Access Statistics for David Levine

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A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 1 135 2 6 8 610
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 209 6 9 17 867
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 194 8 11 15 650
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 1 14 2 5 11 162
A Folk Theorem with Codes of Conduct 0 1 1 30 8 11 12 54
A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays 0 0 0 44 1 1 1 108
A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games 0 0 0 96 1 3 5 189
A Model of Discovery 0 0 1 198 5 5 8 296
A Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study 0 0 0 0 3 6 9 92
A Remark on Serial Correlation in Maximum Likelihood 0 0 0 148 6 8 8 481
A Remark on Serial Correlation in Maximum Likelihood 0 0 0 18 5 7 7 181
A Simple Durable Goods Market* 0 0 0 27 2 3 5 96
A Simple Durable Goods Model 0 0 0 139 2 3 3 290
A Theory of the Dynamics of Factor Shares 0 0 0 11 1 4 6 33
A Unifying Learning Framework for Building Artificial Game-Playing Agents 0 0 0 14 1 2 2 46
AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 3 5 6 208
Adjusting to Change in Complex Systems 0 1 1 20 2 5 6 19
Adversarial forecasters, surprises and randomization 0 0 1 2 2 5 8 16
Against Intellectual Monopoly 0 3 6 323 7 21 29 679
All the Interesting Questions, Almost All the Wrong Reasons 0 0 0 245 1 2 5 687
Altruism and Self Control 0 0 0 261 5 7 11 207
An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk 0 0 0 22 9 12 12 69
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 0 0 0 93 2 6 6 305
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 122 3 5 9 561
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 1 4 1 3 6 75
An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 0 0 0 10 1 1 1 67
An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 0 0 0 132 9 12 13 248
An Evolutionary Model of Intervention and Peace 0 0 0 45 2 3 7 41
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 23 2 2 4 69
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 53 2 3 6 75
Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the Evolution of Societies 0 0 0 34 4 7 8 142
Appropriation and Intellectual Property 0 0 0 129 2 5 6 279
Asset Trading Mechanisms and Expansionary Policy 0 0 0 208 4 9 10 997
Auctions and Relationships 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 57
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 175 3 4 6 514
Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Markets 0 0 0 92 3 4 6 320
Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Models 0 0 0 91 4 6 7 208
Bankruptcy and collateral in debt constrained markets 0 0 0 127 6 7 7 493
Behavioral Mechanism Design as a Benchmark for Experimental Studies 0 0 1 39 2 5 10 42
Behavioral Mechanism Design in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 0 0 2 23 2 4 7 15
Can A Turing Player Identify Itself? 0 0 0 51 4 6 7 127
Changes in Managerial Pay Structures 1986-1992 and Rising Returns to Skill 0 0 0 83 2 5 9 912
Chapter 1 Appendix: The Enforcement of Collusion in Oligopoly 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2
Chapter 1: The Enforcement of Collusion in a Quadratic Symmetric Oligopoly 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
Chapter 2: Long Run Collusion in a Partially Myopic Industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games 0 0 0 30 3 6 7 74
Codes of conduct, private information, and repeated games 0 0 0 40 1 2 5 63
Collusion Constrained Equilibrium 0 0 0 20 6 6 8 118
Collusion, Randomization and Leadership in Groups 0 0 0 53 4 7 8 106
Collusion, Randomization, and Leadership in Groups 0 0 0 30 2 5 7 79
Comments on Bruce Smith's Work 0 0 0 7 5 7 9 63
Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies 0 0 0 90 5 12 13 355
Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies 0 0 0 0 2 5 5 431
Comparitive Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies 0 0 0 57 1 3 3 346
Competition and Innovation 0 0 2 486 7 7 14 568
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 6 1 2 3 75
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 80 5 8 10 331
Conflict and the evolution of societies 0 0 1 29 2 3 9 90
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State 0 0 0 86 9 10 12 184
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State 0 0 0 51 4 6 7 82
Conflict, evolution, hegemony, and the power of the state 0 0 0 57 2 6 9 100
