Access Statistics for Michael C. Jensen
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Bridge Too Far: Divestiture as a Strategic Reaction to Status Inconsistency |
1 |
2 |
3 |
26 |
3 |
8 |
19 |
72 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
4 |
84 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
289 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy* |
1 |
7 |
28 |
212 |
8 |
28 |
96 |
593 |
| Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers |
34 |
88 |
256 |
7,303 |
118 |
364 |
1,005 |
23,801 |
| Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
19 |
968 |
| Agency Problems and Residual Claims |
1 |
5 |
14 |
434 |
9 |
27 |
58 |
3,843 |
| Analysis of alternative standing doctrines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
94 |
| Author-level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
26 |
| Author‐level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
24 |
| Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
156 |
| CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* |
1 |
1 |
3 |
215 |
5 |
8 |
25 |
722 |
| CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How* |
2 |
2 |
3 |
346 |
6 |
10 |
21 |
1,523 |
| CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE |
0 |
0 |
2 |
120 |
2 |
5 |
14 |
371 |
| Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence |
0 |
3 |
5 |
303 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
849 |
| Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
304 |
| Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital Markets |
0 |
1 |
2 |
36 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
170 |
| Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
8 |
12 |
42 |
| Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory |
0 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
1 |
5 |
16 |
108 |
| ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
71 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
106 |
| Great, Madama Butterfly Again! How Robust Market Identity Shapes Opera Repertoires |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
46 |
| I can do that alone…or not? How idea generators juggle between the pros and cons of teamwork |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
43 |
| JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAME |
0 |
0 |
3 |
96 |
2 |
5 |
14 |
408 |
| Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
3 |
9 |
12 |
227 |
| Management compensation and the managerial labor market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
287 |
| Organizational forms and investment decisions |
1 |
1 |
4 |
434 |
4 |
11 |
19 |
1,063 |
| Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process |
1 |
1 |
4 |
352 |
3 |
7 |
14 |
1,125 |
| Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives |
8 |
23 |
54 |
2,884 |
26 |
90 |
238 |
9,914 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
91 |
| Preface |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
73 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
96 |
| Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence |
0 |
1 |
4 |
217 |
2 |
7 |
20 |
620 |
| Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination |
0 |
1 |
6 |
488 |
2 |
11 |
23 |
1,305 |
| Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios |
1 |
2 |
2 |
646 |
2 |
11 |
21 |
1,569 |
| SCIENCE, SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
10 |
| SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY |
0 |
4 |
13 |
312 |
2 |
7 |
33 |
885 |
| SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE |
7 |
20 |
38 |
604 |
14 |
36 |
86 |
1,605 |
| SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
369 |
| Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management |
0 |
0 |
5 |
120 |
3 |
5 |
15 |
452 |
| Separation of Ownership and Control |
18 |
44 |
93 |
1,165 |
54 |
195 |
423 |
10,637 |
| Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency |
3 |
5 |
11 |
738 |
10 |
24 |
61 |
2,014 |
| Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement |
0 |
1 |
1 |
87 |
2 |
10 |
16 |
329 |
| THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, EXIT, AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS |
0 |
0 |
2 |
104 |
1 |
8 |
20 |
736 |
| THE NATURE OF MAN* |
0 |
4 |
19 |
243 |
6 |
18 |
51 |
686 |
| THE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964 |
7 |
12 |
22 |
268 |
15 |
39 |
68 |
1,303 |
| Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences |
0 |
1 |
1 |
889 |
9 |
36 |
41 |
2,012 |
| Teoria da firma: comportamento dos administradores, custos de agência e estrutura de propriedade |
1 |
1 |
3 |
37 |
3 |
10 |
18 |
243 |
| The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance |
0 |
1 |
2 |
54 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
183 |
| The Capital Market as a Growth Engine |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
0 |
3 |
176 |
5 |
19 |
34 |
1,123 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
1 |
4 |
12 |
1,510 |
7 |
112 |
181 |
6,245 |
| The Paradox of Awards: How Status Ripples Affect Who Benefits from CEO Awards |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
1 |
8 |
8 |
33 |
| The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation |
1 |
2 |
3 |
40 |
13 |
21 |
32 |
127 |
| The Real Oscar Curse: The Negative Consequences of Positive Status Shifts |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
9 |
17 |
56 |
| The Two Key Principles Behind Effective TQM Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
116 |
| The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
660 |
| The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
412 |
4 |
14 |
24 |
3,999 |
| The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence |
4 |
9 |
22 |
1,636 |
26 |
70 |
117 |
4,355 |
| Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
80 |
295 |
835 |
13,808 |
331 |
1,045 |
2,945 |
43,156 |
| VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION |
6 |
26 |
81 |
904 |
27 |
103 |
349 |
3,239 |
| Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
6 |
12 |
23 |
457 |
27 |
73 |
156 |
1,913 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
0 |
2 |
10 |
717 |
11 |
31 |
76 |
2,547 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function* |
1 |
9 |
35 |
284 |
9 |
41 |
121 |
872 |
| When Less Is More: How Statistical Discrimination Can Decrease Predictive Accuracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
5 |
13 |
29 |
| Total Journal Articles |
186 |
593 |
1,638 |
39,547 |
800 |
2,651 |
6,707 |
140,941 |
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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