Access Statistics for Michael C. Jensen

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES: PRACTICE VS. THEORY 0 0 0 1 0 0 26 2,163
PERFORMANCE PAY AND TOP MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES 0 0 0 5 4 5 49 3,142
Putting integrity Into Finance: A Purely Positive Approach 0 0 2 84 1 1 22 289
Single-actor scandal or multiple-actor scandal? A framework for studying scandal dynamics 0 0 1 4 1 2 22 38
Single-actor scandal or multiple-actor scandal? A framework for studying scandal dynamics 0 0 0 1 1 2 14 48
THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AMONG CORPORATE MANAGERS, SHAREHOLDERS, AND DIRECTORS 0 0 0 3 0 0 16 1,170
Total Working Papers 0 0 3 98 7 10 149 6,850

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Bridge Too Far: Divestiture as a Strategic Reaction to Status Inconsistency 0 0 2 26 1 4 29 87
Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy 0 0 1 85 0 2 19 302
Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy* 0 0 17 219 3 10 79 632
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers 38 99 385 7,533 126 333 1,441 24,670
Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity 0 0 0 0 0 3 27 983
Agency Problems and Residual Claims 0 3 15 440 8 22 96 3,904
Analysis of alternative standing doctrines 0 0 0 27 0 0 11 98
Author-level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community 0 0 0 2 1 3 13 35
Author‐level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community 0 0 0 3 0 3 13 29
Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors 0 0 0 57 0 2 10 161
CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* 1 1 4 218 1 1 27 736
CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How* 1 1 4 348 4 10 29 1,541
CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE 0 0 2 122 1 2 19 379
Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence 0 0 4 304 0 0 7 851
Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics 0 0 2 118 0 1 9 309
Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital Markets 2 2 5 40 2 2 10 175
Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm 0 0 0 5 0 3 17 48
Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory 0 0 0 16 0 1 14 111
ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION 0 0 0 14 0 0 7 74
Editorial 0 0 0 7 1 2 10 110
Great, Madama Butterfly Again! How Robust Market Identity Shapes Opera Repertoires 0 0 0 7 0 0 11 51
I can do that alone…or not? How idea generators juggle between the pros and cons of teamwork 0 0 0 5 1 1 10 49
JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAME 0 0 1 96 0 3 12 413
Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game 0 0 0 57 0 2 15 233
Management compensation and the managerial labor market 0 0 0 63 0 0 11 292
Organizational forms and investment decisions 0 0 2 435 0 3 19 1,069
Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process 0 0 3 352 1 2 32 1,146
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives 5 7 67 2,914 29 69 337 10,111
Preface 0 0 0 9 0 1 6 98
Preface 0 0 0 9 0 1 5 95
Preface 0 0 1 7 0 1 5 75
Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence 0 0 2 218 1 4 22 629
Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination 1 3 10 496 3 11 39 1,332
Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios 0 0 7 651 3 3 33 1,584
SCIENCE, SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 11
SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY 4 4 17 324 5 6 31 903
SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 8 20 62 639 16 36 115 1,671
SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 0 0 0 101 0 0 7 370
Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management 0 0 0 120 1 3 12 457
Separation of Ownership and Control 9 23 131 1,229 35 97 598 10,958
Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency 0 4 13 744 2 13 71 2,044
Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement 0 0 3 89 2 4 25 340
THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, EXIT, AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 0 0 1 104 0 5 40 763
THE NATURE OF MAN* 1 2 12 247 2 8 45 704
THE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964 0 2 29 282 6 32 144 1,398
Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences 0 0 1 889 0 0 53 2,026
The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance 0 0 1 54 0 1 11 186
The Capital Market as a Growth Engine 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 10
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems 0 0 3 179 0 3 43 1,142
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems 0 0 10 1,515 5 14 183 6,293
The Paradox of Awards: How Status Ripples Affect Who Benefits from CEO Awards 1 3 5 16 1 6 23 48
The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation 0 1 3 41 3 7 42 142
The Real Oscar Curse: The Negative Consequences of Positive Status Shifts 0 0 1 4 3 4 25 69
The Two Key Principles Behind Effective TQM Programs 0 0 0 21 0 0 14 121
The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors 0 0 0 240 1 1 15 667
The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy 0 0 2 414 3 4 39 4,022
The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence 3 6 34 1,654 7 18 183 4,452
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 82 195 1,076 14,351 359 911 4,168 45,625
Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 7 19 35 70 24 60 124 353
VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 9 17 63 933 25 78 353 3,416
Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function 11 23 51 490 51 122 357 2,156
Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function 0 2 9 722 4 16 103 2,599
Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function* 6 18 40 309 20 74 226 1,039
When Less Is More: How Statistical Discrimination Can Decrease Predictive Accuracy 0 0 0 2 0 2 11 34
Total Journal Articles 189 455 2,136 40,688 761 2,030 9,516 146,431
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
arbitrage, information theft and insider trading 0 0 0 46 0 0 5 219
Total Chapters 0 0 0 46 0 0 5 219

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