| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
194 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
642 |
| A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
209 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
859 |
| A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
135 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
605 |
| A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
158 |
| A Folk Theorem with Codes of Conduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
45 |
| A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
| A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
186 |
| A Model of Discovery |
0 |
0 |
1 |
198 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
291 |
| A Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
89 |
| A Remark on Serial Correlation in Maximum Likelihood |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
174 |
| A Remark on Serial Correlation in Maximum Likelihood |
0 |
0 |
0 |
148 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
474 |
| A Simple Durable Goods Market* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
93 |
| A Simple Durable Goods Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
287 |
| A Unifying Learning Framework for Building Artificial Game-Playing Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
| AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
204 |
| Against Intellectual Monopoly |
2 |
3 |
7 |
322 |
8 |
11 |
20 |
666 |
| All the Interesting Questions, Almost All the Wrong Reasons |
0 |
0 |
1 |
245 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
685 |
| Altruism and Self Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
261 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
201 |
| An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
58 |
| An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
302 |
| An Easier Way to Calibrate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
122 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
557 |
| An Easier Way to Calibrate |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
74 |
| An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
| An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
236 |
| An Evolutionary Model of Intervention and Peace |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
39 |
| An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
73 |
| An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
67 |
| Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the Evolution of Societies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
136 |
| Appropriation and Intellectual Property |
0 |
0 |
0 |
129 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
276 |
| Asset Trading Mechanisms and Expansionary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
208 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
991 |
| Auctions and Relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
| Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
175 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
511 |
| Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
316 |
| Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
204 |
| Bankruptcy and collateral in debt constrained markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
127 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
486 |
| Can A Turing Player Identify Itself? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
121 |
| Changes in Managerial Pay Structures 1986-1992 and Rising Returns to Skill |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
907 |
| Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
70 |
| Codes of conduct, private information, and repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
61 |
| Collusion Constrained Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
112 |
| Collusion, Randomization and Leadership in Groups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
101 |
| Collusion, Randomization, and Leadership in Groups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
76 |
| Comments on Bruce Smith's Work |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
56 |
| Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
427 |
| Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
345 |
| Comparitive Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
344 |
| Competition and Innovation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
486 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
561 |
| Conditional Universal Consistency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
| Conditional Universal Consistency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
325 |
| Conflict and the evolution of societies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
88 |
| Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
| Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
175 |
| Conflict, evolution, hegemony, and the power of the state |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
96 |
| Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
474 |
| Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
62 |
| Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
201 |
| Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
| Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
136 |
| Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don't: Two Masters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
74 |
| Debt Constrained Asset Markets |
0 |
1 |
1 |
332 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
939 |
| Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
241 |
| Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
277 |
| Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
328 |
| Debt constrained asset markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
430 |
| Determinacy of Equilibrium in Dynamic Models with Finitely Many Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
177 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
598 |
| Determinacy of Equilibrium in Large Square Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
323 |
| Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
485 |
| Deterrence in the Cold War and the War on Terror |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
335 |
| Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation |
1 |
1 |
2 |
139 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
267 |
| Does Market Incompleteness Matter |
0 |
0 |
1 |
291 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
702 |
| Dynamics in Stochastic Evolutionary Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
60 |
| EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
234 |
| Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
287 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
611 |
| Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
83 |
| Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
563 |
| Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
281 |
| Efficiency and the Value of Money |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
292 |
| Enforcement of Collusion in Oligopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
228 |
| Entertaining Malthus: Bread, Circuses and Economic Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
217 |
| Entertaining Malthus: Bread, Circuses and Economic Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
113 |
| Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
171 |
| Estatica comparativa y prevision perfecta en economias con horizonte infinito |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
93 |
| Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population |
0 |
0 |
0 |
157 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
885 |
| Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
150 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,184 |
| Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game |
0 |
0 |
2 |
172 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
744 |
| Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
157 |
| Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
204 |
6 |
6 |
7 |
464 |
| Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
137 |
| Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
140 |
| Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
84 |
| Evolving to the impatience trap: the example of the farmer-sheriff game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
93 |
