Access Statistics for David MARTIMORT

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making 0 0 1 48 1 1 2 76
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 75 1 2 3 288
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
'Build It or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships 0 0 0 497 0 1 8 1,776
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games 0 0 0 67 0 1 1 100
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games 0 0 0 46 1 1 3 81
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game 0 0 0 64 0 0 2 56
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements 0 0 0 92 0 0 0 143
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements 0 0 0 84 0 0 1 139
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 12
A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement 0 1 2 85 0 1 2 134
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement 0 0 0 47 1 1 1 108
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 38
A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs 0 0 0 139 0 1 1 680
A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs 0 0 0 151 0 0 0 1,170
A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs 0 0 0 29 0 0 6 269
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 23
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11
A necessary and sufficient condition for non-smooth linear-state optimal control problems 0 1 1 23 0 1 3 78
A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 45
Accords environnementaux. Le marché peut-il réussir l'arbitrage entre incitations et participation ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Accords environnementaux. Le marché peut-il réussir l'arbitrage entre incitations et participation ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Acting in the Darkness: Towards some Foundations for the Precautionary Principle 0 0 1 48 0 1 4 14
Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games 0 2 3 90 0 2 5 196
Agir face aux dérèglements du monde 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 29
Agir face aux dérèglements du monde 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 61
Agir face aux dérèglements du monde 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 137
An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision 0 0 0 186 0 0 1 511
Auctioning Long-Term Projects under Financial Constraints 0 0 1 15 1 1 3 15
Collusion Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 941
Collusion and Delegation 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 275
Collusion and Delegation 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 769
Collusion under asymmetric information 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 19
Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information 0 0 0 247 0 0 3 667
Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 237
Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 22
Common agency with informed principals 0 1 2 146 0 1 3 416
Communication by Interest Groups and the Organization of Lobbying 0 0 0 34 0 1 1 229
Competing Mechanisms in a Commun Value Environment 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 294
Competition Under Nonlinear Pricing 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 547
Competition under Nonlinear Pricing 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 311
Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 25
Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process 0 0 0 71 0 0 0 141
Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 98
Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36
Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 56 0 0 1 153
Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 103 0 0 1 348
Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 253
Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer's Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power 0 0 1 9 0 0 1 4
Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer's Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 15
Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 24
Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 228
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria 0 0 1 99 0 0 3 293
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 145
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness 0 0 0 74 0 0 1 125
Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness 0 0 0 74 0 0 1 72
Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness 0 0 0 114 0 0 1 156
Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 79
Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 37
Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Delegated Monitoring versus Arm's Length Contracting 0 0 0 134 1 5 24 478
Delegation and R&D Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 184
Delegation and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy 0 0 0 82 1 3 4 382
Delegation, Capture and Endogenous Information Structures 0 1 2 18 0 1 2 10
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence From Italy 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 12
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence From Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation When Sellers Provide Expert Advice 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 45
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation When Sellers Provide Expert Advice 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 16
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 7
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice 0 0 3 28 0 0 3 109
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 60
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice 0 0 0 41 0 0 2 49
Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 21
Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 82
Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America: Welfare Effects and Beliefs 0 0 1 14 1 1 2 110
Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America: Welfare Effects and Beliefs 0 0 1 77 1 2 6 231
Environmental Risk Regulation and Liability under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 0 1 2 171 0 2 5 471
Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 382
Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Thoery 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 404
Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 26
Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 24 1 1 1 6
Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 41 0 1 1 49
Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 57 0 0 5 94
From Inefficient Behind-The-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model* 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 16
From Inefficient Behind-The-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model* 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 18
From Inside the Firm to the Growth Process 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 113
From inside the firm to the growth process 0 0 0 8 0 0 3 199
Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance 0 0 2 12 0 1 4 48
Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance 0 0 0 7 0 0 3 20
Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance 0 0 0 17 0 0 3 70
Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance 1 1 1 19 1 1 3 78
Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance 0 0 0 53 0 0 7 170
Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance 0 0 0 8 0 0 2 32
Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design 0 0 0 251 0 1 26 4,074
How much discretion for risk regulators? 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 17
How much discretion for risk regulators? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships 0 0 2 82 0 0 3 161
How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 152
How to Design Public-Private Partnerships in a Warming World? - When Infrastructure Becomes a Really “Hot” Topic 0 0 2 62 0 1 7 153
How to design infrastructure contracts in a warning world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9
How to design infrastructure contracts in a warning world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 44
Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition 0 0 0 83 0 0 0 254
Incitations explicites et implicites dans les universités en concurrence. Quelques pistes de réflexion 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 19
Incitations explicites et implicites dans les universités en concurrence. Quelques pistes de réflexion 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5
International Trade with Domestic Regulation under Asymmetric Information: A Simple General Equilibrium Approach 0 0 0 121 0 0 0 319
Interoperability and Quality Provision in Digital Payments 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Interoperability and Quality Provision in Digital Payments 0 1 1 1 1 3 3 3
La Nouvelle Micro-Economie et l'Analyse du Secteur Agro-Alimentaire: Quelques Développements Récents 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 346
Les limites a la discrimination par les prix 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1,030
Les limites à la discrimination par les prix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation 0 0 0 220 0 2 3 495
Mechanism Design with Private Communication 0 0 1 34 0 0 2 123
Mechanism design with private communication 0 1 2 103 0 1 3 289
Media Mergers in Nested Markets 0 1 3 39 0 1 5 17
Menu Auctions Under Asymmetric Information 0 12 12 12 1 31 31 31
Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information 0 0 1 108 0 0 3 121
Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 8
Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 32
Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 0 0 116 0 0 1 397
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 245
Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 81
Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization and Schumpeterian Growth 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 577
Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization and Schumpeterian Growth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 239
Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian Growth 0 0 0 93 0 1 2 510
Multi-Principaux avec Anti-Sélection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 198
Multi-principaux avec anti-selection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 247
Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs 0 0 0 22 0 0 1 271
Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 18
Non-Manipulable Mechanisms: A Brief Overview 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias 0 0 0 56 0 0 1 104
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 18
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 18
On the Optimal Use of Ex Ante Regulation and Ex Post Liability 1 1 1 136 1 1 1 406
Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Optimal Domestic Regulation and the Pattern of Trade 0 0 0 41 0 0 1 181
Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Optimal regulation design of airports: Investment incentives and impact of commercial services 0 0 0 11 0 1 1 14
Optimal regulation design of airports: Investment incentives and impact of commercial services 0 0 0 13 0 0 2 14
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28
Partenariats Public-Privés: quelques réflexions 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 30
Participation Constraints in Discontinuous Adverse Selection Models 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 19
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Pessimistic information gathering 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28
Pessimistic information gathering 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Politics, transaction costs, and the design of regulatory institutions 0 1 1 451 0 1 2 1,175
Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation:Implications for Public-Private Partnerships 0 0 0 156 0 0 1 371
Precaution, Information and Time-Inconsistency: On The Value of the Precautionary Principle 0 0 1 6 0 0 2 21
Privatization and Changes in Corruption Patterns: The Roots of Public Discontent 0 0 2 445 0 0 5 1,236
Promotional Allowances: Loss Leading as an Incentive Device 0 0 5 5 0 0 5 5
Promotional Allowances: Loss Leading as an Incentive Device 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Promotional Allowances: Loss Leading as an Incentive Device 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games 0 0 0 68 0 0 1 174
Reform for Sale: A Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions 0 0 0 5 1 2 4 8
Reform for Sale: a Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions 0 0 2 19 0 0 2 20
Renégotiation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 52
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8
Resale Price Maintenance under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 170 0 0 0 645
Risk Allocation and the Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships 2 2 4 318 2 2 21 736
Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 12
Risk averse supervisors and the efficiency of collusion 0 0 1 17 0 0 4 73
Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 383
Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory 1 3 10 37 2 6 21 45
Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management Contracts for Public Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 36
Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management for Public Utilities 0 0 0 101 0 1 1 333
Solving the GlobalWarming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help! 0 0 0 96 0 0 3 267
Solving the GlobalWarming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help! 0 0 0 46 0 0 1 113
Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help! 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help! 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletely Informed Policymakers 0 0 0 70 0 0 1 595
Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 205
Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletly Informed Policymakers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40
Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletly Informed Policymakers 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 8