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 0 1 7 3 8 9 68
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 0 0 83 4 6 9 479
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 65 5 7 8 207
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 6 3 4 4 85
Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 0 4 6 8 142
Cooperating Through Leaders 0 0 2 22 2 6 11 17
Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability 0 0 3 3 10 18 26 26
Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability 0 1 23 23 2 7 41 41
Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don't: Two Masters 0 0 0 35 2 4 4 77
Debt Constrained Asset Markets 0 1 2 333 1 5 8 943
Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets 0 0 0 38 3 3 4 280
Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets 0 0 0 101 4 7 8 333
Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets 0 0 0 49 2 4 6 245
Debt constrained asset markets 0 1 1 83 4 9 16 439
Determinacy of Equilibrium in Dynamic Models with Finitely Many Consumers 0 0 0 177 5 6 9 604
Determinacy of Equilibrium in Large Square Economies 0 0 0 75 6 10 12 332
Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers 0 0 0 119 7 8 11 493
Deterrence in the Cold War and the War on Terror 1 1 1 81 5 6 7 340
Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation 0 1 1 139 7 9 10 274
Does Market Incompleteness Matter 0 0 1 291 3 4 10 705
Dynamics in Stochastic Evolutionary Models 0 0 0 74 3 5 5 63
EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 236
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 140 3 5 5 567
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 23 1 5 6 86
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 287 3 3 4 614
Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 4 7 8 286
Efficiency and the Value of Money 0 0 0 61 6 7 8 299
Efficiently Breaking the Folk Theorem by Reliably Communicating Long Term Commitments 0 0 1 12 1 3 8 23
Efficiently Breaking the Folk Theorem by Reliably Communicating Long Term Commitments 0 0 4 4 2 2 8 8
Enforcement of Collusion in Oligopoly 0 0 0 52 3 7 8 234
Entertaining Malthus: Bread, Circuses and Economic Growth 0 0 0 94 6 11 13 120
Entertaining Malthus: Bread, Circuses and Economic Growth 0 0 0 116 5 6 12 222
Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' 0 0 0 88 2 4 6 173
Estatica comparativa y prevision perfecta en economias con horizonte infinito 0 0 0 8 5 5 5 98
Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population 0 0 0 157 2 2 2 887
Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game 0 0 0 150 5 7 9 1,191
Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game 0 0 0 0 3 4 7 161
Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game 0 0 1 172 4 9 12 750
Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation 0 0 0 204 4 12 13 470
Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game 0 0 0 18 3 5 7 144
Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game 0 0 0 43 3 3 7 140
Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game 0 0 0 5 2 7 8 90
Evolving to the impatience trap: the example of the farmer-sheriff game 0 0 1 22 1 1 10 94
Extrapolative Investment Equilibrium 0 0 0 6 2 5 5 70
Factor Saving Innovation 0 0 1 77 3 6 8 414
Factor Saving Innovation 0 0 1 96 5 6 11 386
Factor saving innovation 0 0 1 154 2 6 11 586
Failing to Provide Public Goods: Why the Afghan Army did not Fight 0 0 0 3 2 7 7 20
Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 70 4 7 8 195
Farm Size and Reaper Diffusion in the Antebellum Midwest 0 0 0 33 0 3 6 229
Fine Cartels 0 0 0 54 4 5 5 44
Freedom Isn’t the Same as Free Beer 0 0 1 1 1 3 3 3
Game Theory 0 0 0 274 2 3 4 397
Globalization, Intellectual Property, and Economic Prosperity 0 0 0 28 2 6 7 104
Gross Substitutes in Large Square Economics 0 0 1 208 4 8 11 3,254
Growth Cycles and Market Crashes 0 0 0 245 2 4 4 733
Growth and Intellectual Property 0 0 3 172 4 5 9 458
Growth cycles and market crashes 0 0 1 180 4 5 6 682
IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly 0 0 0 92 2 6 6 465
IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: the case against intellectual monopoly 0 0 0 249 5 9 11 928
IP and Market Size 0 0 1 256 4 4 6 688
Imitation 1 1 1 63 3 4 6 69
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 0 15 2 7 9 91
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 1 1 161 6 11 13 354
Indeterminacy in Applied Intertemporal General Equilibrium Models 0 0 2 191 6 7 10 587
