Access Statistics for Kerim Keskin

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A New Keynesian model with unemployment: The effect of on-the-job search 0 0 0 34 0 1 16 70
Bribing in Team Contests 0 0 1 43 0 2 17 63
Effort Comparisons for a Class of Four-Player Tournaments 0 0 0 9 0 2 18 49
Organizational Refinements of Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 55 0 4 15 89
Race Meets Bargaining in Product Development 0 0 1 20 0 0 9 32
Total Working Papers 0 0 2 161 0 9 75 303

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
(In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games 0 0 0 5 0 0 9 18
A Tale of Two Bargaining Solutions 0 0 0 7 0 2 9 88
A game theory approach to football predictions 0 2 6 6 5 17 81 81
A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium 0 0 0 27 1 1 8 104
A new Keynesian model with unemployment: The effect of on‐the‐job search 0 0 0 9 0 1 7 37
An individual-based network model explains Neanderthal extinction through competitive exclusion 0 0 2 6 0 1 9 30
Analyzing strategic behavior in a dynamic model of bargaining and war 0 0 3 10 0 1 19 39
Arms Spending and War Casualties: Understanding the Strategic Trade-Offs in Warfare 0 2 3 3 1 3 13 13
Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions 0 0 1 15 0 1 10 47
Bribing in team contests 0 0 0 8 1 1 8 32
Consideration sets and reference points in a dynamic bargaining game 0 0 1 5 1 2 22 30
Contests over joint production on networks 0 0 0 1 1 1 11 25
Costly argumentation in bargaining 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 4
Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests 0 0 0 5 1 3 11 38
Effort comparisons for a class of four-player tournaments 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 9
Endogenous reference points in bargaining 0 0 1 8 0 1 18 54
Equilibrium Notions for Agents with Cumulative Prospect Theory Preferences 0 0 2 23 0 1 19 80
Institutional enforceability 0 0 0 0 2 3 16 16
Inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions in first-price sealed-bid auctions 0 0 0 9 1 1 15 54
Investment on human capital in a dynamic contest model 0 0 3 8 1 2 13 31
Large Tullock contests 0 0 2 4 0 0 11 20
Multi-player race 0 0 1 16 1 1 11 117
On (mis-)perception of probabilities in first-price sealed-bid auctions 0 0 0 14 1 1 8 60
On the Existence of Berge Equilibrium: An Order Theoretic Approach 0 0 0 8 0 0 6 30
Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium 0 0 0 3 1 3 11 37
Race meets bargaining in product development 0 0 0 1 0 2 8 15
Ramsey's Conjecture in Dynamic Contests 0 0 6 6 1 2 22 22
Sabotage in team contests 0 0 2 15 1 2 20 83
Sourcing strategies in a price and quality competition 0 1 2 2 0 1 14 14
Submodularity and supermodularity in contest games 0 0 0 0 1 1 15 20
Time-varying fairness concerns, delay, and disagreement in bargaining 0 0 2 24 1 1 19 93
Titans that Clash and a State that Buffers 0 0 1 12 0 0 12 55
Using ultimatum power as a leverage in resolving a bargaining conflict 0 0 1 1 1 1 13 13
Total Journal Articles 0 5 39 262 25 59 476 1,409

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Reference Dependence in Bargaining Models 0 0 0 1 0 0 12 32
Total Chapters 0 0 0 1 0 0 12 32

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Statistics updated 2026-08-07