Access Statistics for Jean Lainé

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Model of Electoral Competition 0 0 0 44 0 0 2 220
Choosing a Committee Under Majority Voting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples 0 0 0 14 0 1 1 27
Compromise in combinatorial vote 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hyper-Stable Social Welfare Functions 0 0 0 33 0 1 2 97
Hyper-stable collective rankings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Hyper-stable social welfare functions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
Metrizable preferences over preferences 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Minimally strategy-proof rank aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 4
Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Seperable Voting Rules and the Strong Referandum Paradox 0 1 1 25 0 1 3 107
Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 48
The strong referendum paradox 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Triple-Consistent Social Choice and the Majority Rule 0 0 0 9 0 2 3 70
Unanimity and the Anscombe’s Paradox 0 0 0 31 0 1 6 280
Vote Swapping in Representative Democracy 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 8
When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Total Working Papers 0 1 1 157 1 8 28 940

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples 0 0 1 6 0 0 1 29
Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions 0 0 0 34 0 0 1 117
Compromise in combinatorial vote 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox 0 0 0 68 0 0 0 253
Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Finitely optimal allocation in countably large-square exchange economies 0 0 0 12 1 1 2 43
Forums de consommation sur Internet. Un modèle évolutionniste 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 92
Forums de consommation sur Internet. Un modèle évolutionniste 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 44
Hyper-stable collective rankings 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 28
Hyper-stable social welfare functions 0 0 0 6 0 0 3 44
Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 43
Metrizable preferences over preferences 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 27
On Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in a market for pure indivisibles without money 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 47
On the Nash equilibrium property of an auction matching game 0 0 0 27 0 0 1 70
Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum 0 0 1 78 1 2 4 166
Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation 0 0 1 5 0 0 1 20
Representation in majority tournaments 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 57
Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 12
Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox 0 0 0 38 1 3 5 135
The Budget-Voting Paradox 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 67
The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples 0 0 0 66 0 0 1 230
The strong referendum paradox 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 28
Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 17
Unanimity and the Anscombe’s paradox 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 53
Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures 0 0 2 2 0 0 13 16
When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 7
Total Journal Articles 0 0 5 451 3 6 42 1,653

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5

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Statistics updated 2025-07-04