Access Statistics for Ville Pentti Korpela

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying 0 0 0 57 0 0 2 171
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs 0 1 1 4 0 1 1 12
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 4
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 8
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 21
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 13
An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 0 6 0 1 2 6
An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 1 9 0 0 1 12
An implementation approach to rotation programs 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 9
Behavioral Strong Implementation 0 0 0 23 2 4 8 50
Behavioral Strong Implementation 0 1 1 30 1 3 4 104
Designing Rotation Programs: Limits and Possibilities 0 0 0 6 2 3 4 10
Do Coalitions Matter in Designing Institutions? 0 1 1 43 3 5 7 31
Implementation in vNM Stable Set 0 0 0 6 0 1 3 3
Implementation in vNM Stable Set 0 0 0 12 1 1 4 32
Implementation in vNM stable sets 0 0 0 9 0 1 3 9
Implementation with farsighted agents 0 0 0 12 0 0 4 50
Implementation with foresighted agents 0 0 0 8 0 1 4 13
Iterative Monotonicity Is Equivalent To Strict Group Monotonicity: A Direct Proof 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 4
Mechanism design with farsighted agents 0 0 0 31 0 1 1 33
Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry 0 0 0 28 0 0 3 62
Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility 0 0 0 47 1 1 2 91
Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 3
Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 1 10 1 1 4 15
Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation 0 1 1 3 0 1 3 7
Total Working Papers 0 4 6 369 12 27 66 780

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation 0 0 0 36 0 0 2 116
All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with a Social Norm against Lying 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 33
Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals 0 0 0 13 1 1 5 76
Behavioral strong implementation 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 7
Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 10
Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 12
Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? 0 1 1 7 0 1 3 29
Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 16
Implementation without rationality assumptions 0 0 1 38 1 1 3 109
Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Nash implementation theory -- A note on full characterizations 0 0 1 17 1 1 5 79
Procedurally fair implementation under complete information 1 1 1 7 1 2 4 38
The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 7
Two-player rationalizable implementation 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 5
Total Journal Articles 1 2 4 127 6 20 44 538

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Statistics updated 2025-11-08