Access Statistics for Yuanzhu Lu

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Does Reliable Pirated Product Lead to More Piracy? 0 0 0 96 2 5 16 200
Does the Nature of Piracy and Competition Matter? 0 0 0 63 1 2 7 185
Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation 0 0 0 82 2 10 16 251
Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Competitors 0 0 0 0 1 3 7 7
Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Competitors: the Linear Demand Case 0 0 0 17 2 2 8 190
Mixed oligopoly and the choice of capacity 0 0 1 33 1 3 10 216
Patent Licensing in Spatial Models 0 0 0 115 1 4 11 140
Strategic Choice of Network Externality 0 0 0 51 2 3 7 105
The Choice of Capacity in Mixed Duopoly under Demand Uncertainty 0 0 0 20 0 2 10 158
Total Working Papers 0 0 1 477 12 34 92 1,452

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS PAYOFF MOTIVES AND ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY* 0 0 0 42 3 5 20 172
A NOTE ON ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH STRATEGIC DELEGATION: UNILATERAL EXTERNALITY CASE 0 0 0 12 4 4 5 98
A NOTE ON THE LEAPFROGGING ISSUE IN A QUALITY CHOICE GAME 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 78
Accommodation or deterrence in the face of commercial piracy: the impact of intellectual property rights protection 0 0 0 28 0 1 9 96
ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY AND PRIVATE DUOPOLY –‘CAPACITY‐THEN‐QUANTITY’ GAME: THE LINEAR DEMAND CASE* 0 0 0 16 1 3 9 117
ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY WITH ENDOGENOUS VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION 0 0 0 12 1 5 11 56
Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Competitors: the Linear Demand Case 0 0 0 50 1 1 8 142
Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly consisting of a single public firm and foreign competitors 0 0 0 9 2 3 8 62
Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly: Another forgotten equilibrium 0 0 0 27 3 5 6 107
FIRM OWNERSHIP, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND WELFARE* 0 0 0 40 2 3 11 158
Hotelling's Location Model in Mixed Duopoly 1 1 1 50 6 11 23 208
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN THE TWO-SIDED MARKET 0 0 4 15 2 5 14 41
Impact of Network Externality on End-User Piracy: Revisited 0 0 0 12 2 3 10 77
Incentivizing R&D: Prize or subsidies? 0 0 0 43 2 2 15 246
Limiting End-user Piracy - The Role of Private and Public Anti-Piracy Measure 0 0 0 12 2 2 6 70
Mixed oligopoly and the choice of capacity 0 0 0 53 0 3 12 189
Patent licensing in spatial models 0 0 0 8 4 8 12 58
Retailers' Incentive to Sell through a New Selling Channel and Pricing Behavior in a Multi-channel Environment 0 0 0 21 0 2 11 317
Strategic Choice of Network Externality and Its Impact on Digital Piracy 0 0 0 20 3 4 7 91
TACIT COLLUSION WITH QUANTITY-MATCHING PUNISHMENTS IN A HOMOGENEOUS MARKET 0 0 0 11 1 3 5 47
THE CHOICE OF CAPACITY IN MIXED DUOPOLY UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY* 0 0 0 34 3 4 8 116
THE RELATIVE-PROFIT-MAXIMIZATION OBJECTIVE OF PRIVATE FIRMS AND ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY 0 0 0 6 1 2 5 24
Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments 0 0 1 76 4 6 20 346
Technology licensing and innovation—A correction on two-part tariff analysis 0 0 0 16 2 2 8 52
Technology selling and innovation with bargaining 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 26
Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests 0 0 0 9 1 2 11 37
Total Journal Articles 1 1 6 626 50 90 261 3,031

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06