Access Statistics for Sebastian Kranz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Airport Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 35
Capacity Mechanisms and Effects on Market Structure 0 0 0 28 0 1 15 63
Capacity Mechanisms and Effects on Market Structure 0 0 0 18 0 0 13 74
Decision Structures in Franchise Systems of the Plural Form 0 0 0 67 1 2 11 413
Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers 0 0 0 18 0 0 16 61
Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers 0 0 0 22 0 1 11 77
From Replications to Revelations: Heteroskedasticity-Robust Inference 0 0 1 1 2 2 17 22
From Replications to Revelations: Heteroskedasticity-Robust Inference 0 0 2 2 0 2 21 21
From Replications to Revelations: Heteroskedasticity-Robust Inference 0 0 0 15 0 0 14 35
Imperfect Legal Unbundling of Monopolistic Bottlenecks 0 0 0 62 0 1 12 241
In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers 0 0 0 27 0 0 15 158
Legal Unbundling can be a Golden Mean between Vertical Integration and Separation 0 0 0 108 0 0 8 339
Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society 0 0 0 83 1 2 21 353
Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society 0 0 1 148 1 1 17 796
Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games 0 0 0 21 1 1 15 140
Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games 0 0 0 88 0 0 4 285
Predatory Short Sales and Bailouts 0 0 0 11 0 0 11 65
Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations 0 0 0 27 0 1 16 76
Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up 0 1 1 48 0 1 11 157
Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up 0 0 0 19 0 0 14 77
Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up 0 0 0 25 0 0 11 51
Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments 0 0 0 63 0 0 11 212
Tradeable Import Certificates: A Promising Instrument to Support Domestic Production in Strategic Sectors? 0 0 3 3 2 2 14 14
Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture 0 0 0 31 0 0 8 81
Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture 0 0 0 69 0 0 4 183
Total Working Papers 0 1 8 1,009 8 17 315 4,029

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts 0 0 0 14 0 1 18 112
Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers 0 0 0 4 0 0 15 45
Imperfect legal unbundling of monopolistic bottlenecks 0 0 0 27 0 0 8 106
Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers 0 0 1 59 0 0 25 188
Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separation 0 0 0 98 0 1 6 249
Methods Matter: p-Hacking and Publication Bias in Causal Analysis in Economics: Comment 0 0 6 29 4 7 29 129
Moral norms in a partly compliant society 0 0 0 35 0 1 15 248
Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games 0 0 3 38 0 0 16 180
Predatory Short Sales and Bailouts 0 0 0 2 0 0 12 22
Predatory Short Sales and Bailouts 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 16
Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 16
Renegotiation-proof relational contracts 0 0 0 14 0 0 28 95
Social Planning with Partial Knowledge of Social Interactions. Comment 0 0 0 26 0 0 8 112
Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture 0 0 0 2 0 0 7 25
Total Journal Articles 0 0 10 351 4 11 201 1,543

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Statistics updated 2026-09-10