Access Statistics for David Levine

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A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 193 1 4 18 619
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 1 205 1 3 21 827
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 133 0 5 20 591
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 2 12 3 7 23 108
A Folk Theorem with Codes of Conduct 0 1 2 28 1 4 9 33
A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays 0 0 1 41 0 0 6 102
A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games 0 0 0 95 0 1 6 180
A Model of Discovery 3 5 9 185 3 6 16 259
A Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study 0 0 0 0 2 3 8 74
A Remark on Serial Correlation in Maximum Likelihood 0 0 1 17 1 1 13 167
A Remark on Serial Correlation in Maximum Likelihood 0 1 1 146 1 3 12 459
A Simple Durable Goods Market* 0 0 0 26 0 0 12 89
A Simple Durable Goods Model 0 0 0 138 0 2 8 282
A Unifying Learning Framework for Building Artificial Game-Playing Agents 0 0 0 13 0 2 8 39
AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 202
All the Interesting Questions, Almost All the Wrong Reasons 1 2 6 229 1 2 13 644
Altruism and Self Control 0 1 2 258 2 4 14 175
An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk 0 0 0 22 0 1 4 55
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 1 1 1 93 1 1 3 298
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 1 122 1 1 9 548
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 2 1 2 13 46
An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 0 0 0 10 0 0 8 62
An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 0 0 1 132 0 0 5 232
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 53 0 0 9 62
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 1 23 0 0 8 63
Appropriation and Intellectual Property 1 2 5 125 3 4 13 263
Asset Trading Mechanisms and Expansionary Policy 0 0 1 207 1 1 11 981
Auctions and Relationships 0 0 2 14 0 0 7 51
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 174 0 1 7 504
Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Markets 0 0 0 92 1 2 6 298
Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Models 0 1 1 90 1 2 14 197
Bankruptcy and collateral in debt constrained markets 0 0 0 127 0 0 4 482
Can A Turing Player Identify Itself? 0 0 0 50 0 0 5 116
Changes in Managerial Pay Structures 1986-1992 and Rising Returns to Skill 0 0 0 83 0 2 13 899
Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games 0 1 1 30 0 3 8 64
Codes of conduct, private information, and repeated games 0 1 2 40 0 1 6 54
Collusion, Randomization and Leadership in Groups 0 1 2 53 0 4 11 93
Collusion, Randomization, and Leadership in Groups 0 0 1 29 0 2 14 68
Comments on Bruce Smith's Work 0 0 0 7 0 0 6 45
Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies 0 2 5 81 1 5 22 318
Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 423
Comparitive Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies 0 0 0 56 0 0 9 336
Competition and Innovation 5 9 35 440 6 12 60 474
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 4 5 5 15 55
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 80 1 3 24 317
Conflict and the evolution of societies 0 0 0 27 1 1 7 77
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State 1 3 3 85 2 10 21 163
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State 0 1 1 51 1 3 10 73
Conflict, evolution, hegemony, and the power of the state 0 0 2 56 2 3 10 84
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 1 1 4 2 4 10 52
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 0 1 81 2 7 25 430
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 6 1 1 10 76
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 65 1 1 11 196
Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 132
Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don't: Two Masters 1 1 1 32 1 4 16 47
Debt Constrained Asset Markets 0 1 3 328 3 5 24 904
Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets 1 1 1 38 2 4 9 269
Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets 1 3 3 101 1 3 8 315
Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets 2 3 4 49 2 4 11 234
Debt constrained asset markets 1 1 2 78 4 6 23 401
Determinacy of Equilibrium in Dynamic Models with Finitely Many Consumers 0 0 3 174 1 2 18 583
Determinacy of Equilibrium in Large Square Economies 0 0 1 72 0 0 10 315
Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers 0 0 0 117 1 2 11 476
Deterrence in the Cold War and the War on Terror 1 1 5 77 3 6 19 311
Does Market Incompleteness Matter 0 0 2 288 0 1 14 690
EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 228
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 22 0 0 3 75
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 139 0 0 7 559
