Access Statistics for Prof. Dr. Roland Kirstein

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation 0 0 0 13 1 3 6 201
"Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation 0 0 0 16 2 9 11 197
"Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 45
A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with Two Independent Probabilities of Error 0 0 0 52 1 2 6 220
A Note on Credit-Worthiness Tests 0 0 0 8 1 3 6 123
Anti-Sharing 0 0 0 6 5 5 10 199
Anti-Sharing 0 0 0 20 2 3 6 194
Anti-Sharing 0 0 0 3 1 1 3 100
Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partnerships and Firms 0 0 0 2 1 2 4 34
Anti-Teilen in Teams 0 0 0 10 2 3 5 168
Bayesian Monitoring 0 0 0 11 3 4 7 179
Bayesianische Steuerbehörden und das Tax Payer Puzzle 0 0 0 17 2 2 3 95
Conflict of law rules and international trade: a transaction costs approach 0 0 1 63 1 3 8 473
Constitutions as Equilibria: A Game-theoretic Approach to Positive Constitutional Economics 0 0 0 46 4 7 14 166
Die EU-Richtlinie zum Folgerecht. Eine ökonomische Gesetzesfolgenanalyse 0 1 1 32 0 4 6 200
Do Artists Benefit from Resale Royalties? An Economic Analysis of a New EU Directive 0 0 1 48 2 4 11 201
Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Monitoring 0 0 0 64 0 1 5 307
Efficient Compensation for Employees' Inventions: An Economic Analysis of a Legal Reform in Germany 0 0 0 32 3 5 7 230
Efficient Compensation for Employees? Inventions 0 0 0 18 0 0 1 138
Efficient Compensation for Employees’ Inventions 0 0 0 121 5 5 5 750
Effiziente Vergütung von Arbeitnehmererfindungen. Eine ökonomische Analyse einer deutschen Gesetzesreform 0 0 0 27 1 3 6 161
Effizienzaspekte alternativer Streitbeilegung 0 0 0 13 1 1 2 113
Eigennutz als Triebfeder des Wohlstands: Die "invisible hand" - im Hörsaal-Experiment sichtbar gemacht 0 0 0 36 1 2 6 186
Erzeugt der Europäische Verbraucherschutz Marktversagen? Eine informationsökonomische und empirische Analyse 0 0 1 41 2 2 4 238
Erzeugt der Europäische Verbraucherschutz Marktversagen? Eine informationsökonomische und empirische Analyse 0 0 0 50 1 2 2 297
Europäischer Verbraucherschutz - Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment 0 0 0 10 0 0 2 201
Europäischer Verbraucherschutz – Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment 0 0 0 36 1 3 6 318
FORIS contracts: Litigation Cost Shifting and Contingent Fees in Germany 0 0 0 38 0 1 2 293
Fight or buy? A comparison of internationalization strategies 0 0 0 37 1 2 4 123
Government Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods 0 0 0 34 2 3 4 263
Imperfect Decision-Making and the Tax Payer Puzzle 0 0 0 41 2 5 18 210
Imperfect Monitoring of Monitoring Agents: One Reason Why Hierarchies Can Be Superior to "Lean" Organizations 0 0 0 14 1 2 5 138
Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies 0 0 0 36 4 5 6 245
Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies 0 0 0 19 1 5 7 249
Internationaler Müllhandel aus Sicht der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts 0 0 0 22 0 3 3 163
Internationaler Müllhandel: Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse 0 0 0 37 2 3 5 199
Iterative Reasoning in an Experimental "Lemons" Market 0 0 0 91 3 4 7 553
Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance 0 0 0 11 2 4 5 126
Judicial Detection Skill, Litigational Opportunism, and Contractual Compliance 0 0 0 15 1 1 14 121
Kündigungsschutzrecht in den USA und in Deutschland: ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Rechtsvergleichung 0 0 2 38 0 0 5 310
Law And Economics In Germany 0 0 1 45 2 3 6 245
Legal Cost Insurance as a Strategic Device 0 0 0 4 3 3 5 109
Legal Cost Insurance as a Strategic Device in Settlement Negotiations 0 0 0 4 0 1 4 105
Less Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemon" Markets 0 0 0 31 2 4 5 189
Less Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemons" Markets 1 1 1 24 2 4 8 167
Markt und Marktwirtschaft 0 0 1 35 0 0 1 180
Mehr Markt im Hochschulbereich: Zur Effizienz und Gerechtigkeit von Studiengebühren 0 0 0 37 0 0 3 158
Mehr Markt im Hochschulbereich: Zur Effizienz und Gerechtigkeit von Studiengebühren 0 0 0 47 1 2 3 212
Mitbestimmung als Schutz für Quasirenten 0 0 0 10 1 4 5 102
Optimal Delegation in Nash Bargaining 0 0 0 53 0 0 2 166
Ordnung 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 103
Ordnung 0 0 0 7 0 3 6 117
Quantitative Machtkonzepte in der Ökonomik 0 0 0 34 0 2 4 130
Rechtsvereinheitlichung beim "droit de suite"? Ökonomische Analyse des Richtlinienentwurfs der Europäischen Kommission 0 0 0 11 3 4 5 150
Risk-Neutral Monopolists are Variance-Averse 0 0 0 30 1 1 2 143
Risk-Neutrality and Strategic Insurance 0 0 0 9 1 1 3 98
Self-interest, Social Wealth, and Competition as a Discovery Procedure 0 0 0 100 1 2 6 672
Self-interest, Social Wealth, and Competition as a Discovery Procedure: A classroom experiment that makes the "invisible hand" visible 0 0 0 32 3 3 7 231
Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams 0 0 0 54 3 3 5 274
Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 39
Spontaneous Order - Always Efficient? Comment on Patrick Simon's: "Emergence of a European Ius Commune" 0 0 0 9 5 5 6 150
Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition 0 0 0 141 1 2 5 397
Störung der Vertragsparität 0 0 0 35 1 1 6 685
Störung der Vertragsparität 0 0 0 75 1 1 2 931
The "Rainmaker's Dilemma": Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation 0 0 0 7 2 2 3 273
The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities 0 0 0 59 1 3 6 307
The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities 0 1 1 17 1 4 6 129
The New Basle Accord, Internal Ratings, and the Incentives of Banks 0 0 0 18 2 2 6 195
The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts 0 0 0 5 1 1 2 38
The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts 0 0 0 13 2 2 3 128
The “Rainmaker’s Dilemma:” Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation 0 0 0 53 0 2 8 689
Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation 0 0 0 96 0 0 1 1,074
Volkswagen vs. Porsche. A Power-Index Analysis 0 0 0 132 1 4 8 550
Warum Staaten Ökosteuern statt Lizenzen einführen, und wann das schlecht für die Wohlfahrt ist 0 0 0 25 2 3 3 199
Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren 0 0 2 47 3 4 16 363
Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren 0 0 1 18 0 0 2 79
Wie die "unsichtbare Hand" funktioniert: Gewinnmaximierung als Triebfeder der Effizienz. Ein "classroom-experiment" 0 0 1 50 1 1 3 290
You go First! Coordination Problems and the Standard of Proof in Inquisitorial Prosecution 0 0 0 19 2 2 5 28
Ökonomik der Kriminalität 0 0 0 36 1 1 1 170
Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts 0 0 1 309 0 2 9 1,101
Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts 0 2 4 461 2 6 19 1,279
Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts 0 0 0 491 0 5 9 1,474
Total Working Papers 1 5 19 3,923 114 211 452 22,846

