Access Statistics for Fahad Khalil

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auctioneers as Agents 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 2,209
Auctioneers as Market Makers: Managing Momentum in Chittagong Tea Auctions 0 0 0 5 0 1 3 75
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 68
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 1 2 4 4 173
Big Techs vs Banks 0 0 0 2 1 3 6 10
Big Techs vs Banks 0 0 4 31 1 5 18 56
Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils 0 0 0 77 2 3 7 587
Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 0 18 0 2 2 145
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 5 1 1 1 44
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 126 3 3 3 399
Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard 0 0 0 18 0 1 2 26
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 8 3 3 4 66
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 49 1 3 4 83
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 173
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 591
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 444
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract 0 0 0 1 3 5 6 471
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract 0 0 0 0 3 4 7 174
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract 0 0 2 160 2 4 7 559
Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 27
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 33 0 0 4 98
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 447
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 75
Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production 0 0 1 20 3 3 4 43
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 0 0 62 2 3 4 249
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 0 0 116 0 2 4 401
Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 12 3 4 6 87
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 222 2 2 2 526
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 0 1 5 5 114
Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation? 0 0 0 34 0 1 1 119
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 20 2 4 5 80
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 34 0 0 1 60
Service-level Selection: Strategic Risk Selection in Medicare Advantage in Response to Risk Adjustment 0 0 0 7 1 1 3 52
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 168
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 546
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 0 5 6 7 196
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 446
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 88
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 343
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey 0 0 0 67 0 2 4 143
The impacts of intellectual property rights protection on cross-border M&As 0 0 0 62 0 3 6 88
Third Party Purchasing and Incentives: The "Outcome Movement" and Contracts for Health Services 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 43
Third Party Purchasing of Health Services: Patient Choice and Agency 0 0 0 33 2 3 4 131
Total Working Papers 0 0 7 1,237 56 106 181 10,973

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 187 1 1 3 525
Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 1 40 3 3 7 208
Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 31 2 2 3 121
Collusive Auditors 0 1 1 106 1 3 5 313
Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard 0 0 0 6 3 4 7 28
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 1 1 2 179 2 7 11 378
Contracts offered by bureaucrats 0 0 0 3 3 4 8 60
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract 1 3 7 385 6 18 33 1,298
Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature 1 1 2 43 1 1 3 143
Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium 0 0 0 2 0 1 8 22
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT* 0 0 2 72 0 0 3 190
Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 128 0 1 3 471
Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production 0 0 0 3 0 2 4 32
Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 240
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 33 4 5 7 129
Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation? 0 0 1 44 1 1 2 191
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information 0 0 0 8 3 6 10 72
Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered 2 4 5 104 6 10 16 307
The Impacts of Intellectual Property Rights Protection on Cross-Border M&As 0 0 0 9 2 3 3 80
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey 2 3 4 19 4 9 16 91
Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency 0 0 0 70 1 3 7 197
Use it or lose it 1 2 4 9 2 7 11 51
Total Journal Articles 8 15 29 1,482 46 92 171 5,147

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06