| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "God Damn": The Law and Economics of Monastic Malediction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
51 |
| A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
63 |
| A Reply to a Replication of “Weathering Corruption†( Journal of Law and Economics, 2008): Different Data Produce Different Results |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
| A normal market |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
5 |
| Alexander J. Field (2001) Altruistically Inclined? The Behavioral Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and the Origins of Reciprocity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. ISBN0-472-11224-4. x-373 pp |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
147 |
| An Austrian approach to law and economics, with special reference to superstition |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
137 |
| An economic analysis of Magna Carta |
0 |
2 |
3 |
16 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
93 |
| An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization |
0 |
3 |
20 |
343 |
6 |
19 |
94 |
2,065 |
| Anarchy and Development: An Application of the Theory of Second Best |
0 |
0 |
5 |
59 |
1 |
2 |
34 |
376 |
| Anarchy, Monopoly, and Predation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
206 |
| Are Anarcho-Capitalists Insane? Medieval Icelandic Conflict Institutions in Comparative Perspective |
1 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
12 |
23 |
68 |
111 |
| Balkanization and assimilation: Examining the effects of state-created homogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
99 |
| Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse |
1 |
1 |
2 |
111 |
2 |
6 |
17 |
630 |
| Billionaires |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
89 |
| C.C. Gibson, K. Andersson, E. Ostrom and S. Shivakumar, The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005) ISBN 0-19-927884-9 264Â +Â xxi pp., index, $35.00 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
341 |
| Celestial Anarchy: A Threat to Outer Space Commerce? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
134 |
| Chicken Soup for the Out-of-Step Scholar's Soul |
1 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
44 |
| Child brides |
0 |
0 |
3 |
23 |
2 |
3 |
22 |
118 |
| Comparative historical political economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
153 |
| Comparing the spread of capitalism and democracy |
1 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
110 |
| Contracts Without Government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
37 |
| Converting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
140 |
| Cooperation and Conflict |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
135 |
| Coordination without command: Stretching the scope of spontaneous order |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
114 |
| Costly price discrimination |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
141 |
| Criminal constitutions |
0 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
39 |
| Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
| Do we need behavioral economics to explain law? |
0 |
0 |
3 |
25 |
2 |
2 |
15 |
107 |
| Does the market self-correct? Asymmetrical adjustment and the structure of economic error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
211 |
| Earw(h)ig: I can’t hear you because your ideas are old |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
56 |
| Economic origins of the no-fault divorce revolution |
2 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
72 |
| Economics is not statistics (and vice versa) |
1 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
41 |
| Edward P. Stringham, ed., Anarchy and the Law: The Political Economy of Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
178 |
| Efficient anarchy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
219 |
| Endogenizing fractionalization |
1 |
2 |
2 |
43 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
138 |
| Escaping Poverty: Foreign Aid, Private Property, and Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
125 |
| Externality and COVID‐19 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
5 |
15 |
21 |
| Gary H. Stern and Ron J. Feldman, Too Big To Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC (2004) 230 + xiii pp., index, US$ 32.95, ISBN 0-8157-8152-0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
260 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
981 |
| Good for the Goose, Bad for the Gander: International Labor Standards and Comparative Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
123 |
| Government intervention and the structure of social capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
157 |
| Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
163 |
0 |
6 |
14 |
780 |
| Government, clubs, and constitutions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
107 |
| Gypsy law |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
82 |
| Hate groups and hate crime |
1 |
2 |
12 |
63 |
3 |
5 |
27 |
224 |
| Hobo Economicus* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Hooligans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
105 |
| How Do Rulers Choose? Dual Domains of Discretion in Political Decision Making |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| How Important is State Enforcement for Trade&quest |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
| Human Sacrifice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
163 |
| IS THE TRANSITION TO THE MARKET TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT TO THE MARKET? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
170 |
| Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
152 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
588 |
| Institutionally Constrained Technology Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle |
0 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
62 |
| Kornai goes to Kenya |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
| Logic is a harsh mistress: welfare economics for economists |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
37 |
| Market-Provided National Defense: Reply to Newhard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
| Media Freedom, Political Knowledge, and Participation |
1 |
1 |
2 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
403 |
| Media as a Mechanism of Institutional Change and Reinforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
187 |
| Oracles |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
53 |
| Ordeals |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
139 |
| Organizing Crime |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
16 |
| Pirates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
80 |
| Pirates, prisoners, and preliterates: anarchic context and the private enforcement of law |
0 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
98 |
| Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices |
2 |
2 |
3 |
64 |
3 |
5 |
15 |
331 |
| Prenups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
51 |
| Quasimarket failure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
64 |
| Race, politics, and punishment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
| Racial Fractionalization and School Performance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
112 |
| Rational choice, Round Robin, and rebellion: An institutional solution to the problems of revolution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
159 |
| Read All About It! Understanding the Role of Media in Economic Development |
2 |
2 |
8 |
609 |
7 |
9 |
23 |
2,363 |
| Regulating quack medicine |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
65 |
| Robust political economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
129 |
| Sassywood |
1 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
125 |
| Saving government failure theory from itself: recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
309 |
| Scott Gehlbach: Representation Through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
| Self-enforcing arrangements in African political economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
| Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
127 |
| Testing rational choice theories of institutional change |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
23 |
| The Amplification Effect: Foreign Aid's Impact on Political Institutions |
0 |
0 |
3 |
61 |
3 |
4 |
13 |
220 |
| The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
37 |
| The Laws of Lawlessness |
0 |
2 |
3 |
32 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
194 |
| The Many Faces of the Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
78 |
| The New Comparative Political Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
294 |
| The Plight of Underdeveloped Countries |
0 |
0 |
3 |
36 |
2 |
3 |
17 |
200 |
| The Political Economy of Peter Boettke |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
43 |
| The Political, Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| The Unimportance of Spending: How Fractionalization Affects School Performance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
| The brewer, the baker, and the monopoly maker |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
29 |
| The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
127 |
| The costs of conflict |
0 |
1 |
5 |
37 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
132 |
| The golden age of mercenaries |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
9 |
| The irrelevance of normative considerations for founding an Austrian law and economics: Reply to Marciano |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
78 |
| The reformers’ dilemma: media, policy ownership, and reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
85 |
| Think tanks |
1 |
1 |
4 |
33 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
154 |
| Trading with Bandits |
1 |
1 |
1 |
29 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
170 |
| Trading with the Dead |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
10 |
| Two-tiered entrepreneurship and economic development |
0 |
3 |
4 |
39 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
197 |
| Vermin Trials |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
130 |
| Was Mises right? |
0 |
1 |
4 |
49 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
194 |
| Was privateering plunder efficient? |
0 |
1 |
2 |
41 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
791 |
| Wealth-destroying private property rights |
1 |
3 |
7 |
22 |
1 |
7 |
17 |
156 |
| Weathering Corruption |
0 |
1 |
3 |
60 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
229 |
| What Aid Can't Do: Reply to Ranis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
| What Can Aid Do? |
1 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
76 |
| Wife Sales |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
55 |
| Wisdom, Alterability, and Social Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
| Witch Trials |
1 |
5 |
12 |
32 |
2 |
16 |
43 |
212 |
| Total Journal Articles |
21 |
47 |
181 |
3,860 |
91 |
216 |
934 |
19,577 |
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