Access Statistics for Fahad Khalil

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Working Paper	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Auctioneers as Agents	0	0	0	0	2	3	14	2,220
Auctioneers as Market Makers: Managing Momentum in Chittagong Tea Auctions	0	0	0	5	1	2	8	82
Auditing Without Commitment	0	0	0	1	1	1	32	201
Auditing Without Commitment	0	0	0	0	1	2	8	75
Big Techs vs Banks	0	0	1	32	1	1	11	62
Big Techs vs Banks	0	0	0	2	1	1	15	22
Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils	0	0	1	78	0	0	11	595
Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils	0	0	0	18	0	1	14	157
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring	0	0	0	126	0	0	10	406
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring	0	0	0	5	3	3	9	52
Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard	0	0	0	18	0	0	12	37
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats	0	0	0	8	0	0	9	72
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats	0	0	0	49	0	0	8	88
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering	0	0	0	1	1	1	21	609
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering	0	0	0	0	1	1	18	188
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering	0	0	0	0	0	2	15	456
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract	0	0	0	1	1	3	17	483
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract	0	0	0	0	2	3	11	181
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract	0	0	1	161	0	0	14	569
Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	58
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment	0	0	0	2	1	1	10	36
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment	0	0	0	33	1	1	7	105
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	451
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?	0	0	0	0	0	1	12	85
Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production	0	0	0	20	1	1	17	57
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting	0	0	0	62	0	0	7	253
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting	0	0	1	117	0	0	10	409
Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting	0	0	0	12	1	1	10	93
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing	0	0	0	222	0	0	8	532
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	124
Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation?	0	0	0	34	0	0	8	126
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information	0	1	1	21	0	1	12	88
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information	0	0	0	34	1	1	4	64
Service-level Selection: Strategic Risk Selection in Medicare Advantage in Response to Risk Adjustment	0	0	0	7	2	2	31	82
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered	0	0	0	0	1	1	7	174
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered	0	0	0	1	1	2	9	554
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	454
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered	0	0	0	0	1	2	28	218
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	90
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	352
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey	0	0	1	68	2	4	26	167
The impacts of intellectual property rights protection on cross-border M&As	0	0	0	62	1	2	22	107
Third Party Purchasing and Incentives: The "Outcome Movement" and Contracts for Health Services	0	0	0	10	0	0	4	47
Third Party Purchasing of Health Services: Patient Choice and Agency	0	0	0	33	2	2	15	143
Total Working Papers	0	1	6	1,243	30	46	557	11,424

Journal Article	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Journal Article	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Auditing Without Commitment	0	0	0	187	4	6	14	538
Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils	0	0	0	40	0	2	16	221
Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring	0	0	0	31	0	0	4	123
Collusive Auditors	0	0	1	106	4	4	14	324
Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard	0	0	0	6	0	2	13	37
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering	0	0	3	181	0	1	23	394
Contracts offered by bureaucrats	0	0	0	3	0	0	10	66
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract	0	0	3	385	2	5	35	1,315
Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature	0	0	2	44	0	1	7	149
Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium	0	0	0	2	0	1	14	35
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT*	0	0	0	72	1	2	15	205
Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?	0	0	0	128	0	0	7	477
Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production	0	0	0	3	1	2	16	46
Loan Size as a Commitment Device	0	0	0	1	0	0	9	248
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting	0	0	0	33	0	2	23	147
Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation?	0	0	1	45	0	1	11	201
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information	0	0	0	8	0	1	14	80
Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered	0	0	7	107	1	2	31	328
The Impacts of Intellectual Property Rights Protection on Cross-Border M&As	0	0	0	9	0	0	9	86
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey	1	1	7	23	1	2	29	111
Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency	0	0	0	70	0	0	11	205
Use it or lose it	0	0	2	9	0	1	18	62
Total Journal Articles	1	1	26	1,493	14	35	343	5,398

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Statistics updated 2026-09-10