| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Historical Perspective on Stablecoins |
0 |
1 |
62 |
62 |
1 |
8 |
33 |
33 |
| A New Public Data Source: Call Reports from 1959 to 2025 |
1 |
16 |
16 |
16 |
3 |
21 |
21 |
21 |
| Bank Failures: The Roles of Solvency and Liquidity |
5 |
5 |
5 |
5 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
| Bank Failures: The Roles of Solvency and Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Bank Failures: The Roles of Solvency and Liquidity |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
13 |
13 |
13 |
| Bank Funding Risk, Reference Rates, and Credit Supply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
23 |
26 |
49 |
| Bank Funding Risk, Reference Rates, and Credit Supply |
0 |
1 |
2 |
34 |
3 |
13 |
24 |
108 |
| Bank Funding Risk, Reference Rates, and Credit Supply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
13 |
| Bank Funding during the Current Monetary Policy Tightening Cycle |
0 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
2 |
8 |
13 |
66 |
| Bank Liquidity Provision Across the Firm Size Distribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
14 |
54 |
61 |
195 |
| Bank Liquidity Provision across the Firm Size Distribution |
0 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
22 |
55 |
62 |
121 |
| Banks, Shadow Banking, and Fragility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
1 |
9 |
10 |
148 |
| Banks, shadow banking, and fragility |
0 |
1 |
3 |
170 |
1 |
11 |
23 |
446 |
| Deposit Betas: Up, Up, and Away? |
1 |
5 |
27 |
97 |
4 |
26 |
85 |
290 |
| Deposits and the March 2023 Banking Crisis—A Retrospective |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
| Did QE Lead Banks to Relax Their Lending Standards? Evidence from the Federal Reserve's LSAPs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
190 |
| Digitizing Historical Balance Sheet Data: A Practitioner's Guide |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
24 |
| Employment Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy: Evidence from QE |
0 |
0 |
2 |
67 |
4 |
11 |
19 |
253 |
| Failing Banks |
1 |
2 |
15 |
15 |
4 |
18 |
32 |
32 |
| Failing Banks |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
1 |
11 |
24 |
40 |
| Failing Banks |
2 |
3 |
4 |
21 |
3 |
10 |
33 |
49 |
| Fight the Pandemic, Save the Economy: Lessons from the 1918 Flu |
0 |
0 |
3 |
799 |
0 |
15 |
36 |
2,386 |
| How (Un-)Informed Are Depositors in a Banking Panic? A Lesson from History |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
2 |
11 |
13 |
56 |
| How Do Interest Rates (and Depositors) Impact Measures of Bank Value? |
0 |
0 |
3 |
36 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
73 |
| How the LIBOR Transition Affects the Supply of Revolving Credit |
0 |
1 |
6 |
44 |
1 |
6 |
17 |
94 |
| Implications of the COVID-19 Disruption for Corporate Leverage |
0 |
0 |
2 |
37 |
0 |
7 |
14 |
107 |
| Inflating Away the Debt: The Debt-Inflation Channel of German Hyperinflation |
0 |
1 |
2 |
33 |
4 |
11 |
15 |
37 |
| Insights from Newly Digitized Banking Data, 1867-1904 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
23 |
| Micro-evidence from a System-wide Financial Meltdown: The German Crisis of 1931 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
48 |
| Outside Liquidity, Rollover Risk, and Government Bonds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
83 |
| Pandemics Depress the Economy, Public Health Interventions Do Not: Evidence from the 1918 Flu |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
8 |
16 |
47 |
| Sovereign Defaults, Bank Runs, and Contagion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
0 |
10 |
16 |
146 |
| Supervising Failing Banks |
0 |
0 |
12 |
12 |
0 |
7 |
8 |
8 |
| Supervising Failing Banks |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
2 |
11 |
19 |
19 |
| Supervising Failing Banks |
0 |
0 |
8 |
8 |
4 |
15 |
29 |
29 |
| Ten years later – Did QE work? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
34 |
3 |
11 |
16 |
86 |
| The Banking Industry and COVID-19: Lifeline or Life Support? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
5 |
12 |
18 |
125 |
| The Debt-Inflation Channel of the German (Hyper-)Inflation |
0 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
3 |
16 |
29 |
51 |
| The Debt-Inflation Channel of the German Hyperinflation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
16 |
23 |
62 |
| Weathering the Storm: Who Can Access Credit in a Pandemic? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
11 |
16 |
88 |
| Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
4 |
14 |
20 |
81 |
| Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
7 |
17 |
24 |
57 |
| Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
6 |
12 |
40 |
| Why Do Banks Fail? Bank Runs Versus Solvency |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
4 |
9 |
16 |
32 |
| Why Do Banks Fail? The Predictability of Bank Failures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
7 |
13 |
38 |
| Why Do Banks Fail? Three Facts About Failing Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
8 |
9 |
15 |
| test anna templatetype feb 14 Once Upon a Time in the Banking Sector: Historical Insights into Banking Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
6 |
7 |
44 |
| Total Working Papers |
11 |
39 |
193 |
2,386 |
132 |
560 |
934 |
5,986 |