| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
4 |
7 |
9 |
207 |
| "Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
48 |
| "Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
4 |
9 |
17 |
204 |
| A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with Two Independent Probabilities of Error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
225 |
| A Note on Credit-Worthiness Tests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
126 |
| Anti-Sharing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
12 |
14 |
111 |
| Anti-Sharing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
4 |
9 |
12 |
201 |
| Anti-Sharing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
13 |
15 |
207 |
| Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partnerships and Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
39 |
| Anti-Teilen in Teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
169 |
| Bayesian Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
8 |
10 |
184 |
| Bayesianische Steuerbehörden und das Tax Payer Puzzle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
98 |
| Conflict of law rules and international trade: a transaction costs approach |
0 |
0 |
1 |
63 |
1 |
7 |
12 |
479 |
| Constitutions as Equilibria: A Game-theoretic Approach to Positive Constitutional Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
7 |
14 |
169 |
| Die EU-Richtlinie zum Folgerecht. Eine ökonomische Gesetzesfolgenanalyse |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
204 |
| Do Artists Benefit from Resale Royalties? An Economic Analysis of a New EU Directive |
2 |
2 |
2 |
50 |
3 |
8 |
14 |
207 |
| Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
311 |
| Efficient Compensation for Employees' Inventions: An Economic Analysis of a Legal Reform in Germany |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
4 |
10 |
13 |
237 |
| Efficient Compensation for Employees? Inventions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
140 |
| Efficient Compensation for Employees’ Inventions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
0 |
8 |
8 |
753 |
| Effiziente Vergütung von Arbeitnehmererfindungen. Eine ökonomische Analyse einer deutschen Gesetzesreform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
163 |
| Effizienzaspekte alternativer Streitbeilegung |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
114 |
| Eigennutz als Triebfeder des Wohlstands: Die "invisible hand" - im Hörsaal-Experiment sichtbar gemacht |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
188 |
| Erzeugt der Europäische Verbraucherschutz Marktversagen? Eine informationsökonomische und empirische Analyse |
0 |
1 |
2 |
42 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
240 |
| Erzeugt der Europäische Verbraucherschutz Marktversagen? Eine informationsökonomische und empirische Analyse |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
298 |
| Europäischer Verbraucherschutz - Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
203 |
| Europäischer Verbraucherschutz – Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
320 |
| FORIS contracts: Litigation Cost Shifting and Contingent Fees in Germany |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
297 |
| Fight or buy? A comparison of internationalization strategies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
125 |
| Government Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
266 |
| Imperfect Decision-Making and the Tax Payer Puzzle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
212 |
| Imperfect Monitoring of Monitoring Agents: One Reason Why Hierarchies Can Be Superior to "Lean" Organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
143 |
| Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
2 |
13 |
14 |
254 |
| Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
4 |
12 |
17 |
260 |
| Internationaler Müllhandel aus Sicht der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
164 |
| Internationaler Müllhandel: Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
200 |
| Iterative Reasoning in an Experimental "Lemons" Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
2 |
8 |
11 |
558 |
| Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
9 |
11 |
133 |
| Judicial Detection Skill, Litigational Opportunism, and Contractual Compliance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
6 |
19 |
126 |
| Kündigungsschutzrecht in den USA und in Deutschland: ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Rechtsvergleichung |
0 |
1 |
3 |
39 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
313 |
| Law And Economics In Germany |
0 |
1 |
2 |
46 |
3 |
8 |
11 |
251 |
| Legal Cost Insurance as a Strategic Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
113 |
| Legal Cost Insurance as a Strategic Device in Settlement Negotiations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
8 |
11 |
113 |
| Less Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemon" Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
190 |
| Less Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemons" Markets |
0 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
4 |
15 |
18 |
180 |
| Markt und Marktwirtschaft |
0 |
0 |
1 |
35 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
184 |
| Mehr Markt im Hochschulbereich: Zur Effizienz und Gerechtigkeit von Studiengebühren |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
160 |
| Mehr Markt im Hochschulbereich: Zur Effizienz und Gerechtigkeit von Studiengebühren |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
215 |
| Mitbestimmung als Schutz für Quasirenten |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
103 |
| Optimal Delegation in Nash Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
173 |
| Ordnung |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
121 |
| Ordnung |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
105 |
| Quantitative Machtkonzepte in der Ökonomik |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
134 |
| Rechtsvereinheitlichung beim "droit de suite"? Ökonomische Analyse des Richtlinienentwurfs der Europäischen Kommission |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
150 |
| Risk-Neutral Monopolists are Variance-Averse |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
144 |
| Risk-Neutrality and Strategic Insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
101 |
| Self-interest, Social Wealth, and Competition as a Discovery Procedure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
676 |
| Self-interest, Social Wealth, and Competition as a Discovery Procedure: A classroom experiment that makes the "invisible hand" visible |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
234 |
| Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
276 |
| Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
9 |
47 |
| Spontaneous Order - Always Efficient? Comment on Patrick Simon's: "Emergence of a European Ius Commune" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
6 |
6 |
151 |
| Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
7 |
13 |
14 |
409 |
| Störung der Vertragsparität |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
934 |
| Störung der Vertragsparität |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
687 |
| The "Rainmaker's Dilemma": Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
8 |
8 |
279 |
| The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
1 |
9 |
13 |
137 |
| The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
309 |
| The New Basle Accord, Internal Ratings, and the Incentives of Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
7 |
10 |
200 |
| The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
131 |
| The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
40 |
| The “Rainmaker’s Dilemma:” Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
3 |
4 |
12 |
693 |
| Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
6 |
7 |
1,080 |
| Volkswagen vs. Porsche. A Power-Index Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
554 |
| Warum Staaten Ökosteuern statt Lizenzen einführen, und wann das schlecht für die Wohlfahrt ist |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
200 |
| Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren |
0 |
0 |
2 |
47 |
1 |
9 |
19 |
369 |
| Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
82 |
| Wie die "unsichtbare Hand" funktioniert: Gewinnmaximierung als Triebfeder der Effizienz. Ein "classroom-experiment" |
0 |
0 |
1 |
50 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
292 |
| You go First! Coordination Problems and the Standard of Proof in Inquisitorial Prosecution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
31 |
| Ökonomik der Kriminalität |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
171 |
| Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts |
0 |
0 |
3 |
461 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
1,279 |
| Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
309 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
1,103 |
| Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
491 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
1,476 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
6 |
22 |
3,928 |
96 |
441 |
688 |
23,173 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.