Access Statistics for Prof. Dr. Roland Kirstein

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation 0 0 0 16 5 7 10 195
"Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation 0 0 0 13 0 2 5 200
"Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 45
A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with Two Independent Probabilities of Error 0 0 1 52 1 2 6 219
A Note on Credit-Worthiness Tests 0 0 0 8 2 2 5 122
Anti-Sharing 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 99
Anti-Sharing 0 0 0 6 0 0 6 194
Anti-Sharing 0 0 0 20 0 1 4 192
Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partnerships and Firms 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 33
Anti-Teilen in Teams 0 0 0 10 0 1 3 166
Bayesian Monitoring 0 0 0 11 0 1 4 176
Bayesianische Steuerbehörden und das Tax Payer Puzzle 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 93
Conflict of law rules and international trade: a transaction costs approach 0 0 1 63 1 3 7 472
Constitutions as Equilibria: A Game-theoretic Approach to Positive Constitutional Economics 0 0 0 46 2 4 10 162
Die EU-Richtlinie zum Folgerecht. Eine ökonomische Gesetzesfolgenanalyse 1 1 1 32 4 4 7 200
Do Artists Benefit from Resale Royalties? An Economic Analysis of a New EU Directive 0 0 1 48 0 2 9 199
Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Monitoring 0 0 0 64 0 1 5 307
Efficient Compensation for Employees' Inventions: An Economic Analysis of a Legal Reform in Germany 0 0 0 32 0 2 4 227
Efficient Compensation for Employees? Inventions 0 0 0 18 0 0 1 138
Efficient Compensation for Employees’ Inventions 0 0 0 121 0 0 0 745
Effiziente Vergütung von Arbeitnehmererfindungen. Eine ökonomische Analyse einer deutschen Gesetzesreform 0 0 0 27 1 3 5 160
Effizienzaspekte alternativer Streitbeilegung 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 112
Eigennutz als Triebfeder des Wohlstands: Die "invisible hand" - im Hörsaal-Experiment sichtbar gemacht 0 0 0 36 0 1 5 185
Erzeugt der Europäische Verbraucherschutz Marktversagen? Eine informationsökonomische und empirische Analyse 0 0 1 41 0 0 2 236
Erzeugt der Europäische Verbraucherschutz Marktversagen? Eine informationsökonomische und empirische Analyse 0 0 0 50 1 1 1 296
Europäischer Verbraucherschutz - Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment 0 0 0 10 0 0 2 201
Europäischer Verbraucherschutz – Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment 0 0 0 36 0 2 5 317
FORIS contracts: Litigation Cost Shifting and Contingent Fees in Germany 0 0 0 38 0 1 2 293
Fight or buy? A comparison of internationalization strategies 0 0 0 37 0 1 4 122
Government Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods 0 0 0 34 1 1 2 261
Imperfect Decision-Making and the Tax Payer Puzzle 0 0 0 41 3 4 16 208
Imperfect Monitoring of Monitoring Agents: One Reason Why Hierarchies Can Be Superior to "Lean" Organizations 0 0 0 14 1 1 4 137
Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies 0 0 0 36 0 1 2 241
Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies 0 0 0 19 1 4 6 248
Internationaler Müllhandel aus Sicht der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts 0 0 0 22 3 3 3 163
Internationaler Müllhandel: Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse 0 0 0 37 1 1 3 197
Iterative Reasoning in an Experimental "Lemons" Market 0 0 0 91 0 2 4 550
Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance 0 0 0 11 1 2 3 124
Judicial Detection Skill, Litigational Opportunism, and Contractual Compliance 0 0 0 15 0 1 13 120
Kündigungsschutzrecht in den USA und in Deutschland: ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Rechtsvergleichung 0 0 2 38 0 0 5 310
Law And Economics In Germany 0 0 1 45 0 1 5 243
Legal Cost Insurance as a Strategic Device 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 106
Legal Cost Insurance as a Strategic Device in Settlement Negotiations 0 0 0 4 0 2 4 105
Less Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemon" Markets 0 0 0 31 1 2 3 187
Less Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemons" Markets 0 0 0 23 0 3 6 165
Markt und Marktwirtschaft 0 0 1 35 0 0 1 180
Mehr Markt im Hochschulbereich: Zur Effizienz und Gerechtigkeit von Studiengebühren 0 0 0 37 0 0 3 158
Mehr Markt im Hochschulbereich: Zur Effizienz und Gerechtigkeit von Studiengebühren 0 0 0 47 0 1 2 211
Mitbestimmung als Schutz für Quasirenten 0 0 0 10 2 3 4 101
Optimal Delegation in Nash Bargaining 0 0 0 53 0 0 3 166
Ordnung 0 0 0 7 3 3 6 117
Ordnung 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 103
Quantitative Machtkonzepte in der Ökonomik 0 0 0 34 0 2 4 130
Rechtsvereinheitlichung beim "droit de suite"? Ökonomische Analyse des Richtlinienentwurfs der Europäischen Kommission 0 0 0 11 1 1 2 147
Risk-Neutral Monopolists are Variance-Averse 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 142
Risk-Neutrality and Strategic Insurance 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 97
Self-interest, Social Wealth, and Competition as a Discovery Procedure 0 0 0 100 1 1 5 671
Self-interest, Social Wealth, and Competition as a Discovery Procedure: A classroom experiment that makes the "invisible hand" visible 0 0 0 32 0 0 4 228
Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams 0 0 0 54 0 0 2 271
Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 39
Spontaneous Order - Always Efficient? Comment on Patrick Simon's: "Emergence of a European Ius Commune" 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 145
Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition 0 0 0 141 1 1 4 396
Störung der Vertragsparität 0 0 0 75 0 0 1 930
Störung der Vertragsparität 0 0 0 35 0 0 6 684
The "Rainmaker's Dilemma": Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 271
The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities 0 1 1 17 2 3 6 128
The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities 0 0 0 59 0 2 5 306
The New Basle Accord, Internal Ratings, and the Incentives of Banks 0 0 0 18 0 0 4 193
The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 126
The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 37
The “Rainmaker’s Dilemma:” Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation 0 0 0 53 2 3 8 689
Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation 0 0 0 96 0 0 1 1,074
Volkswagen vs. Porsche. A Power-Index Analysis 0 0 0 132 1 3 7 549
Warum Staaten Ökosteuern statt Lizenzen einführen, und wann das schlecht für die Wohlfahrt ist 0 0 0 25 0 1 1 197
Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren 0 0 2 47 1 1 15 360
Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren 0 0 1 18 0 0 2 79
Wie die "unsichtbare Hand" funktioniert: Gewinnmaximierung als Triebfeder der Effizienz. Ein "classroom-experiment" 0 0 1 50 0 1 2 289
You go First! Coordination Problems and the Standard of Proof in Inquisitorial Prosecution 0 0 0 19 0 0 4 26
Ökonomik der Kriminalität 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 169
Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts 2 2 4 461 3 5 17 1,277
Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts 0 0 0 491 2 5 9 1,474
Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts 0 0 1 309 1 4 10 1,101
Total Working Papers 3 4 19 3,922 50 111 351 22,732