| Extrapolative Investment Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
66 |
| Factor Saving Innovation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
77 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
409 |
| Factor Saving Innovation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
96 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
381 |
| Factor saving innovation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
154 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
582 |
| Failing to Provide Public Goods: Why the Afghan Army did not Fight |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
| Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
191 |
| Farm Size and Reaper Diffusion in the Antebellum Midwest |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
227 |
| Fine Cartels |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
40 |
| Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
274 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
395 |
| Globalization, Intellectual Property, and Economic Prosperity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
101 |
| Gross Substitutes in Large Square Economics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
208 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
3,248 |
| Growth Cycles and Market Crashes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
245 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
730 |
| Growth and Intellectual Property |
0 |
1 |
3 |
172 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
453 |
| Growth cycles and market crashes |
0 |
1 |
1 |
180 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
678 |
| IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
462 |
| IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: the case against intellectual monopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
249 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
920 |
| IP and Market Size |
0 |
0 |
1 |
256 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
684 |
| Imitation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
65 |
| Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities |
0 |
0 |
1 |
160 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
344 |
| Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
85 |
| Indeterminacy in Applied Intertemporal General Equilibrium Models |
0 |
0 |
2 |
191 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
580 |
| Indeterminacy of Relative Prices in Overlapping Generations Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
356 |
| Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
238 |
| Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
73 |
| Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information |
3 |
4 |
35 |
1,440 |
4 |
7 |
49 |
3,121 |
| Information Aggregation, Currency Swaps, and the Design of Derivative Securities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
341 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1,152 |
| Information Aggregation, Security Design and Currency Swaps |
0 |
0 |
0 |
124 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
980 |
| Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
160 |
| Intellectual Property |
2 |
3 |
6 |
260 |
3 |
9 |
16 |
419 |
| Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Creation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
115 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
375 |
| Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Innovations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
151 |
| Intellectual Property, Innovation and the Governance of the Internet |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
55 |
| Intellectual property and market size |
0 |
0 |
0 |
491 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1,597 |
| Intertemporal Separability in Overlapping Generations Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
356 |
| Intertemporal Separability in Overlapping Generations Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
371 |
| Interventions when Social Norms are Endogenous: A Critique |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
58 |
| Interventions with Sticky Social Norms: A Critique |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
52 |
| Introduction to Learning in Games: A Symposium in Honor of David Blackwell |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
625 |
| Introduction to Special Issue in Honor of Lloyd Shapley: Seven Topics in Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
27 |
| Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue |
1 |
1 |
1 |
225 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
641 |
| Is Behavioral Economics Doomed? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
453 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
353 |
| Labor Associations: The Blue Wall of Silence |
0 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
40 |
| Leaders and Social Norms: On the Emergence of Consensus or Conflict |
1 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
4 |
6 |
13 |
38 |
| Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
75 |
| Learning and Belief Based Trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
159 |
| Learning and Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
126 |
| Learning in Games |
0 |
1 |
1 |
32 |
3 |
6 |
14 |
173 |
| Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
54 |
| Learning in the Stock Flow Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
176 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
809 |
| Learning to Play Bayesian Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
63 |
| Learning to Play Bayesian Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
324 |
| Learning to Play Bayesian Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
268 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
763 |
| Learning to Play Bayesian Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
236 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
569 |
| Learning with Recency Bias |
0 |
1 |
4 |
144 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
142 |
| Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
81 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
155 |
| Limit Games and Limit Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
173 |
| Limit Games and Limit Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
62 |
| Limit Games and Limit Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
179 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
451 |
| Liquidity Constrained vs. Debt Constrained Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
439 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
974 |
| Local Almost Perfect Equilibrium with Large Adjustment Costs* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
57 |
| Lotteries, Sunspots and Incentive Constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
200 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
657 |
| MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
502 |
| Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
162 |
| Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
351 |
| Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed |
0 |
0 |
0 |
197 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
560 |
| Market Size and Intellectual Property Protection |
0 |
0 |
1 |
260 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
619 |
| Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source |
0 |
0 |
0 |
124 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
161 |
| Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source Industries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
248 |
| Market for Degrees and Educational Standards |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
| Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
43 |
| Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
201 |
| Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
506 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1,796 |
| Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
183 |
| Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
344 |
| Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
143 |
| Monopoly and the incentive to innovate when adoption involves switchover disruptions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
567 |
| Nash Equilibria Equal Competitive Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
| Neuroeconomics? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
