Access Statistics for Roger Lagunoff

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 23 0 2 3 177
A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 29 1 5 8 146
A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary versus Involuntary Provision of Public Goods 0 0 1 312 1 4 7 1,453
A Model of Financial Fragility 0 0 0 701 2 7 16 1,788
A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty 0 0 0 415 0 3 6 1,138
A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods 0 0 0 560 0 1 3 2,227
A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 35 2 3 6 141
A model of financial fragility 0 0 0 465 3 9 13 1,516
An 'Anti-Folk Theorem' for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games' 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 254
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric? 0 0 0 43 0 1 3 188
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric? 0 0 0 103 0 4 4 427
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games 0 0 0 30 2 7 9 217
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games 0 0 0 261 0 2 3 1,030
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games' 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 180
Carbon Consumption, the Carbon-Based Ecosystem, and Output 0 0 0 21 0 5 11 61
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 31 0 3 11 155
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 37 1 8 9 133
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 35 0 2 4 162
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 30 1 2 5 100
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 76 1 4 9 588
Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: 'Whitewashes' and 'Coverups' 0 0 1 1 3 5 10 52
Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' 0 0 0 92 0 1 6 510
Credible Communication in Dynastic Government 0 0 0 42 0 11 15 353
Credible Communication in Dynastic Government 0 0 0 99 0 3 5 434
Credible Communication in Dynastic Government 0 0 0 22 0 1 4 281
Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Auditing, Disclosure, and Verification in Organizations 0 0 1 40 1 8 16 88
Do Actions Speak Louder than Words? 0 0 0 24 1 3 10 259
Dynamic Enfrachisement 0 0 1 18 0 3 6 205
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 1 51 0 5 9 234
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 1 26 0 2 4 163
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 0 27 0 0 7 269
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 0 58 2 8 11 466
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 0 42 0 7 10 375
Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons 0 0 0 15 4 17 21 83
Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons 0 0 1 32 0 10 12 69
Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons 0 0 0 25 1 6 7 97
Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions 0 0 0 44 1 7 12 221
Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions 0 0 0 176 0 5 8 564
Financial Fragility with Rational and Irrational Exuberance 0 0 0 435 0 5 6 1,602
Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance 0 0 0 179 2 9 11 779
Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games 0 0 0 287 0 1 7 877
International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency 0 0 0 154 1 1 7 984
International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency 0 0 0 93 1 5 8 662
Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions 0 0 0 83 0 10 14 245
Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions 0 0 0 227 4 11 15 669
Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions 0 0 0 92 3 9 14 281
Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games 0 0 1 273 1 4 10 1,178
Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games 0 0 0 28 1 5 8 106
On the 'Faustian' Dynamics of Policy and Political Power 0 0 0 108 0 5 11 370
On the Evolution of Pereto Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems 0 0 0 213 0 0 2 1,170
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 203 0 3 5 644
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 46 0 2 3 261
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 115 0 3 6 813
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 25 0 4 9 193
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 100 1 8 10 446
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 14
On the Size and Structure of Group cooperation 0 0 0 22 1 2 4 69
On the Social Stability of Coalitional Property Rights Regimes 0 0 0 134 1 3 4 750
On the ``Faustian Dynamics" of Policy and Political Power 0 0 0 0 1 6 14 108
On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provisions of public projects 0 0 0 64 1 5 7 522
On the “Faustian” Dynamics of Policy and Political Power 0 0 0 49 0 1 6 247
One Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 24 0 1 7 214
Optimal Collateralized Contracts 0 0 0 49 0 1 3 91
Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism 0 0 1 233 1 4 8 1,069
Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism 0 0 0 4 1 3 8 50
Power, Property Rights, and the Dynamics of Local Wealth Appropriation 1 2 5 27 1 5 13 98
Revealed Political Power 0 0 0 68 0 2 9 196
Revealed Political Power 0 0 0 0 1 11 18 60
Revealed Political Power 0 0 0 32 2 9 11 68
Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model 0 0 0 60 0 6 7 265
Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model 0 0 0 83 0 3 4 602
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 53 0 3 6 172
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 90 1 7 10 626
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 38 2 3 6 192
Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood Planning 0 0 0 288 0 5 7 1,080
Status Quo Property Protection in Politico-Legal Systems 0 0 1 10 0 3 7 40
Sufficiently Specialized Economies Have Nonempty Cores 0 0 0 60 0 2 2 680
Sufficiently Specialized Economies have Nonempty Cores' 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 177
The Design of Optimal Collateralized Contracts 0 0 0 47 1 1 4 120
The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions 0 0 0 54 2 6 10 339
The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions 0 1 2 104 0 2 7 318
The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies 1 1 3 41 2 6 11 83
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 67 4 8 12 426
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 39 2 7 9 233
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 116 1 3 7 578
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 1 20 1 4 13 247
Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Carbon Commons 0 0 0 32 0 7 9 79
Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Carbon Commons 0 0 0 12 2 4 7 41
Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Carbon Commons 0 0 0 23 0 3 8 61
social Norms, Local Interaction and Neighborhood Planning 0 0 0 78 0 3 6 369
Total Working Papers 2 4 21 8,723 69 410 735 38,368

