Access Statistics for Anat Lerner
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Working Paper | File Downloads | Abstract Views | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last month | 3 months | 12 months | Total | Last month | 3 months | 12 months | Total | |
| Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 636 |
| Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods | 0 | 0 | 0 | 332 | 3 | 5 | 14 | 1,567 |
| Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 10 | 32 |
| Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 3 | 4 | 10 | 892 |
| Total Working Papers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 350 | 11 | 15 | 41 | 3,127 |
| Journal Article | File Downloads | Abstract Views | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last month | 3 months | 12 months | Total | Last month | 3 months | 12 months | Total | |
| A Pie Allocation Among Sharing Groups | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 2 | 2 | 11 | 83 |
| Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 26 |
| Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 52 |
| Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 60 |
| Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 31 |
| Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 18 | 49 |
| The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 12 | 69 |
| Two-Outcome dictatorial mechanisms in constrained combinatorial auctions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 39 |
| Total Journal Articles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 47 | 13 | 20 | 72 | 409 |
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