214 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
194 |
| New Approaches to Rewarding Pharmaceutical Innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
168 |
| Notes on Discrete Dynamic Programming |
1 |
2 |
4 |
635 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
1,187 |
| On Characterizing Equilibria of Models with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
213 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
518 |
| On characterizing equilibria of economies with externalities and taxes as solutions to optimization problems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
108 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
383 |
| On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
114 |
| On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
122 |
| On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
301 |
| On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements |
0 |
0 |
1 |
210 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
505 |
| On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
72 |
| Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
665 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
185 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1,030 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
321 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
822 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
468 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
67 |
| Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
525 |
| Peer Discipline and Incentives Within Groups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
80 |
| Peer Discipline and the Strength of Organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
65 |
| Peer Monitoring, Ostracism and the Internalization of Social Norms |
0 |
0 |
1 |
93 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
97 |
| Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
123 |
| Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
244 |
| Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
72 |
| Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient |
0 |
0 |
0 |
220 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
517 |
| Perfectly Competitive Innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
228 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
866 |
| Perfectly Competitive Innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
159 |
| Perfectly Competitive Innovation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
315 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
561 |
| Perfectly Competitive Innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
639 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
1,776 |
| Perfectly Competitive Innovation (Growth) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
271 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
281 |
| Perfectly competitive innovation |
0 |
1 |
4 |
451 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
2,037 |
| Polarization and Electoral Balance |
0 |
1 |
1 |
33 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
41 |
| Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
756 |
| Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation |
0 |
1 |
2 |
45 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
188 |
| Production Chains |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
41 |
| Production Chains |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
162 |
| Production Chains |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
53 |
| Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth |
0 |
1 |
1 |
180 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
320 |
| Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
80 |
| Quantum Games Have No News For Economics |
0 |
1 |
2 |
150 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
266 |
| Radical Markets by Eric Posner and Glen Weyl: a review essay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
170 |
| Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
220 |
| Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
| Reforming Patent Law: The Case of Covid‐19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
47 |
| Regularity in Overlapping Generations Exchange Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
180 |
| Regularity in Overlapping Generations Exchange Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
254 |
| Rent Seeking and Innovation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
181 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
408 |
| Rent-seeking and innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
246 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
980 |
| Repeated Games with Frequent Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
193 |
| Repeated Games with Frequent Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
| Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
283 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
248 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player |
0 |
0 |
1 |
100 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
312 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
329 |
| Reputation with Noisy Precommitment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
342 |
| Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
6 |
220 |
| Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
| Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
192 |
| Review of Unsettled: What Climate Science Tells Us, What It Doesn’t, and Why It Matters (By Stephen E. Koonin) |
0 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
61 |
| Review: Beyond Individual Choice by Michael Bacharach with Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
217 |
| Risk Sharing and Market Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
412 |
| Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
247 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
535 |
| Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
288 |
| Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
204 |
| Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
261 |
| Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
| Sensitivity of MLE to Measurement Error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
178 |
| Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
203 |
| Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
| Sins of Omission and Commission in Complex Systems |
0 |
0 |
2 |
33 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
56 |
| Size, Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
53 |
| Special Issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
32 |
| State Power and Conflict Driven Evolution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
29 |
| Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
355 |
| Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi |
1 |
1 |
1 |
63 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
652 |
| Steady States and Determinacy in Economies with Infinitely Lived Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
440 |
| Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality |
0 |
0 |
4 |
99 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
352 |
| Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
471 |
4 |
4 |
7 |
1,221 |
| Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
400 |
| Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
68 |
| Success in Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
22 |
| Superstition and Rational Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
995 |
| Superstition and Rational Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
105 |
| Superstition and Rational Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
227 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
1,918 |
| Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
104 |
| Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules |
0 |
0 |
2 |
94 |
2 |
5 |
14 |
158 |
| THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
7 |
460 |
| Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
50 |
| Tail probabilities for triangular arrays |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
52 |
| The Brother in Law Effect |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
191 |
| The Brother in Law Effect |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
378 |
| The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