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 2 285 2 2 11 607
Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 1 2 11 275
Efficiency and the Value of Money 0 0 0 61 0 0 6 290
Enforcement of Collusion in Oligopoly 0 0 2 47 1 1 55 213
Entertaining Malthus: Bread, Circuses and Economic Growth 0 0 3 90 0 6 23 82
Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' 0 1 2 88 0 2 11 161
Estatica comparativa y prevision perfecta en economias con horizonte infinito 0 0 0 8 0 0 3 90
Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population 0 0 0 156 0 0 4 881
Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game 0 0 0 148 0 0 13 1,174
Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game 0 1 2 169 0 1 6 732
Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 144
Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation 1 1 1 200 1 1 9 445
Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game 0 0 0 43 0 2 12 130
Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game 0 0 1 4 1 1 9 77
Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game 0 0 0 12 1 1 12 121
Evolving to the impatience trap: the example of the farmer-sheriff game 0 0 1 19 0 1 8 74
Extrapolative Investment Equilibrium 0 0 1 6 0 0 7 62
Factor Saving Innovation 0 0 4 75 0 1 21 393
Factor Saving Innovation 0 0 2 95 1 3 17 367
Factor saving innovation 0 0 0 150 1 1 14 551
Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 70 0 0 7 183
Farm Size and Reaper Diffusion in the Antebellum Midwest 0 0 0 32 0 1 4 221
Game Theory 0 0 0 269 0 1 10 380
Globalization, Intellectual Property, and Economic Prosperity 0 0 3 23 0 0 12 84
Gross Substitutes in Large Square Economics 0 1 5 203 1 8 29 3,212
Growth Cycles and Market Crashes 0 0 1 241 2 2 11 716
Growth and Intellectual Property 0 0 0 162 0 1 16 430
Growth cycles and market crashes 1 1 2 171 2 2 15 652
IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly 0 0 0 92 0 0 11 451
IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: the case against intellectual monopoly 0 0 1 244 1 5 22 892
IP and Market Size 0 1 2 254 1 3 10 674
Imitation 1 1 2 61 1 2 12 53
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 0 15 1 1 4 78
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 0 156 2 2 8 333
Indeterminacy in Applied Intertemporal General Equilibrium Models 0 0 2 179 0 0 9 560
Indeterminacy of Relative Prices in Overlapping Generations Models 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 350
Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets 0 0 0 50 0 0 5 232
Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 62
Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information 1 5 36 1,291 8 18 88 2,898
Information Aggregation, Currency Swaps, and the Design of Derivative Securities 0 0 0 341 0 0 8 1,146
Information Aggregation, Security Design and Currency Swaps 0 0 0 123 0 3 12 970
Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps 0 0 0 24 0 0 8 142
Intellectual Property 4 14 49 176 8 22 93 281
Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Creation 0 0 0 113 0 0 8 359
Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Innovations 0 0 1 59 1 2 7 144
Intellectual Property, Innovation and the Governance of the Internet 0 0 0 44 0 2 7 44
Intellectual property and market size 0 0 2 487 0 1 16 1,564
Intertemporal Separability in Overlapping Generations Models 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 350
Intertemporal Separability in Overlapping Generations Models 0 0 2 85 0 0 9 362
Introduction to Learning in Games: A Symposium in Honor of David Blackwell 0 0 1 169 0 1 6 613
Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue 0 0 0 221 0 0 4 633
Is Behavioral Economics Doomed? 0 1 2 444 0 2 12 324
Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons 0 0 0 96 0 4 10 64
Learning and Belief Based Trading 0 1 1 44 1 3 8 154
Learning and Equilibrium 0 0 0 31 0 0 6 115
Learning in Games 0 0 3 24 2 3 12 131
Learning in the Stock Flow Model 0 0 0 175 0 0 8 806
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 4 0 1 9 45
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 75 0 4 11 316
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 236 1 2 11 557
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 268 9 10 20 748
Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis 0 0 2 77 0 1 8 145
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 1 173 0 1 6 430
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 1 1 48 0 1 5 165
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 15 0 1 7 55
Liquidity Constrained vs. Debt Constrained Markets 0 1 2 438 0 2 9 964
Local Almost Perfect Equilibrium with Large Adjustment Costs* 0 0 0 6 0 0 4 55
Lotteries, Sunspots and Incentive Constraints 0 0 0 199 0 2 10 642
MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 497
Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent 0 0 0 49 0 0 5 149
Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent 0 0 0 72 0 0 12 342
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 195 0 3 13 536
Market Size and Intellectual Property Protection 1 1 2 257 1 1 7 603
Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source Industries 0 2 2 114 0 3 13 238
Market for Degrees and Educational Standards 0 0 1 8 0 1 6 46
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 1 0 2 6 34
Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 38 0 2 9 194
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments 0 0 8 499 0 1 23 1,753
Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets 0 0 0 52 0 0 5 177
Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions 0 0 0 77 0 2 17 316
Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions 0 0 0 38 1 1 12 130
Monopoly and the incentive to innovate when adoption involves switchover disruptions 1 1 2 47 2 3 20 543
Nash Equilibria Equal Competitive Equilibria 0 0 0 20 0 0 3 109
Neuroeconomics? 0 1 3 211 0 1 10 176
Notes on Discrete Dynamic Programming 1 2 3 629 1 3 10 1,177
On Characterizing Equilibria of Models with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems 0 0 2 209 0 1 9 512
On characterizing equilibria of economies with externalities and taxes as solutions to optimization problems 2 2 5 101 2 4 24 359
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 1 17 0 0 11 94
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 2 15 0 1 9 101
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 66 1 2 10 274
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 7 1 1 8 60
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 1 1 207 1 3 6 488
Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players 0 0 0 151 0 0 6 661
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 1 5 55 760
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 2 5 1 1 15 57
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 134 0 0 5 458
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 311
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 185 0 0 6 1,006
Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 509
Peer Discipline and Incentives Within Groups 0 0 1 65 0 2 11 64
Peer Monitoring, Ostracism and the Internalization of Social Norms 0 1 2 89 1 8 24 63
Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 0 27 0 1 6 116
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 1 1 1 52 1 2 6 239
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 0 0 4 0 1 7 66
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient 0 0 0 220 0 0 7 510
Perfectly Competitive Innovation 0 0 1 634 3 7 20 1,726
Perfectly Competitive Innovation 0 0 2 21 3 6 22 123
Perfectly Competitive Innovation 0 0 2 311 2 5 28 510
Perfectly Competitive Innovation 0 1 3 223 1 3 22 825
Perfectly Competitive Innovation (Growth) 0 1 4 264 0 1 12 266
Perfectly competitive innovation 0 1 1 442 6 10 31 1,963
Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation 0 0 0 41 1 2 12 177
Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation 0 0 0 92 1 3 10 729
Production Chains 0 0 2 63 2 4 14 141
Production Chains 0 0 0 15 1 4 11 46
Production Chains 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 29
Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth 1 1 5 169 2 3 17 293
Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth 0 1 2 9 0 1 16 62
Quantum Games Have No News For Economics 0 1 1 140 0 1 4 241
Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries 0 0 2 52 0 1 10 203
Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 16 0 4 13 57
Regularity in Overlapping Generations Exchange Economies 0 0 1 61 0 1 8 249
Regularity in Overlapping Generations Exchange Economies 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 176
Rent Seeking and Innovation 0 0 1 178 0 1 7 393
Rent-seeking and innovation 0 0 4 238 3 6 20 938
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 14 0 0 6 63
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 91 1 1 10 188
Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game 0 0 0 61 0 0 7 280
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 236
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 0 88 0 2 9 310
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 1 2 2 92 1 2 9 280
Reputation with Noisy Precommitment 0 0 0 106 0 0 10 340
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 212
Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models 0 0 0 51 0 0 6 188
Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models 0 0 0 16 0 1 9 59
Review: Beyond Individual Choice by Michael Bacharach with Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden 0 0 0 76 0 0 4 204
