Access Statistics for Fahad Khalil

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auctioneers as Agents 0 0 0 0 3 5 11 2,217
Auctioneers as Market Makers: Managing Momentum in Chittagong Tea Auctions 0 0 0 5 2 3 6 80
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 1 2 3 28 197
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 73
Big Techs vs Banks 0 0 0 2 3 6 14 19
Big Techs vs Banks 0 1 3 32 0 4 13 61
Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils 0 1 1 78 2 4 12 594
Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 0 18 1 1 13 156
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 126 2 2 10 406
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 5 1 1 6 49
Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard 0 0 0 18 3 5 12 37
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 49 0 2 8 88
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 8 2 3 10 72
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 0 5 8 14 454
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 1 1 7 20 608
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 0 0 0 2 7 17 187
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract 0 0 0 0 1 2 11 178
Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract 0 0 0 1 1 1 14 480
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract 1 1 3 161 3 6 16 569
Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment 0 0 0 0 3 3 8 58
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 2 1 5 8 33
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 33 2 5 5 103
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 451
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 1 2 11 84
Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production 0 0 1 20 3 5 15 54
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 1 1 117 3 5 12 409
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 0 0 62 2 3 7 253
Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 12 2 3 9 91
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 222 0 2 8 532
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 0 1 1 15 124
Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation? 0 0 0 34 5 5 8 126
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 20 3 5 11 87
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 34 1 1 4 63
Service-level Selection: Strategic Risk Selection in Medicare Advantage in Response to Risk Adjustment 0 0 0 7 3 6 29 79
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 173
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 1 1 2 7 551
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 0 3 6 10 454
Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered 0 0 0 0 0 15 26 216
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 90
The Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 0 2 3 10 352
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey 0 0 1 68 4 13 23 163
The impacts of intellectual property rights protection on cross-border M&As 0 0 0 62 3 4 21 103
Third Party Purchasing and Incentives: The "Outcome Movement" and Contracts for Health Services 0 0 0 10 0 1 4 47
Third Party Purchasing of Health Services: Patient Choice and Agency 0 0 0 33 0 5 13 141
Total Working Papers 1 4 10 1,242 82 179 525 11,362

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auditing Without Commitment 0 0 0 187 2 4 8 531
Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 1 40 4 6 16 218
Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 31 0 0 5 123
Collusive Auditors 0 0 1 106 1 2 11 320
Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard 0 0 0 6 3 4 13 35
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 0 1 3 181 2 7 23 392
Contracts offered by bureaucrats 0 0 0 3 1 1 10 65
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract 0 0 5 385 3 3 36 1,309
Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature 0 1 3 44 1 3 7 148
Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium 0 0 0 2 5 8 16 34
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT* 0 0 1 72 4 5 13 201
Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 128 0 1 7 477
Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production 0 0 0 3 5 8 16 44
Loan Size as a Commitment Device 0 0 0 1 1 3 9 248
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 33 6 10 22 145
Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation? 0 0 1 45 1 3 9 199
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information 0 0 0 8 3 4 14 78
Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered 0 1 7 107 2 8 28 323
The Impacts of Intellectual Property Rights Protection on Cross-Border M&As 0 0 0 9 2 4 9 86
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey 0 1 6 22 3 7 31 109
Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency 0 0 0 70 1 4 12 205
Use it or lose it 0 0 2 9 2 4 16 60
Total Journal Articles 0 4 30 1,492 52 99 331 5,350

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06