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation 0 0 0 1 2 3 5 548
Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation 0 0 0 6 3 5 14 142
Banken zwischen Wettbewerb, Selbstkontrolle und staatlicher Regulierung: Anmerkungen zum gleichnamigen Buch von Gerrit Fey 0 0 0 1 2 4 8 26
Blair, R. D., and Cotter, T. F.: Intellectual Property: Economic and Legal Dimensions of Rights and Remedies 0 0 0 31 2 2 4 152
Collective Wage Agreements on Fixed Wages and Piece Rates May Cartelize Product Markets 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 73
Der Anstieg der Management-Vergütung: Markt oder Macht?. Anmerkungen zum gleichnamigen von Margit Osterloh und Katja Rost herausgegebenen Band 0 0 0 11 1 1 2 32
Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Enforcement 0 0 0 16 0 1 4 80
Efficient compensation for employees' inventions 0 0 0 41 0 1 2 208
Efficient contracting under the U.S. copyright termination law 0 0 0 33 0 0 2 86
Eigennutz als Triebfeder des Wohlstands - die invisible hand im Hörsaal-Experiment sichtbar gemacht 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 13
Government Incentives When Pollution Permits Are Durable Goods 0 0 0 60 2 3 3 448
Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance 0 0 0 30 0 2 5 195
Kurzbesprechungen 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 6
Maklergebühren und Grunderwerbsteuer als Wertsteuer mit aufgeteilter Zahllast: Eine ökonomische Analyse des „Bestellerprinzips“ 0 0 0 3 1 3 5 21
More Rights, Less Income?: An Economic Analysis of the New Copyright Law in Germany 0 0 2 57 1 7 13 160
Optimal ticket pricing in professional sports: a social identity approach 0 0 0 80 0 2 9 307
Risk Neutrality and Strategic Insurance 0 0 1 18 1 4 5 122
Sharing and anti-sharing in teams 0 0 0 20 2 3 4 152
Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition 0 0 0 8 1 3 8 31
Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition 0 0 0 24 0 5 8 128
Strategic delegation in Nash bargaining 0 1 1 1 2 6 7 7
The Violent and the Weak 0 0 0 42 2 3 4 212
The new Basle Accord, internal ratings, and the incentives of banks 0 0 0 68 2 2 5 405
Volkswagen vs. Porsche: a power-index analysis 0 0 1 12 3 4 8 45
Vorwort 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 7
You go first!: coordination problems and the burden of proof in inquisitorial prosecution 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 9
Total Journal Articles 0 1 5 571 30 75 145 3,615

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Evolutorische Ordnungsökonomik 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 9
Some game-theoretic aspects of Brexit 0 0 2 10 2 4 12 32
Total Chapters 0 0 2 10 4 7 16 41

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Statistics updated 2026-01-09