Access Statistics for Bettina Klaus

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Fair Marriages:" An Impossibility 0 0 0 107 0 3 5 297
A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets 0 0 1 80 1 6 12 185
A Characterization of the Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Housing Markets via Respecting-Improvement 0 1 1 16 1 7 11 31
A Dynamic Recontracting Process for Multiple-Type Housing Markets 0 0 1 31 0 4 8 151
A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division Problems 0 0 0 132 2 9 12 405
A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked 0 0 0 87 0 1 3 463
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 9 0 4 11 69
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities 1 1 1 146 1 3 9 307
Amartya Sen and World Food Day 2000 0 0 0 1 2 5 5 8
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods 0 0 0 1 0 1 5 14
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods 0 0 0 208 0 3 6 630
Characterizing the Typewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets 0 0 0 10 1 6 9 20
Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences 0 0 0 7 0 4 5 12
Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited 1 1 1 118 2 11 14 269
Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets 0 0 0 27 0 7 8 119
Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets 0 0 0 54 0 3 4 154
Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets 0 0 0 54 1 3 4 185
Consistency and Monotonicity in One-Sided Assignment Problems 0 0 0 71 1 5 5 203
Consistency and Population Sensitivity Properties in Marriage and Roommate Markets 0 0 0 70 0 0 3 222
Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 39 0 3 4 81
Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 22 1 2 6 48
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 0 2 2 3 7 38
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 0 40 3 6 11 185
Consistent house allocation 0 0 0 27 1 8 9 155
Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences 0 0 3 17 6 12 18 57
Corrigendum to "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems" 0 0 0 38 0 15 17 125
Corrigendum to ''On Randomized Matching Mechanisms'' [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381] 0 0 0 74 0 6 6 356
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 23 0 2 5 113
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 83 2 8 10 341
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 8 0 6 7 55
Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples 0 0 0 78 0 4 5 263
Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods 0 0 0 4 1 4 5 67
Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods 0 0 0 78 0 3 3 258
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 40 0 5 6 245
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 6 0 3 6 61
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 246 1 4 6 1,512
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 25 1 3 5 218
Employment by Lotto Revisited 0 0 0 65 0 4 7 443
Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists 0 0 0 22 0 5 8 51
Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists 0 0 0 22 0 1 6 35
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples 0 0 0 70 0 5 7 492
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples 0 0 0 2 1 3 7 60
Farsighted House Allocation 0 0 0 1 1 4 6 101
Farsighted House Allocation 0 0 0 48 1 10 11 132
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 81 0 4 6 207
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 3 4 5 6 61
Hedonic Coalition Formation Games with Variable Populations: Core Characterizations and (Im)Possibilities 0 0 0 76 0 3 6 164
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance 0 0 0 34 0 2 11 54
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance 0 0 0 21 0 3 6 52
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (N.B.: This paper has been extended and results are now contained in working paper 14.08.) 0 0 1 29 0 4 8 91
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field 0 0 1 33 0 10 16 120
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field 0 0 0 59 3 10 15 166
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field 0 0 0 51 5 20 31 233
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field 0 0 0 27 1 5 14 81
How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field 0 0 0 13 2 12 18 79
Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement 0 0 0 7 0 4 6 85
Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement 0 0 0 76 1 6 8 178
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods 0 0 0 140 1 9 9 522
Matching under Preferences 0 1 1 81 1 3 4 164
Median Stable Matching for College Admission 0 0 0 8 0 3 3 68
Median Stable Matching for College Admission 0 0 0 225 0 5 6 867
Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism 0 0 0 4 2 8 11 25
Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism 0 0 0 50 1 4 8 113
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 21 3 10 12 98
Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 1 0 5 5 17
Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 34 0 4 4 107
Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 15
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability 0 0 0 37 1 9 11 64
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability 0 0 0 42 2 6 6 107
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability 0 0 0 27 1 7 11 62
Normative properties for object allocation problems: Characterizations and trade-offs 0 0 2 84 0 4 11 186
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics 0 0 0 131 1 4 10 389
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics 0 0 0 19 0 2 5 64
Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application 0 0 0 157 0 21 31 398
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics 0 0 0 6 0 5 10 42
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness:median-voting over intervals 0 0 0 17 8 12 14 40
Overtime and short-time with fluctuating absenteeism and demand 0 0 0 59 0 3 6 261
Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto efficiency in (probabilistic) object allocation 0 0 7 7 0 6 11 11
Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites 0 0 0 45 0 6 9 125
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples 0 1 1 10 0 2 2 51
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples 0 0 0 135 1 5 9 628
Paths to Stability in the Assignment Problem 0 0 0 49 1 6 9 137
Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems 0 0 0 14 0 5 9 51
Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules 0 0 0 0 2 7 11 208
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules 0 0 0 37 0 9 14 268
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching 0 0 0 184 0 1 2 672
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching 0 0 0 4 3 16 18 67
Random Matching under Priorities: Stability and No Envy Concepts 0 1 1 28 0 3 5 79
Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good 0 0 0 15 2 8 11 212
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation 0 0 0 7 3 7 11 68
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 0 34 0 5 8 225
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 0 161 0 5 8 719
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 0 13 1 5 7 177
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices 0 0 0 33 0 2 7 70
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices 0 0 2 114 0 8 12 280
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices:Heterogeneous Objects 0 0 0 47 4 9 11 110
Smith and Rawls Share a Room 0 0 0 1 2 6 7 50
Smith and Rawls Share a Room 0 0 0 66 0 6 8 162
Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians 0 0 0 71 0 2 4 145
Smith and Rawls share a room 0 0 0 56 2 5 5 215