Indeterminacy of Relative Prices in Overlapping Generations Models 0 0 0 0 2 5 7 360
Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets 0 0 0 9 1 7 9 78
Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets 0 0 0 50 3 3 6 241
Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information 1 6 25 1,443 4 11 39 3,128
Information Aggregation, Currency Swaps, and the Design of Derivative Securities 0 0 0 341 1 2 5 1,154
Information Aggregation, Security Design and Currency Swaps 0 0 0 124 5 7 9 985
Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps 0 0 0 24 2 2 3 162
Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 3
Intellectual Property 0 3 7 261 5 10 23 426
Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Creation 0 0 1 115 8 10 12 383
Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Innovations 0 0 1 60 4 5 6 156
Intellectual Property, Innovation and the Governance of the Internet 0 0 0 44 1 3 8 58
Intellectual property and market size 0 0 0 491 3 5 6 1,602
Intertemporal Separability in Overlapping Generations Models 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 357
Intertemporal Separability in Overlapping Generations Models 0 0 0 85 7 8 10 379
Interventions when Social Norms are Endogenous: A Critique 0 0 0 40 1 1 3 59
Interventions with Sticky Social Norms: A Critique 0 0 0 34 7 9 12 60
Introduction to Learning in Games: A Symposium in Honor of David Blackwell 0 0 0 169 3 7 9 630
Introduction to Special Issue in Honor of Lloyd Shapley: Seven Topics in Game Theory 0 0 1 38 3 4 6 30
Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue 0 1 1 225 7 9 10 649
Is Behavioral Economics Doomed? 0 0 1 453 5 9 11 359
Labor Associations: The Blue Wall of Silence 0 0 2 14 6 9 15 48
Labor Associations: The Blue Wall of Silence 0 0 0 2 1 4 5 31
Leaders and Social Norms: On the Emergence of Consensus or Conflict 1 3 5 17 7 13 21 47
Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons 1 1 1 98 5 7 8 80
Learning and Belief Based Trading 0 0 0 44 6 7 8 166
Learning and Equilibrium 0 0 0 32 2 2 5 128
Learning in Games 0 0 1 32 5 11 19 181
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments 1 1 2 11 3 4 8 58
Learning in the Stock Flow Model 0 0 0 176 2 3 3 812
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 236 4 6 7 574
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 76 3 6 7 330
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 2 9 2 3 9 66
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 268 5 8 9 770
Learning with Recency Bias 1 1 4 145 4 7 14 148
Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis 0 0 1 81 0 0 2 155
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 48 4 5 5 178
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 179 6 9 11 459
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 16 1 4 4 65
Liquidity Constrained vs. Debt Constrained Markets 0 0 0 439 4 5 6 979
Local Almost Perfect Equilibrium with Large Adjustment Costs* 0 0 0 6 3 3 4 60
Lotteries, Sunspots and Incentive Constraints 0 0 0 200 2 7 10 661
MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 504
Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent 0 0 0 50 3 8 8 166
Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent 0 0 0 73 5 6 6 357
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 197 8 10 13 569
Market Size and Intellectual Property Protection 0 0 1 260 2 3 7 622
Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source 0 0 0 124 3 6 7 166
Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source Industries 0 0 0 116 1 1 2 249
Market for Degrees and Educational Standards 0 0 0 9 2 2 2 50
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 2 6 8 10 50
Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 1 39 5 6 10 206
Method of Moments and Maximum Likelihood in the Laboratory 1 1 2 7 7 10 12 15
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments 0 0 0 506 4 7 9 1,802
Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets 0 0 0 53 6 7 8 190
Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions 0 0 0 40 4 10 10 150
Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions 0 0 0 80 2 4 5 348
Monopoly and the incentive to innovate when adoption involves switchover disruptions 0 0 0 50 5 8 10 574
Nash Equilibria Equal Competitive Equilibria 0 0 0 21 3 4 4 117
Neuroeconomics? 0 0 1 214 5 5 7 199
New Approaches to Rewarding Pharmaceutical Innovation 0 0 0 94 1 5 6 171
Notes on Discrete Dynamic Programming 0 1 4 635 2 4 7 1,189
