Access Statistics for John O. Ledyard

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A New and Improved Design For Multi-Object Iterative Auctions 0 0 0 181 3 6 7 563
A Partial Characterization of Organizations and Environments Which are Consistent With Incentive Compatibility 0 0 0 17 3 5 6 145
A Theory of Price Formation and Exchange in Oral Auctions 0 0 1 48 3 3 4 174
A Theory of Price Formation and Exchange in Oral Auctions 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 29
A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments 0 0 0 141 1 3 4 398
Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources 0 0 0 25 2 2 3 132
An Incentive Mechanism for Efficient Resource Allocation in General Equilibrium with Public Goods 0 0 0 67 2 4 5 805
Changes in the Environment and Individual Learning 0 0 0 0 3 6 9 1,126
Computer Testbeds and Mechanism Design 0 0 0 50 0 1 1 225
Computer Testbeds: The Dynamics of Groves-Ledyard Mechanisms 0 0 0 81 4 6 7 291
Contracting inside an organization: An experimental study 0 0 0 6 0 2 4 48
Decentralized Disequilibrium Trading and Price Formation 0 0 0 15 1 1 2 91
Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights 0 0 0 434 3 6 7 2,018
Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights 0 0 0 19 1 4 4 142
Experimental Testbedding of a Pollution Trading System: Southern California's Reclaim Emmissions Market 0 0 0 188 1 3 8 776
First Best Bayesian Privatization Mechanisms 0 0 0 86 1 4 6 267
Incentive Compatibility 0 0 0 43 2 2 2 130
Incentive Compatibility Ten Years Later 0 0 1 75 0 1 3 230
Incentive Compatibility and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 22 2 4 4 95
Inducing Liquidity In Thin Financial Markets Through Combined-Value Trading Mechanisms 0 0 0 54 0 1 2 307
Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections 0 0 1 42 2 2 3 159
Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem 0 0 0 49 1 1 1 194
Market Failure 0 0 0 193 0 3 4 421
Market design for fishery IFQ programs 0 0 0 16 0 6 7 55
Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem 0 0 1 120 2 4 6 420
On the Incentive Problem with Public Goods 0 0 0 104 1 3 12 385
Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider Problem' 0 0 1 549 3 5 10 1,956
Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment 0 0 0 256 4 8 9 597
Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment 0 0 0 30 5 9 11 137
Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results 0 0 0 32 0 2 3 220
Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 1 2 11 2,363 12 20 41 9,361
Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 0 0 3 211 7 9 19 639
Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 3 16 40 6,859 33 80 152 20,708
Repeated Implementation 0 0 0 75 4 8 10 327
Repeated Implementation 0 0 0 54 4 13 16 373
Some Limitations of Demand Revealing Processes 0 0 0 51 2 8 11 312
The Allocation of Public Goods with Sealed-Bid Auctions: Some Preliminary Evaluations 0 0 0 15 3 9 11 95
The Allocation of Shared Resource within an Organization 0 0 0 2 3 4 4 529
The Allocation of a Shared Resource Within an Organization 0 0 0 68 2 3 5 277
The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes 0 0 0 5 4 8 9 49
The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes 0 0 0 21 3 4 5 117
The Design of Coordination Mechanisms and Organizational Computing 0 0 0 16 0 1 1 203
The Design of Mechanisms to Allocate Space Station Resources 0 0 0 19 1 4 4 95
The Design of Multi-Object Multi-Round Auction 0 0 0 35 1 2 3 250
The Economics of Space Station 0 0 0 47 1 4 5 177
The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods 0 0 0 41 3 4 5 160
The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services 0 0 0 170 2 5 8 561
The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior When Consumers Have Incomplete Information 0 0 0 6 2 3 4 67
The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition: A General Equilibrium Analysis 0 0 0 218 0 0 0 492
The Pure Theory of Large Two Candidate Elections 0 0 0 140 3 4 8 401
The Results of Some Tests of Mechanism Designs for the Allocation and Pricing of Collections of Heterogeneous 0 0 0 0 3 4 6 334
The Scope of the Hypothesis of Bayesian Equilibrium 0 0 0 34 2 3 5 167
Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions 0 0 0 199 7 8 8 532
Using Computerized Exchange Systems to Solve an Allocation Problem in Project Management 0 0 2 57 2 3 7 297
Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms 0 1 1 8 1 4 7 115
Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms 0 1 1 249 3 4 6 1,115
Total Working Papers 4 20 63 13,915 158 326 514 50,289

