Access Statistics for Michael C. Jensen
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Bridge Too Far: Divestiture as a Strategic Reaction to Status Inconsistency |
1 |
4 |
8 |
22 |
2 |
5 |
15 |
49 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
2 |
80 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
273 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy* |
0 |
2 |
17 |
181 |
1 |
6 |
32 |
482 |
| Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers |
20 |
46 |
209 |
6,946 |
66 |
186 |
754 |
22,369 |
| Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
946 |
| Agency Problems and Residual Claims |
0 |
4 |
21 |
414 |
2 |
17 |
73 |
3,762 |
| Analysis of alternative standing doctrines |
0 |
1 |
1 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
85 |
| Author-level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
| Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
149 |
| CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* |
0 |
0 |
2 |
211 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
691 |
| CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How* |
0 |
2 |
6 |
338 |
0 |
3 |
24 |
1,492 |
| CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE |
0 |
3 |
9 |
115 |
1 |
8 |
20 |
348 |
| Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence |
0 |
1 |
4 |
296 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
834 |
| Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
293 |
| Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
162 |
| Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm |
1 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
23 |
| Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
89 |
| ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
67 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
97 |
| Great, Madama Butterfly Again! How Robust Market Identity Shapes Opera Repertoires |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
34 |
| I can do that alone…or not? How idea generators juggle between the pros and cons of teamwork |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
23 |
| JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAME |
0 |
0 |
2 |
88 |
0 |
4 |
17 |
385 |
| Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game |
0 |
1 |
2 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
211 |
| Management compensation and the managerial labor market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
276 |
| Organizational forms and investment decisions |
0 |
1 |
6 |
429 |
1 |
4 |
19 |
1,035 |
| Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process |
0 |
0 |
16 |
347 |
0 |
2 |
40 |
1,107 |
| Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives |
1 |
11 |
36 |
2,804 |
5 |
41 |
191 |
9,569 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
88 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
90 |
| Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence |
1 |
1 |
7 |
210 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
591 |
| Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination |
0 |
0 |
9 |
478 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
1,269 |
| Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios |
0 |
1 |
8 |
641 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
1,541 |
| SCIENCE, SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY |
0 |
3 |
16 |
295 |
0 |
4 |
36 |
841 |
| SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE |
3 |
12 |
66 |
530 |
6 |
28 |
151 |
1,450 |
| SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
362 |
| Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management |
0 |
0 |
1 |
115 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
435 |
| Separation of Ownership and Control |
5 |
10 |
49 |
1,028 |
10 |
39 |
164 |
10,063 |
| Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency |
0 |
1 |
8 |
717 |
1 |
8 |
33 |
1,932 |
| Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
313 |
| THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, EXIT, AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS |
0 |
0 |
2 |
101 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
710 |
| THE NATURE OF MAN* |
1 |
2 |
18 |
210 |
3 |
12 |
58 |
602 |
| THE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
242 |
2 |
13 |
71 |
1,220 |
| Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences |
0 |
0 |
8 |
888 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
1,967 |
| Teoria da firma: comportamento dos administradores, custos de agência e estrutura de propriedade |
0 |
2 |
4 |
33 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
220 |
| The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance |
0 |
0 |
2 |
52 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
170 |
| The Capital Market as a Growth Engine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
0 |
3 |
172 |
2 |
3 |
17 |
1,078 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
3 |
7 |
1,493 |
4 |
14 |
50 |
6,032 |
| The Paradox of Awards: How Status Ripples Affect Who Benefits from CEO Awards |
1 |
1 |
8 |
8 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
17 |
| The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation |
1 |
3 |
6 |
35 |
1 |
6 |
19 |
85 |
| The Real Oscar Curse: The Negative Consequences of Positive Status Shifts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
38 |
| The Two Key Principles Behind Effective TQM Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
103 |
| The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors |
0 |
0 |
3 |
240 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
642 |
| The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy |
0 |
0 |
3 |
409 |
3 |
5 |
19 |
3,965 |
| The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence |
1 |
5 |
28 |
1,599 |
4 |
21 |
101 |
4,194 |
| Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
22 |
99 |
570 |
12,727 |
187 |
718 |
2,928 |
39,267 |
| VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION |
2 |
10 |
57 |
780 |
13 |
53 |
194 |
2,742 |
| Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
0 |
1 |
7 |
419 |
3 |
11 |
65 |
1,703 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
0 |
2 |
16 |
697 |
3 |
11 |
52 |
2,430 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function* |
2 |
7 |
48 |
221 |
7 |
24 |
131 |
690 |
| When Less Is More: How Statistical Discrimination Can Decrease Predictive Accuracy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
9 |
| Total Journal Articles |
62 |
243 |
1,321 |
37,250 |
339 |
1,297 |
5,524 |
131,809 |
2 registered items for which data could not be found
|
|
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.