| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Dominant Strategy, Double Clock Auction with Estimation-Based Tatonnement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
55 |
| Assessing the Performance of Simple Contracts Empirically: The Case of Percentage Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
13 |
56 |
| Assessing the Performance of Simple Contracts Empirically:The Case of Percentage Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
7 |
12 |
100 |
| Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
110 |
| Biased experts, costly lies, and binary decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
328 |
| Collusive Market Allocations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
64 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
102 |
| Collusive Market Allocations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
37 |
| Competitive E?ects of Vertical Integration with Downstream Oligopsony and Oligopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
164 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
263 |
| Coordination in the Fight Against Collusion |
2 |
2 |
4 |
58 |
2 |
8 |
15 |
87 |
| Coordination in the fight against collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
29 |
| Dynamic Location Games |
1 |
2 |
2 |
74 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
250 |
| False Alarm? Terror Alerts and Reelection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
3 |
10 |
17 |
209 |
| Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
789 |
| Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
103 |
| Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
13 |
13 |
71 |
| Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
2 |
7 |
13 |
91 |
| Global and local players in a model of spatial competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
328 |
| Horizontally Differentiated Market Makers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
846 |
| Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
245 |
| Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage |
0 |
0 |
1 |
121 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
953 |
| Learning, public good provision, and the information trap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
194 |
| Learning, voting and the information trap |
0 |
0 |
1 |
130 |
0 |
9 |
12 |
487 |
| Market Structure and the Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
128 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
200 |
| Market making oligopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
175 |
5 |
9 |
12 |
558 |
| Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
8 |
11 |
48 |
| Switching Costs, Firm Size, and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
564 |
| Switching Costs, Firm Size, and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
884 |
| The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
7 |
13 |
14 |
256 |
| When is Seller Price Setting with Linear Fees Optimal for Intermediaries? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
2 |
12 |
15 |
298 |
| When is Seller Price Setting with Linear Fees Optimal for Intermediaries? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
3 |
8 |
11 |
305 |
| Total Working Papers |
3 |
4 |
10 |
2,022 |
43 |
190 |
304 |
8,846 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
2 |
8 |
16 |
147 |
| A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
19 |
29 |
| A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
38 |
| A general non-central hypergeometric distribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
| An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
1 |
8 |
19 |
75 |
| Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
11 |
| Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
31 |
| Auctions and Economic Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
7 |
7 |
42 |
| Auctions with bid credits and resale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
44 |
| Bilateral Trade with Multiunit Demand and Supply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
| Chain Stores, Consumer Mobility, and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
124 |
| Club good intermediaries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
123 |
| Coordinated Effects in Merger Review |
1 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
3 |
14 |
26 |
74 |
| Coordination in the Fight against Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
16 |
| Digital monopolies: Privacy protection or price regulation? |
0 |
1 |
2 |
56 |
0 |
8 |
22 |
203 |
| Entry-deterring agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
18 |
| For the Student: Matching and Economic Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
86 |
| Global and local players in a model of spatial competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
67 |
| Horizontally Differentiated Market Makers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
203 |
| Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
1 |
8 |
14 |
120 |
| Inefficient policies and incumbency advantage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
10 |
13 |
191 |
| Learning, public good provision, and the information trap |
0 |
0 |
3 |
33 |
2 |
5 |
13 |
145 |
| MARKET MAKING OLIGOPOLY* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
107 |
| Make and Buy: Outsourcing, Vertical Integration, and Cost Reduction |
0 |
0 |
3 |
44 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
121 |
| Market power, randomization and regulation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
17 |
| Market structure and the competitive effects of vertical integration |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
132 |
| Merger Review for Markets with Buyer Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
9 |
13 |
113 |
| Merger review with intermediate buyer power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
25 |
| Mix-and-Match Divestitures and Merger Harm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
25 |
| Mix‐and‐match divestitures and merger harm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
14 |
| Monopoly Pricing, Optimal Randomization, and Resale |
0 |
3 |
6 |
26 |
0 |
10 |
27 |
108 |
| On cheating, doping and whistleblowing |
0 |
1 |
2 |
81 |
0 |
8 |
14 |
240 |
| Optimal market thickness |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
0 |
40 |
48 |
74 |
| Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
83 |
| Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
154 |
| Road to recovery: Managing an epidemic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
16 |
| Rock–Scissors–Paper and evolutionarily stable strategies |
1 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
3 |
7 |
9 |
104 |
| Sequential location games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
69 |
| The ABC of complementary products mergers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
126 |
| The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
31 |
| To sell public or private goods |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
3 |
9 |
17 |
21 |
| Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
52 |
| Vertical mergers that eliminate double markups are procompetitive |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
65 |
| When Walras meets Vickrey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
16 |
| Total Journal Articles |
2 |
10 |
32 |
719 |
33 |
265 |
468 |
3,512 |
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