Access Statistics for Fahad Khalil

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auctioneers as Agents 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2,206
Auctioneers as Market Makers: Managing Momentum in Chittagong Tea Auctions 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 74
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 169
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 67
Big Techs vs Banks 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 6
Big Techs vs Banks 0 0 2 29 0 1 14 49
Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils 0 0 0 77 1 1 3 583
Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 0 18 0 0 5 143
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 43
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 126 0 0 0 396
Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard 0 0 0 18 0 0 1 25
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 49 0 0 1 80
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 63
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 441
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 170
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 588
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 169
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 466
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract 0 1 1 159 0 1 2 554
Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 33 0 0 6 98
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 26
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 446
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 73
Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production 0 1 1 20 0 1 1 40
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 0 0 62 0 0 1 246
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 0 0 116 1 1 1 398
Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 12 1 1 2 83
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 109
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 222 0 0 0 524
Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation? 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 118
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 59
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 76
Service-level Selection: Strategic Risk Selection in Medicare Advantage in Response to Risk Adjustment 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 50
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 166
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 444
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 544
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 190
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 83
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 342
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey 0 0 0 67 0 1 2 141
The impacts of intellectual property rights protection on cross-border M&As 0 0 0 62 0 1 2 83
Third Party Purchasing and Incentives: The "Outcome Movement" and Contracts for Health Services 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 43
Third Party Purchasing of Health Services: Patient Choice and Agency 0 0 0 33 0 0 1 128
Total Working Papers 0 2 4 1,234 6 15 77 10,852

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 187 0 0 1 523
Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 0 39 0 1 3 203
Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 31 1 1 1 119
Collusive Auditors 0 0 1 105 1 1 5 310
Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard 0 0 0 6 0 1 2 23
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 1 178 1 2 4 371
Contracts offered by bureaucrats 0 0 0 3 1 1 4 56
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract 1 2 4 382 2 7 20 1,280
Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature 1 1 1 42 1 1 2 142
Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium 0 0 0 2 1 3 11 21
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT* 1 1 2 72 1 1 2 189
Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 128 0 0 8 470
Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production 0 0 0 3 2 2 2 30
Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 239
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 33 0 1 2 124
Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation? 0 0 1 44 0 0 3 190
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information 0 0 0 8 2 2 4 66
Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered 0 0 1 100 1 2 6 297
The Impacts of Intellectual Property Rights Protection on Cross-Border M&As 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 77
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey 0 0 1 16 1 2 5 80
Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency 0 0 0 70 1 1 4 194
Use it or lose it 0 0 3 7 0 0 7 44
Total Journal Articles 3 4 15 1,466 16 29 99 5,048

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Statistics updated 2025-08-05