| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Deterrence, Lawsuits and Litigation Outcomes under Agency Problems and Court Errors |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
400 |
| Effective Labor Relations Laws and Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
67 |
| Exclusionary Vertical Restraints and Antitrust: Experimental Law and Economics Contributions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
227 |
| Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
108 |
| Financially-Constrained Lawyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
55 |
| Financially-Constrained Lawyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
22 |
| Financially-Constrained Lawyers: An Economic Theory of Legal Disputes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
53 |
| Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
31 |
| Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
75 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
80 |
| Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
98 |
| Law and Economics and Tort Litigation Institutions: Theory and Experiments |
1 |
1 |
3 |
46 |
2 |
4 |
16 |
80 |
| Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
215 |
| Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
266 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency |
0 |
0 |
2 |
72 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
57 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
17 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
33 |
| Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
30 |
| Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
18 |
| Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
24 |
| Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Damage Caps under Self-Serving Bias |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
183 |
| Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Damage Caps under Self-Serving Bias |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
126 |
| Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
121 |
| Shotguns and Deadlocks |
0 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
101 |
| Split-Award Tort Reform and Settlement Outcomes: An Experimental Investigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
300 |
| Split-Award Tort Reform, Firm's Level of Care and Litigation Outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
340 |
| Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
60 |
| Tort Reform, Disputes and Belief Formation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
159 |
| Tort Reform, Disputes and Belief Formation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
239 |
| Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
3 |
6 |
14 |
479 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
2 |
12 |
1,008 |
43 |
64 |
238 |
3,989 |
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