Access Statistics for Michael C. Jensen
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Bridge Too Far: Divestiture as a Strategic Reaction to Status Inconsistency |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
2 |
10 |
28 |
82 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy |
1 |
1 |
2 |
85 |
1 |
10 |
20 |
299 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy* |
0 |
5 |
20 |
217 |
5 |
19 |
86 |
612 |
| Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers |
36 |
103 |
323 |
7,406 |
159 |
417 |
1,263 |
24,218 |
| Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
24 |
977 |
| Agency Problems and Residual Claims |
0 |
3 |
16 |
437 |
11 |
34 |
86 |
3,877 |
| Analysis of alternative standing doctrines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
97 |
| Author-level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
31 |
| Author‐level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
26 |
| Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
158 |
| CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* |
0 |
1 |
4 |
216 |
5 |
8 |
30 |
730 |
| CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How* |
0 |
1 |
3 |
347 |
2 |
6 |
22 |
1,529 |
| CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE |
0 |
2 |
3 |
122 |
0 |
6 |
19 |
377 |
| Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence |
0 |
1 |
5 |
304 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
850 |
| Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics |
0 |
2 |
2 |
118 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
307 |
| Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital Markets |
1 |
2 |
3 |
38 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
173 |
| Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
44 |
| Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
110 |
| ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
73 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
108 |
| Great, Madama Butterfly Again! How Robust Market Identity Shapes Opera Repertoires |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
51 |
| I can do that alone…or not? How idea generators juggle between the pros and cons of teamwork |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
48 |
| JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAME |
0 |
0 |
1 |
96 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
409 |
| Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
229 |
| Management compensation and the managerial labor market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
291 |
| Organizational forms and investment decisions |
0 |
0 |
3 |
434 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
1,064 |
| Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process |
0 |
0 |
3 |
352 |
2 |
8 |
21 |
1,133 |
| Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives |
7 |
17 |
67 |
2,901 |
33 |
98 |
311 |
10,012 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
93 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
97 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
74 |
| Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence |
0 |
1 |
3 |
218 |
0 |
3 |
19 |
623 |
| Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination |
1 |
4 |
9 |
492 |
3 |
8 |
26 |
1,313 |
| Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios |
1 |
4 |
6 |
650 |
2 |
10 |
28 |
1,579 |
| SCIENCE, SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
| SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY |
1 |
6 |
13 |
318 |
2 |
9 |
28 |
894 |
| SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE |
5 |
11 |
44 |
615 |
7 |
23 |
88 |
1,628 |
| SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
369 |
| Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management |
0 |
0 |
1 |
120 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
452 |
| Separation of Ownership and Control |
9 |
31 |
113 |
1,196 |
41 |
164 |
528 |
10,801 |
| Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency |
0 |
2 |
10 |
740 |
2 |
13 |
65 |
2,027 |
| Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement |
0 |
1 |
2 |
88 |
0 |
4 |
18 |
333 |
| THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, EXIT, AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
104 |
3 |
20 |
37 |
756 |
| THE NATURE OF MAN* |
0 |
2 |
20 |
245 |
0 |
7 |
55 |
693 |
| THE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964 |
0 |
10 |
28 |
278 |
12 |
49 |
107 |
1,352 |
| Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences |
0 |
0 |
1 |
889 |
3 |
14 |
54 |
2,026 |
| The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance |
0 |
0 |
2 |
54 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
185 |
| The Capital Market as a Growth Engine |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
10 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
2 |
2 |
4 |
178 |
4 |
14 |
45 |
1,137 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
2 |
5 |
15 |
1,515 |
8 |
29 |
193 |
6,274 |
| The Paradox of Awards: How Status Ripples Affect Who Benefits from CEO Awards |
0 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
1 |
6 |
14 |
39 |
| The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
40 |
3 |
8 |
38 |
135 |
| The Real Oscar Curse: The Negative Consequences of Positive Status Shifts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
3 |
9 |
23 |
65 |
| The Two Key Principles Behind Effective TQM Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
3 |
4 |
13 |
120 |
| The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
664 |
| The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy |
1 |
2 |
2 |
414 |
4 |
19 |
40 |
4,018 |
| The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence |
4 |
9 |
27 |
1,645 |
14 |
63 |
163 |
4,418 |
| Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
87 |
257 |
978 |
14,065 |
398 |
1,059 |
3,542 |
44,215 |
| Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
5 |
8 |
10 |
45 |
21 |
32 |
47 |
275 |
| VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION |
4 |
11 |
77 |
915 |
14 |
70 |
372 |
3,309 |
| Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
4 |
7 |
28 |
464 |
27 |
74 |
214 |
1,987 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
0 |
2 |
11 |
719 |
6 |
31 |
99 |
2,578 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function* |
3 |
5 |
31 |
289 |
11 |
48 |
141 |
920 |
| When Less Is More: How Statistical Discrimination Can Decrease Predictive Accuracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
32 |
| Total Journal Articles |
174 |
519 |
1,901 |
40,066 |
823 |
2,476 |
8,164 |
143,417 |
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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