205 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
442 |
| The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
156 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
329 |
| The Case Against Intellectual Property |
0 |
0 |
1 |
517 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
1,570 |
| The Case Against Intellectual Property |
1 |
1 |
3 |
453 |
5 |
6 |
12 |
1,220 |
| The Case Against Patents |
0 |
0 |
2 |
99 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
300 |
| The Castle on the Hill |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
518 |
| The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property |
0 |
0 |
2 |
253 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
605 |
| The Economics of Indeterminacy in Overlapping Generations Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
192 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
564 |
| The Enforcement of Collusion in a Frictionless Oligopoly I: Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
73 |
| The Enforcement of Collusion in a Frictionless Oligopoly II: Stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
59 |
| The Enforcement of Collusion in a Simple Oligopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
| The Financial Sector in the Planning of Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
268 |
| The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information |
0 |
1 |
1 |
255 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
925 |
| The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
233 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
838 |
| The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
215 |
| The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
265 |
| The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
91 |
| The Optimum Quantity of Money Revisited |
0 |
0 |
2 |
32 |
4 |
4 |
10 |
175 |
| The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study |
0 |
0 |
2 |
61 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
214 |
| The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study |
1 |
1 |
3 |
205 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
503 |
| The Political Economy of Policy Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
62 |
| The Relationship between Economic Theory and Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
89 |
| The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
140 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
75 |
| The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
326 |
| The Reputation Trap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
165 |
| The Sensitivity of MLE to Measurement Error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
| The Slippery Slope of Concession |
0 |
0 |
1 |
83 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
236 |
| The Theory of Learning in Games |
0 |
3 |
10 |
893 |
1 |
8 |
27 |
1,912 |
| The Whip and the Bible: Punishment Versus Internalization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
48 |
| The case against patents |
1 |
1 |
2 |
189 |
4 |
7 |
15 |
429 |
| The economics of ideas and intellectual property |
0 |
0 |
2 |
481 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
1,183 |
| The optimum quantity of money revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
211 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
566 |
| Timing and Self-Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
72 |
| Timing and Self-Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
137 |
| Trade Associations: Why Not Cartels? |
0 |
1 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
34 |
| Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
122 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
503 |
| Virtual Model Validation for Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
| Virtual Model Validation for Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
45 |
| Voter Participation with Collusive Parties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
67 |
| Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment |
0 |
1 |
1 |
35 |
5 |
6 |
6 |
82 |
| Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment (working paper version) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
| Voting Leaders and Voting Participation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
84 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
318 |
| What’s Intellectual Property Good for? |
0 |
1 |
3 |
207 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
368 |
| When Are Agents Negligible? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
283 |
| When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
78 |
| When are Agents Negligible? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
389 |
| When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
427 |
| When is Reputation Bad |
0 |
0 |
0 |
235 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
624 |
| When is Reputation Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
92 |
| When is Reputation Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
454 |
| When is Reputation Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
283 |
| When is Reputation Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
144 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
396 |
| When to Appease and When to Punish: Hitler, Putin, and Hamas |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
55 |
| Whither Game Theory? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
271 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
157 |
| Total Working Papers |
15 |
40 |
178 |
34,542 |
333 |
636 |
1,262 |
111,711 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| 2003 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
273 |
| A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
3 |
7 |
14 |
664 |
| A Model of Discovery |
0 |
0 |
0 |
201 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
564 |
| A Simple Durable Goods Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
179 |
| A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
41 |
| A remark on serial correlation in maximum likelihood |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
127 |
| An Easier Way to Calibrate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
126 |
| An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
45 |
| An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
186 |
| Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
648 |
| Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
212 |
| COMMENTS ON GREEN-ZHOU "MONEY AS A MECHANISM IN A BEWLEY ECONOMY" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
174 |
| Can A Turing Player Identify Itself? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
36 |
| Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
65 |
| Collusion constrained equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
57 |
| Comments on Bruce Smith’s work |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
68 |
| Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
446 |
| Conditional Universal Consistency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
159 |
| Consistency and cautious fictitious play |
0 |
0 |
2 |
76 |
5 |
6 |
12 |
313 |
| Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
201 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
618 |
| Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
160 |
| DETERRENCE IN THE COLD WAR AND THE 'WAR ON TERROR' |
1 |
2 |
2 |
35 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
192 |
| Damned if you do and damned if you don't: Two masters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
63 |
| Debt constraints and equilibrium in infinite horizon economies with incomplete markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
213 |
| Debt-Constrained Asset Markets |
0 |
2 |
7 |
733 |
2 |
7 |
22 |
1,756 |
| Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
237 |
| Determinacy of equilibrium in large-scale economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
107 |
| Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation? |
2 |
2 |
2 |
78 |
4 |
4 |
7 |
351 |
| Does Market Incompleteness Matter? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
159 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
569 |
| Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
78 |
| ENTERTAINING MALTHUS: BREAD, CIRCUSES, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH |
1 |
1 |
2 |
22 |
3 |
9 |
17 |
173 |
