Access Statistics for Michele Lombardi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction 0 0 0 18 2 3 15 50
A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction 0 0 0 24 0 0 10 137
A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction 0 0 1 51 0 0 14 316
Alternative Characterizations of the Proportional Solution for Nonconvex Bargaining Problems with Claims 0 0 0 1 0 2 6 29
Alternative Characterizations of the Proportional Solution for Nonconvex Bargaining Problems with Claims 0 0 0 8 0 0 7 91
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs 0 0 1 5 1 1 11 23
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs 0 0 2 4 1 2 11 15
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs 0 0 0 1 2 3 7 14
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs 0 0 1 8 1 2 17 25
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs 0 0 0 2 1 3 15 28
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs 0 0 0 3 2 3 15 36
An Impossibility Result for Social Welfare Relations in Infinitely-lived Societies 0 0 0 26 2 2 8 202
An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 0 6 1 2 13 19
An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 0 9 1 1 14 26
An implementation approach to rotation programs 0 0 0 5 1 2 14 23
Behavioral Strong Implementation 0 0 1 24 1 3 23 73
Behavioral Strong Implementation 0 0 0 30 3 4 27 131
Designing Rotation Programs: Limits and Possibilities 0 0 1 7 2 2 23 33
Do Coalitions Matter in Designing Institutions? 0 0 0 43 3 5 18 49
Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining 0 0 0 42 0 0 10 67
Implementation in partial equilibrium 0 0 0 19 3 4 14 69
Implementation in vNM Stable Set 0 0 1 13 4 4 16 48
Implementation in vNM Stable Set 0 0 1 7 0 1 8 11
Implementation in vNM stable sets 0 0 1 10 1 2 13 22
Implementation with farsighted agents 0 0 1 13 2 3 14 64
Implementation with foresighted agents 0 0 0 8 2 3 18 31
Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization 0 0 0 17 0 0 7 12
Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization 0 0 0 15 1 4 17 35
Iterative Monotonicity Is Equivalent To Strict Group Monotonicity: A Direct Proof 0 0 1 2 1 1 9 13
Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle 0 0 0 34 1 4 18 260
Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle 0 0 0 58 2 3 24 133
Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle 0 0 0 36 1 1 15 104
Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle 0 0 0 2 1 2 12 36
Liberal Principles for Social Welfare Relations in Infinitely-Lived Societies 0 0 0 1 3 3 14 20
Mechanism design with farsighted agents 0 0 0 31 1 2 13 46
National implementation with partially honest agents 0 0 1 10 5 6 12 112
Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents 0 0 0 25 1 2 11 114
Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents in Economic Environments 0 0 1 26 1 1 16 69
Natural Implementation with Partially-honest Agents in Economic Environments with Free-disposal 0 0 0 18 1 2 16 54
Natural Implementation with Semi-responsible-sincere Agents in Pure Exchange Economies 0 0 1 22 1 2 9 51
Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments 0 0 1 19 0 0 12 93
Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal 0 0 0 16 2 3 20 69
Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal 0 0 0 37 1 1 9 52
Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies 0 0 1 19 1 2 11 48
Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies 0 0 1 20 0 0 9 30
Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies 0 0 1 56 3 3 14 42
On Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity 0 0 1 8 0 1 8 13
On the Relationship between Robust and Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 0 9 4 4 7 11
On the Relationship between Robust and Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 1 4 1 1 8 11
Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: an experiment 0 0 0 10 1 3 13 27
Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization 0 0 0 37 2 3 10 48
Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization 0 0 0 5 3 5 21 67
Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization 0 0 0 26 2 3 15 52
Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization 0 0 0 16 2 6 19 49
Partially-honest Nash Implementation with Non-connected Honesty Standards 0 0 0 15 0 0 13 45
Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results 0 0 0 33 4 5 10 161
Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results 0 0 0 37 0 0 11 131
Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results 0 0 0 11 2 3 13 89
Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization 0 0 0 13 1 1 9 47
Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization 0 0 0 16 0 0 26 59
Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization 0 0 0 35 1 2 13 59
Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization 0 0 0 18 2 2 12 44
Reason-Based Choice Correspondences 0 1 1 4 3 5 14 33
Sequential implementation without commitment 0 0 0 6 3 3 8 41
Social decision under uncertainty and responsibility for beliefs 0 0 0 15 0 6 12 36
Treading a Fine Line: (Im)possibilities for Nash Implementation with Partially-honest Individuals 0 0 1 20 3 4 22 45
Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals 0 0 1 58 2 2 25 48
Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals 0 0 1 30 0 0 11 72
Treading a Â…fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals 0 0 0 23 2 3 12 40
Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 1 4 1 2 14 21
Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 1 5 3 6 21 24
Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 0 10 2 2 9 24
Two-agent Nash implementation with partially-honest agents: Almost Full Characterizations 0 0 0 28 0 0 4 60
Uncovered Bargaining Solutions 0 0 0 1 1 1 15 39
Uncovered Set Choice Rule 0 0 0 4 1 1 9 25
Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms: Complete information 0 0 0 25 4 4 13 104
What Kind of Preference Maximization Does the Weak Axiom of Revealed Non-inferiority Characterize? 0 0 1 2 1 3 10 25
Total Working Papers 0 1 28 1,379 114 180 1,036 4,575
8 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction 0 0 0 6 0 0 10 55
Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims 0 1 1 10 0 1 9 64
An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation 1 1 1 3 1 1 13 18
Behavioral strong implementation 0 0 0 1 2 2 26 33
Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation 0 1 1 3 3 4 13 23
Constrained implementation 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 26
Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information 0 0 0 3 1 1 7 22
Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities 0 0 0 1 1 1 16 28
Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? 0 0 0 7 0 2 11 40
Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements 0 0 1 2 3 3 11 26
Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining 0 0 0 1 1 1 16 44
Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures 0 0 0 2 1 1 10 26
Implementation in partial equilibrium 0 0 0 10 1 1 14 79
Implementation in strong core by codes of rights 0 0 0 0 1 2 13 18
Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle 0 0 0 2 0 0 17 50
Minimal covering set solutions 0 1 1 22 5 6 11 86
Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction 1 1 1 5 1 1 6 43
Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies 0 0 0 1 3 3 7 29
On trade in bilateral oligopolies with altruistic and spiteful agents 0 0 0 3 0 1 11 30
One-step-ahead implementation 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 34
Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: An experiment 0 0 0 2 3 4 9 18
Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization 0 0 0 4 1 1 15 44
Reason-based choice correspondences 0 0 0 36 0 8 15 161
Social discount rate: spaces for agreement 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 23
Treading a Fine Line: Characterisations and Impossibilities for Liberal Principles in Infinitely-Lived Societies 0 0 0 4 1 1 7 53
Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals 0 0 0 3 2 2 20 47
Uncovered bargaining solutions 0 0 0 12 1 1 8 63
Uncovered set choice rules 0 0 0 21 0 0 3 59
User-Aware Electricity Price Optimization for the Competitive Market 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 42
What kind of preference maximization does the weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority characterize? 0 0 0 15 1 1 12 79
Total Journal Articles 2 5 6 183 33 49 337 1,363

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Statistics updated 2026-11-12