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 546
Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation 0 0 0 6 2 2 11 139
Banken zwischen Wettbewerb, Selbstkontrolle und staatlicher Regulierung: Anmerkungen zum gleichnamigen Buch von Gerrit Fey 0 0 0 1 1 2 6 24
Blair, R. D., and Cotter, T. F.: Intellectual Property: Economic and Legal Dimensions of Rights and Remedies 0 0 0 31 0 0 2 150
Collective Wage Agreements on Fixed Wages and Piece Rates May Cartelize Product Markets 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 73
Der Anstieg der Management-Vergütung: Markt oder Macht?. Anmerkungen zum gleichnamigen von Margit Osterloh und Katja Rost herausgegebenen Band 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 31
Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Enforcement 0 0 0 16 0 1 4 80
Efficient compensation for employees' inventions 0 0 0 41 0 1 2 208
Efficient contracting under the U.S. copyright termination law 0 0 0 33 0 0 3 86
Eigennutz als Triebfeder des Wohlstands - die invisible hand im Hörsaal-Experiment sichtbar gemacht 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 11
Government Incentives When Pollution Permits Are Durable Goods 0 0 0 60 1 1 1 446
Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance 0 0 0 30 2 3 6 195
Kurzbesprechungen 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 6
Maklergebühren und Grunderwerbsteuer als Wertsteuer mit aufgeteilter Zahllast: Eine ökonomische Analyse des „Bestellerprinzips“ 0 0 0 3 0 2 4 20
More Rights, Less Income?: An Economic Analysis of the New Copyright Law in Germany 0 0 2 57 3 6 12 159
Optimal ticket pricing in professional sports: a social identity approach 0 0 0 80 1 2 9 307
Risk Neutrality and Strategic Insurance 0 0 1 18 2 3 4 121
Sharing and anti-sharing in teams 0 0 0 20 1 1 2 150
Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition 0 0 0 24 5 5 8 128
Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition 0 0 0 8 1 2 7 30
Strategic delegation in Nash bargaining 0 1 1 1 2 4 5 5
The Violent and the Weak 0 0 0 42 0 1 2 210
The new Basle Accord, internal ratings, and the incentives of banks 0 0 0 68 0 0 3 403
Volkswagen vs. Porsche: a power-index analysis 0 0 1 12 1 1 5 42
Vorwort 0 0 0 0 2 6 7 7
You go first!: coordination problems and the burden of proof in inquisitorial prosecution 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 8
Total Journal Articles 0 1 5 571 24 48 119 3,585

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Evolutorische Ordnungsökonomik 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 7
Some game-theoretic aspects of Brexit 0 1 2 10 0 4 10 30
Total Chapters 0 1 2 10 1 6 13 37

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06