Access Statistics for Jingfeng Lu

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Reverse" Nested Lottery Contests 0 0 0 51 0 1 10 120
All Pay Quality-Bids in Score Procurement Auctions 0 0 2 38 1 1 13 62
Auctions design with private costs of valuation discovery 0 0 0 61 0 0 7 236
Auctions with selective entry 0 0 0 16 2 2 12 31
Axiomatization of Reverse Nested Lottery Contests 0 0 0 30 2 2 27 97
Axiomatizing Multi-Prize Nested Lottery Contests: A Complete and Strict Ranking Perspective 0 0 0 47 0 1 14 110
Contest design and optimal endogenous entry 0 0 0 60 0 0 14 253
Endogenous entry and auctions design with private participation costs 0 0 0 106 2 3 12 342
Estimating risk aversion from ascending and sealed-bid auctions: the case of timber auction data 0 0 0 124 3 3 12 439
Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth 0 0 0 13 0 0 10 41
Identification and Inference in First-Price Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders and Selective Entry 0 0 0 39 0 2 16 49
Identification and estimation in first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders and selective entry 0 0 0 13 1 1 14 65
Identification and estimation in first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders and selective entry 0 0 1 1 0 2 16 21
Peace Through Side Payments 0 0 0 12 0 1 14 39
Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request 0 0 0 22 0 0 9 58
The Optimal Multi-Stage Contest 0 0 0 36 0 1 7 141
The beauty of "bigness" in contest design: merging or splitting? 0 0 0 53 0 0 10 219
The optimal multi-stage contest 0 0 0 105 0 0 10 391
Unifying Contests: from Noisy Ranking to Ratio-Form Contest Success Functions 0 0 0 34 0 0 18 245
Unifying Contests: from Noisy Ranking to Ratio-Form Contest Success Functions 0 0 0 46 0 2 13 174
Unifying Identity-Specific and Financial Externalities in Auction Design 0 0 0 41 0 0 14 221
When and how to dismantle nuclear weapons 0 0 0 80 0 0 8 610
Total Working Papers 0 0 3 1,028 11 22 280 3,964

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An implementation of the general optimal mechanism in Esö and Szentes (2007) 0 0 1 1 1 2 14 15
Auction design with opportunity cost 0 0 0 37 1 1 13 132
Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert 0 0 0 2 0 0 12 20
Auctions with selective entry 0 0 0 4 0 1 10 54
Auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders: theory and evidence 0 0 0 14 0 1 8 93
Axiomatization of reverse nested lottery contests 0 0 1 4 0 1 13 38
Axiomatizing multi-prize nested lottery contests: A complete and strict ranking perspective 0 0 0 5 1 3 20 55
CONTEST DESIGN AND OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS ENTRY 0 0 0 27 1 2 18 121
Competitive effect of cross-shareholdings in all-pay auctions with complete information 0 0 0 20 0 0 6 108
Constrained contests with a continuum of battles 0 0 0 3 0 2 34 37
Contest with pre-contest investment 0 0 2 56 0 0 10 150
Contests with endogenous entry 0 0 1 9 1 2 10 59
Contests with multiplicative sabotage effect 0 0 2 4 0 0 14 21
Coupling Information Disclosure with a Quality Standard in R&D Contests 0 1 2 2 0 3 10 10
Deposit Requirements in Auctions 0 0 3 4 1 2 12 18
Design tools for all-pay contests: Aligning incentives and balancing the playing field 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 3
Disclosure policy in Tullock contests with asymmetric stochastic entry 0 0 0 4 0 0 12 46
Disclosure policy in Tullock contests with asymmetric stochastic entry 0 0 0 0 1 1 11 24
Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities 0 0 0 5 0 2 9 43
ENHANCING EFFORT SUPPLY WITH PRIZE‐AUGMENTING ENTRY FEES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS 0 0 0 4 0 1 9 24
ENTRY COORDINATION AND AUCTION DESIGN WITH PRIVATE COSTS OF INFORMATION ACQUISITION 0 0 0 21 0 1 12 126
EX ANTE EFFICIENT MECHANISM WITH PRIVATE ENTRY COSTS 0 0 0 2 1 2 9 33
Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs 0 0 0 17 0 1 5 125
Efficient public good provision by lotteries with nonlinear pricing 0 0 1 2 0 1 12 16
Estimating risk aversion from ascending and sealed-bid auctions: the case of timber auction data 0 0 0 63 1 1 12 271
Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth 0 0 0 8 0 1 13 81
How to split the pie: Optimal rewards in dynamic multi-battle competitions 0 0 0 3 0 0 11 70
Incentivizing R&D: Prize or subsidies? 0 0 0 43 0 1 15 247
Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types 0 0 0 2 0 1 10 20
Measuring the degree of assortative mating 0 0 0 70 0 0 17 219
Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking 0 0 0 26 0 1 6 101
Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux 1 1 1 12 1 2 14 71
Move orders in contests: Equilibria and winning chances 0 0 1 2 2 2 16 29
Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes 0 0 0 4 0 2 10 19
ON EQUILIBRIUM PLAYER ORDERING IN DYNAMIC TEAM CONTESTS 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 21
On disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry 0 0 0 24 0 1 6 91
Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities 0 0 0 25 0 2 10 120
Optimal contest design under reverse-lottery technology 0 0 1 16 2 2 7 78
Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes 0 0 0 4 0 1 14 29
Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests 0 0 1 1 0 0 6 13
Optimal prize allocation in contests: The role of negative prizes 0 0 0 11 3 4 17 120
Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles 0 0 0 1 1 3 17 24
Optimal prize-rationing strategy in all-pay contests with incomplete information 0 0 0 14 0 1 6 85
Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search 0 0 0 5 0 1 10 34
Orchestrating Information Acquisition 0 0 0 7 2 4 8 34
Pairing provision price and default remedy: optimal two‐stage procurement with private R&D efficiency 0 0 1 5 0 2 10 60
Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request 0 0 0 1 0 2 11 32
Performance bundling in multi-dimensional competitions 0 0 0 3 0 0 7 15
Private Provisions of a Discrete Public Good with Voluntary Participation 0 0 0 22 0 2 17 120
RANKING DISCLOSURE POLICIES IN ALL‐PAY AUCTIONS 0 0 0 3 0 0 8 56
Sequential Screening with Type-Enhancing Investment 0 2 2 7 0 2 10 27
Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007) 0 0 0 8 0 0 15 55
Task arrangement in team competitions 0 0 0 12 1 1 9 75
Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles 0 0 0 45 1 2 21 275
The beauty of "bigness": On optimal design of multi-winner contests 0 0 0 40 0 1 14 165
The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes 0 0 0 6 0 1 8 50
The optimal allocation of prizes in contests with costly entry 0 0 2 5 0 1 16 36
The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: A Bayesian persuasion perspective 0 0 0 13 0 1 9 64
The optimal multi-stage contest 0 0 0 29 0 0 10 143
Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power 0 0 0 3 0 0 18 58
Why a Simple Second-Price Auction Induces Efficient Endogenous Entry 0 0 0 30 0 2 6 97
Willingness to fight on: Environmental quality in dynamic contests 0 0 0 6 0 1 18 40
Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests 0 0 0 9 1 2 10 39
“Reverse” nested lottery contests 0 0 0 14 0 2 10 119
Total Journal Articles 1 4 23 851 23 81 745 4,674

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Statistics updated 2026-09-10