Access Statistics for Takashi Kunimoto

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies 0 0 0 13 0 0 2 65
A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies 0 0 0 17 0 0 2 78
Bargaining and Competition Revisited 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 228
Compellingness in Nash Implementation 0 0 10 10 1 2 7 7
Compellingness in Nash Implementation 0 0 1 23 0 0 1 8
Continuous Implementation with Small Transfers 0 0 0 15 1 2 2 16
Efficient Bilateral Trade via Two-Stage Mechanisms under One- Sided Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 13
Efficient Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: The Use of Two-Stage Mechanisms 1 1 1 18 1 1 2 26
Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design Abstract: We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robust monotonicity and robust measurability have been shown to be necessary for robust (full) exact and virtual implementation, respectively. This paper shows that while violations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily go away, we identify a mild condition on environments in which robust measurability is satisfied by all social choice functions over an open and dense subset of first-order types. We conclude that there is a precise sense in which robust virtual implementation can be significantly more permissive than robust exact implementation 0 0 0 9 0 1 4 197
Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design 0 0 0 43 0 1 1 105
Implementation with Transfers 0 0 0 44 1 1 3 95
Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 13
Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions 0 0 0 11 1 2 2 29
Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima 0 0 0 15 1 1 1 20
ON THE NON-ROBUSTNESS OF NASH IMPLEMENTATION 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 140
On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms 1 1 1 25 1 1 1 94
Order on Types based on Monotone Comparative Statics 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 34
Rationalizable Implementation in Finite Mechanisms 0 0 1 17 1 2 3 24
Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences 1 1 1 19 1 1 1 40
Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies 0 0 0 11 0 1 1 20
Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies 1 1 1 5 1 2 4 22
Robust Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies in General Mechanisms 0 0 0 17 0 0 3 24
Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 159
Robust implementation in rationalizable strategies in general mechanisms 0 0 1 1 2 2 9 9
Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine 0 0 0 110 0 0 0 318
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 2 16 0 3 7 97
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 10
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 16
THE ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 260
The interplay of interdependence and correlation in bilateral trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4
Total Working Papers 5 5 20 676 13 26 69 2,171
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 50
Bargaining and competition revisited 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 169
Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 9
Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: Comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments 0 0 2 3 0 2 5 9
Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work 0 0 1 4 3 7 15 46
Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 78
Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 51
Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 12
On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms 0 0 0 1 0 1 5 11
Order on types based on monotone comparative statics 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 15
Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 14
Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 8
Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine 0 0 2 27 0 0 3 118
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 2 33 2 4 15 244
Total Journal Articles 0 1 9 149 6 19 55 836
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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Statistics updated 2025-03-03