Access Statistics for Fahad Khalil

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auctioneers as Agents 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 2,210
Auctioneers as Market Makers: Managing Momentum in Chittagong Tea Auctions 0 0 0 5 1 1 4 76
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 68
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 1 10 14 14 183
Big Techs vs Banks 0 0 3 31 0 4 15 56
Big Techs vs Banks 0 0 0 2 1 3 7 11
Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils 0 0 0 77 1 4 7 588
Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 0 18 5 7 7 150
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 126 2 5 5 401
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 44
Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard 0 0 0 18 5 6 7 31
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 8 0 3 4 66
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 49 0 2 4 83
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 444
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 173
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 1 1 4 5 592
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract 0 0 0 0 1 4 8 175
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract 0 0 0 1 3 8 9 474
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract 0 0 2 160 0 4 6 559
Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 51
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 33 0 0 3 98
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 27
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 448
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 2 4 7 77
Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production 0 0 1 20 2 5 6 45
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 0 0 62 0 3 4 249
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 0 0 116 0 2 4 401
Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 12 0 4 6 87
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 0 2 5 7 116
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 222 2 4 4 528
Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation? 0 0 0 34 0 1 1 119
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 34 1 1 2 61
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 20 1 5 5 81
Service-level Selection: Strategic Risk Selection in Medicare Advantage in Response to Risk Adjustment 0 0 0 7 16 17 18 68
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 169
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 546
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 0 1 6 8 197
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 448
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 88
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 0 3 4 5 346
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey 0 0 0 67 1 2 5 144
The impacts of intellectual property rights protection on cross-border M&As 0 0 0 62 5 6 11 93
Third Party Purchasing and Incentives: The "Outcome Movement" and Contracts for Health Services 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 44
Third Party Purchasing of Health Services: Patient Choice and Agency 0 0 0 33 2 5 6 133
Total Working Papers 0 0 6 1,237 75 167 246 11,048

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 187 2 3 5 527
Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 1 40 1 4 8 209
Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 31 0 2 3 121
Collusive Auditors 0 0 1 106 2 4 7 315
Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard 0 0 0 6 0 4 7 28
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 1 2 3 180 3 8 14 381
Contracts offered by bureaucrats 0 0 0 3 1 5 9 61
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract 0 2 6 385 4 19 36 1,302
Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature 0 1 2 43 1 2 4 144
Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium 0 0 0 2 1 2 8 23
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT* 0 0 2 72 2 2 5 192
Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 128 2 2 4 473
Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production 0 0 0 3 1 2 5 33
Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 241
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 33 1 6 8 130
Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation? 0 0 1 44 1 2 3 192
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information 0 0 0 8 2 8 12 74
Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered 1 5 6 105 3 13 19 310
The Impacts of Intellectual Property Rights Protection on Cross-Border M&As 0 0 0 9 0 2 3 80
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey 0 2 3 19 3 11 18 94
Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency 0 0 0 70 2 5 9 199
Use it or lose it 0 1 4 9 1 7 11 52
Total Journal Articles 2 13 29 1,484 34 115 200 5,181

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Statistics updated 2026-01-09