| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A trust game in loss domain |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
6 |
7 |
92 |
| Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
5 |
10 |
14 |
787 |
| Balanced Scorecards: A Relational Contract Approach |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
4 |
8 |
18 |
38 |
| Conspiracy against the public - An experiment on collusion11“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” (Adam Smith, (1776), pp. 111) |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
8 |
19 |
91 |
| Cooperation in Knowledge-Intensive Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
138 |
| Cooperation versus Competition between Agents in Relational Contracts |
0 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
0 |
10 |
18 |
30 |
| Cost Structure and Vertical Integration between Farming and Processing |
0 |
1 |
1 |
95 |
1 |
12 |
18 |
377 |
| Do financial advisors exhibit myopic loss aversion? |
1 |
1 |
1 |
68 |
3 |
13 |
18 |
226 |
| Do norms matter for firm boundaries? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
144 |
| Does strategic kindness crowd out prosocial behavior? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
5 |
15 |
79 |
| Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
68 |
6 |
13 |
15 |
312 |
| Fair advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
7 |
12 |
31 |
| Hidden benefits of reward: A field experiment on motivation and monetary incentives |
0 |
1 |
17 |
131 |
4 |
6 |
44 |
427 |
| Incentive Provision when Contracting is Costly |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
2 |
11 |
16 |
57 |
| Incentives to motivate |
1 |
1 |
5 |
50 |
7 |
13 |
26 |
207 |
| Leadership Styles and Labor Market Conditions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
23 |
| Myopic Investment Management |
1 |
2 |
6 |
146 |
3 |
7 |
16 |
441 |
| Myopic risk-taking in tournaments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
13 |
17 |
123 |
| No Guts, No Glory: An Experiment on Excessive Risk-Taking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
9 |
11 |
15 |
118 |
| Performance pay and dynamic social preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
18 |
18 |
76 |
| Playing the trust game with other people’s money |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
3 |
7 |
12 |
174 |
| Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
47 |
| Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
3 |
11 |
12 |
192 |
| Relative performance feedback to teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
6 |
14 |
81 |
| Risk-taking on behalf of others |
0 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
0 |
10 |
21 |
71 |
| Self-enforcing contracts in agriculture |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
306 |
| Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
165 |
5 |
76 |
80 |
689 |
| The Rise of Individual Performance Pay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
107 |
| The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
84 |
| Tournaments with Prize‐setting Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
3 |
11 |
15 |
81 |
| Total Journal Articles |
3 |
7 |
44 |
1,142 |
65 |
322 |
517 |
5,649 |
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