Access Statistics for Michael C. Jensen
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Bridge Too Far: Divestiture as a Strategic Reaction to Status Inconsistency |
0 |
0 |
5 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
53 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy |
1 |
1 |
2 |
81 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
277 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy* |
5 |
9 |
15 |
193 |
9 |
26 |
49 |
519 |
| Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers |
9 |
34 |
197 |
7,065 |
37 |
158 |
782 |
22,881 |
| Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
951 |
| Agency Problems and Residual Claims |
1 |
1 |
13 |
421 |
4 |
7 |
52 |
3,789 |
| Analysis of alternative standing doctrines |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
86 |
| Author-level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
| Author‐level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
| Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
150 |
| CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* |
0 |
0 |
1 |
212 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
698 |
| CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How* |
0 |
1 |
8 |
343 |
0 |
3 |
20 |
1,504 |
| CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE |
0 |
3 |
7 |
119 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
358 |
| Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence |
1 |
1 |
5 |
299 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
842 |
| Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
116 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
298 |
| Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
163 |
| Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
31 |
| Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory |
0 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
96 |
| ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
67 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
99 |
| Great, Madama Butterfly Again! How Robust Market Identity Shapes Opera Repertoires |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
37 |
| I can do that alone…or not? How idea generators juggle between the pros and cons of teamwork |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
12 |
14 |
37 |
| JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAME |
0 |
4 |
7 |
95 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
397 |
| Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game |
0 |
1 |
2 |
57 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
218 |
| Management compensation and the managerial labor market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
279 |
| Organizational forms and investment decisions |
0 |
1 |
3 |
430 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
1,044 |
| Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process |
0 |
0 |
2 |
348 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1,111 |
| Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives |
1 |
6 |
41 |
2,831 |
6 |
25 |
180 |
9,685 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
90 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
91 |
| Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence |
0 |
2 |
8 |
214 |
2 |
7 |
18 |
603 |
| Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination |
1 |
2 |
7 |
483 |
2 |
4 |
22 |
1,284 |
| Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios |
0 |
0 |
5 |
644 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
1,549 |
| SCIENCE, SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
| SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY |
3 |
4 |
13 |
303 |
5 |
11 |
29 |
862 |
| SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE |
3 |
10 |
60 |
571 |
8 |
22 |
119 |
1,531 |
| SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
362 |
| Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management |
2 |
4 |
4 |
119 |
4 |
7 |
10 |
443 |
| Separation of Ownership and Control |
4 |
15 |
68 |
1,080 |
17 |
53 |
237 |
10,245 |
| Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency |
1 |
3 |
13 |
728 |
3 |
7 |
37 |
1,957 |
| Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
314 |
| THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, EXIT, AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
102 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
716 |
| THE NATURE OF MAN* |
1 |
3 |
18 |
225 |
2 |
8 |
52 |
637 |
| THE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
248 |
1 |
2 |
41 |
1,237 |
| Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
888 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
1,972 |
| Teoria da firma: comportamento dos administradores, custos de agência e estrutura de propriedade |
1 |
1 |
4 |
35 |
3 |
4 |
12 |
228 |
| The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
173 |
| The Capital Market as a Growth Engine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1,498 |
1 |
11 |
52 |
6,068 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
0 |
2 |
173 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
1,090 |
| The Paradox of Awards: How Status Ripples Affect Who Benefits from CEO Awards |
0 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
25 |
| The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation |
1 |
2 |
7 |
38 |
1 |
5 |
19 |
96 |
| The Real Oscar Curse: The Negative Consequences of Positive Status Shifts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
41 |
| The Two Key Principles Behind Effective TQM Programs |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
107 |
| The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
648 |
| The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy |
0 |
0 |
4 |
412 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
3,976 |
| The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence |
0 |
4 |
25 |
1,616 |
4 |
18 |
87 |
4,248 |
| Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
35 |
97 |
456 |
13,035 |
118 |
376 |
2,259 |
40,461 |
| VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION |
2 |
20 |
62 |
831 |
9 |
51 |
233 |
2,907 |
| Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
1 |
6 |
19 |
436 |
7 |
24 |
83 |
1,768 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
0 |
0 |
13 |
707 |
3 |
11 |
60 |
2,475 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function* |
6 |
10 |
48 |
256 |
15 |
27 |
114 |
768 |
| When Less Is More: How Statistical Discrimination Can Decrease Predictive Accuracy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
18 |
| Total Journal Articles |
80 |
248 |
1,181 |
38,055 |
275 |
948 |
4,864 |
134,776 |
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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