Access Statistics for Jacques Lawarree

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence 0 0 0 0 2 4 4 68
A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 331
Analysis of Electricity Market Rules and Their Effects on Strategic Behavior in a Non-Congestive Grid 0 0 0 120 3 4 5 422
Analysis of Electricity Market Rules and Their Effects on Strategic Behavior in a Non-Congestive Grid 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 42
Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils 0 0 0 77 2 5 9 590
Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 0 18 5 10 12 155
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 126 3 8 8 404
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 5 4 5 5 48
Collusion in Hierarchical Agency 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 248
Collusion in Hierarchical Agency 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 107
Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard 0 0 0 18 1 6 8 32
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 8 3 6 7 69
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 49 3 4 7 86
Cost Observation, Auditing and Limited Liability 0 0 0 0 3 4 4 169
Cost Observation, Auditing and Limited Liability 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 28
Exit Option in Hierarchical Agency 0 0 0 2 6 10 12 231
Financial Risk Management in a Competitive Electricity Market 0 0 1 515 3 3 10 855
Financial Risk Management in a Competitive Electricity Market 0 0 0 106 2 5 5 251
Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment 0 0 0 0 4 5 5 55
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 33 0 0 1 98
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 2 1 2 4 28
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 449
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 5 9 12 82
Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production 0 0 1 20 4 9 10 49
Moral Hazard and Limited Liability 0 0 0 155 3 4 5 224
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 222 2 6 6 530
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 0 7 10 14 123
On the Information Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 29
On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion 0 0 0 0 3 6 8 61
On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion 0 0 0 0 3 8 10 234
Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 19
Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 192
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 34 1 2 3 62
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 20 1 4 6 82
Total Working Papers 0 0 2 1,539 85 161 212 6,453

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence 0 0 1 150 6 8 14 501
Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 1 40 3 7 10 212
COLLUSION ET AUDIT D'ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES 0 0 0 2 1 2 3 15
Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 31 2 4 5 123
Collusion in Hierarchical Agency 0 1 2 426 4 12 18 1,137
Collusive Auditors 0 0 1 106 3 6 10 318
Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard 0 0 0 6 3 6 10 31
Contracts offered by bureaucrats 0 0 0 3 3 7 12 64
Cost observation, auditing and limited liability 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 72
Exit option in hierarchical agency 0 0 0 25 5 8 9 97
Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium 0 0 0 2 3 4 11 26
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT* 0 0 1 72 4 6 8 196
INCITATIONS MANAGERIALES DANS LES ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 11
Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 128 3 5 7 476
Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production 0 0 0 3 3 4 8 36
On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires 0 0 0 16 1 3 5 63
On the optimality of allowing collusion 0 0 1 123 2 3 7 309
Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation, and Limited Liability 0 0 0 15 5 5 5 55
Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents 0 0 0 2 4 6 10 430
PRODUCTIVITE, COUT ET CARACTERISTIQUES TECHNOLOGIQUES DES SOCIETES BELGES DE TRANSPORTS URBAINS 0 0 0 0 3 8 9 20
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information 0 0 0 8 0 5 12 74
Une comparaison empirique des performances des secteurs privé et public: le cas des collectes d'imondices en Belgique 0 1 1 24 3 4 6 63
Use it or lose it 0 1 3 9 4 7 13 56
Total Journal Articles 0 3 11 1,221 65 121 193 4,385

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2026-02-12