Access Statistics for Michael C. Jensen
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Bridge Too Far: Divestiture as a Strategic Reaction to Status Inconsistency |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
2 |
5 |
28 |
85 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy |
0 |
1 |
1 |
85 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
301 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy* |
0 |
2 |
20 |
219 |
4 |
19 |
88 |
626 |
| Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers |
30 |
94 |
358 |
7,464 |
100 |
378 |
1,355 |
24,437 |
| Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
27 |
982 |
| Agency Problems and Residual Claims |
0 |
0 |
15 |
437 |
6 |
22 |
93 |
3,888 |
| Analysis of alternative standing doctrines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
98 |
| Author-level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
33 |
| Author‐level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
13 |
29 |
| Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
160 |
| CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* |
0 |
1 |
4 |
217 |
0 |
10 |
32 |
735 |
| CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How* |
0 |
0 |
3 |
347 |
3 |
7 |
25 |
1,534 |
| CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE |
0 |
0 |
2 |
122 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
378 |
| Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence |
0 |
0 |
4 |
304 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
851 |
| Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics |
0 |
0 |
2 |
118 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
309 |
| Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital Markets |
0 |
1 |
3 |
38 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
173 |
| Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
3 |
4 |
17 |
48 |
| Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
110 |
| ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
74 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
109 |
| Great, Madama Butterfly Again! How Robust Market Identity Shapes Opera Repertoires |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
51 |
| I can do that alone…or not? How idea generators juggle between the pros and cons of teamwork |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
48 |
| JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAME |
0 |
0 |
1 |
96 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
410 |
| Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
231 |
| Management compensation and the managerial labor market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
292 |
| Organizational forms and investment decisions |
0 |
1 |
3 |
435 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
1,067 |
| Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process |
0 |
0 |
3 |
352 |
1 |
14 |
32 |
1,145 |
| Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives |
1 |
14 |
68 |
2,908 |
27 |
90 |
328 |
10,069 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
95 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
75 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
98 |
| Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
218 |
3 |
5 |
22 |
628 |
| Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination |
1 |
3 |
9 |
494 |
5 |
16 |
34 |
1,326 |
| Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios |
0 |
2 |
7 |
651 |
0 |
4 |
30 |
1,581 |
| SCIENCE, SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
11 |
| SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY |
0 |
3 |
13 |
320 |
1 |
6 |
28 |
898 |
| SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE |
5 |
14 |
48 |
624 |
11 |
25 |
96 |
1,646 |
| SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
370 |
| Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management |
0 |
0 |
0 |
120 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
455 |
| Separation of Ownership and Control |
5 |
24 |
120 |
1,211 |
24 |
125 |
564 |
10,885 |
| Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency |
1 |
1 |
10 |
741 |
2 |
8 |
65 |
2,033 |
| Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement |
0 |
1 |
3 |
89 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
336 |
| THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, EXIT, AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
104 |
3 |
8 |
40 |
761 |
| THE NATURE OF MAN* |
0 |
0 |
17 |
245 |
3 |
6 |
54 |
699 |
| THE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964 |
2 |
4 |
32 |
282 |
11 |
37 |
129 |
1,377 |
| Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences |
0 |
0 |
1 |
889 |
0 |
3 |
53 |
2,026 |
| The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
54 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
186 |
| The Capital Market as a Growth Engine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
3 |
4 |
179 |
1 |
7 |
44 |
1,140 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
2 |
14 |
1,515 |
0 |
13 |
185 |
6,279 |
| The Paradox of Awards: How Status Ripples Affect Who Benefits from CEO Awards |
2 |
2 |
4 |
15 |
4 |
8 |
21 |
46 |
| The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
40 |
1 |
4 |
37 |
136 |
| The Real Oscar Curse: The Negative Consequences of Positive Status Shifts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
4 |
23 |
66 |
| The Two Key Principles Behind Effective TQM Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
121 |
| The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
666 |
| The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy |
0 |
1 |
2 |
414 |
1 |
5 |
38 |
4,019 |
| The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence |
2 |
9 |
31 |
1,650 |
4 |
34 |
178 |
4,438 |
| Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
46 |
224 |
1,032 |
14,202 |
246 |
1,143 |
3,916 |
44,960 |
| Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
9 |
20 |
25 |
60 |
21 |
60 |
85 |
314 |
| VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION |
4 |
9 |
62 |
920 |
23 |
66 |
373 |
3,361 |
| Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
3 |
10 |
33 |
470 |
27 |
101 |
275 |
2,061 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
2 |
3 |
12 |
722 |
4 |
15 |
98 |
2,587 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function* |
4 |
9 |
34 |
295 |
21 |
77 |
191 |
986 |
| When Less Is More: How Statistical Discrimination Can Decrease Predictive Accuracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
33 |
| Total Journal Articles |
117 |
458 |
2,011 |
40,350 |
581 |
2,388 |
8,938 |
144,982 |
1 registered items for which data could not be found
|
|
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.