Access Statistics for Bettina Klaus

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Fair Marriages:" An Impossibility 0 0 0 107 0 1 8 301
A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets 0 0 0 80 1 3 17 195
A Characterization of the Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Housing Markets via Respecting-Improvement 0 0 1 16 3 6 26 48
A Dynamic Recontracting Process for Multiple-Type Housing Markets 0 0 0 31 1 1 12 157
A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division Problems 0 0 0 132 0 0 17 412
A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked 0 0 0 87 0 0 5 467
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities 0 0 1 146 0 1 9 309
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 9 0 1 14 74
Amartya Sen and World Food Day 2000 0 0 0 1 1 2 12 15
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods 0 0 0 208 0 0 8 632
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 14
Characterizing the Typewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets 0 0 0 10 0 1 11 25
Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences 0 0 0 7 1 2 9 16
Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited 0 0 1 118 0 0 14 269
Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets 0 0 0 27 0 0 14 125
Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets 0 0 0 54 0 0 10 160
Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets 0 0 0 54 0 0 9 191
Consistency and Monotonicity in One-Sided Assignment Problems 0 0 0 71 0 0 6 204
Consistency and Population Sensitivity Properties in Marriage and Roommate Markets 0 0 0 70 0 1 9 229
Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 22 0 0 8 51
Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 39 1 1 12 89
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 0 2 0 0 9 41
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 0 40 0 0 10 186
Consistent house allocation 0 0 0 27 1 2 11 158
Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences 0 0 2 19 0 1 18 62
Corrigendum to "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems" 0 0 0 38 0 0 17 126
Corrigendum to ''On Randomized Matching Mechanisms'' [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381] 0 0 0 74 0 1 8 358
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 8 0 0 9 58
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 23 0 0 7 115
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 83 0 0 14 346
Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples 0 0 0 78 0 0 7 266
Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 67
Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods 0 0 0 78 1 2 9 264
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 25 0 1 8 222
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 246 0 0 8 1,515
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 40 0 1 11 251
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 1 7 0 0 8 64
Employment by Lotto Revisited 0 0 0 65 0 0 8 444
Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists 0 0 1 23 0 0 9 40
Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists 0 0 0 22 0 1 19 62
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples 0 0 0 2 0 2 8 64
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples 0 0 0 70 0 1 9 494
Farsighted House Allocation 0 0 0 48 0 3 17 139
Farsighted House Allocation 0 0 0 1 0 1 12 107
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 81 0 0 10 211
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 3 0 0 11 66
Hedonic Coalition Formation Games with Variable Populations: Core Characterizations and (Im)Possibilities 0 0 0 76 1 2 9 170
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance 0 0 0 34 0 0 12 57
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance 0 0 0 21 0 2 10 57
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (N.B.: This paper has been extended and results are now contained in working paper 14.08.) 1 1 1 30 1 1 9 95
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field 0 0 0 59 2 3 25 177
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field 0 0 0 33 0 0 18 125
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field 0 0 1 28 0 1 16 88
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field 0 0 0 51 0 0 32 238
How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field 1 1 1 14 2 4 28 91
Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement 0 0 0 7 0 0 10 89
Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement 0 0 0 76 0 3 12 183
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods 0 0 0 140 2 2 16 529
Matching under Preferences 0 0 1 81 0 1 8 169
Median Stable Matching for College Admission 0 0 0 225 1 1 6 868
Median Stable Matching for College Admission 0 0 0 8 0 0 7 72
Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism 0 0 0 50 1 4 14 121
Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism 0 0 0 4 0 0 12 28
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 21 1 2 19 106
Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 19
Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 34 0 1 9 112
Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 21
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability 0 0 0 42 0 1 13 114
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability 0 0 0 27 0 0 13 66
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability 0 0 0 37 0 1 17 71
Normative properties for object allocation problems: Characterizations and trade-offs 0 0 1 85 0 3 11 193
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics 0 0 0 131 1 1 13 396
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics 0 0 0 19 0 0 2 64
Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application 0 0 0 157 1 3 39 411
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics 0 0 0 6 0 1 15 49
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness:median-voting over intervals 0 0 0 17 0 0 18 44
Overtime and short-time with fluctuating absenteeism and demand 0 0 0 59 0 0 7 263
Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto efficiency in (probabilistic) object allocation 0 0 0 7 0 1 12 15
Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites 0 0 0 45 0 0 13 130
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples 0 0 1 10 0 1 6 55
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples 0 0 0 135 0 0 12 631
Paths to Stability in the Assignment Problem 0 0 0 49 0 0 11 142
Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems 0 0 0 14 1 1 13 56
Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 211
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules 0 0 0 37 1 1 17 273
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching 0 0 0 4 0 0 32 81
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching 0 0 0 184 0 0 10 681
Random Matching under Priorities: Stability and No Envy Concepts 0 0 1 28 1 1 9 84
Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good 0 0 0 15 0 0 14 215
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation 0 0 0 7 1 1 16 74
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 0 34 0 0 14 232
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 0 13 0 0 9 180
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 0 161 0 1 18 730
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices 0 0 1 114 2 2 21 290
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices 0 0 0 33 0 2 7 74
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices:Heterogeneous Objects 0 0 0 47 0 0 14 115
Smith and Rawls Share a Room 0 0 0 1 1 1 14 57
Smith and Rawls Share a Room 0 0 0 66 0 1 11 165
Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians 0 0 0 71 0 0 9 151
Smith and Rawls share a room 0 0 0 56 0 0 9 219
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians 2 2 2 205 2 4 15 471
