| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Mechanism That Overcomes Coordination Failure Based on Gradualism, Endogeneity, and Modification |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
129 |
| A mechanism overcoming coordination failure based on gradualism and endogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
71 |
| A new basis and the Shapley value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
91 |
| A theory of sanctions: Objectives, degree of heterogeneity, and growth potential matter for optimal use of carrot or stick |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
109 |
| A theory of strategic auditing: How should we select one member from a homogeneous group? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
109 |
| Altruistic and risk preference of individuals and groups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
96 |
| Behavioral bargaining theory: Equality bias, risk attitude, and reference-dependent utility |
0 |
1 |
2 |
26 |
2 |
4 |
20 |
52 |
| Causes and Effects of Wealth Inequality: visibility leads to a tradeoff between social mobility and wealth satisfaction |
0 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
81 |
| Does the order of punishment matter? A comparison of pool punishment systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
52 |
| Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
131 |
| Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
| Fixation of inequality and emergence of the equal split norm: Approach from behavioral bargaining theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
| Generativity and social value orientation between rural and urban societies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
210 |
| Hearing the voice of future generations: A laboratory experiment of ``Demeny voting'' |
0 |
0 |
1 |
71 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
249 |
| Impact of altruistic behavior on group cooperation: A mechanism working in the presence of an altruist may solve the public goods provision problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
96 |
| Institutionalize reciprocity to overcome the public goods provision problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
73 |
| Institutionalize reciprocity to overcome the public goods provision problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
40 |
| Intentions behind disclosure to promote trust under short-termism: An experimental study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
92 |
| Negotiating with the future: Incorporating imaginary future generations into negotiations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
82 |
| Negotiating with the future: Incorporating imaginary future generations into negotiations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
| Risk-averse and self-interested shifts in groups in both median and random rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
36 |
| Smokers, Smoking Deprivation, and Time Discounting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
217 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
122 |
| Solving intergenerational sustainability dilemma through imaginary future generations: A qualitative-deliberative approach |
0 |
0 |
2 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
91 |
| Sustainability of common pool resources: A field-experimental approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
110 |
| The function of peer reward and punishment in localized society: We can only “Think locally, Act locally” |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
18 |
| Time preferences between individuals and groups in the transition from hunter-gatherer to industrial societies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
79 |
| Time preferences between individuals and groups in the transition from hunter-gatherer to industrial societiesm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
56 |
| Voting on behalf of a future generation: A laboratory experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
184 |
| Who is audited? Experimental study of rule-based tax auditing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
| Who is audited? Experimental study on rule-based and human tax auditing schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
125 |
| Who is audited? Experimental study on rule-based tax auditing schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
57 |
| Who is audited? Experimental study on rule-based tax auditing schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
47 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
2 |
8 |
1,287 |
18 |
35 |
124 |
2,753 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES |
0 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
40 |
| A linear proportional effort allocation rule |
0 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
6 |
7 |
169 |
| A new basis and the Shapley value |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
44 |
| Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
75 |
| Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
24 |
| Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
64 |
| Designing division of labor with strategic uncertainty within organizations: Model analysis and a behavioral experiment |
1 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
6 |
9 |
15 |
18 |
| Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
87 |
| FARSIGHTED COALITIONAL STABILITY OF A PRICE LEADERSHIP CARTEL |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
| Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
123 |
| Institutionalize Reciprocity to Overcome the Public Goods Provision Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
| Interregional mixed duopoly |
1 |
1 |
1 |
31 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
162 |
| Overcoming coordination failure using a mechanism based on gradualism and endogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
29 |
| Overcoming coordination failure using a mechanism based on gradualism and endogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
59 |
| Preemptive Striking in Individual and Group Conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
41 |
| Rewards versus punishments in additive, weakest-link, and best-shot contests |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
108 |
| Risk-Averse and Self-Interested Shifts in Groups in Both Median and Random Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Smokers, smoking deprivation, and time discounting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
60 |
| Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
36 |
| Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
225 |
| Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
86 |
| The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
53 |
| The endogenous objective function of a partially privatized firm: A Nash bargaining approach |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
59 |
| Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
71 |
| Time Preferences between Individuals and Groups in the Transition from Hunter-Gatherer to Industrial Societies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
63 |
| Voting on Behalf of a Future Generation: A Laboratory Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
83 |
| Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
93 |
| Total Journal Articles |
2 |
6 |
11 |
333 |
12 |
53 |
104 |
1,968 |
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