Access Statistics for Sebastian Kranz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Airport Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture 0 0 0 5 2 4 5 34
Capacity Mechanisms and Effects on Market Structure 0 0 1 28 4 7 9 55
Capacity Mechanisms and Effects on Market Structure 0 0 0 18 1 7 8 69
Decision Structures in Franchise Systems of the Plural Form 0 0 0 67 1 5 8 409
Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers 0 0 0 22 0 8 11 75
Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers 0 0 0 18 2 9 11 54
From Replications to Revelations: Heteroskedasticity-Robust Inference 1 1 2 2 1 10 11 11
From Replications to Revelations: Heteroskedasticity-Robust Inference 0 0 0 15 0 7 16 33
From Replications to Revelations: Heteroskedasticity-Robust Inference 0 0 1 1 1 6 12 14
Imperfect Legal Unbundling of Monopolistic Bottlenecks 0 0 0 62 0 3 4 233
In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers 0 0 1 27 0 6 11 151
Legal Unbundling can be a Golden Mean between Vertical Integration and Separation 0 0 0 108 0 2 8 333
Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society 0 0 0 83 0 13 14 346
Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society 0 0 1 148 2 5 16 792
Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games 0 0 0 88 2 2 4 285
Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games 0 0 0 21 0 8 12 136
Predatory Short Sales and Bailouts 0 0 0 11 1 3 8 62
Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations 0 0 0 27 1 5 7 66
Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up 0 0 0 47 0 2 3 149
Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up 0 0 0 25 0 6 9 47
Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up 0 0 0 19 5 10 11 73
Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments 0 0 0 63 1 7 7 208
Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture 0 0 0 69 2 3 6 183
Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture 0 0 0 31 0 6 8 79
Total Working Papers 1 1 6 1,005 26 144 219 3,897

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts 0 0 0 14 0 6 7 101
Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers 0 0 0 4 1 5 9 37
Imperfect legal unbundling of monopolistic bottlenecks 0 0 0 27 1 5 7 104
Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers 0 0 2 59 3 12 24 182
Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separation 0 0 0 98 0 3 6 247
Methods Matter: p-Hacking and Publication Bias in Causal Analysis in Economics: Comment 0 3 5 27 3 12 23 117
Moral norms in a partly compliant society 0 0 0 35 0 7 12 244
Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games 1 1 2 37 3 7 14 176
Predatory Short Sales and Bailouts 0 0 0 0 1 6 8 12
Predatory Short Sales and Bailouts 0 0 0 2 0 6 11 20
Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations 0 0 1 3 0 2 5 16
Renegotiation-proof relational contracts 0 0 0 14 5 15 20 85
Social Planning with Partial Knowledge of Social Interactions. Comment 0 0 0 26 1 3 4 108
Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture 0 0 0 2 1 5 9 24
Total Journal Articles 1 4 10 348 19 94 159 1,473

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04