Access Statistics for Aymeric Lardon

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Partial Characterization of the Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-games with Transferable Technologies 0 0 0 63 1 2 2 77
A partial characterization of the core in Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with transferable technologies 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 21
An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 10
An Experiment on The Nash Program: A Comparison of Two Strategic Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 2
An Experiment on the Nash Program: Comparing two Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value 0 0 0 66 0 1 1 134
An Experimental Nash Program: A Comparison of Structured v.s. Semi-Structured Bargaining Experiments 1 1 1 6 3 5 7 14
An Optimization Characterization of the upper optimal complaint value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Concept of the Core of Games in Effectiveness Form 0 0 0 41 0 0 1 50
Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Core 0 0 0 18 2 3 4 35
Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Core 0 0 0 18 0 1 3 34
Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Core 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 20
Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Core Concept for Games in Effectiveness Form 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Core Concept for Games in Effectiveness Form 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 16
Axiomatic foundations of a unifying concept of the core of games in effectiveness form 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 18
Axiomatic foundations of a unifying concept of the core of games in effectiveness form 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 15
Coalitional Games and Oligopolies 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 10
Compromise for the Per Capita Complaint: An Optimization Characterization of Two Equalitarian Values 0 0 0 22 1 1 2 45
Compromise for the per Capita Complaint: an optimization CharaCterization of two equalitarian values 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 11
Convexity and the Shapley value in Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with Shubik's demand functions 0 0 1 82 1 3 5 116
Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products 0 0 0 41 0 1 2 81
Cournot oligopoly interval games 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11
Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the cores 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 67
Jeux de coalitions et oligopoles 0 0 0 28 1 4 4 65
On the Coalitional Stability of Monopoly Power in Differentiated Bertrand and Cournot Oligopolies 0 0 0 87 1 2 3 108
On the Internal and External Stability of Coalitions and Application to Group Purchasing Organizations 0 0 0 10 1 2 4 15
On the Internal and External Stability of Coalitions and Application to Group Purchasing Organizations 0 0 0 25 1 1 2 34
On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 17
Optimal Deterrence of Cooperation 0 0 0 22 0 1 2 23
Optimal Deterrence of Cooperation 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 23
Optimal Deterrence of Cooperation 0 0 0 46 4 5 5 58
Optimal Deterrence of Cooperation 0 0 0 18 0 3 4 31
Procedural and Optimization Implementation of the Weighted ENSC Value 0 0 0 19 1 6 7 61
Sharing a Polluted River under Waste Flow Control 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 86
Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games: characterization of the core and 1-concavity of the dual game 0 0 0 37 0 0 1 121
The Average Tree Solution for Multi-Choice Forest Games 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 45
The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 38
The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games 0 0 0 31 2 2 5 103
The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 5
The core of voting games: a partition approach 0 0 0 37 1 2 3 72
The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4
The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value 0 0 0 10 1 1 3 15
The gamma-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 63
The gamma-core of Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 26
The γ -core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 18
The γ-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 16
Unifying Axioms for Myopic Equilibrium Concepts 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 13
Total Working Papers 1 1 2 878 36 70 106 1,869
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 4
An Optimization Characterization of the upper optimal complaint value 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 12
An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 8
Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form 0 0 1 6 0 0 2 10
Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 32
Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the cores 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 17
Jeux de coalitions et oligopoles 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 9
On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies 0 0 0 5 1 3 7 35
Optimal deterrence of cooperation 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 30
Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value 0 0 1 3 0 2 8 31
Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 36
The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies 0 0 0 5 0 1 3 16
The Core of Voting Games: A Partition Approach 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 15
The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 47
The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value 0 0 0 3 2 3 4 10
The γ-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints 0 0 0 17 0 2 3 67
Total Journal Articles 0 0 2 63 8 20 47 379

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06