Risk Sharing and Market Incompleteness 0 0 1 115 0 0 10 405
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs 0 0 0 246 0 0 5 521
Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 0 0 0 97 2 4 9 268
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 66 4 4 12 245
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 2 2 11 184
Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 0 0 0 15 0 0 5 114
Sensitivity of MLE to Measurement Error 0 0 0 45 0 2 6 171
Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 191
Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 1 1 1 52 1 2 8 122
Size, Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations 0 0 0 33 0 1 11 39
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 1 1 112 0 3 14 341
Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi 0 0 3 58 0 2 9 634
Steady States and Determinacy in Economies with Infinitely Lived Agents 1 1 2 135 1 3 16 424
Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality 0 0 3 89 0 0 9 333
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games 0 1 5 467 0 5 16 1,196
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 78 0 0 6 399
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 8 0 0 9 64
Superstition and Rational Learning 1 1 3 222 2 4 31 1,819
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 1 146 0 1 7 981
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 18 0 1 6 95
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 15 0 0 6 99
Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules 0 0 4 85 1 7 24 103
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 2 3 14 428
Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays 0 0 0 6 0 2 6 45
Tail probabilities for triangular arrays 0 1 1 3 0 1 10 41
The Brother in Law Effect 0 0 0 134 0 0 4 373
The Brother in Law Effect 0 0 0 17 0 2 10 181
The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1 0 1 1 204 0 2 8 432
The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 2 0 0 0 152 0 0 2 313
The Case Against Intellectual Property 0 1 3 442 0 2 14 1,167
The Case Against Intellectual Property 0 1 4 509 3 6 21 1,495
The Case Against Patents 1 1 3 84 5 9 37 251
The Castle on the Hill 0 0 0 103 0 0 4 514
The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property 0 0 1 250 1 3 9 595
The Economics of Indeterminacy in Overlapping Generations Models 0 0 0 188 1 1 11 550
The Enforcement of Collusion in a Frictionless Oligopoly I: Equilibrium 0 0 1 18 0 0 6 68
The Enforcement of Collusion in a Frictionless Oligopoly II: Stability 0 0 1 14 0 1 8 56
The Enforcement of Collusion in a Simple Oligopoly 0 1 2 50 2 3 8 118
The Financial Sector in the Planning of Economic Development 0 0 0 104 0 0 2 267
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 0 232 2 2 8 820
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 1 254 2 3 10 901
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games 0 0 0 32 1 4 10 201
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 0 0 75 0 0 4 254
The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 0 2 8 0 0 7 87
The Optimum Quantity of Money Revisited 0 0 0 22 2 8 27 114
The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study 0 2 3 57 0 2 9 193
The Political Economy of Policy Implementation 0 1 2 17 0 3 9 47
The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments 0 0 1 138 0 0 5 63
The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments 0 0 1 168 0 0 5 322
The Sensitivity of MLE to Measurement Error 0 0 1 16 0 0 9 63
The Slippery Slope of Concession 1 1 3 78 2 3 10 209
The Theory of Learning in Games 0 2 13 831 2 6 47 1,736
The case against patents 1 1 2 180 7 12 44 363
The economics of ideas and intellectual property 0 0 1 475 0 1 12 1,153
The optimum quantity of money revisited 0 0 5 205 0 0 8 541
Timing and Self-Control 0 0 0 7 0 3 19 60
Timing and Self-Control 0 0 0 87 0 0 9 127
Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium 0 0 0 122 0 0 6 502
Virtual Model Validation for Economics 0 0 0 4 1 1 5 41
Virtual Model Validation for Economics 0 0 0 59 0 0 5 43
Voter Participation with Collusive Parties 0 0 1 33 0 2 11 58
Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment (working paper version) 1 3 5 33 1 6 15 46
Voting Leaders and Voting Participation 0 0 0 80 0 1 8 299
What’s Intellectual Property Good for? 0 0 1 186 1 2 33 320
When Are Agents Negligible? 0 0 0 58 0 0 5 280
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 4 0 1 6 57
When are Agents Negligible? 0 0 0 18 0 1 6 383
When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible 0 0 1 63 0 1 9 420
When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 234 0 0 9 620
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 108 0 0 9 443
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 128 0 0 4 382
