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A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets |
0 |
0 |
12 |
79 |
1 |
3 |
32 |
172 |
A Characterization of the Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Housing Markets via Respecting-Improvement |
2 |
15 |
15 |
15 |
3 |
19 |
19 |
19 |
A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
315 |
A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
A Dual Egalitarian Solution |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
A Dual Egalitarian Solution |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
A Many-to-Many "Rural Hospital Theorem" |
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0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
128 |
A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
102 |
A dual egalitarian solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
A game theoretic approach to assignment problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
Academic Integrity in On-line Exams: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
59 |
Affirmative Action through Minority Reserves: An Experimental Study on School Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
154 |
Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
Assignment games satisfy the CoMa property |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
101 |
Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
211 |
Balancedness of Permutation Games and Envy-Free Allocations in Indivisible Good Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
Balancedness of Permutation Games and Envy-Free Allocations in Indivisible Good Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
Balancedness of permutation games and envy-free allocations in indivisible good economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
Characterizations of a Multi-Choice Value |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
Characterizations of a Multi-Choice Value |
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0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
Characterizations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
Characterizations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
Characterizing the Typewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets |
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0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogenous Workers with Preferences over Peers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
Constrained School Choice |
1 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
190 |
Constrained School Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
192 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
594 |
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental QRE Analysis |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
38 |
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
72 |
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
187 |
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
386 |
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
199 |
Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences |
0 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
39 |
Corrigendum to ''On Randomized Matching Mechanisms'' [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381] |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
350 |
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
46 |
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
331 |
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
108 |
Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
258 |
Distribution Center Consolidation Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
85 |
Distribution Center Consolidation Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
202 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
718 |
Employment by Lotto Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
436 |
Employment by Lotto Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Objects: An Algorithm and an Application |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Objects: An Algorithm and an Application |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
86 |
Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples |
0 |
1 |
1 |
70 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
484 |
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
53 |
Farsighted House Allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
Farsighted House Allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
94 |
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
201 |
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
34 |
Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
170 |
Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
85 |
Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
319 |
Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey |
0 |
0 |
2 |
144 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
357 |
Median Stable Matching for College Admission |
0 |
0 |
0 |
225 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
861 |
Median Stable Matching for College Admission |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
65 |
Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
105 |
Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
99 |
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
51 |
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
On Games corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Precedence Relations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
492 |
On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
44 |
On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
On a new class of parallel sequencing situations and related games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
On the Balancedness of M-Sequencing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
On the Balancedness of M-Sequencing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
117 |
On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets |
0 |
1 |
1 |
52 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
66 |
On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
124 |
On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
Online Academic Exams: Does Multiplicity of Exam Versions Mitigate Cheating? |
1 |
1 |
14 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
20 |
Outsourcing with Identical Suppliers and Shortest-First Policy: A Laboratory Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
619 |
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
145 |
Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
245 |
Price of Anarchy in Sequencing Situations and the Impossibility to Coordinate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
48 |
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
184 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
670 |
Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
46 |
Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
75 |
School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
81 |
School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
47 |
School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
54 |
Sequencing Games without Initial Order |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
986 |
Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
30 |
Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
38 |
Smith and Rawls Share a Room |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
43 |
Smith and Rawls Share a Room |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
153 |
Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
Smith and Rawls share a room |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
210 |
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians |
0 |
0 |
0 |
203 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
455 |
Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
56 |
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
253 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
983 |
Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
109 |
Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
149 |
Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
61 |
Stochastic stability for roommate markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
133 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
288 |
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
251 |
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
The egalitarian solution for convex games: Some characterizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
The evolution of roommate networks: a comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
212 |
Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
Total Working Papers |
4 |
20 |
61 |
4,401 |
25 |
64 |
245 |
16,952 |