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians 0 0 0 203 0 6 9 464
Solidarity Properties of Choice Correspondences 0 0 0 43 0 1 7 88
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: Characterizing target set correspondences 0 0 0 81 1 1 4 180
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences 0 0 0 54 0 5 6 47
Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 0 0 7 1 5 7 63
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 0 0 253 0 2 7 990
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples 0 0 0 45 0 6 9 199
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples 0 0 0 28 0 8 8 109
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts 0 0 0 107 0 8 9 235
Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 6 6 10 16 70
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts 0 1 1 84 0 5 12 369
Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems 0 0 0 40 1 3 14 128
Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems 0 0 0 4 2 7 11 18
Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 1 10 3 9 12 74
Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems 0 0 0 23 3 11 14 123
Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems 0 0 0 64 4 10 21 92
Stochastic stability for roommate markets 0 0 0 133 0 2 5 294
Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 13 0 8 13 70
Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 0 0 1 19 0 1 6 101
Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 18 1 4 9 76
Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments 0 0 0 48 1 4 5 239
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 0 5 0 4 7 50
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 0 67 0 5 5 256
The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness 0 0 0 71 1 26 31 250
The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible 0 0 1 159 1 5 7 644
The core for housing markets with limited externalities 0 0 0 71 0 6 9 148
The evolution of roommate networks: a comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 0 49 0 3 4 216
The impact of price disclosure on dynamic shopping decisions 0 0 0 85 0 1 4 317
The role of regulatory capital in international bank mergers and acquisitions 0 0 0 91 4 10 11 430
The role of replication-invariance: two answers concerning the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked 0 0 0 50 0 4 7 382
Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants 0 0 0 149 5 10 12 404
Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants 0 0 1 55 2 4 18 171
Total Working Papers 2 7 29 7,228 127 757 1,177 26,443
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Fair marriages": An impossibility 0 0 0 18 0 6 9 101
A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences 0 0 0 7 3 7 11 61
A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement 0 0 1 1 1 9 14 14
A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets 0 0 0 10 0 4 8 76
A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems 0 0 4 27 3 9 18 103
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods 0 0 0 11 0 3 6 81
Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited 1 1 1 1 2 9 16 16
Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets 0 0 0 0 2 6 7 10
Choice correspondences for public goods 0 0 0 19 0 2 4 171
Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object 0 0 0 32 4 6 9 142
Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems 1 1 2 39 4 8 10 155
Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets 0 0 0 5 0 3 7 54
Consistency and its converse for roommate markets 0 0 0 4 1 8 13 34
Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets 0 0 0 2 2 4 7 41
Consistency in one-sided assignment problems 0 1 1 9 0 1 5 51
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 1 25 1 14 17 121
Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences 0 0 1 1 0 3 6 6
Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106] 0 0 0 33 0 4 7 110
Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381] 0 0 0 14 0 5 6 130
Corrigendum to “Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems” 0 0 0 14 0 6 12 57
EMPLOYMENT BY LOTTO REVISITED 0 0 0 1 1 5 7 27
Efficient priority rules 0 0 0 53 2 3 6 173
Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists 0 0 0 2 3 8 12 31
Fair and efficient student placement with couples 0 1 1 8 1 6 7 66
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 2 2 5 8 49
Farsighted house allocation 1 1 1 2 3 10 12 59
Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities 0 0 0 8 0 3 6 61
How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field 0 0 3 5 2 6 21 57
Introduction to the Coalition Theory Network Special Issue 0 0 0 14 1 8 8 86
Local and global consistency properties for student placement 0 0 0 2 0 4 8 43
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods 0 0 0 26 0 4 4 161
Median Stable Matching for College Admissions 0 0 0 40 2 6 10 185
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 13 0 5 9 67
Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability 0 0 0 4 2 5 7 42
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics 0 0 0 14 5 7 10 60
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application 0 0 0 6 1 6 10 40
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals 0 1 1 2 1 5 12 22
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples 0 0 0 21 8 12 12 127
Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems 0 0 0 2 2 6 9 24
Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules 0 0 0 11 1 4 5 62
Procedurally fair and stable matching 0 0 0 18 0 8 12 146
Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts 0 0 2 8 1 7 12 43
Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good 0 0 0 45 1 8 13 419
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems 0 0 0 26 5 10 13 141
Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices 0 0 0 2 1 8 13 27
Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects 0 0 0 0 3 7 11 18
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians 0 0 0 9 0 4 6 46
Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules 0 0 0 0 1 4 7 10
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences 0 0 0 1 2 3 5 15
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 0 0 13 1 5 7 98
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples 0 0 0 8 0 4 7 56
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts 0 1 2 42 0 9 13 158
Stable matchings and preferences of couples 0 0 0 106 0 5 10 300
Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems 0 0 0 0 3 7 9 17
Stochastic stability for roommate markets 0 0 0 8 9 17 21 88
Stochastic stability in assignment problems 0 0 0 4 2 10 11 46
Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped 0 0 0 43 1 4 12 188
Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments 0 0 1 83 2 6 8 781
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems 0 0 1 89 1 8 15 311
Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems 0 0 1 84 0 3 9 369
Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces 0 0 0 11 1 5 8 59
The Role of Replication-Invariance: Two Answers Concerning the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked 0 0 0 9 1 3 4 52
The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible 0 0 0 15 0 3 4 93
The core for housing markets with limited externalities 0 0 0 0 1 6 9 14
The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness 0 0 0 7 0 6 9 60
Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants 0 0 0 8 1 5 9 67
original papers: Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited 0 0 0 34 4 8 8 307
Total Journal Articles 3 7 24 1,181 101 408 640 6,905
2 registered items for which data could not be found
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Statistics updated 2026-03-04