Access Statistics for Bettina Klaus

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Fair Marriages:" An Impossibility 0 0 0 107 0 0 0 290
A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets 1 5 53 56 1 8 93 105
A Dynamic Recontracting Process for Multiple-Type Housing Markets 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 142
A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division Problems 0 0 0 131 0 0 0 392
A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked 0 0 0 87 0 0 0 459
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities 0 1 2 145 0 2 4 297
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities 1 2 2 9 1 2 2 53
Amartya Sen and World Food Day 2000 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods 0 0 0 208 0 0 1 624
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8
Characterizing the Coordinatewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets 0 0 9 9 1 2 6 6
Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited 4 11 29 69 6 17 67 145
Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 146
Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 110
Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets 0 0 0 54 0 0 1 180
Consistency and Monotonicity in One-Sided Assignment Problems 0 0 0 71 0 1 1 197
Consistency and Population Sensitivity Properties in Marriage and Roommate Markets 0 0 0 70 0 0 0 219
Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 77
Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 40
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 31
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 174
Consistent house allocation 0 0 0 27 0 0 1 146
Corrigendum to "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems" 0 0 0 38 0 0 1 108
Corrigendum to ''On Randomized Matching Mechanisms'' [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381] 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 348
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 83 0 1 1 331
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 23 1 1 1 106
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 44
Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples 0 0 0 78 0 0 2 257
Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 61
Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods 0 0 0 77 0 0 0 254
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 236
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 246 0 0 1 1,506
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 213
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 55
Employment by Lotto Revisited 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 15
Employment by Lotto Revisited 0 0 1 64 0 0 1 432
Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists 0 0 0 22 0 1 1 29
Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists 0 0 0 22 0 0 1 41
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 51
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples 0 0 0 69 0 0 0 483
Farsighted House Allocation 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 120
Farsighted House Allocation 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 79
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 52
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 81 0 0 0 201
Hedonic Coalition Formation Games with Variable Populations: Core Characterizations and (Im)Possibilities 0 0 0 75 0 1 1 155
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance 0 0 0 21 0 0 3 45
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance 0 1 2 34 1 2 4 42
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (N.B.: This paper has been extended and results are now contained in working paper 14.08.) 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 80
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field 0 1 1 57 0 1 10 139
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field 0 1 5 22 0 2 13 39
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field 0 0 2 50 1 1 5 194
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field 0 0 1 30 1 1 3 95
How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 43
Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement 0 0 0 75 0 1 1 168
Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 77
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods 0 0 0 140 0 0 0 509
Matching under Preferences 0 0 0 78 1 1 5 150
Median Stable Matching for College Admission 0 0 0 8 0 0 3 63
Median Stable Matching for College Admission 0 0 0 225 0 0 0 860
Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism 0 0 1 3 1 1 6 12
Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism 1 7 19 47 1 11 39 85
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 1 1 21 0 2 3 84
Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 10
Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 1 34 0 0 2 100
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability 0 0 1 27 0 0 2 50
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability 0 0 0 42 0 1 2 98
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability 0 0 0 37 0 0 2 53
Normative properties for object allocation problems: Characterizations and trade-offs 1 5 28 67 1 11 60 135
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics 0 0 0 131 0 1 2 377
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics 0 0 0 19 0 0 2 55
Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application 0 0 2 155 1 3 10 340
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 30
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness:median-voting over intervals 0 0 0 16 0 1 3 23
Overtime and short-time with fluctuating absenteeism and demand 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 255
Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites 0 0 0 44 0 0 1 114
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 47
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples 0 0 0 135 0 0 0 619
Paths to Stability in the Assignment Problem 0 0 3 49 0 2 5 121
Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems 0 0 1 14 1 3 9 36
Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 195
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules 0 0 0 37 0 0 1 254
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching 0 0 0 184 0 0 0 668
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 47
Random Matching under Priorities: Stability and No Envy Concepts 0 0 0 27 1 3 9 71
Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 200
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 55
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 217
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 0 160 0 0 1 708
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 169
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices 0 0 0 31 0 1 3 57
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices 0 0 0 111 0 0 2 261
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices:Heterogeneous Objects 0 0 0 46 0 2 4 97
Smith and Rawls Share a Room 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 41
Smith and Rawls Share a Room 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 153
Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians 0 0 0 71 0 0 1 140
Smith and Rawls share a room 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 208
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians 0 0 0 203 0 1 1 453
Solidarity Properties of Choice Correspondences 0 0 0 43 0 0 1 76
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: Characterizing target set correspondences 0 1 1 81 0 1 1 173
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences 0 0 0 54 0 0 4 37
Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 51
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 0 0 253 0 0 0 983
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 187
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 99
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts 0 0 0 107 1 1 1 224
Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 1 6 0 0 2 54
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts 0 0 0 83 4 12 34 343
Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems 0 0 17 28 1 5 45 57
Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 1 8 0 0 2 56
Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems 0 0 0 64 0 0 0 70
Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems 0 0 0 23 0 0 2 109
Stochastic stability for roommate markets 0 0 0 133 0 0 0 287
Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 13 0 0 2 53
Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 18 0 0 1 64
Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 1 1 2 17 1 3 5 88
Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 233
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 0 67 0 0 0 250
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 43
The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness 0 0 0 69 0 1 2 202
The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible 0 0 1 158 0 0 2 634
The core for housing markets with limited externalities 0 1 21 71 0 2 41 135
The evolution of roommate networks: a comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 211
The impact of price disclosure on dynamic shopping decisions 0 0 0 85 0 0 0 313
The role of regulatory capital in international bank mergers and acquisitions 0 0 0 91 0 0 1 417
The role of replication-invariance: two answers concerning the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked 1 1 1 50 1 1 3 370
Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants 0 0 2 147 0 0 6 381
Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants 0 0 3 47 0 6 19 124
Total Working Papers 10 39 214 7,007 28 121 593 24,495

