Access Statistics for Fahad Khalil

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auctioneers as Agents 0 0 0 0 7 10 41 2,123
Auctioneers as Market Makers: Managing Momentum in Chittagong Tea Auctions 0 0 1 5 1 2 5 68
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 62
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 1 0 3 3 167
Big Techs vs Banks 0 1 26 26 1 6 23 23
Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils 0 1 2 77 1 2 5 577
Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 0 18 0 0 2 134
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 43
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 1 126 0 0 2 396
Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard 0 0 0 18 1 1 1 19
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 61
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 1 49 0 0 1 78
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 587
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 439
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 168
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 464
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 163
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract 0 0 1 158 0 0 3 545
Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 21
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 31 0 2 2 88
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 69
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 446
Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production 0 0 0 19 0 1 3 38
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 245
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 0 0 116 0 0 3 393
Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 79
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 3 221 1 2 6 522
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 108
Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation? 0 0 0 34 0 0 1 117
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 20 0 1 1 73
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 55
Service-level Selection: Strategic Risk Selection in Medicare Advantage in Response to Risk Adjustment 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 49
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 163
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 440
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 541
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 188
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 340
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 82
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey 0 0 1 67 0 0 6 134
The impacts of intellectual property rights protection on cross-border M&As 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 73
Third Party Purchasing and Incentives: The "Outcome Movement" and Contracts for Health Services 0 0 0 10 0 1 1 42
Third Party Purchasing of Health Services: Patient Choice and Agency 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 127
Total Working Papers 0 2 36 1,220 13 36 128 10,600

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 2 186 1 3 7 517
Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 1 38 0 0 1 199
Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 1 31 0 0 1 117
Collusive Auditors 0 2 2 104 0 2 4 303
Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard 0 0 0 5 0 1 2 16
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 4 175 1 2 11 357
Contracts offered by bureaucrats 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 52
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract 0 0 5 374 1 7 31 1,237
Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 140
Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium 0 0 1 1 0 1 4 4
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT* 0 0 0 69 0 0 2 185
Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 1 1 124 1 2 6 453
Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production 0 1 2 3 0 1 8 25
Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 236
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting 1 1 1 32 1 1 2 120
Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation? 1 1 1 42 1 1 2 185
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 60
Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered 0 0 1 98 0 0 2 282
The Impacts of Intellectual Property Rights Protection on Cross-Border M&As 0 0 1 9 0 0 4 71
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey 0 0 0 14 0 0 4 67
Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency 0 0 0 69 0 0 0 189
Use it or lose it 0 0 1 2 0 1 8 31
Total Journal Articles 2 6 24 1,429 6 24 105 4,846

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Statistics updated 2023-05-07