| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Dominant Strategy, Double Clock Auction with Estimation-Based Tatonnement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
67 |
| Assessing the Performance of Simple Contracts Empirically: The Case of Percentage Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
61 |
| Assessing the Performance of Simple Contracts Empirically:The Case of Percentage Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
103 |
| Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
113 |
| Biased experts, costly lies, and binary decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
330 |
| Collusive Market Allocations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
43 |
| Collusive Market Allocations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
111 |
| Competitive E?ects of Vertical Integration with Downstream Oligopsony and Oligopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
164 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
267 |
| Coordination in the Fight Against Collusion |
0 |
0 |
2 |
58 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
94 |
| Coordination in the fight against collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
37 |
| Dynamic Location Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
74 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
255 |
| False Alarm? Terror Alerts and Reelection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
213 |
| Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
792 |
| Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
110 |
| Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
99 |
| Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
76 |
| Global and local players in a model of spatial competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
332 |
| Horizontally Differentiated Market Makers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
851 |
| Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
966 |
| Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
250 |
| Learning, public good provision, and the information trap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
201 |
| Learning, voting and the information trap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
493 |
| Market Structure and the Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
128 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
205 |
| Market making oligopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
175 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
561 |
| Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
56 |
| Switching Costs, Firm Size, and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
887 |
| Switching Costs, Firm Size, and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
568 |
| The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
263 |
| When is Seller Price Setting with Linear Fees Optimal for Intermediaries? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
310 |
| When is Seller Price Setting with Linear Fees Optimal for Intermediaries? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
304 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2,023 |
7 |
38 |
419 |
9,018 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
150 |
| A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
35 |
| A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
40 |
| A general non-central hypergeometric distribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
7 |
| An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
79 |
| Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
15 |
| Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
34 |
| Auctions and Economic Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
44 |
| Auctions with bid credits and resale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
47 |
| Bilateral Trade with Multiunit Demand and Supply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
18 |
| Chain Stores, Consumer Mobility, and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
130 |
| Club good intermediaries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
127 |
| Coordinated Effects in Merger Review |
1 |
2 |
4 |
28 |
3 |
7 |
35 |
88 |
| Coordination in the Fight against Collusion |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
20 |
| Digital monopolies: Privacy protection or price regulation? |
0 |
2 |
4 |
59 |
2 |
4 |
19 |
211 |
| Entry-deterring agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
22 |
| For the Student: Matching and Economic Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
89 |
| Global and local players in a model of spatial competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
70 |
| Horizontally Differentiated Market Makers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
208 |
| Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
127 |
| Inefficient policies and incumbency advantage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
197 |
| Learning, public good provision, and the information trap |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
149 |
| MARKET MAKING OLIGOPOLY* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
114 |
| Make and Buy: Outsourcing, Vertical Integration, and Cost Reduction |
1 |
1 |
5 |
48 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
137 |
| Market power, randomization and regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
27 |
| Market structure and the competitive effects of vertical integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
136 |
| Merger Review for Markets with Buyer Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
113 |
| Merger review with intermediate buyer power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
28 |
| Mix-and-Match Divestitures and Merger Harm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
31 |
| Mix‐and‐match divestitures and merger harm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
15 |
| Monopoly Pricing, Optimal Randomization, and Resale |
0 |
0 |
7 |
29 |
2 |
4 |
31 |
124 |
| On cheating, doping and whistleblowing |
0 |
0 |
2 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
243 |
| Optimal market thickness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
4 |
51 |
85 |
| Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
88 |
| Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
155 |
| Road to recovery: Managing an epidemic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
26 |
| Rock–Scissors–Paper and evolutionarily stable strategies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
106 |
| Sequential location games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
73 |
| The ABC of complementary products mergers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
130 |
| The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
37 |
| To sell public or private goods |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
26 |
| Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
61 |
| Vertical mergers that eliminate double markups are procompetitive |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
71 |
| When Walras meets Vickrey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
23 |
| Total Journal Articles |
2 |
6 |
30 |
733 |
19 |
56 |
591 |
3,756 |
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