Access Statistics for Roger Lagunoff

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 23 1 1 2 175
A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 29 0 2 2 140
A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary versus Involuntary Provision of Public Goods 0 0 0 311 0 0 2 1,447
A Model of Financial Fragility 0 0 0 701 3 3 6 1,776
A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty 0 0 0 415 0 0 1 1,132
A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods 0 0 0 560 0 0 1 2,225
A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 35 2 2 3 138
A model of financial fragility 0 0 1 465 1 2 5 1,507
An 'Anti-Folk Theorem' for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games' 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 248
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric? 0 0 0 43 0 1 1 186
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric? 0 0 0 103 0 0 0 423
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games 0 0 0 30 1 2 3 210
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games 0 0 0 261 0 1 1 1,028
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 174
Carbon Consumption, the Carbon-Based Ecosystem, and Output 0 0 0 21 0 5 5 55
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 76 2 3 3 582
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 31 3 5 7 150
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 158
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 30 1 1 3 96
Communication and Learning 0 0 1 37 0 1 5 125
Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: 'Whitewashes' and 'Coverups' 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 45
Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' 0 0 0 92 1 3 6 509
Credible Communication in Dynastic Government 0 0 0 99 0 1 2 430
Credible Communication in Dynastic Government 0 0 0 42 2 3 5 341
Credible Communication in Dynastic Government 0 0 0 22 0 1 2 279
Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Auditing, Disclosure, and Verification in Organizations 0 0 1 40 3 4 7 77
Do Actions Speak Louder than Words? 0 0 1 24 0 1 5 252
Dynamic Enfrachisement 0 0 1 18 0 1 3 202
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 0 27 4 4 5 266
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 0 58 2 2 2 457
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 0 50 0 0 2 226
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 0 42 1 1 3 367
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 1 1 26 0 1 2 160
Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons 0 0 1 32 1 1 3 59
Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons 0 0 0 15 2 2 3 65
Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons 0 0 0 25 1 1 2 91
Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions 0 0 0 44 3 3 3 212
Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions 0 0 0 176 1 1 2 558
Financial Fragility with Rational and Irrational Exuberance 0 0 0 435 0 0 2 1,597
Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance 0 0 0 179 0 0 2 768
Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games 0 0 1 287 4 4 6 875
International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency 0 0 0 93 1 1 1 655
International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency 0 0 0 154 3 4 5 982
Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions 0 0 0 92 2 3 6 271
Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions 0 0 1 227 3 3 4 657
Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions 0 0 0 83 2 3 4 235
Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games 0 0 0 28 0 1 2 100
Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games 0 1 1 273 1 4 5 1,172
On the 'Faustian' Dynamics of Policy and Political Power 0 0 0 108 2 2 4 363
On the Evolution of Pereto Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems 0 0 0 213 1 1 2 1,169
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 203 1 1 1 640
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 25 0 2 3 187
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 100 0 0 1 437
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 258
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 115 0 0 1 807
On the Size and Structure of Group cooperation 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 65
On the Social Stability of Coalitional Property Rights Regimes 0 0 0 134 0 0 1 746
On the ``Faustian Dynamics" of Policy and Political Power 0 0 0 0 3 4 5 99
On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provisions of public projects 0 0 0 64 2 2 2 517
On the “Faustian” Dynamics of Policy and Political Power 0 0 0 49 0 2 4 244
One Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 24 1 2 4 211
Optimal Collateralized Contracts 0 0 0 49 0 0 1 88
Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism 0 0 1 233 1 2 3 1,064
Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism 0 0 0 4 1 3 6 46
Power, Property Rights, and the Dynamics of Local Wealth Appropriation 0 0 4 25 1 2 9 90
Revealed Political Power 0 0 0 32 0 1 2 58
Revealed Political Power 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 47
Revealed Political Power 0 0 0 68 4 6 7 194
Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model 0 0 1 83 0 1 2 599
Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model 0 0 0 60 0 1 1 259
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 53 2 2 4 169
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 38 0 2 3 189
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 90 1 2 3 619
Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood Planning 0 0 0 288 1 1 2 1,075
Status Quo Property Protection in Politico-Legal Systems 0 0 1 10 0 1 4 36
Sufficiently Specialized Economies Have Nonempty Cores 0 0 0 60 0 0 1 678
Sufficiently Specialized Economies have Nonempty Cores' 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 173
The Design of Optimal Collateralized Contracts 0 0 0 47 0 2 4 119
The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions 0 0 1 103 1 2 6 316
The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions 0 0 0 54 0 0 4 332
The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies 0 2 2 40 0 2 8 76
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 39 1 1 2 226
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 1 1 1 20 5 5 6 239
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 67 1 1 2 415
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 116 2 3 4 574
Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Carbon Commons 0 0 0 32 0 1 1 71
Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Carbon Commons 0 0 0 23 3 3 4 57
Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Carbon Commons 0 0 0 12 2 2 3 37
social Norms, Local Interaction and Neighborhood Planning 0 0 0 78 0 0 2 365
Total Working Papers 1 5 22 8,717 90 149 279 37,849

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary vs. Involuntary Provision of Public Goods 0 0 0 37 0 2 6 196
A Model of Financial Fragility 0 1 2 322 1 7 16 752
A Simple Noncooperative Core Story 0 0 0 39 1 1 2 132
A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty 0 0 0 5 0 1 5 153
A Tiebout theory of public vs private provision of collective goods 0 0 0 65 1 1 4 331
A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games 0 0 0 16 1 3 4 102
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric? 0 0 0 23 2 2 3 245
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 244
Auditing, disclosure, and verification in decentralized decision problems 0 0 0 6 0 1 2 31
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 30 2 4 7 165
Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’ 0 0 0 10 0 1 4 119
Credible communication in dynastic government 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 38
Credible communication in dynastic government 0 0 0 20 1 3 5 154
DYNAMIC MECHANISM DESIGN FOR A GLOBAL COMMONS 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 11
Dynamic enfranchisement 0 1 2 84 0 2 5 273
Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions 0 0 0 48 2 2 4 154
Evolution in Mechanisms for Public Projects 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 164
Financial Fragility with Rational And Irrational Exuberance 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 318
Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 276
Fully Endogenous Mechanism Selection on Finite Outcome Sets 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 121
Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 187
International versus domestic auditing of bank solvency 0 0 0 30 0 1 2 285
Markov Perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games 0 0 0 6 0 1 4 79
NSF conference on decentralization 0 0 0 5 1 1 3 48
On the Evolution of Pareto-Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 274
On the Faustian Dynamics of Policy and Political Power 0 0 0 68 0 0 6 302
On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 104
On the size and structure of group cooperation 0 0 1 68 0 0 2 187
On the social stability of coalitional property rights regimes 0 0 0 26 0 1 3 213
Optimal Collateralized Contracts 0 0 0 6 2 2 2 24
Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism 0 0 1 21 0 1 4 117
REVEALED POLITICAL POWER 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 6
Resilient Allocation Rules for Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 13 1 1 3 61
SOCIAL NORMS, LOCAL INTERACTION, AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING * 0 0 0 70 0 0 1 400
Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model 0 0 0 29 1 1 3 154
Social Memory, Evidence, and Conflict 0 0 0 77 0 0 2 469
Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 67
Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights 0 0 0 9 1 1 4 64
Status Quo Property Protection in Politico-Legal Systems 0 0 2 4 0 2 5 10
The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies 0 0 2 4 0 3 8 21
Tipping points and business-as-usual in a global commons 0 0 0 8 0 2 4 31
Total Journal Articles 1 3 11 1,208 23 57 146 7,082

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06