On Characterizing Equilibria of Models with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems 0 0 0 213 3 4 4 522
On Concave Functions over Lotteries 0 0 0 102 2 6 8 15
On characterizing equilibria of economies with externalities and taxes as solutions to optimization problems 0 0 0 108 6 6 9 389
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 0 21 6 6 9 128
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 1 17 19 22 26 133
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 210 4 8 12 511
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 9 4 7 13 79
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 66 4 7 8 306
Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players 0 0 0 151 4 6 7 670
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 3 5 12 826
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 185 4 8 10 1,037
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 137 5 6 9 474
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 2 5 7 324
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 5 2 4 6 70
Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 6 8 15 532
Peer Discipline and Incentives Within Groups 0 0 0 67 4 4 5 84
Peer Discipline and the Strength of Organizations 0 0 0 85 4 9 10 72
Peer Monitoring, Ostracism and the Internalization of Social Norms 0 0 1 93 6 8 13 104
Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 0 28 6 8 9 130
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 0 0 52 3 4 5 247
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 0 1 5 0 0 2 72
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient 0 0 0 220 5 8 11 524
Perfectly Competitive Innovation 0 0 0 228 5 7 9 873
Perfectly Competitive Innovation 0 0 0 21 1 4 6 163
Perfectly Competitive Innovation 0 0 1 315 2 3 6 564
Perfectly Competitive Innovation 0 0 0 639 1 4 6 1,777
Perfectly Competitive Innovation (Growth) 0 0 1 271 5 6 7 287
Perfectly competitive innovation 0 0 4 451 7 10 19 2,046
Phoenix From the Ashes: The Evolution of Mechanism Designers 0 0 0 12 3 6 8 15
Polarization and Electoral Balance 0 0 1 33 3 5 6 45
Polarization and Electoral Balance 0 0 2 2 2 4 8 13
Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation 0 0 2 45 2 5 10 192
Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation 0 0 0 96 6 11 15 764
Predicting Cooperation with Trembles 0 0 17 17 2 5 17 17
Production Chains 0 0 0 66 0 2 8 164
Production Chains 0 0 0 16 7 7 8 60
Production Chains 0 0 0 0 8 12 13 53
Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth 0 1 1 12 7 9 9 88
Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth 0 0 1 180 5 5 10 325
Quantum Games Have No News For Economics 0 0 2 150 3 6 12 271
Radical Markets by Eric Posner and Glen Weyl: a review essay 0 0 0 92 8 9 12 178
Razor-Thin Mass Elections with High Turnout 0 0 0 16 3 6 6 21
Razor-Thin Mass Elections with High Turnout 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5
Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries 0 0 0 55 1 2 3 221
Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 17 4 5 6 67
Reforming Patent Law: The Case of Covid‐​19 0 0 1 41 3 6 10 52
Regularity in Overlapping Generations Exchange Economies 0 0 0 0 3 4 6 184
Regularity in Overlapping Generations Exchange Economies 0 0 0 61 0 3 4 257
Rent Seeking and Innovation 0 0 1 181 4 9 13 415
Rent-seeking and innovation 0 0 0 246 3 16 17 994
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 14 4 4 4 73
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 91 2 4 7 197
Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game 0 0 0 62 2 3 3 286
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player 0 0 0 0 3 9 11 253
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 1 100 5 9 14 318
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 0 91 5 6 9 334
Reputation with Noisy Precommitment 0 0 0 106 2 5 5 347
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales 0 0 0 0 1 6 7 221
Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 192
Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models 0 0 0 16 1 1 1 62
Review of Unsettled: What Climate Science Tells Us, What It Doesn’t, and Why It Matters (By Stephen E. Koonin) 0 0 1 25 1 1 4 62
Review: Beyond Individual Choice by Michael Bacharach with Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden 0 0 0 83 3 3 4 220
Risk Sharing and Market Incompleteness 0 0 0 116 3 5 7 416
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs 0 0 0 247 3 5 8 538
Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 0 0 0 98 3 7 9 293
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 69 3 7 10 267
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 4 6 8 209
Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 0 0 0 15 9 10 10 129
Sensitivity of MLE to Measurement Error 0 0 0 46 2 4 4 182
Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers 0 0 0 0 3 3 7 206
Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 0 56 2 2 2 132
Sins of Omission and Commission in Complex Systems 0 0 2 33 5 8 13 63
Size, Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations 0 0 0 34 6 7 10 59
Social Mechanisms and Political Economy: When Lobbyists Succeed, Pollsters Fail and Populists Win 0 0 2 121 2 5 11 42
Social Mechanisms and Political Economy: When Lobbyists Succeed, Pollsters Fail and Populists Win 1 1 2 2 7 11 13 13
Special Issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis 0 0 0 9 3 11 16 40
State Power and Conflict Driven Evolution 0 0 0 37 5 7 8 35
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 113 7 11 12 366
Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi 0 1 1 63 3 7 8 657
Steady States and Determinacy in Economies with Infinitely Lived Agents 0 0 0 137 4 5 7 444
Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality 0 0 4 99 6 8 13 359
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games 0 0 0 471 3 7 10 1,224
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 8 3 4 7 72
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 78 3 5 5 405
Success in Contests 0 0 0 7 6 7 11 28
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 146 5 9 11 1,003
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 227 10 23 29 1,940
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 19 5 7 10 111
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 104
Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules 0 1 3 95 6 12 23 168
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 3 9 10 464
Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays 0 0 0 6 1 4 4 52
Tail probabilities for triangular arrays 0 0 0 3 7 9 11 60
The Brother in Law Effect 0 0 0 134 2 5 5 381
The Brother in Law Effect 0 0 0 17 1 3 7 192
The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1 0 0 0 205 3 7 8 448
The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 2 0 0 1 156 7 7 10 336
The Case Against Intellectual Property 0 0 1 517 4 9 13 1,577
The Case Against Intellectual Property 0 1 2 453 2 10 15 1,225
The Case Against Patents 0 0 2 99 8 11 15 311
The Castle on the Hill 0 0 0 103 1 3 4 521
The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property 0 0 2 253 2 4 6 608
The Economics of Indeterminacy in Overlapping Generations Models 0 0 0 192 3 6 8 567
The Enforcement of Collusion in a Frictionless Oligopoly I: Equilibrium 0 0 0 19 0 2 3 74
The Enforcement of Collusion in a Frictionless Oligopoly II: Stability 0 0 0 14 2 4 5 61
The Enforcement of Collusion in a Simple Oligopoly 0 0 0 51 6 8 8 131
The Evolution of Resilience 0 0 52 52 2 7 25 25
The Financial Sector in the Planning of Economic Development 0 0 0 104 4 4 4 272
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 1 255 5 10 17 933
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 0 233 3 5 8 843
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games 0 0 0 32 9 10 12 224
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 0 0 76 3 4 8 268
The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 0 0 8 3 4 5 94
The Optimum Quantity of Money Revisited 0 0 2 32 7 12 18 183
The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study 0 0 1 61 2 5 7 218
The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study 0 1 1 205 3 8 10 507
The Political Economy of Policy Implementation 0 0 0 22 2 3 4 64
The Relationship between Economic Theory and Experiments 0 0 0 103 3 10 15 95
The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments 0 0 0 169 3 5 5 330
The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments 0 0 1 140 2 3 6 77
The Reputation Trap 0 0 0 54 3 5 11 169
The Sensitivity of MLE to Measurement Error 0 0 0 16 2 5 5 71
The Slippery Slope of Concession 0 0 1 83 4 7 13 241
The Theory of Learning in Games 2 3 11 896 10 15 35 1,926
The Tripartite Auction Folk Theorem 0 0 0 116 2 5 7 14
The Tripartite Auction Folk Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 11
The Whip and the Bible: Punishment Versus Internalization 0 0 0 54 2 3 6 51
The case against patents 0 2 2 190 3 10 19 435