| EconomicDynamics Interviews David Levine on Experimental Economics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
362 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
| Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
2 |
309 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
532 |
| Efficiency and the Value of Money |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
97 |
| Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
261 |
| Evolution of Impatience: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game |
0 |
1 |
1 |
49 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
115 |
| Factor Saving Innovation |
0 |
0 |
3 |
85 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
356 |
| Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems |
0 |
0 |
2 |
48 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
223 |
| Globalization, intellectual property, and economic prosperity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
372 |
| Gross substitutability in large-square economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
140 |
| Growth Cycles and Market Crashes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
280 |
| Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities |
0 |
1 |
2 |
104 |
3 |
6 |
15 |
276 |
| Infinite horizon equilibrium with incomplete markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
62 |
| Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps |
0 |
0 |
1 |
51 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
407 |
| Innováció - a verseny szemszögéből |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
75 |
| Intertemporal separability in overlapping-generations models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
170 |
| Intervention and peace |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
67 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
468 |
| Introduction to the Special Issue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
39 |
| Learning and Belief-Based Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
111 |
| Learning and Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
155 |
| Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
92 |
| Learning in games |
0 |
3 |
11 |
201 |
5 |
8 |
36 |
562 |
| Learning to play Bayesian games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
235 |
2 |
5 |
13 |
620 |
| Limit games and limit equilibria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
180 |
| Liquidity Constrained Markets versus Debt Constrained Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
695 |
| Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
324 |
| MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
570 |
| Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
311 |
| Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed |
0 |
1 |
2 |
248 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
550 |
| Manifesto for research in economics |
0 |
0 |
5 |
238 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
423 |
| Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
149 |
| Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
887 |
2 |
4 |
22 |
3,845 |
| Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions |
0 |
1 |
1 |
36 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
187 |
| Nash equilibria equal competitive equilibria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
43 |
| Neuroeconomics? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
168 |
| On Characterizing Equilibria of Economies with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
521 |
| On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
162 |
| On the robustness of equilibrium refinements |
1 |
1 |
3 |
154 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
369 |
| Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players |
0 |
0 |
1 |
154 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
356 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
1 |
1 |
85 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
258 |
| Peer discipline and incentives within groups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
71 |
| Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
222 |
| Perfectly competitive innovation |
0 |
2 |
8 |
334 |
6 |
14 |
46 |
1,346 |
| Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation |
0 |
2 |
3 |
87 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
373 |
| Production Chains |
0 |
0 |
1 |
188 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
824 |
| Radical Markets by Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl: A Review Essay |
1 |
2 |
3 |
25 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
135 |
| Regularity in overlapping generations exchange economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
95 |
| Rent-seeking and innovation |
0 |
0 |
3 |
123 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
402 |
| Repeated Games with Frequent Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
245 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player |
0 |
1 |
1 |
406 |
2 |
6 |
12 |
1,133 |
| Reputation with Noisy Precommitment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
122 |
| Reverse regression for latent-variable models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
83 |
| Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
156 |
| Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
1 |
2 |
152 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
568 |
| Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
236 |
| Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
66 |
| Special issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
22 |
| Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
152 |
5 |
7 |
10 |
632 |
| Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games |
1 |
1 |
5 |
231 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
528 |
| Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
167 |
| Superstition and Rational Learning |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
379 |
| THE BROTHER-IN-LAW EFFECT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
188 |
| THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF CONCESSION |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
139 |
| TRADE ASSOCIATIONS: WHY NOT CARTELS? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
37 |
| The Case Against Intellectual Property |
1 |
1 |
5 |
252 |
5 |
6 |
18 |
744 |
| The Case against Patents |
1 |
2 |
5 |
150 |
6 |
12 |
38 |
565 |
| The Castle on the Hill |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
888 |
| The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information |
0 |
1 |
2 |
468 |
2 |
7 |
14 |
1,254 |
| The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games |
0 |
1 |
1 |
41 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
166 |
| The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study |
0 |
0 |
2 |
29 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
112 |
| The Reputation Trap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
3 |
6 |
13 |
83 |
| The economics of indeterminacy in overlapping generations models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
307 |
| The evolution of cooperation through imitation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
216 |
| The sensitivity of MLE to measurement error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
56 |
| The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
| Timing and Self‐Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
276 |
| Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
149 |
| Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
134 |
| What can we do with money ? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
28 |
| What's Intellectual Property Good for? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
78 |
| When Are Agents Negligible? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
532 |
| When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
231 |
| When is reputation bad? |
0 |
1 |
2 |
112 |
2 |
5 |
12 |
314 |
| Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
170 |
| Why Mickey Mouse is Not Subject to Congestion: A Letter on 'Eldred and Fair Use' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
261 |
| ¿Está la economía del comportamiento condenada a desaparecer? Lo ordinario frente a lo extraordinario |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
202 |
| Total Journal Articles |
10 |
33 |
115 |
10,213 |
147 |
297 |
811 |
38,814 |