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 55 0 0 9 269
When is Reputation Bad? 0 1 1 10 0 2 11 83
Whither Game Theory? 0 0 4 268 1 4 14 108
Total Working Papers 42 116 421 31,373 209 582 3,329 103,083

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
2003 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly 0 0 0 52 0 0 5 261
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 1 167 2 7 35 621
A Model of Discovery 0 1 5 195 0 2 19 540
A Simple Durable Goods Model 0 0 0 63 0 1 10 166
A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication 0 0 0 1 0 1 8 25
A remark on serial correlation in maximum likelihood 0 2 3 30 1 3 9 113
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 30 1 2 8 120
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 1 6 0 2 11 29
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information 1 1 1 54 1 1 6 166
Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies 2 2 8 41 22 43 93 327
Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy 0 0 0 50 0 0 6 195
COMMENTS ON GREEN-ZHOU "MONEY AS A MECHANISM IN A BEWLEY ECONOMY" 0 0 0 23 0 0 3 167
Can A Turing Player Identify Itself? 0 0 0 3 0 0 6 30
Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games 0 1 1 3 1 3 18 61
Collusion constrained equilibrium 0 0 0 4 0 1 7 43
Comments on Bruce Smith’s work 0 0 1 12 0 0 5 57
Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies 0 0 0 133 0 4 10 430
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 2 3 49 0 2 14 138
Consistency and cautious fictitious play 0 1 4 66 1 3 11 284
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 1 1 2 197 3 4 15 572
Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" 0 0 1 47 0 0 6 152
DETERRENCE IN THE COLD WAR AND THE 'WAR ON TERROR' 0 0 0 32 1 1 10 176
Debt constraints and equilibrium in infinite horizon economies with incomplete markets 0 0 1 57 0 2 10 201
Debt-Constrained Asset Markets 0 3 16 711 1 8 62 1,611
Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers 0 0 0 49 0 1 12 215
Determinacy of equilibrium in large-scale economies 0 0 0 16 0 0 4 95
Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation? 1 1 1 66 7 49 69 292
Does Market Incompleteness Matter? 0 0 3 159 0 8 29 555
Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models 0 0 0 9 0 2 14 70
EconomicDynamics Interviews David Levine on Experimental Economics 0 0 0 60 2 2 8 350
Editorial 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 9
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 2 9 290 2 8 25 485
Efficiency and the Value of Money 0 0 0 16 0 1 3 86
Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game 0 0 0 41 2 3 7 243
Evolution of Impatience: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game 0 0 3 33 0 0 10 81
Factor Saving Innovation 0 0 3 80 0 0 18 329
Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems 0 2 5 33 0 5 18 168
Globalization, intellectual property, and economic prosperity 0 0 0 99 0 0 5 358
Gross substitutability in large-square economies 0 0 0 36 0 0 5 131
Growth Cycles and Market Crashes 0 0 1 92 1 1 10 254
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 1 99 1 2 7 246
Infinite horizon equilibrium with incomplete markets 0 0 0 8 0 0 7 52
Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps 0 0 0 49 0 1 9 384
Innováció - a verseny szemszögéből 0 0 0 5 1 1 6 44
Intertemporal separability in overlapping-generations models 0 0 2 32 0 1 11 158
Introduction 0 1 1 74 0 2 6 458
Introduction to the Special Issue 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 35
Learning and Belief-Based Trade 0 0 0 18 0 1 8 102
Learning and Equilibrium 0 0 0 28 0 1 7 138
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory 0 0 1 20 0 3 13 81
Learning in games 4 8 21 116 7 15 46 362
Learning to play Bayesian games 0 0 0 227 1 1 10 594
Limit games and limit equilibria 0 0 0 50 0 0 3 154
Liquidity Constrained Markets versus Debt Constrained Markets 0 0 0 4 1 4 15 680
Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints 0 0 0 90 1 1 11 315
MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 0 2 3 117 2 12 30 542
Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent 0 0 1 72 0 5 10 298
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 234 0 1 10 506
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 139
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment 1 11 41 793 12 40 128 3,454
Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions 0 0 2 31 1 2 18 163
Nash equilibria equal competitive equilibria 0 1 1 3 0 1 4 33
Neuroeconomics? 1 1 3 57 1 3 13 148
On Characterizing Equilibria of Economies with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems 0 0 0 0 2 4 13 512
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 1 18 1 2 14 139
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements 0 0 2 145 2 5 14 313
Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players 0 0 0 145 0 0 5 330
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 1 1 5 79 1 3 16 229
Peer discipline and incentives within groups 0 1 2 8 0 3 10 50
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 0 2 88 0 1 10 210
Perfectly competitive innovation 0 1 17 284 7 19 102 1,059
Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation 0 1 5 70 3 10 20 326
Production Chains 0 0 3 171 3 7 38 750
Regularity in overlapping generations exchange economies 0 1 1 20 0 1 4 88
Rent-seeking and innovation 0 2 4 95 0 3 20 331
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 35 1 6 15 219
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 1 8 392 1 9 28 1,080
Reputation with Noisy Precommitment 0 0 0 23 1 1 6 116
Reverse regression for latent-variable models 0 0 0 12 0 2 6 76
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs 0 0 1 23 1 1 11 133
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 142 2 7 16 542
Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique 0 0 1 64 1 3 18 227
Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations 0 0 0 3 0 1 11 43
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 146 0 6 9 608
Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games 0 1 5 196 1 8 21 445
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 36 0 0 5 162
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 62 2 5 25 363
THE BROTHER-IN-LAW EFFECT 0 0 0 44 0 2 9 158
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF CONCESSION 0 0 2 19 0 2 10 121
Technological diversification - discussion 0 0 0 13 0 0 6 47
The Case Against Intellectual Property 0 0 5 236 0 2 30 655
The Case against Patents 0 3 5 115 5 12 41 391
The Castle on the Hill 0 0 0 75 0 1 10 871
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 1 3 8 453 3 13 35 1,187
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 0 38 1 1 9 154
The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study 1 1 7 8 4 9 24 39
The economics of indeterminacy in overlapping generations models 0 0 0 86 1 1 9 301
The evolution of cooperation through imitation 0 0 2 55 0 3 10 190
The sensitivity of MLE to measurement error 0 0 0 7 1 2 6 52
Timing and Self‐Control 0 0 0 61 2 7 26 260
Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium 0 0 0 24 0 0 4 137
What can we do with money ? 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 20
What's Intellectual Property Good for? 0 0 4 16 1 1 15 57
When Are Agents Negligible? 0 0 1 100 0 1 10 522
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 34 0 2 11 220
When is reputation bad? 0 0 0 105 0 1 10 280
Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games 1 1 3 30 3 6 27 129
Whither game theory? Towards a theory of learning in games 0 0 0 0 1 7 22 69
Why Mickey Mouse is Not Subject to Congestion: A Letter on 'Eldred and Fair Use' 0 0 0 50 0 0 3 249
¿Está la economía del comportamiento condenada a desaparecer? Lo ordinario frente a lo extraordinario 0 0 0 2 0 1 8 191
Total Journal Articles 15 60 245 9,068 127 451 1,791 33,943

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Against Intellectual Monopoly 0 0 0 0 8 20 52 299
Against Intellectual Monopoly 0 0 0 0 7 11 30 128
The Theory of Learning in Games 0 0 0 0 4 20 83 1,003
Total Books 0 0 0 0 19 51 165 1,430

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7
Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Markets 0 0 0 7 0 0 7 38
Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 17
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 2 0 2 10 21
FINITE PLAYER APPROXIMATIONS TO A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS 0 0 1 1 0 0 5 7
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 1 1 1 6 10 40 69
MAINTAINING A REPUTATION AGAINST A LONG-LIVED OPPONENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 1 2 0 1 12 21
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 3 1 2 7 24
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players 0 0 2 14 0 2 8 51
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 14
REPUTATION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH A PATIENT PLAYER 0 0 1 4 1 3 16 36
Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games 0 0 0 1 1 2 7 18
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 1 1 5 2 6 13 24
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 5
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 13
When is reputation bad? 0 1 2 3 0 1 8 16
Total Chapters 0 3 9 43 13 32 170 389

Software Item File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
wjecon.php3, a script converting ReDIF data to html 0 0 1 137 4 12 62 1,894
Total Software Items 0 0 1 137 4 12 62 1,894

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