Access Statistics for Johannes Hörner

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk 0 0 0 125 1 1 4 356
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12
Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 144
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 0 0 1 201
Belief-free Price Formation 0 0 0 19 1 1 4 88
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 13
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 36 0 1 2 142
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 35
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
Biased Social Learning 0 0 0 49 0 1 1 178
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 7 1 2 2 115
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 84
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 10 1 2 2 116
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 53 0 1 1 133
Career Concerns with Exponential Learning 1 2 3 42 1 2 14 112
Collaborating 0 0 4 19 1 1 8 136
Collaborating 0 0 2 123 0 1 4 282
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 36 1 2 6 68
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 24 2 3 3 52
Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 57
Dynamic sender receiver games 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 17
Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? 0 0 0 13 0 1 2 26
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games" 0 0 0 26 0 0 1 52
How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 28
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 17
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 157
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 1 31 0 0 1 48
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 9 0 2 3 58
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 0 0 1 64
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 29
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 32 0 2 2 48
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 66
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 62
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 23 0 1 2 46
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 90
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 49
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 55 0 1 1 140
Mediation and Peace 0 0 1 25 0 1 4 57
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 26 0 1 1 74
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 60
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 50
Motivational Ratings 0 1 1 52 0 1 3 85
On A Markov Game with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 92 0 0 0 168
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information 0 0 0 72 0 1 1 185
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 21
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 108
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 0 26 0 1 2 57
Optimal Design for Social Learning 0 0 0 22 1 1 1 79
Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions 0 0 0 80 2 2 4 258
Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence 0 0 0 4 2 2 5 32
Public Enterprises and Labor Market Performance 0 0 0 85 0 1 3 354
Public enterprises and labor market performance 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 39
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 230
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 28
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for ! ! 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 58
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 78 1 1 2 249
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 47
Reputation and Competition 0 0 1 45 0 0 2 124
Reputation and Competition' 0 0 1 541 0 0 2 936
Selling Information 0 0 0 22 0 3 3 172
Selling Information 0 0 0 77 1 1 7 110
Selling Information 0 0 0 5 0 1 6 117
Selling Information 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 182
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 1 10 0 0 2 108
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 0 17 0 1 1 72
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 30 0 2 2 124
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 125 0 1 2 39
Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit 0 0 0 181 0 0 0 842
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 116
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 77 1 2 3 62
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 64
Supervised Social Learning 0 0 0 9 1 1 2 46
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 46 1 1 4 147
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 18 0 1 3 56
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 38
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 44 0 0 1 47
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 49
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 25 0 1 1 98
The Wisdom of the Minority 0 0 0 106 2 2 4 270
The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring 0 0 0 43 1 1 5 267
The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 36
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 33 0 1 1 66
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 40
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 85 0 0 1 83
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 32
Total Working Papers 1 3 15 3,497 23 61 165 9,943

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead 0 0 0 5 0 3 7 40
A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels 0 0 1 31 1 1 2 136
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 19 0 2 2 114
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 180 0 0 1 572
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence 0 0 0 12 0 1 3 61
Biased social learning 0 0 1 15 0 3 9 100
Career concerns with exponential learning 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 70
Coase and Hotelling: A Meeting of the Minds 0 0 1 14 0 2 4 200
Collaborating 0 0 0 83 0 0 4 312
Collusion with (almost) no information 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 29
Costly Signalling in Auctions -super-1 0 0 2 93 0 2 7 326
How Robust is the Folk Theorem? 0 0 1 22 0 3 9 197
How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? 0 0 0 3 0 2 3 34
Incentives for experimenting agents 0 0 2 7 0 0 5 73
Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation 0 0 1 7 0 2 3 68
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 1 81 0 4 6 432
Mediation, arbitration and negotiation 0 2 12 314 9 14 39 1,372
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 1 1 3 3 17
On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games 0 0 1 13 0 1 8 61
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE 0 0 0 52 0 0 2 221
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 59 0 0 1 232
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 179
Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 0 0 0 10 0 3 6 88
Reputation and Competition 0 0 0 484 2 4 9 1,297
Selling Information 1 1 6 107 2 5 23 413
Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders 0 0 0 66 0 3 4 178
Specialized Careers 0 0 0 5 0 2 2 42
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 139 0 0 0 328
The role of commitment in bilateral trade 0 0 0 17 0 1 6 74
The wisdom of the minority 0 0 1 92 0 1 7 256
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 12 0 2 4 91
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 19 0 1 2 89
Total Journal Articles 1 3 30 1,976 16 67 189 7,702

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Statistics updated 2025-10-06