Access Statistics for Michael C. Jensen
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Bridge Too Far: Divestiture as a Strategic Reaction to Status Inconsistency |
1 |
1 |
6 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
54 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy |
2 |
3 |
3 |
83 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
279 |
| Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy* |
4 |
13 |
18 |
197 |
7 |
29 |
50 |
526 |
| Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers |
18 |
36 |
183 |
7,083 |
74 |
159 |
772 |
22,955 |
| Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
953 |
| Agency Problems and Residual Claims |
0 |
1 |
11 |
421 |
2 |
6 |
46 |
3,791 |
| Analysis of alternative standing doctrines |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
87 |
| Author-level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
| Author‐level Eigenfactor metrics: Evaluating the influence of authors, institutions, and countries within the social science research network community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
| Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
150 |
| CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* |
0 |
0 |
1 |
212 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
700 |
| CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How* |
1 |
1 |
8 |
344 |
3 |
5 |
18 |
1,507 |
| CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE |
0 |
1 |
7 |
119 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
358 |
| Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence |
0 |
1 |
4 |
299 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
843 |
| Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
116 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
298 |
| Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital Markets |
1 |
1 |
1 |
35 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
165 |
| Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
31 |
| Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory |
0 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
96 |
| ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
67 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
100 |
| Great, Madama Butterfly Again! How Robust Market Identity Shapes Opera Repertoires |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
37 |
| I can do that alone…or not? How idea generators juggle between the pros and cons of teamwork |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
38 |
| JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAME |
0 |
2 |
7 |
95 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
398 |
| Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game |
0 |
1 |
2 |
57 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
218 |
| Management compensation and the managerial labor market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
280 |
| Organizational forms and investment decisions |
1 |
1 |
3 |
431 |
2 |
2 |
15 |
1,046 |
| Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process |
1 |
1 |
2 |
349 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
1,112 |
| Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives |
3 |
4 |
41 |
2,834 |
16 |
25 |
173 |
9,701 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
91 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
| Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
90 |
| Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence |
1 |
2 |
6 |
215 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
604 |
| Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination |
0 |
1 |
5 |
483 |
3 |
5 |
19 |
1,287 |
| Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios |
0 |
0 |
4 |
644 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
1,551 |
| SCIENCE, SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
| SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY |
2 |
6 |
13 |
305 |
4 |
14 |
29 |
866 |
| SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE |
0 |
5 |
53 |
571 |
9 |
21 |
118 |
1,540 |
| SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
363 |
| Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management |
0 |
4 |
4 |
119 |
1 |
7 |
11 |
444 |
| Separation of Ownership and Control |
3 |
11 |
65 |
1,083 |
28 |
59 |
249 |
10,273 |
| Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency |
2 |
3 |
14 |
730 |
5 |
9 |
38 |
1,962 |
| Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
315 |
| THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, EXIT, AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS |
1 |
1 |
2 |
103 |
3 |
3 |
11 |
719 |
| THE NATURE OF MAN* |
0 |
1 |
17 |
225 |
1 |
3 |
48 |
638 |
| THE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
250 |
8 |
10 |
38 |
1,245 |
| Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
888 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1,972 |
| Teoria da firma: comportamento dos administradores, custos de agência e estrutura de propriedade |
0 |
1 |
4 |
35 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
228 |
| The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
173 |
| The Capital Market as a Growth Engine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
2 |
2 |
10 |
1,500 |
13 |
17 |
63 |
6,081 |
| The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems |
1 |
1 |
2 |
174 |
2 |
3 |
17 |
1,092 |
| The Paradox of Awards: How Status Ripples Affect Who Benefits from CEO Awards |
0 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
25 |
| The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation |
0 |
1 |
6 |
38 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
97 |
| The Real Oscar Curse: The Negative Consequences of Positive Status Shifts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
42 |
| The Two Key Principles Behind Effective TQM Programs |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
107 |
| The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
649 |
| The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy |
0 |
0 |
3 |
412 |
2 |
3 |
18 |
3,978 |
| The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence |
2 |
4 |
24 |
1,618 |
7 |
17 |
82 |
4,255 |
| Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure |
52 |
114 |
459 |
13,087 |
212 |
462 |
2,124 |
40,673 |
| VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION |
7 |
15 |
68 |
838 |
30 |
47 |
248 |
2,937 |
| Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
0 |
2 |
18 |
436 |
5 |
16 |
81 |
1,773 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function |
1 |
1 |
13 |
708 |
4 |
8 |
60 |
2,479 |
| Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function* |
2 |
9 |
44 |
258 |
11 |
28 |
113 |
779 |
| When Less Is More: How Statistical Discrimination Can Decrease Predictive Accuracy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
19 |
| Total Journal Articles |
110 |
256 |
1,155 |
38,165 |
477 |
1,019 |
4,726 |
135,253 |
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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