Access Statistics for Flip Klijn

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets 0 0 0 80 2 5 14 189
A Characterization of the Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Housing Markets via Respecting-Improvement 0 0 1 16 5 8 17 38
A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects 0 0 0 70 2 2 7 322
A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects 0 0 0 1 3 4 6 38
A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects 0 0 0 1 2 4 7 24
A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects 0 0 0 1 3 3 6 11
A Dual Egalitarian Solution 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 29
A Dual Egalitarian Solution 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem' 0 0 0 15 2 5 15 144
A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem' 0 0 0 29 1 7 12 114
A dual egalitarian solution 0 0 0 1 1 2 6 33
A game theoretic approach to assignment problems 0 0 0 5 3 3 7 31
Academic Integrity in On-line Exams: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment 0 0 0 20 4 4 17 76
Affirmative Action through Minority Reserves: An Experimental Study on School Choice 0 0 1 33 3 6 14 171
Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core 0 0 0 14 2 6 20 65
Assignment games satisfy the CoMa property 0 0 0 3 2 2 3 23
Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint 0 0 0 14 1 4 9 110
Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint 0 0 0 16 4 4 4 64
Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint 0 0 0 59 3 6 12 223
Balanced Exchange in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market 0 0 1 1 2 4 10 13
Balancedness of Permutation Games and Envy-Free Allocations in Indivisible Good Economies 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 24
Balancedness of Permutation Games and Envy-Free Allocations in Indivisible Good Economies 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 9
Balancedness of permutation games and envy-free allocations in indivisible good economies 0 0 0 0 2 3 10 24
Characterizations of a Multi-Choice Value 0 0 0 0 3 3 7 12
Characterizations of a Multi-Choice Value 0 0 0 5 0 2 10 43
Characterizations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex Games 0 0 0 2 1 2 6 23
Characterizations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex Games 0 0 0 0 4 4 9 16
Characterizing the Typewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets 0 0 0 10 1 3 10 22
Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogenous Workers with Preferences over Peers 0 0 0 35 2 5 15 54
Constrained School Choice 0 0 0 193 2 12 20 615
Constrained School Choice 0 1 1 22 1 6 20 212
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental QRE Analysis 0 0 0 11 1 8 21 59
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 12 6 22 58 247
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study 0 0 1 7 2 6 12 88
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 130 3 5 14 400
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study 1 1 1 57 4 5 20 219
Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences 0 1 4 18 1 8 20 59
Corrigendum to ''On Randomized Matching Mechanisms'' [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381] 0 0 0 74 1 1 7 357
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 8 1 2 9 57
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 23 0 1 6 114
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 83 3 5 13 344
Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples 0 0 0 78 3 3 8 266
Distribution Center Consolidation Games 0 0 0 202 6 7 27 746
Employment by Lotto Revisited 0 0 0 65 0 0 7 443
Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Objects: An Algorithm and an Application 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5
Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Objects: An Algorithm and an Application 0 0 0 3 1 2 4 32
Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists 0 0 0 22 3 4 10 39
Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists 0 0 0 22 7 8 16 59
Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare 0 0 0 27 2 3 17 77
Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare 0 0 0 24 2 14 25 111
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare 0 0 0 1 2 4 7 21
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples 0 0 0 70 1 1 8 493
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples 0 0 0 2 2 3 8 62
Farsighted House Allocation 0 0 0 1 3 6 11 106
Farsighted House Allocation 0 0 0 48 2 3 13 134
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 3 4 9 11 66
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 81 1 3 9 210
Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance 0 0 0 30 7 11 21 66
Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance 0 0 0 27 1 1 13 47
Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement 0 0 0 76 1 2 9 179
Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement 0 0 0 7 0 1 7 86
Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests 0 0 0 18 1 4 9 94
Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment 0 0 0 78 0 1 7 326
Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey 0 0 1 146 3 9 15 374
Median Stable Matching for College Admission 0 0 0 8 4 4 7 72
Median Stable Matching for College Admission 0 0 0 225 0 0 5 867
Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism 0 0 0 50 1 4 11 116
Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism 0 0 0 4 1 4 13 27
Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution 0 0 0 1 2 2 4 31
Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 10
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability 0 0 0 42 4 7 11 112
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability 0 0 0 37 2 6 16 69
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability 0 0 0 27 1 3 12 64
On Games corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Precedence Relations 0 0 0 68 5 7 10 503
On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games 0 0 0 3 3 4 7 51
On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 6
On a new class of parallel sequencing situations and related games 0 0 0 1 1 3 7 38
On the Balancedness of M-Sequencing Games 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 18
On the Balancedness of M-Sequencing Games 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 7
On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 8
On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 20
On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets 0 0 0 52 3 7 13 79
On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets 0 0 0 25 1 2 14 131
On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 7
On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 24
On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 17 0 1 10 135
On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 4
On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games 0 0 0 5 7 8 14 37
Online Academic Exams: Does Multiplicity of Exam Versions Mitigate Cheating? 0 0 0 14 5 7 45 66
Outsourcing with Identical Suppliers and Shortest-First Policy: A Laboratory Experiment 0 0 0 18 3 6 15 49
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples 0 0 0 135 0 2 10 629
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples 0 0 1 10 1 3 5 54
Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment 0 0 0 40 4 4 5 150
Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment 0 0 0 11 3 4 19 83
Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment 0 0 0 64 1 1 6 251
Price of Anarchy in Sequencing Situations and the Impossibility to Coordinate 0 0 0 24 3 4 7 71
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching 0 0 0 184 2 5 7 677
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching 0 0 0 4 11 16 31 80
Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems 0 0 0 24 2 2 10 85
Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems 0 0 0 8 2 3 8 54
Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems 0 0 0 17 4 7 13 52
School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms 0 0 0 26 1 5 10 91
School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms 0 0 0 6 3 6 11 59
School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms 0 0 0 27 3 3 11 66
Sequencing Games without Initial Order 0 0 0 84 4 7 14 1,000
Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market 0 0 0 13 1 7 19 50
Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange 0 0 1 4 7 8 27 65
Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange 0 0 0 7 2 3 8 24
Smith and Rawls Share a Room 0 0 0 66 2 2 10 164
Smith and Rawls Share a Room 0 0 0 1 6 8 13 56
Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians 0 0 0 71 6 6 10 151
Smith and Rawls share a room 0 0 0 56 4 6 9 219
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians 0 0 0 203 2 3 12 467
Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 0 0 7 3 5 11 67
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 0 0 253 2 3 10 993
Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 0 6 2 11 19 75
Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment 0 0 0 46 5 13 30 180
Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment 0 0 0 44 3 8 28 138
Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 10 2 6 14 77
Stochastic stability for roommate markets 0 0 0 133 4 7 12 301
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 0 67 2 4 9 260
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 0 5 2 2 9 52
The egalitarian solution for convex games: Some characterizations 0 0 0 0 3 6 9 19
The evolution of roommate networks: a comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 0 49 3 3 7 219
Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model 0 0 0 2 1 2 5 29
Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model 0 0 0 0 1 2 20 24
Total Working Papers 1 3 13 4,404 301 564 1,468 18,348
3 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO QUEUE ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE OBJECTS 0 0 0 1 1 3 5 24
A Dual Egalitarian Solution 0 0 0 80 1 1 9 577
A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement 0 0 1 1 2 5 17 18
A comment on "School choice: An experimental study" [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231] 0 0 0 22 2 5 12 302
A many-to-many ‘rural hospital theorem’ 0 0 0 2 3 8 18 57
A selfish allocation heuristic in scheduling: Equilibrium and inefficiency bound analysis 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 14
Academic integrity in on-line exams: Evidence from a randomized field experiment 0 0 1 8 6 9 17 32
Affirmative action through minority reserves: An experimental study on school choice 0 0 0 14 3 4 13 76
Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core 0 0 0 1 3 4 8 13
An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money 0 0 0 114 0 2 9 348
Assignment Games Satisfy the CoMa-Property 0 0 0 38 2 2 4 169
Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint 0 0 0 6 0 2 9 56
Balancedness of permutation games and envy-free allocations in indivisible good economies 0 0 0 8 4 6 13 109
Characterizations of a multi-choice value 0 0 0 45 1 1 5 255
Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets 0 0 0 0 1 5 10 13
Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers 0 0 0 3 1 6 10 27
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 77 2 3 14 348
Constrained school choice 0 1 4 161 3 6 24 481
Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis 0 0 0 1 1 6 22 27
Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences 1 1 2 2 5 7 13 13
Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106] 0 0 0 33 3 3 10 113
Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381] 0 0 0 14 2 3 9 133
EMPLOYMENT BY LOTTO REVISITED 0 0 0 1 3 4 10 30
Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists 0 0 0 2 3 6 15 34
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare 0 0 0 13 0 1 5 60
Fair and efficient student placement with couples 0 0 1 8 1 4 10 69
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 0 0 0 2 1 4 10 51
Farsighted house allocation 0 1 1 2 4 8 17 64
Implementation of optimal schedules in outsourcing with identical suppliers 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 16
Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance 0 0 1 11 0 0 10 50
Local and global consistency properties for student placement 0 0 0 2 2 3 11 46
MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY 0 0 0 8 2 2 14 49
Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests 0 0 0 3 1 2 5 36
Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment 0 0 0 5 2 2 6 100
Median Stable Matching for College Admissions 0 0 0 40 2 5 11 188
Neighbor games and the leximax solution 0 0 0 0 3 4 19 31
Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability 0 0 0 4 2 4 9 44
On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games 0 1 1 2 2 8 16 32
On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games 0 0 0 0 3 3 6 18
On the balancedness of multiple machine sequencing games 0 0 1 12 1 2 12 74
On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable 0 0 0 10 0 1 5 52
On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 7 2 2 14 64
On the nucleolus of neighbor games 0 0 0 8 3 4 6 118
Online academic exams: Does multiplicity of exam versions mitigate cheating? 0 0 1 2 11 12 28 30
Outsourcing with identical suppliers and shortest-first policy: a laboratory experiment 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 42
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples 0 0 0 21 1 11 15 130
Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment 0 1 2 50 3 4 16 256
Procedurally fair and stable matching 0 0 0 18 0 1 12 147
School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms 0 0 0 0 5 12 19 28
Sequencing games without initial order 0 0 0 0 3 3 5 17
Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market 0 0 0 0 2 2 12 15
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians 0 0 0 9 4 5 11 51
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 0 0 13 3 4 10 101
Stable matchings and preferences of couples 0 0 0 106 0 1 9 301
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment 0 0 0 11 5 9 21 107
Stochastic stability for roommate markets 0 0 0 8 1 13 23 92
The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs 0 0 0 5 0 2 10 39
The egalitarian solution for convex games: some characterizations 0 0 0 15 1 3 7 89
Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model 0 0 0 28 5 6 12 147
Total Journal Articles 1 5 16 1,058 131 252 687 6,023

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06