Access Statistics for Michael C. Jensen
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Bridge Too Far: Divestiture as a Strategic Reaction to Status Inconsistency |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
0 |
6 |
11 |
64 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
4 |
84 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
284 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy* |
2 |
5 |
24 |
207 |
10 |
22 |
88 |
575 |
| Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers |
34 |
101 |
227 |
7,249 |
147 |
355 |
901 |
23,584 |
| Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
958 |
| Agency Problems and Residual Claims |
3 |
7 |
14 |
432 |
12 |
20 |
52 |
3,828 |
| Analysis of alternative standing doctrines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
88 |
| Author-level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
24 |
| Author‐level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
19 |
| Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
154 |
| CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* |
0 |
0 |
3 |
214 |
1 |
6 |
19 |
715 |
| CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How* |
0 |
0 |
3 |
344 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
1,514 |
| CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE |
0 |
0 |
4 |
120 |
0 |
6 |
13 |
366 |
| Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence |
3 |
3 |
5 |
303 |
3 |
3 |
10 |
847 |
| Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
302 |
| Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
35 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
166 |
| Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
34 |
| Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory |
0 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
2 |
8 |
13 |
105 |
| ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
68 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
101 |
| Great, Madama Butterfly Again! How Robust Market Identity Shapes Opera Repertoires |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
44 |
| I can do that alone…or not? How idea generators juggle between the pros and cons of teamwork |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
41 |
| JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAME |
0 |
1 |
7 |
96 |
2 |
4 |
17 |
405 |
| Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
4 |
4 |
9 |
222 |
| Management compensation and the managerial labor market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
285 |
| Organizational forms and investment decisions |
0 |
0 |
4 |
433 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
1,052 |
| Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process |
0 |
2 |
3 |
351 |
3 |
7 |
11 |
1,121 |
| Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives |
11 |
25 |
51 |
2,872 |
27 |
77 |
207 |
9,851 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
72 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
91 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
93 |
| Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence |
1 |
1 |
5 |
217 |
4 |
10 |
22 |
617 |
| Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination |
1 |
2 |
7 |
488 |
4 |
5 |
19 |
1,298 |
| Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios |
0 |
0 |
1 |
644 |
1 |
8 |
12 |
1,559 |
| SCIENCE, SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
| SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY |
1 |
2 |
11 |
309 |
1 |
7 |
29 |
879 |
| SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE |
5 |
12 |
32 |
589 |
9 |
22 |
78 |
1,578 |
| SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
365 |
| Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management |
0 |
0 |
5 |
120 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
447 |
| Separation of Ownership and Control |
15 |
38 |
75 |
1,136 |
92 |
174 |
368 |
10,534 |
| Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency |
1 |
3 |
11 |
734 |
5 |
22 |
48 |
1,995 |
| Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
320 |
| THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, EXIT, AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS |
0 |
1 |
2 |
104 |
3 |
8 |
19 |
731 |
| THE NATURE OF MAN* |
1 |
5 |
22 |
240 |
4 |
13 |
49 |
672 |
| THE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964 |
4 |
7 |
15 |
260 |
17 |
27 |
48 |
1,281 |
| Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences |
1 |
1 |
1 |
889 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
1,978 |
| Teoria da firma: comportamento dos administradores, custos de agência e estrutura de propriedade |
0 |
1 |
2 |
36 |
4 |
8 |
13 |
237 |
| The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance |
1 |
1 |
2 |
54 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
180 |
| The Capital Market as a Growth Engine |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
0 |
0 |
3 |
176 |
9 |
14 |
30 |
1,113 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
1 |
2 |
10 |
1,507 |
60 |
83 |
143 |
6,193 |
| The Paradox of Awards: How Status Ripples Affect Who Benefits from CEO Awards |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
26 |
| The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation |
0 |
0 |
3 |
38 |
1 |
7 |
18 |
107 |
| The Real Oscar Curse: The Negative Consequences of Positive Status Shifts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
13 |
51 |
| The Two Key Principles Behind Effective TQM Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
111 |
| The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
656 |
| The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
412 |
6 |
8 |
17 |
3,991 |
| The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence |
2 |
9 |
19 |
1,629 |
3 |
19 |
64 |
4,288 |
| Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
129 |
367 |
737 |
13,642 |
426 |
1,080 |
2,563 |
42,537 |
| VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION |
9 |
17 |
81 |
887 |
43 |
116 |
344 |
3,179 |
| Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
2 |
8 |
19 |
447 |
21 |
62 |
127 |
1,861 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
0 |
2 |
10 |
715 |
8 |
28 |
65 |
2,524 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function* |
4 |
10 |
34 |
279 |
15 |
33 |
110 |
846 |
| When Less Is More: How Statistical Discrimination Can Decrease Predictive Accuracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
26 |
| Total Journal Articles |
231 |
633 |
1,463 |
39,185 |
976 |
2,351 |
5,747 |
139,266 |
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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