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary vs. Involuntary Provision of Public Goods 0 0 0 37 0 8 15 205
A Model of Financial Fragility 0 0 1 322 2 11 26 765
A Simple Noncooperative Core Story 0 0 0 39 2 3 5 135
A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty 0 0 0 5 3 6 12 161
A Tiebout theory of public vs private provision of collective goods 0 0 0 65 0 4 12 340
A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games 0 0 0 16 1 3 7 106
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric? 0 0 0 23 0 2 4 247
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 248
Auditing, disclosure, and verification in decentralized decision problems 0 0 0 6 0 2 3 33
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 30 2 7 14 172
Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’ 0 0 0 10 3 4 8 125
Credible communication in dynastic government 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 40
Credible communication in dynastic government 0 0 0 20 1 2 6 156
DYNAMIC MECHANISM DESIGN FOR A GLOBAL COMMONS 0 0 0 2 0 4 8 17
Dynamic enfranchisement 0 0 1 84 1 3 10 280
Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions 0 0 0 48 3 8 12 162
Evolution in Mechanisms for Public Projects 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 166
Financial Fragility with Rational And Irrational Exuberance 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 323
Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance 0 0 0 0 0 6 9 283
Fully Endogenous Mechanism Selection on Finite Outcome Sets 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 127
Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games 0 0 0 0 1 9 14 196
International versus domestic auditing of bank solvency 0 0 0 30 1 6 10 293
Markov Perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games 0 1 1 7 0 8 13 88
NSF conference on decentralization 0 0 0 5 0 5 7 53
On the Evolution of Pareto-Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems 0 0 0 29 0 2 3 277
On the Faustian Dynamics of Policy and Political Power 0 0 0 68 0 5 11 307
On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects 0 0 0 14 0 0 2 105
On the size and structure of group cooperation 0 0 0 68 0 5 6 193
On the social stability of coalitional property rights regimes 0 0 0 26 0 4 7 217
Optimal Collateralized Contracts 0 0 0 6 0 0 3 25
Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism 0 0 1 21 0 3 6 120
REVEALED POLITICAL POWER 0 0 1 2 0 3 5 9
Resilient Allocation Rules for Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 13 1 2 4 63
SOCIAL NORMS, LOCAL INTERACTION, AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING * 0 0 0 70 2 6 8 408
Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model 0 0 0 29 0 2 3 156
Social Memory, Evidence, and Conflict 0 0 0 77 1 3 6 473
Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights 0 0 0 10 0 1 4 69
Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights 0 0 0 9 0 2 7 67
Status Quo Property Protection in Politico-Legal Systems 0 0 1 4 0 3 8 15
The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies 0 0 1 4 1 3 11 26
Tipping points and business-as-usual in a global commons 0 0 0 8 0 2 7 34
Total Journal Articles 0 1 7 1,209 25 162 322 7,285

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’ 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 7
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 7

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Statistics updated 2026-04-09