Access Statistics for Roger Lagunoff

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 29 4 5 7 145
A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 23 1 2 2 176
A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary versus Involuntary Provision of Public Goods 0 1 1 312 3 5 6 1,452
A Model of Financial Fragility 0 0 0 701 5 13 16 1,786
A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty 0 0 0 415 2 5 5 1,137
A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods 0 0 0 560 0 1 2 2,226
A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 35 1 3 4 139
A model of financial fragility 0 0 1 465 5 6 10 1,512
An 'Anti-Folk Theorem' for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games' 0 0 0 0 2 5 7 252
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric? 0 0 0 43 1 2 3 188
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric? 0 0 0 103 3 3 3 426
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games 0 0 0 30 4 5 6 214
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games 0 0 0 261 2 2 3 1,030
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games' 0 0 0 0 6 6 6 180
Carbon Consumption, the Carbon-Based Ecosystem, and Output 0 0 0 21 4 5 10 60
Communication and Learning 0 0 1 37 7 7 10 132
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 76 1 5 6 585
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 35 1 3 3 161
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 31 3 8 11 155
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 30 1 4 5 99
Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: 'Whitewashes' and 'Coverups' 0 0 1 1 1 3 6 48
Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' 0 0 0 92 1 2 7 510
Credible Communication in Dynastic Government 0 0 0 99 2 3 4 433
Credible Communication in Dynastic Government 0 0 0 22 1 2 4 281
Credible Communication in Dynastic Government 0 0 0 42 11 14 15 353
Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Auditing, Disclosure, and Verification in Organizations 0 0 1 40 4 10 14 84
Do Actions Speak Louder than Words? 0 0 1 24 0 4 9 256
Dynamic Enfrachisement 0 0 1 18 0 0 3 202
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 0 42 5 7 8 373
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 1 1 51 5 8 9 234
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 0 58 5 8 8 463
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 0 27 0 7 7 269
Dynamic Enfranchisement 0 0 1 26 2 3 5 163
Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons 0 0 0 25 1 2 2 92
Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons 0 0 1 32 6 7 9 65
Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons 0 0 0 15 8 11 12 74
Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions 0 0 0 176 4 6 7 563
Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions 0 0 0 44 2 7 7 216
Financial Fragility with Rational and Irrational Exuberance 0 0 0 435 4 4 5 1,601
Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance 0 0 0 179 5 7 7 775
Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games 0 0 1 287 1 6 8 877
International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency 0 0 0 154 0 4 6 983
International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency 0 0 0 93 4 7 7 661
Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions 0 0 0 83 2 4 6 237
Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions 0 0 1 227 5 9 10 663
Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions 0 0 0 92 2 5 8 274
Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games 0 0 1 273 2 5 8 1,176
Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games 0 0 0 28 4 5 7 105
On the 'Faustian' Dynamics of Policy and Political Power 0 0 0 108 3 7 9 368
On the Evolution of Pereto Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems 0 0 0 213 0 2 2 1,170
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 25 3 5 8 192
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 115 2 5 6 812
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 46 1 2 2 260
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 100 6 7 8 444
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 203 1 3 3 642
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 14
On the Size and Structure of Group cooperation 0 0 0 22 0 2 2 67
On the Social Stability of Coalitional Property Rights Regimes 0 0 0 134 2 3 4 749
On the ``Faustian Dynamics" of Policy and Political Power 0 0 0 0 5 11 13 107
On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provisions of public projects 0 0 0 64 3 5 5 520
On the “Faustian” Dynamics of Policy and Political Power 0 0 0 49 0 2 6 246
One Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 0 0 0 24 1 4 7 214
Optimal Collateralized Contracts 0 0 0 49 1 3 4 91
Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism 0 0 0 4 2 4 7 49
Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism 0 0 1 233 3 5 7 1,068
Power, Property Rights, and the Dynamics of Local Wealth Appropriation 1 1 5 26 4 8 15 97
Revealed Political Power 0 0 0 0 6 9 14 55
Revealed Political Power 0 0 0 32 4 5 6 63
Revealed Political Power 0 0 0 68 0 4 7 194
Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model 0 0 0 60 6 6 7 265
Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model 0 0 1 83 3 3 5 602
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 53 2 4 6 171
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 38 1 1 4 190
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 90 5 6 8 624
Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood Planning 0 0 0 288 3 4 5 1,078
Status Quo Property Protection in Politico-Legal Systems 0 0 1 10 2 3 6 39
Sufficiently Specialized Economies Have Nonempty Cores 0 0 0 60 1 1 2 679
Sufficiently Specialized Economies have Nonempty Cores' 0 0 0 0 1 5 5 177
The Design of Optimal Collateralized Contracts 0 0 0 47 0 0 3 119
The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions 0 0 0 54 4 5 8 337
The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions 1 1 2 104 2 3 7 318
The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies 0 0 2 40 4 5 10 81
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 67 4 8 9 422
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 1 1 20 3 12 13 246
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 39 5 6 7 231
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 116 2 5 7 577
Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Carbon Commons 0 0 0 32 6 7 8 78
Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Carbon Commons 0 0 0 12 2 4 5 39
Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Carbon Commons 0 0 0 23 2 6 7 60
social Norms, Local Interaction and Neighborhood Planning 0 0 0 78 3 4 6 369
Total Working Papers 2 5 26 8,721 252 451 608 38,210

