Access Statistics for Rene Kirkegaard

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions 0 0 0 147 3 15 66 370
Asymmetric Auctions with More Than Two Bidders 0 0 3 38 1 9 37 139
Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand 0 0 0 98 0 3 10 446
Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand 0 0 0 152 1 1 7 635
Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds 0 0 0 44 0 4 13 311
Contracting with Private Rewards 0 0 0 29 2 4 8 80
Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps 0 0 0 56 0 3 13 208
Financial Constraints and Multivariate Incomplete Information in the Mixture Model of Contests 0 0 1 6 0 3 10 17
Incomplete Information and Rent Dissipation in Deterministic Contests 0 0 0 26 0 3 9 101
Microfounded Contest Design 0 0 0 44 0 6 24 94
Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions 0 0 0 68 0 3 10 362
Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions 0 0 0 30 0 2 5 195
Preferential Treatment may Hurt: Another Application of the All-Pay Auction 0 0 0 23 0 3 9 82
Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the Dispersive Order 0 0 0 32 1 5 18 106
Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions 0 0 0 65 2 10 25 224
Total Working Papers 0 0 4 858 10 74 264 3,370

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions 0 0 0 26 0 1 5 224
A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result 0 1 1 245 0 4 9 540
A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems 0 0 0 11 0 1 11 72
Asymmetric first price auctions 0 1 2 57 4 17 79 250
Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands 0 0 0 36 0 3 11 202
Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds 0 0 0 27 1 3 11 99
Contest Design with Stochastic Performance 0 0 2 5 0 2 7 21
Contracting with private rewards 0 0 0 1 0 1 11 35
Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices 0 0 0 4 0 9 21 38
Endogenous criteria for success 0 0 0 1 0 1 8 15
Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps 0 0 1 16 0 6 17 107
Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders 0 0 1 6 0 3 17 84
Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests 0 0 0 6 0 0 15 84
Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach 0 1 1 13 0 3 11 58
Multivariate Incomplete Information in the Mixture Model of Contests 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7
Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers 0 0 0 42 0 3 9 116
Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions 0 0 0 30 1 6 13 154
Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch 0 0 0 8 0 2 3 67
Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions 0 0 0 1 0 2 10 21
Scale effects in multi-unit auctions 0 0 0 5 0 1 5 38
Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions 0 0 0 11 0 10 51 119
Total Journal Articles 0 3 8 551 6 78 331 2,351

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-07-10