| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Deterrence, Lawsuits and Litigation Outcomes under Agency Problems and Court Errors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
411 |
| Effective Labor Relations Laws and Social Welfare |
0 |
1 |
1 |
40 |
1 |
8 |
10 |
89 |
| Exclusionary Vertical Restraints and Antitrust: Experimental Law and Economics Contributions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
244 |
| Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
124 |
| Financially-Constrained Lawyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
| Financially-Constrained Lawyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
60 |
| Financially-Constrained Lawyers: An Economic Theory of Legal Disputes |
1 |
1 |
2 |
36 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
74 |
| Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
48 |
| Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
96 |
| Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
4 |
4 |
5 |
108 |
| Law and Economics and Tort Litigation Institutions: Theory and Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
94 |
| Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
285 |
| Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
235 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
7 |
8 |
10 |
39 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
53 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
67 |
| Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
41 |
| Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
45 |
| Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
7 |
7 |
9 |
35 |
| Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Damage Caps under Self-Serving Bias |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
143 |
| Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Damage Caps under Self-Serving Bias |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
192 |
| Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
133 |
| Shotguns and Deadlocks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
124 |
| Split-Award Tort Reform and Settlement Outcomes: An Experimental Investigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
304 |
| Split-Award Tort Reform, Firm's Level of Care and Litigation Outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
350 |
| Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
70 |
| Tort Reform, Disputes and Belief Formation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
4 |
4 |
6 |
248 |
| Tort Reform, Disputes and Belief Formation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
168 |
| Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
109 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
532 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
2 |
5 |
1,037 |
52 |
97 |
169 |
4,437 |
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