Solidarity Properties of Choice Correspondences 0 0 0 43 2 2 6 91
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: Characterizing target set correspondences 0 0 0 81 0 1 7 184
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences 0 0 0 54 0 3 10 51
Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 0 0 7 0 0 11 67
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 0 0 253 0 0 7 993
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples 0 0 0 45 0 2 12 204
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples 0 0 0 28 1 1 13 114
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts 0 0 0 107 2 3 14 240
Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 6 0 1 20 76
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts 0 0 1 84 0 1 15 376
Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems 0 0 0 4 0 1 15 25
Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems 0 0 0 40 0 0 18 135
Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 10 0 1 14 78
Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems 0 0 0 23 2 2 20 129
Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems 0 0 0 64 2 3 29 101
Stochastic stability for roommate markets 0 0 0 133 0 1 14 303
Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 13 0 1 16 74
Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 19 0 1 10 108
Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 18 0 0 14 83
Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments 0 0 0 48 0 1 7 241
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 0 5 0 1 9 54
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 0 67 0 0 10 261
The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness 0 0 0 71 2 2 38 259
The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible 0 0 1 159 0 1 13 651
The core for housing markets with limited externalities 0 0 0 71 0 0 12 151
The evolution of roommate networks: a comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 0 49 0 0 7 219
The impact of price disclosure on dynamic shopping decisions 0 0 0 85 0 0 3 317
The role of regulatory capital in international bank mergers and acquisitions 0 0 0 91 1 1 17 436
The role of replication-invariance: two answers concerning the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked 0 0 0 50 0 1 9 386
Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants 0 1 2 57 0 2 17 180
Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants 0 0 1 150 0 0 16 408
Total Working Papers 4 5 22 7,241 45 124 1,674 27,122
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Fair marriages": An impossibility 0 0 0 18 1 2 9 104
A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences 0 0 0 7 0 0 11 62
A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement 0 0 0 1 0 0 15 18
A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets 0 0 0 10 0 0 8 78
A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems 0 0 0 27 0 1 20 111
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods 0 0 0 11 0 2 11 87
Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited 0 0 1 1 1 1 18 23
Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 16
Choice correspondences for public goods 0 0 0 19 0 0 6 173
Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object 0 0 0 32 0 1 11 145
Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems 0 0 2 40 0 2 13 160
Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets 0 0 0 5 1 1 9 57
Consistency and its converse for roommate markets 0 0 0 4 0 1 17 41
Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets 0 0 0 2 0 1 10 45
Consistency in one-sided assignment problems 0 0 1 9 0 0 3 53
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 0 25 2 2 18 124
Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences 0 0 2 2 1 2 16 16
Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106] 0 0 0 33 0 4 14 117
Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381] 0 0 0 14 0 0 10 134
Corrigendum to “Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems” 0 0 0 14 0 0 9 58
EMPLOYMENT BY LOTTO REVISITED 0 0 0 1 0 1 10 31
Efficient priority rules 0 0 1 54 0 0 6 176
Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists 0 0 0 2 0 1 17 37
Fair and efficient student placement with couples 0 0 1 8 0 0 10 69
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 2 0 0 11 52
Farsighted house allocation 0 0 1 2 0 0 17 66
Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities 0 0 0 8 0 1 7 63
How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field 0 0 1 5 0 2 19 62
Introduction to the Coalition Theory Network Special Issue 0 0 0 14 0 0 10 88
Local and global consistency properties for student placement 0 0 0 2 0 0 11 47
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods 0 0 0 26 0 1 6 163
Median Stable Matching for College Admissions 0 0 0 40 0 0 10 188
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 0 0 0 13 0 0 9 71
Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability 0 0 0 4 0 0 9 45
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics 0 0 0 14 1 2 15 67
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application 0 0 0 6 0 1 12 43
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals 0 0 1 2 1 3 14 26
Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto efficiency in (probabilistic) object allocation 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples 0 0 0 21 1 2 18 133
Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems 0 0 0 2 0 0 7 24
Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules 0 0 0 11 0 0 5 63
Procedurally fair and stable matching 0 0 0 18 0 0 13 148
Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts 0 0 1 8 0 0 13 46
Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good 0 0 0 45 0 0 9 419
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems 0 0 0 26 0 2 17 147
Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices 0 0 0 2 0 0 19 34
Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 20
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians 0 0 0 9 0 1 11 52
Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 14
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 18
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 0 0 13 0 0 10 101
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples 0 0 0 8 0 1 8 59
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts 0 0 1 42 2 2 15 164
Stable matchings and preferences of couples 0 0 0 106 0 2 11 303
Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 19
Stochastic stability for roommate markets 0 0 0 8 0 0 23 92
Stochastic stability in assignment problems 0 0 0 4 0 0 18 54
Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped 1 1 1 44 2 3 16 196
Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments 0 0 0 83 0 0 11 785
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems 1 1 1 90 1 1 15 315
Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems 0 0 0 84 0 0 14 376
Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces 0 0 0 11 1 1 9 62
The Role of Replication-Invariance: Two Answers Concerning the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked 0 0 0 9 0 0 8 56
The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible 0 0 0 15 0 0 8 98
The core for housing markets with limited externalities 0 0 0 0 1 1 17 22
The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness 0 0 0 7 1 4 20 72
Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants 0 0 0 8 0 1 13 73
original papers: Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited 0 0 0 34 0 0 13 312
Total Journal Articles 2 2 15 1,186 20 57 810 7,194
2 registered items for which data could not be found
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Statistics updated 2026-10-11