Access Statistics for Jacques Lawarree

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 74
A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 337
Analysis of Electricity Market Rules and Their Effects on Strategic Behavior in a Non-Congestive Grid 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 43
Analysis of Electricity Market Rules and Their Effects on Strategic Behavior in a Non-Congestive Grid 0 0 0 120 0 0 7 425
Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils 0 0 1 78 0 0 11 595
Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 0 18 0 1 14 157
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 5 3 3 9 52
CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 126 0 0 10 406
Collusion in Hierarchical Agency 0 0 0 0 4 14 20 124
Collusion in Hierarchical Agency 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 252
Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard 0 0 0 18 0 0 12 37
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 8 0 0 9 72
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 0 0 0 49 0 0 8 88
Cost Observation, Auditing and Limited Liability 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 170
Cost Observation, Auditing and Limited Liability 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 31
Exit Option in Hierarchical Agency 0 0 0 2 1 1 13 234
Financial Risk Management in a Competitive Electricity Market 0 0 0 106 0 0 8 254
Financial Risk Management in a Competitive Electricity Market 0 0 0 515 0 0 6 857
Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 58
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 2 1 1 10 36
Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment 0 0 0 33 1 1 7 105
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 451
Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 85
Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production 0 0 0 20 1 1 17 57
Moral Hazard and Limited Liability 0 0 0 155 0 0 7 227
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 124
On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing 0 0 0 222 0 0 8 532
On the Information Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires 0 0 0 7 0 2 3 32
On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 64
On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion 0 0 0 0 1 1 12 237
Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 194
Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 21
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 1 1 21 0 1 12 88
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information 0 0 0 34 1 1 4 64
Total Working Papers 0 1 2 1,541 13 28 307 6,583

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence 1 1 2 151 2 3 16 507
Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils 0 0 0 40 0 2 16 221
COLLUSION ET AUDIT D'ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES 0 0 0 2 1 2 8 20
Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring 0 0 0 31 0 0 4 123
Collusion in Hierarchical Agency 0 1 2 427 7 21 42 1,165
Collusive Auditors 0 0 1 106 4 4 14 324
Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard 0 0 0 6 0 2 13 37
Contracts offered by bureaucrats 0 0 0 3 0 0 10 66
Cost observation, auditing and limited liability 0 0 0 27 0 0 4 76
Exit option in hierarchical agency 0 0 0 25 0 0 15 104
Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium 0 0 0 2 0 1 14 35
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT* 0 0 0 72 1 2 15 205
INCITATIONS MANAGERIALES DANS LES ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES 0 0 0 3 1 1 4 14
Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? 0 0 0 128 0 0 7 477
Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production 0 0 0 3 1 2 16 46
On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires 0 0 0 16 0 1 7 67
On the optimality of allowing collusion 1 1 2 124 3 4 14 318
Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation, and Limited Liability 0 0 0 15 0 0 8 58
Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents 0 0 0 2 0 0 10 434
PRODUCTIVITE, COUT ET CARACTERISTIQUES TECHNOLOGIQUES DES SOCIETES BELGES DE TRANSPORTS URBAINS 0 0 0 0 2 2 16 28
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information 0 0 0 8 0 1 14 80
Une comparaison empirique des performances des secteurs privé et public: le cas des collectes d'imondices en Belgique 0 0 1 24 0 0 6 65
Use it or lose it 0 0 2 9 0 1 18 62
Total Journal Articles 2 3 10 1,224 22 49 291 4,532

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Statistics updated 2026-09-10