Access Statistics for Michael C. Jensen
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Bridge Too Far: Divestiture as a Strategic Reaction to Status Inconsistency |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
4 |
7 |
11 |
64 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
4 |
84 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
284 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy* |
1 |
4 |
22 |
205 |
6 |
20 |
79 |
565 |
| Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers |
31 |
93 |
206 |
7,215 |
109 |
286 |
821 |
23,437 |
| Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
957 |
| Agency Problems and Residual Claims |
3 |
5 |
15 |
429 |
4 |
13 |
45 |
3,816 |
| Analysis of alternative standing doctrines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
88 |
| Author-level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
| Author‐level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
| Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
153 |
| CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* |
0 |
0 |
3 |
214 |
1 |
8 |
20 |
714 |
| CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How* |
0 |
0 |
4 |
344 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
1,513 |
| CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE |
0 |
0 |
4 |
120 |
3 |
7 |
15 |
366 |
| Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
300 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
844 |
| Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
301 |
| Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
166 |
| Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
34 |
| Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory |
0 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
3 |
7 |
11 |
103 |
| ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
68 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
101 |
| Great, Madama Butterfly Again! How Robust Market Identity Shapes Opera Repertoires |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
43 |
| I can do that alone…or not? How idea generators juggle between the pros and cons of teamwork |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
40 |
| JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAME |
1 |
1 |
7 |
96 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
403 |
| Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
218 |
| Management compensation and the managerial labor market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
284 |
| Organizational forms and investment decisions |
0 |
0 |
4 |
433 |
2 |
2 |
15 |
1,052 |
| Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process |
2 |
2 |
3 |
351 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
1,118 |
| Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives |
7 |
18 |
42 |
2,861 |
24 |
74 |
201 |
9,824 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
90 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
92 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
71 |
| Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence |
0 |
0 |
4 |
216 |
3 |
7 |
19 |
613 |
| Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination |
1 |
1 |
7 |
487 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
1,294 |
| Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios |
0 |
0 |
1 |
644 |
6 |
7 |
11 |
1,558 |
| SCIENCE, SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
| SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY |
0 |
1 |
10 |
308 |
2 |
7 |
28 |
878 |
| SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE |
2 |
7 |
29 |
584 |
5 |
15 |
76 |
1,569 |
| SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
364 |
| Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management |
0 |
0 |
5 |
120 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
447 |
| Separation of Ownership and Control |
15 |
29 |
63 |
1,121 |
48 |
105 |
299 |
10,442 |
| Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency |
1 |
2 |
12 |
733 |
12 |
20 |
46 |
1,990 |
| Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
4 |
4 |
6 |
319 |
| THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, EXIT, AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS |
1 |
1 |
2 |
104 |
3 |
6 |
17 |
728 |
| THE NATURE OF MAN* |
1 |
10 |
21 |
239 |
4 |
19 |
49 |
668 |
| THE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
256 |
5 |
13 |
34 |
1,264 |
| Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
888 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
1,976 |
| Teoria da firma: comportamento dos administradores, custos de agência e estrutura de propriedade |
0 |
1 |
2 |
36 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
233 |
| The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
178 |
| The Capital Market as a Growth Engine |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
0 |
3 |
176 |
4 |
5 |
22 |
1,104 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
1 |
10 |
1,506 |
13 |
27 |
88 |
6,133 |
| The Paradox of Awards: How Status Ripples Affect Who Benefits from CEO Awards |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
| The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation |
0 |
0 |
3 |
38 |
3 |
7 |
18 |
106 |
| The Real Oscar Curse: The Negative Consequences of Positive Status Shifts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
47 |
| The Two Key Principles Behind Effective TQM Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
110 |
| The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
654 |
| The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
412 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
3,985 |
| The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence |
3 |
8 |
18 |
1,627 |
6 |
24 |
68 |
4,285 |
| Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
185 |
300 |
648 |
13,513 |
536 |
885 |
2,295 |
42,111 |
| VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION |
5 |
16 |
79 |
878 |
44 |
117 |
320 |
3,136 |
| Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
2 |
6 |
21 |
445 |
27 |
50 |
115 |
1,840 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
1 |
2 |
12 |
715 |
11 |
21 |
63 |
2,516 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function* |
2 |
11 |
35 |
275 |
9 |
27 |
107 |
831 |
| When Less Is More: How Statistical Discrimination Can Decrease Predictive Accuracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
24 |
| Total Journal Articles |
265 |
525 |
1,321 |
38,954 |
944 |
1,854 |
5,155 |
138,290 |
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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