 9 53
The wisdom of the minority 0 0 1 83 0 0 5 205
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 11 0 0 6 66
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 1 17 0 0 3 73
Total Journal Articles 1 8 32 1,701 16 69 247 6,056

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Statistics updated 2019-07-03