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Fair marriages": An impossibility 0 1 1 18 0 1 2 91
A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 50
A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 67
A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems 0 0 0 22 0 0 1 82
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 73
Choice correspondences for public goods 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 166
Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object 0 0 0 32 0 0 1 130
Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems 0 0 1 35 0 0 4 140
Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 46
Consistency and its converse for roommate markets 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 21
Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 32
Consistency in one-sided assignment problems 0 0 1 8 0 1 3 46
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 101
Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106] 0 0 0 31 0 0 1 99
Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381] 0 0 0 14 1 1 2 120
Corrigendum to “Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems” 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 45
EMPLOYMENT BY LOTTO REVISITED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19
Efficient priority rules 0 1 2 53 0 1 2 166
Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 18
Fair and efficient student placement with couples 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 58
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 40
Farsighted house allocation 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 47
Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 53
How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10
Introduction to the Coalition Theory Network Special Issue 0 0 1 14 1 1 2 77
Local and global consistency properties for student placement 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 33
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 156
Median Stable Matching for College Admissions 0 0 0 40 0 0 1 174
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 13 0 1 2 57
Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 34
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 42
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application 0 0 1 5 0 0 2 26
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples 0 1 3 19 0 1 4 110
Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 7
Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 56
Procedurally fair and stable matching 0 1 1 18 0 1 2 132
Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts 0 0 0 4 0 1 4 24
Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 406
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 127
Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 12
Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians 0 0 0 9 1 1 2 32
Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 1 1 11 0 2 4 85
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 47
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts 1 3 3 35 2 7 9 128
Stable matchings and preferences of couples 0 0 3 105 1 2 9 286
Stochastic stability for roommate markets 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 65
Stochastic stability in assignment problems 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 35
Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 23
Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped 0 0 1 39 0 0 1 167
Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments 0 1 1 82 0 1 1 772
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems 0 1 1 86 0 2 2 293
Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems 0 0 4 79 0 1 7 348
Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 51
The Role of Replication-Invariance: Two Answers Concerning the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 48
The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 86
The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 47
Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 52
original papers: Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited 0 0 1 34 0 0 1 296
Total Journal Articles 2 11 28 1,115 7 28 90 6,076

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Statistics updated 2023-05-07