Access Statistics for Fahad Khalil

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auctioneers as Agents 0 0 0 0 2 5 10 2,214
Auctioneers as Market Makers: Managing Momentum in Chittagong Tea Auctions 0 0 0 5 1 3 4 78
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 1 1 22 26 195
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 71
Big Techs vs Banks 1 1 3 32 2 3 14 59
Big Techs vs Banks 0 0 0 2 3 6 11 16
Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils 1 1 1 78 1 4 9 591
Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 0 18 0 10 12 155
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 5 0 4 5 48
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 126 0 5 8 404
Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard 0 0 0 18 2 8 9 34
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 8 1 4 8 70
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 49 2 5 9 88
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 0 5 12 15 185
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 0 3 5 9 449
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 1 3 13 17 604
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract 0 0 0 0 1 3 10 177
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract 0 0 0 1 0 8 13 479
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract 0 0 2 160 1 5 11 564
Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 55
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 33 2 2 2 100
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 2 4 5 8 32
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 1 8 12 83
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 450
Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production 0 0 1 20 1 7 11 50
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 1 1 1 117 2 5 9 406
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 0 0 62 1 2 5 251
Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 12 1 2 7 89
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 222 1 5 7 531
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 0 0 9 14 123
Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation? 0 0 0 34 0 2 3 121
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 34 0 2 3 62
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 20 1 3 7 83
Service-level Selection: Strategic Risk Selection in Medicare Advantage in Response to Risk Adjustment 0 0 0 7 2 23 25 75
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 171
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 0 10 15 21 211
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 1 0 3 5 549
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 0 2 4 6 450
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 0 1 7 9 350
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 88
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey 0 1 1 68 9 16 19 159
The impacts of intellectual property rights protection on cross-border M&As 0 0 0 62 0 11 17 99
Third Party Purchasing and Incentives: The "Outcome Movement" and Contracts for Health Services 0 0 0 10 1 4 4 47
Third Party Purchasing of Health Services: Patient Choice and Agency 0 0 0 33 4 9 12 140
Total Working Papers 3 4 9 1,241 73 283 431 11,256

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 187 1 3 5 528
Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 1 40 1 5 11 213
Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 31 0 2 5 123
Collusive Auditors 0 0 1 106 1 6 10 319
Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard 0 0 0 6 1 4 11 32
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 1 2 4 181 5 12 23 390
Contracts offered by bureaucrats 0 0 0 3 0 4 10 64
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract 0 0 5 385 0 8 35 1,306
Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature 0 0 2 43 1 3 5 146
Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium 0 0 0 2 2 6 11 28
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT* 0 0 1 72 1 7 9 197
Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 128 1 6 7 477
Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production 0 0 0 3 1 5 9 37
Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 1 1 6 7 246
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 33 3 9 16 138
Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation? 0 1 1 45 0 5 6 196
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information 0 0 0 8 0 2 10 74
Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered 1 3 8 107 4 12 26 319
The Impacts of Intellectual Property Rights Protection on Cross-Border M&As 0 0 0 9 1 3 6 83
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey 1 3 6 22 3 14 29 105
Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency 0 0 0 70 3 7 11 204
Use it or lose it 0 0 3 9 0 5 13 56
Total Journal Articles 3 9 32 1,491 30 134 275 5,281

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04