| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A trust game in loss domain |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
95 |
| Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
793 |
| Balanced Scorecards: A Relational Contract Approach |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
2 |
3 |
17 |
44 |
| Conspiracy against the public - An experiment on collusion11“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” (Adam Smith, (1776), pp. 111) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
4 |
27 |
107 |
| Cooperation in Knowledge-Intensive Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
140 |
| Cooperation versus Competition between Agents in Relational Contracts |
0 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
39 |
| Cost Structure and Vertical Integration between Farming and Processing |
0 |
0 |
3 |
97 |
1 |
3 |
28 |
390 |
| Do financial advisors exhibit myopic loss aversion? |
1 |
1 |
2 |
69 |
1 |
1 |
25 |
235 |
| Do norms matter for firm boundaries? |
1 |
1 |
1 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
150 |
| Does strategic kindness crowd out prosocial behavior? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
85 |
| Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting |
0 |
1 |
1 |
69 |
0 |
3 |
23 |
322 |
| Fair advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
37 |
| Hidden benefits of reward: A field experiment on motivation and monetary incentives |
0 |
0 |
14 |
132 |
3 |
5 |
45 |
439 |
| Incentive Provision when Contracting is Costly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
60 |
| Incentives to motivate |
0 |
0 |
2 |
50 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
212 |
| Leadership Styles and Labor Market Conditions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
26 |
| Myopic Investment Management |
1 |
1 |
5 |
149 |
3 |
4 |
14 |
448 |
| Myopic risk-taking in tournaments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
124 |
| No Guts, No Glory: An Experiment on Excessive Risk-Taking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
127 |
| Performance pay and dynamic social preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
77 |
| Playing the trust game with other people’s money |
0 |
1 |
1 |
35 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
180 |
| Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
53 |
| Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
198 |
| Relative performance feedback to teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
87 |
| Risk-taking on behalf of others |
1 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
3 |
4 |
29 |
84 |
| Self-enforcing contracts in agriculture |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
308 |
| Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
165 |
1 |
2 |
84 |
695 |
| The Rise of Individual Performance Pay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
115 |
| The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
88 |
| Tournaments with Prize‐setting Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
87 |
| Total Journal Articles |
4 |
6 |
40 |
1,157 |
19 |
50 |
610 |
5,845 |
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