Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
A note on Condorcet's other paradox |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
Analyse économique du règlement sportif de la coupe du monde de football |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
18 |
Book review: Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.): Handbook on Approval Voting, Springer, 2010 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
18 |
59 |
Choix collectif et procédures de votes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
Correlation, Partitioning and the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote under the Majority Rule |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
33 |
Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective |
0 |
1 |
2 |
34 |
4 |
9 |
20 |
115 |
Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective |
0 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
56 |
Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
19 |
32 |
Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
Introduction to the Special Issue on New Developments in Social Choice and Welfare Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
37 |
Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
34 |
Introduction à la théorie des jeux (1): jeux non coopératifs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
20 |
Introduction à la théorie des jeux (2): jeux coopératifs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (Eds.): Handbook on Approval Voting, Springer, 2010 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.): Handbook on approval voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
16 |
La détermination du nombre de délégués au sein des structures intercommunales: une application de l'indice de pouvoir de Banzhaf |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
50 |
La détermination du nombre des délégués au sein des structures intercommunales: une application de l'indice de pouvoir de Banzhaf |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
202 |
La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote: une étude expérimentale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
80 |
La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote: une étude expérimentale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
La mesure du pouvoir de vote |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
44 |
Le Scrutin Binominal Paritaire: Un Regard d'Ingénierie Electorale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
15 |
Le Scrutin Binominal Paritaire: Un Regard d'Ingénierie Electorale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
35 |
Le système de vote par note à trois niveaux: étude d'un nouveau mode de scrutin |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
Measurement of Voting Power: a Preliminary Analysis of an Historical French Electoral Episode Through Simulations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
Michel Regenwetter, Bernard Grofman, A.A.J. Marley, and Ilia M. Tsetlin: Behavioral social choice. Probabilistic models, statistical inference and applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
Modeling crop-livestock integration systems on a regional scale in Reunion Island: sugar cane and dairy cow activities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
More on Statistical Manipulability of Social Choice Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
On Ehrhart Polynomials and Probability Calculations in Voting Theory |
0 |
1 |
1 |
86 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
350 |
On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
On some limitations of the median voting rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
50 |
On the Likelihood of Dummy players in Weighted Majority Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
70 |
On the Voting Power of an Alliance and the Subsequent Power of its Members |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
130 |
On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
On the probability to act in the european union |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members |
0 |
1 |
1 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
158 |
Partage d'un cours d'eau international: l'apport de la théories des jeux coopératifs (Partie 1) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
21 |
Partage d'un cours d'eau international: l'apport de la théories des jeux coopératifs (Partie 2) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
22 |
Refining measures of group mutual coherence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
15 |
Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules with Mutually Coherent Voter Preferences: A Borda Compromise |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
27 |
The Condorcet ranking efficiency of voting rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
The Impact of Dependence among Voters’ Preferences with Partial Indifference |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
16 |
The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
37 |
The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: From IC to IAC trhough Ehrhart's Polynomials and Strong Mixing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
69 |
The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: From IC to IAC trhough Ehrhart's Polynomials and Strong Mixing |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
97 |
The Probability of Conflicts in a U.S. Presidential Type Election |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
49 |
The Probability of Conflicts in a US Presidential Type Election |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
38 |
The Theoretical Shapley-Shubik Probability of an Election Inversion in a Toy Symmetric Version of the U.S. Presidential Electoral System |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
32 |
The Theoretical Shapley-Shubik Probability of an Election Inversion in a Toy Symmetric Version of the U.S. Presidential Electoral System |
0 |
0 |
7 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
The Theoretical Shapley-Shubik Probability of an Election Inversion in a Toy Symmetric Version of the U.S. Presidential Electoral System |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
20 |
The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
The likehood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
The measurement of voting power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
34 |
To Rank or Not to Rank: A Summary |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
Une Analyse de la Loi Electorale du 29 Juin 1820 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
44 |
Une Analyse de la Loi Electorale du 29 Juin 1820 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
66 |
Une analyse de la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
Voter équitable dans l'Europe à 27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
28 |
Voters’ preference diversity, concepts of agreement and Condorcet’s paradox |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
12 |
Voting paradoxes and group coherence: the condorcet efficiency of voting rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
35 |
Voting rules manipulability and social homogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
23 |
Total Working Papers |
0 |
5 |
19 |
418 |
43 |
102 |
354 |
2,714 |
Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
A Note on the Probability of Having a Strong Condorcet Winner |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
35 |
A note on Condorcet's other paradox |
0 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
60 |
An Evaluation of the Benefit of Using Two-Stage Election Procedures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
Analyses géométriques et probabilistes des règles de vote, avec une application au scrutin majoritaire à deux tours |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
75 |
Choix social positionnel et principe majoritaire |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
14 |
Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
13 |
Computer simulations of voting systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
40 |
Condorcet's paradox for weak preference orderings |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
301 |
Condorcet's paradox under the maximal culture condition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences (*) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
437 |
Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective |
0 |
3 |
4 |
18 |
7 |
22 |
44 |
87 |
Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
Introduction to the Special Issue on New Developments in Social Choice and Welfare Theories |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
26 |
Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.): Handbook on approval voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
35 |
La détermination du nombre des délégués au sein des structures intercommunales: une application de l'indice de pouvoir de Banzhaf |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
35 |
La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote: une étude expérimentale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
80 |
Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
23 |
Le scrutin binominal paritaire: un regard d’ingénierie électorale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
Le système de vote par note à trois niveaux: étude d'un nouveau mode de scrutin |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
Measurement of Voting Power: a Preliminary Analysis of an Historical French Electoral Episode Through Simulations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
Michel Regenwetter, Bernard Grofman, A.A.J. Marley, and Ilia M. Tsetlin: Behavioral social choice. Probabilistic models, statistical inference and applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
87 |
Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
26 |
On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
58 |
On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
287 |
On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
15 |
15 |
On the Kim and Roush Voting Procedure |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
18 |
On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
33 |
On the probability of electing the Condorcet |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
34 |
On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
63 |
On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections |
1 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
3 |
6 |
20 |
20 |
Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case |
0 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
65 |
Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
143 |
Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
52 |
Strategic Manipulation in Committees Using the Plurality Rule: Alternative Concepts and Frequency Calculations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules with Mutually Coherent Voter Preferences: A Borda Compromise |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
20 |
The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
63 |
The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
64 |
The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
The impact of dependence among voters’ preferences with partial indifference |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
40 |
The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
17 |
The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
81 |
The probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type election |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
127 |
The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
71 |
The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
71 |
The theoretical Shapley–Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
10 |
Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
Une analyse de la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
Voters’ preference diversity, concepts of agreement and Condorcet’s paradox |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
33 |
Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
160 |
original papers: Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
158 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
707 |
Total Journal Articles |
1 |
11 |
27 |
739 |
35 |
89 |
264 |
4,300 |