Access Statistics for Michael C. Jensen
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Bridge Too Far: Divestiture as a Strategic Reaction to Status Inconsistency |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
1 |
10 |
29 |
83 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy |
0 |
1 |
2 |
85 |
1 |
8 |
19 |
300 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy* |
2 |
4 |
22 |
219 |
10 |
20 |
89 |
622 |
| Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers |
28 |
88 |
343 |
7,434 |
119 |
402 |
1,321 |
24,337 |
| Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
26 |
980 |
| Agency Problems and Residual Claims |
0 |
2 |
16 |
437 |
5 |
31 |
91 |
3,882 |
| Analysis of alternative standing doctrines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
98 |
| Author-level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
32 |
| Author‐level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
26 |
| Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
159 |
| CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* |
1 |
2 |
4 |
217 |
5 |
13 |
34 |
735 |
| CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How* |
0 |
1 |
3 |
347 |
2 |
7 |
22 |
1,531 |
| CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE |
0 |
0 |
2 |
122 |
0 |
4 |
18 |
377 |
| Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence |
0 |
1 |
5 |
304 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
851 |
| Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics |
0 |
0 |
2 |
118 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
308 |
| Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital Markets |
0 |
1 |
3 |
38 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
173 |
| Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
45 |
| Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
110 |
| ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
74 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
108 |
| Great, Madama Butterfly Again! How Robust Market Identity Shapes Opera Repertoires |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
51 |
| I can do that alone…or not? How idea generators juggle between the pros and cons of teamwork |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
48 |
| JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAME |
0 |
0 |
1 |
96 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
410 |
| Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
231 |
| Management compensation and the managerial labor market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
292 |
| Organizational forms and investment decisions |
1 |
1 |
4 |
435 |
2 |
2 |
19 |
1,066 |
| Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process |
0 |
0 |
3 |
352 |
11 |
16 |
32 |
1,144 |
| Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives |
6 |
16 |
69 |
2,907 |
30 |
102 |
319 |
10,042 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
74 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
97 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
94 |
| Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
218 |
2 |
3 |
20 |
625 |
| Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination |
1 |
3 |
8 |
493 |
8 |
12 |
31 |
1,321 |
| Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios |
1 |
3 |
7 |
651 |
2 |
7 |
30 |
1,581 |
| SCIENCE, SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
| SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY |
2 |
6 |
14 |
320 |
3 |
9 |
30 |
897 |
| SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE |
4 |
9 |
45 |
619 |
7 |
21 |
89 |
1,635 |
| SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
370 |
| Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management |
0 |
0 |
1 |
120 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
454 |
| Separation of Ownership and Control |
10 |
32 |
118 |
1,206 |
60 |
166 |
559 |
10,861 |
| Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency |
0 |
0 |
10 |
740 |
4 |
9 |
67 |
2,031 |
| Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement |
1 |
2 |
3 |
89 |
3 |
6 |
21 |
336 |
| THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, EXIT, AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
104 |
2 |
20 |
38 |
758 |
| THE NATURE OF MAN* |
0 |
1 |
20 |
245 |
3 |
6 |
57 |
696 |
| THE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964 |
2 |
9 |
30 |
280 |
14 |
50 |
119 |
1,366 |
| Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences |
0 |
0 |
1 |
889 |
0 |
7 |
54 |
2,026 |
| The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
54 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
185 |
| The Capital Market as a Growth Engine |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
3 |
14 |
1,515 |
5 |
26 |
187 |
6,279 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
1 |
3 |
4 |
179 |
2 |
14 |
45 |
1,139 |
| The Paradox of Awards: How Status Ripples Affect Who Benefits from CEO Awards |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
3 |
7 |
17 |
42 |
| The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
40 |
0 |
6 |
36 |
135 |
| The Real Oscar Curse: The Negative Consequences of Positive Status Shifts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
8 |
23 |
65 |
| The Two Key Principles Behind Effective TQM Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
121 |
| The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
2 |
6 |
16 |
666 |
| The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy |
0 |
2 |
2 |
414 |
0 |
14 |
39 |
4,018 |
| The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence |
3 |
9 |
30 |
1,648 |
16 |
53 |
177 |
4,434 |
| Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
91 |
258 |
1,019 |
14,156 |
499 |
1,207 |
3,844 |
44,714 |
| Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
6 |
13 |
16 |
51 |
18 |
48 |
65 |
293 |
| VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION |
1 |
7 |
67 |
916 |
29 |
62 |
377 |
3,338 |
| Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
3 |
9 |
31 |
467 |
47 |
100 |
256 |
2,034 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
1 |
3 |
11 |
720 |
5 |
30 |
98 |
2,583 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function* |
2 |
5 |
31 |
291 |
45 |
77 |
180 |
965 |
| When Less Is More: How Statistical Discrimination Can Decrease Predictive Accuracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
32 |
| Total Journal Articles |
167 |
494 |
1,975 |
40,233 |
984 |
2,660 |
8,743 |
144,401 |
1 registered items for which data could not be found
|
|
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.