Access Statistics for Michael C. Jensen
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Bridge Too Far: Divestiture as a Strategic Reaction to Status Inconsistency |
0 |
0 |
6 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
53 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
80 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
275 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy* |
0 |
1 |
11 |
184 |
4 |
11 |
32 |
497 |
| Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers |
16 |
38 |
211 |
7,047 |
73 |
180 |
844 |
22,796 |
| Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
949 |
| Agency Problems and Residual Claims |
0 |
6 |
17 |
420 |
3 |
14 |
62 |
3,785 |
| Analysis of alternative standing doctrines |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
86 |
| Author-level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
| Author‐level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
| Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
150 |
| CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* |
0 |
1 |
1 |
212 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
697 |
| CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How* |
1 |
3 |
9 |
343 |
1 |
3 |
23 |
1,502 |
| CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE |
2 |
2 |
8 |
118 |
3 |
6 |
20 |
357 |
| Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence |
0 |
0 |
5 |
298 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
840 |
| Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
116 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
298 |
| Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
163 |
| Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
30 |
| Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
92 |
| ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
67 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
99 |
| Great, Madama Butterfly Again! How Robust Market Identity Shapes Opera Repertoires |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
37 |
| I can do that alone…or not? How idea generators juggle between the pros and cons of teamwork |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
11 |
15 |
36 |
| JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAME |
2 |
4 |
5 |
93 |
2 |
7 |
22 |
394 |
| Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game |
0 |
0 |
2 |
56 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
215 |
| Management compensation and the managerial labor market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
279 |
| Organizational forms and investment decisions |
1 |
1 |
4 |
430 |
3 |
7 |
16 |
1,044 |
| Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process |
0 |
0 |
9 |
348 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
1,111 |
| Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives |
5 |
11 |
45 |
2,830 |
16 |
53 |
218 |
9,676 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
90 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
91 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
| Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence |
1 |
1 |
7 |
213 |
4 |
6 |
17 |
600 |
| Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination |
1 |
2 |
8 |
482 |
2 |
7 |
27 |
1,282 |
| Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios |
0 |
1 |
6 |
644 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
1,548 |
| SCIENCE, SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
| SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY |
0 |
1 |
13 |
299 |
1 |
2 |
29 |
852 |
| SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE |
5 |
11 |
70 |
566 |
10 |
26 |
141 |
1,519 |
| SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
362 |
| Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
437 |
| Separation of Ownership and Control |
7 |
14 |
70 |
1,072 |
22 |
71 |
237 |
10,214 |
| Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency |
2 |
6 |
13 |
727 |
3 |
9 |
38 |
1,953 |
| Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
313 |
| THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, EXIT, AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
102 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
716 |
| THE NATURE OF MAN* |
2 |
6 |
23 |
224 |
6 |
16 |
63 |
635 |
| THE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
246 |
0 |
5 |
51 |
1,235 |
| Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
888 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
1,971 |
| Teoria da firma: comportamento dos administradores, custos de agência e estrutura de propriedade |
0 |
0 |
3 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
225 |
| The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
52 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
172 |
| The Capital Market as a Growth Engine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
2 |
8 |
1,498 |
7 |
19 |
54 |
6,064 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
0 |
3 |
173 |
4 |
7 |
22 |
1,089 |
| The Paradox of Awards: How Status Ripples Affect Who Benefits from CEO Awards |
0 |
1 |
9 |
11 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
25 |
| The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation |
1 |
2 |
8 |
37 |
4 |
7 |
21 |
95 |
| The Real Oscar Curse: The Negative Consequences of Positive Status Shifts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
39 |
| The Two Key Principles Behind Effective TQM Programs |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
107 |
| The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors |
0 |
0 |
1 |
240 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
647 |
| The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy |
0 |
0 |
4 |
412 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
3,975 |
| The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence |
2 |
5 |
31 |
1,614 |
8 |
21 |
100 |
4,238 |
| Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
35 |
108 |
497 |
12,973 |
126 |
395 |
2,585 |
40,211 |
| VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION |
12 |
24 |
67 |
823 |
34 |
74 |
268 |
2,890 |
| Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
4 |
10 |
19 |
434 |
13 |
32 |
86 |
1,757 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
0 |
4 |
17 |
707 |
7 |
18 |
71 |
2,471 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function* |
3 |
9 |
55 |
249 |
10 |
27 |
129 |
751 |
| When Less Is More: How Statistical Discrimination Can Decrease Predictive Accuracy |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
16 |
| Total Journal Articles |
102 |
276 |
1,298 |
37,909 |
406 |
1,099 |
5,457 |
134,234 |
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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