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary vs. Involuntary Provision of Public Goods 0 0 0 37 8 9 15 205
A Model of Financial Fragility 0 0 2 322 6 9 24 760
A Simple Noncooperative Core Story 0 0 0 39 1 2 3 133
A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty 0 0 0 5 1 3 7 156
A Tiebout theory of public vs private provision of collective goods 0 0 0 65 1 7 9 337
A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games 0 0 0 16 2 4 6 105
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric? 0 0 0 23 2 4 5 247
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 246
Auditing, disclosure, and verification in decentralized decision problems 0 0 0 6 1 1 3 32
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 30 5 7 12 170
Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’ 0 0 0 10 1 3 6 122
Credible communication in dynastic government 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 40
Credible communication in dynastic government 0 0 0 20 0 1 5 154
DYNAMIC MECHANISM DESIGN FOR A GLOBAL COMMONS 0 0 0 2 3 6 7 16
Dynamic enfranchisement 0 0 1 84 2 6 10 279
Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions 0 0 0 48 2 4 6 156
Evolution in Mechanisms for Public Projects 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 166
Financial Fragility with Rational And Irrational Exuberance 0 0 0 0 2 3 7 321
Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance 0 0 0 0 5 6 8 282
Fully Endogenous Mechanism Selection on Finite Outcome Sets 0 0 0 0 4 6 7 127
Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games 0 0 0 0 8 9 13 195
International versus domestic auditing of bank solvency 0 0 0 30 5 7 9 292
Markov Perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games 1 1 1 7 8 9 13 88
NSF conference on decentralization 0 0 0 5 5 6 8 53
On the Evolution of Pareto-Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems 0 0 0 29 1 2 2 276
On the Faustian Dynamics of Policy and Political Power 0 0 0 68 5 5 11 307
On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects 0 0 0 14 0 1 2 105
On the size and structure of group cooperation 0 0 0 68 4 5 6 192
On the social stability of coalitional property rights regimes 0 0 0 26 4 4 7 217
Optimal Collateralized Contracts 0 0 0 6 0 3 3 25
Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism 0 0 1 21 1 1 5 118
REVEALED POLITICAL POWER 0 1 1 2 1 3 3 7
Resilient Allocation Rules for Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 13 1 2 3 62
SOCIAL NORMS, LOCAL INTERACTION, AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING * 0 0 0 70 3 5 5 405
Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model 0 0 0 29 2 3 4 156
Social Memory, Evidence, and Conflict 0 0 0 77 1 2 4 471
Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights 0 0 0 10 0 2 3 68
Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights 0 0 0 9 2 4 7 67
Status Quo Property Protection in Politico-Legal Systems 0 0 1 4 2 4 7 14
The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies 0 0 1 4 2 4 10 25
Tipping points and business-as-usual in a global commons 0 0 0 8 2 3 7 34
Total Journal Articles 1 2 8 1,209 108 172 281 7,231

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’ 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 5
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 5

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2026-02-12