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods 0 0 0 0 5 8 10 243
A Convergent Pareto-Satisfactory Non-Tatonnement Adjustment Process for a Class of Unselfish Exchange Environments 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 90
A Market-Based Mechanism for Allocating Space Shuttle Secondary Payload Priority 0 0 0 34 5 8 10 173
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions 0 0 1 13 2 6 10 81
A behavioral model for mechanism design: Individual evolutionary learning 0 0 1 36 5 6 10 184
A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments 0 0 1 25 12 12 13 108
Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach 0 1 1 157 0 6 6 473
An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats 0 0 0 51 3 8 11 218
An experimental test of combinatorial information markets 0 0 0 31 3 5 8 128
Call market book information and efficiency 0 0 0 48 1 5 7 134
Concurrent trading in two experimental markets with demand interdependence 0 0 0 118 3 3 4 681
Contracting inside an organization: An experimental study 0 0 0 28 0 3 5 268
Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Statistical Hypothesis Test: An Example from Urban Transportation 0 0 0 35 4 4 7 227
Designing organizations for trading pollution rights 0 0 0 57 4 8 10 302
Efficiency of continuous double auctions under individual evolutionary learning with full or limited information 0 0 1 9 7 11 15 98
Elections and reputations 0 0 0 0 3 5 7 22
Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms 0 0 0 80 1 5 7 218
Incentive Compatible Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations 0 0 0 17 2 4 6 130
Incentive Compatible Space Station Pricing 0 0 0 11 1 2 2 67
Incentive compatibility and incomplete information 0 0 0 56 1 2 3 128
Individual evolutionary learning, other-regarding preferences, and the voluntary contributions mechanism 0 0 1 36 2 8 10 277
Inducing liquidity in thin financial markets through combined-value trading mechanisms 0 0 0 46 1 1 4 221
Introduction 0 0 0 5 1 1 3 40
Introduction to the issues in honor of Leonid Hurwicz 0 0 0 5 1 2 3 46
Introduction to the special issue on optimal income taxation 0 0 0 18 2 3 4 69
Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem 0 0 0 102 3 5 8 387
Nonvoting and the existence of equilibrium under majority rule 0 0 0 122 3 4 4 330
Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem 0 1 3 927 4 6 13 3,084
Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 68
Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results (*) 0 0 0 0 3 4 6 300
Prediction Markets: Alternative Mechanisms for Complex Environments with Few Traders 0 0 1 20 4 7 9 94
Repeated Implementation 0 0 0 35 3 8 15 253
Reply to comments by Tidemand and Tullock and Greenberg, Mackay and Tideman on some limitations of demand revealing processes 0 0 0 1 2 4 4 17
Scaling Up Learning Models in Public Good Games 0 0 0 54 1 4 4 247
Some limitations of demand revelaing processes 0 0 0 5 2 2 2 23
The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods 0 0 0 55 2 2 5 192
The First Use of a Combined-Value Auction for Transportation Services 0 0 0 2 3 7 11 33
The Speed of Information Revelation and Eventual Price Quality in Markets with Insiders: Comparing Two Theories 0 0 0 10 2 3 9 58
The allocation of a shared resource within an organization 0 0 0 29 3 4 5 131
The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes 0 0 0 85 4 6 10 207
The pure theory of large two-candidate elections 0 0 1 43 2 5 18 157
The relation of optima and market equilibria with externalities 0 0 0 8 1 2 2 35
The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium 0 0 0 82 0 1 7 239
Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms 0 0 0 28 4 4 9 155
Total Journal Articles 0 2 11 2,535 118 208 322 10,636

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Statistics updated 2026-02-12