The economics of ideas and intellectual property 0 0 2 481 2 4 9 1,185
The optimum quantity of money revisited 0 0 0 211 5 8 9 574
Timing and Self-Control 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 73
Timing and Self-Control 0 0 0 89 4 5 6 141
Trade Associations: Why Not Cartels? 0 0 1 25 6 6 10 40
Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium 0 0 0 122 1 3 3 505
True Myths 0 0 0 7 2 5 8 18
Twin Peaks: Expressive Externality in Group Participation 0 0 0 20 0 3 4 26
Virtual Model Validation for Economics 0 0 0 59 0 0 1 46
Virtual Model Validation for Economics 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 46
Vote or Fight? 0 0 1 16 7 12 18 27
Voter Participation with Collusive Parties 0 0 0 33 2 3 6 69
Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment 0 0 1 35 5 12 13 89
Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment (working paper version) 0 0 0 35 2 3 3 55
Voting Leaders and Voting Participation 0 0 1 84 3 6 14 324
What’s Intellectual Property Good for? 0 0 3 207 2 4 12 371
When Are Agents Negligible? 0 0 1 59 5 5 6 288
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 4 6 7 8 85
When are Agents Negligible? 0 0 0 18 6 9 9 397
When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible 0 0 0 64 3 6 6 431
When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 235 2 2 2 626
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 108 4 7 10 458
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 144 4 4 10 400
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 58 0 2 2 283
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 10 3 6 6 97
When to Appease and When to Punish: Hitler, Putin, and Hamas 0 0 0 1 1 4 7 9
When to Appease and When to Punish: Hitler, Putin, and Hamas 0 0 1 33 4 5 14 59
Whither Game Theory? 0 0 0 271 4 6 10 162
Total Working Papers 11 41 283 35,217 1,213 2,043 2,959 113,822

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
2003 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly 0 0 0 52 2 3 5 276
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 1 1 1 170 9 15 26 676
A Model of Discovery 0 0 0 201 6 9 13 572
A Simple Durable Goods Model 0 1 1 67 0 1 5 180
A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication 0 1 2 4 2 6 11 44
A remark on serial correlation in maximum likelihood 0 0 0 32 3 5 9 131
A theory of the dynamics of factor shares 0 1 4 6 1 8 21 27
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 30 4 4 8 130
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 1 8 2 3 7 47
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information 0 0 1 58 3 5 11 189
Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies 0 0 1 74 3 6 7 653
Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy 0 0 0 53 9 13 16 223
COMMENTS ON GREEN-ZHOU "MONEY AS A MECHANISM IN A BEWLEY ECONOMY" 0 0 0 23 1 1 1 175
Can A Turing Player Identify Itself? 0 0 0 4 5 6 7 41
Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games 0 0 0 3 1 1 4 66
Collusion constrained equilibrium 0 0 0 5 7 10 12 65
Comments on Bruce Smith’s work 0 0 0 12 0 1 2 69
Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies 0 0 0 135 2 3 7 448
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 53 2 6 10 162
Consistency and cautious fictitious play 0 0 1 76 14 19 22 327
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 201 2 4 12 621
Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" 0 0 0 49 1 3 4 162
DETERRENCE IN THE COLD WAR AND THE 'WAR ON TERROR' 0 1 2 35 7 8 11 199
Damned if you do and damned if you don't: Two masters 0 0 0 5 4 7 8 67
Debt constraints and equilibrium in infinite horizon economies with incomplete markets 0 0 1 61 2 4 7 217
Debt-Constrained Asset Markets 0 1 8 734 6 13 31 1,767
Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers 0 0 0 58 3 4 8 241
Determinacy of equilibrium in large-scale economies 0 0 0 17 5 9 11 113
Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation? 0 2 2 78 1 9 11 356
Does Market Incompleteness Matter? 0 0 0 159 2 3 6 572
Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models 0 0 0 10 3 5 6 83
ENTERTAINING MALTHUS: BREAD, CIRCUSES, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 0 1 1 22 5 9 21 179
EconomicDynamics Interviews David Levine on Experimental Economics 0 0 1 61 1 2 4 364
Editorial 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 13
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 2 309 0 1 5 532
Efficiency and the Value of Money 0 0 0 19 2 2 7 99
Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game 0 0 0 41 5 8 13 266
Evolution of Impatience: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game 0 0 1 49 3 3 7 118
Factor Saving Innovation 0 0 3 85 6 11 19 367
Failing to Provide Public Goods: Why the Afghan Army Did Not Fight 0 0 0 3 5 11 14 27
Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems 0 1 2 49 4 11 17 232
Fine cartels 0 0 0 0 7 8 9 22
Globalization, intellectual property, and economic prosperity 0 0 0 101 0 5 6 374
Gross substitutability in large-square economies 0 0 0 40 4 5 7 145
Growth Cycles and Market Crashes 0 0 0 104 3 3 5 283
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 2 104 1 5 16 278
Infinite horizon equilibrium with incomplete markets 0 0 0 9 6 6 9 68
Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps 0 0 0 51 6 8 11 413
Innováció - a verseny szemszögéből 0 0 0 16 1 3 6 78
Intertemporal separability in overlapping-generations models 0 0 0 33 3 5 9 173
Intervention and peace 0 0 0 17 6 7 8 74
Intervention with limited information 0 0 1 8 3 3 7 25
Interventions with Sticky Social Norms: A Critique 0 0 0 1 4 6 8 20
Introduction 0 0 0 74 6 7 10 475
Introduction to the Special Issue 0 0 0 5 2 3 5 42
Leaders and social norms: On the emergence of consensus or conflict 0 1 2 2 4 8 19 19
Learning and Belief-Based Trade 0 0 0 20 5 6 8 117
Learning and Equilibrium 0 0 1 29 4 5 10 159
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory 0 0 0 21 5 7 9 97
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 13
Learning in games 0 0 10 201 6 15 42 572
Learning to play Bayesian games 0 0 2 235 3 6 16 624
Limit games and limit equilibria 0 1 2 61 3 4 10 184
Liquidity Constrained Markets versus Debt Constrained Markets 0 0 0 4 4 6 7 701
Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints 0 0 0 91 3 4 8 327
MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 0 0 0 119 3 7 10 577
Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent 0 0 0 73 2 2 3 313
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 2 248 6 9 15 558
Manifesto for research in economics 0 0 2 238 5 6 13 428
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 1 5 6 9 154
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment 0 0 2 887 7 16 28 3,859
Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions 0 0 1 36 5 5 11 192
Nash equilibria equal competitive equilibria 0 0 1 4 4 9 12 50
Neuroeconomics? 0 0 1 61 6 7 9 175
On Characterizing Equilibria of Economies with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems 0 0 0 0 4 5 7 525
On concave functions over lotteries 0 0 0 1 1 5 9 14
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 0 20 1 3 7 163
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements 0 1 1 154 2 3 9 371
Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players 0 0 1 154 6 6 10 362
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 85 2 7 12 262
Peer discipline and incentives within groups 0 0 0 10 5 9 13 78
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 0 0 88 3 4 8 226
Perfectly competitive innovation 1 1 8 335 13 20 54 1,360
Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation 0 0 3 87 1 2 11 374
Production Chains 0 0 1 188 5 10 13 833
RAZOR‐THIN MASS ELECTIONS WITH HIGH TURNOUT 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 4
Radical Markets by Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl: A Review Essay 0 1 3 25 15 18 25 150
Regularity in overlapping generations exchange economies 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 95
Rent-seeking and innovation 0 1 3 124 4 7 11 408
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 36 3 7 16 251
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 1 406 5 11 19 1,142
Reputation with Noisy Precommitment 0 0 1 24 4 5 8 126
Reverse regression for latent-variable models 0 0 0 12 4 5 8 87
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs 0 0 0 26 9 11 17 166
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 2 152 6 11 14 579
Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique 0 0 0 64 7 8 12 244
Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations 0 0 0 5 7 12 17 75
Special Issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis – Part II 0 0 1 1 2 8 13 17
Special issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis 0 0 1 1 5 5 11 27
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 1 152 2 9 14 636
Stephen E. Koonin: unsettled: what climate science tells us, what it doesn’t, and why it matters 0 0 0 3 2 2 4 23
Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games 1 2 5 232 11 14 22 541
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 36 4 4 5 171
Success in contests 0 0 0 5 1 4 7 18
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 65 7 8 12 386
Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 11
THE BROTHER-IN-LAW EFFECT 0 0 0 45 1 3 9 189
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF CONCESSION 0 0 1 24 3 4 7 143
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS: WHY NOT CARTELS? 0 0 0 7 4 5 6 41
The Case Against Intellectual Property 0 1 5 252 7 16 26 755
The Case against Patents 0 1 3 150 7 28 52 587
The Castle on the Hill 0 0 0 76 1 1 4 889
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 2 468 6 10 22 1,262
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 1 41 5 6 9 172
The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study 0 0 0 29 7 10 14 120
The Reputation Trap 0 0 0 21 3 7 15 87
The economics of indeterminacy in overlapping generations models 0 0 0 88 5 6 8 313
The evolution of cooperation through imitation 0 0 1 58 7 7 14 223
The evolution of resilience 0 0 0 0 4 12 12 12
The sensitivity of MLE to measurement error 0 0 0 7 5 6 8 62
The tripartite auction folk theorem 0 0 0 0 4 5 6 6
The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization 0 0 0 2 4 4 8 18
Timing and Self‐Control 0 0 0 61 8 9 11 284
Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium 0 0 0 24 3 3 5 152
Twin peaks: Expressive externality in group participation 0 0 0 3 3 3 6 10
Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment 0 0 0 13 6 9 15 141
What can we do with money ? 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 29
What's Intellectual Property Good for? 0 0 0 20 8 9 12 86
When Are Agents Negligible? 0 0 0 100 1 3 6 533
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 35 3 7 12 237
When is reputation bad? 0 0 1 112 4 6 13 318
Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games 0 0 0 39 4 7 12 175
Whither game theory? Towards a theory oflearning in games 0 0 0 0 4 6 8 9
Why Mickey Mouse is Not Subject to Congestion: A Letter on 'Eldred and Fair Use' 0 0 0 53 1 1 2 262
¿Está la economía del comportamiento condenada a desaparecer? Lo ordinario frente a lo extraordinario 0 0 0 4 3 3 3 205
Total Journal Articles 3 20 111 10,255 544 884 1,509 39,730
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Against Intellectual Monopoly 0 0 0 0 9 12 24 553
Against Intellectual Monopoly 0 0 0 0 6 8 13 187
The Theory of Learning in Games 0 0 0 0 13 26 57 1,413
Total Books 0 0 0 0 28 46 94 2,153

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 0 0 0 1 1 5 6 16
Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Markets 0 0 0 7 4 6 10 53
Conclusion 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring 0 0 0 0 4 4 6 26
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 3 17 25 28 57
FINITE PLAYER APPROXIMATIONS TO A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 17
Introduction 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 3
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 119
MAINTAINING A REPUTATION AGAINST A LONG-LIVED OPPONENT 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 15
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 2 2 3 4 38
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 3 8 9 14 48
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players 0 0 0 15 0 0 2 62
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 23
Political Consequences 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 7
REPUTATION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH A PATIENT PLAYER 0 0 0 5 6 8 11 75
Steady States and Determinacy of Equilibria in Economies With Infinitely Lived Agents 0 0 0 0 5 6 7 14
Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games 0 1 2 14 26 44 48 88
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 1 8 4 9 16 54
The Financial Sector in the Planning of Economic Development 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 0 2 2 3 4 23
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 23
When is reputation bad? 0 0 0 4 4 5 8 32
Total Chapters 0 1 3 69 89 142 192 797

Software Item File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
wjecon.php3, a script converting ReDIF data to html 0 0 0 143 4 8 18 2,066
Total Software Items 0 0 0 143 4 8 18 2,066

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