The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth 0 1 2 72 2 5 15 271
The Benefits of Central Bank's Political Independence 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 850
The Benefits of Extended Liability 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 159
The Benefits of Extended Liability 0 0 0 99 0 1 1 617
The Collective Wisdom of Beauty Contests 0 0 1 76 0 0 1 137
The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector 0 0 1 32 0 0 2 119
The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 128
The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector 0 0 0 70 0 0 1 235
The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries 0 0 0 200 1 2 3 471
The Firm as a Multicontact Organization 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 672
The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics 0 0 0 57 0 1 2 217
The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 570
The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 682
The Organization of Delegated Expertise 0 0 0 73 1 1 2 207
The Organization of Delegated Expertise 0 0 0 70 0 0 1 216
The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 291
The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 17
The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors 0 0 0 25 0 1 1 64
The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk 0 0 0 37 0 0 1 146
The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in TheControl of Environmental Risk 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 106
The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in the Control of Environmental Risk 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 26
The Regulatory State: The Power of Not Having the Power to Act 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 17
The Regulatory State: The Power of Not Having the Power to Act 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 15
The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games 0 0 0 196 0 0 0 583
The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships 0 1 2 755 0 3 11 2,026
The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships 0 0 6 317 0 2 13 774
The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 37
The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships 0 0 0 2 1 1 8 66
The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment 0 0 0 104 0 0 0 486
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 223
The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector 0 0 0 157 0 0 0 447
The benefits of central bank's political independence 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 14
The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector 0 0 0 24 0 0 3 30
The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 22
The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 89
The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
The multiprincipal nature of government 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 19
The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 5
The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 104
The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 17
The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 38
The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 52
The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 13
To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 103
Transaction Costs and Contract Theory 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 28
Transaction Costs and Incentie Theory 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 677
Transaction Costs and Incentive Theory 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 22
Transaction costs, politics, regulatory institutions and regulatory outcomes 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 71
Two-Tier Asymmetric Information as a Motive for Trade, Trade Policies and Inefficient Trade Agreements 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 122
Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Use and Abuse of Regulated Prices in Electricity Markets: "How to Regulate Regulated Prices?" 0 0 1 69 0 0 2 119
Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: “How to regulate regulated prices?” 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 16
Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: “How to regulate regulated prices?” 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 14
Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36
Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? 0 0 20 21 1 1 11 12
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
“When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19
“When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 25
Total Working Papers 6 33 110 10,721 32 134 556 48,078
19 registered items for which data could not be found


Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH TO CLIMATE-CHANGE AGREEMENTS 0 1 3 57 0 1 4 144
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements 0 0 4 25 0 0 4 63
A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 14
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement 0 0 1 25 0 0 11 135
A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs 0 0 0 60 0 2 7 279
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 52
Accords environnementaux. Le marché peut-il réussir l'arbitrage entre incitations et participation ? 0 0 0 13 0 0 2 37
An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization 1 1 2 115 1 1 5 304
An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision 0 0 1 167 1 2 3 505
CONTRACTING FOR AN INNOVATION UNDER BILATERAL ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION* 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 93
Collusion and Delegation 0 1 3 171 0 1 3 643
Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise 1 1 3 75 1 4 7 237
Collusion under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 872
Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information 0 0 0 169 1 1 3 674
Collusion‐Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods 0 0 0 115 0 0 0 522
Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information 0 0 2 77 0 0 4 219
Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 738
Competition under Nonlinear Pricing 0 1 2 19 0 1 3 48
Continuity in mechanism design without transfers 0 0 1 76 0 0 4 192
Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners 0 0 1 22 0 1 2 64
Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 20
Contracts as a barrier to entry: Impact of Buyer’s asymmetric information and bargaining power 0 0 1 12 0 0 3 28
Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks 0 0 1 10 0 0 7 72
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria 0 0 0 207 0 0 0 593
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 38
Corrigendum to "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment" 0 0 1 58 0 1 3 190
Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness 0 0 1 64 1 2 5 216
Corruption in Public-Private Partnerships, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 10
Delegated monitoring versus arm's-length contracting 0 0 0 70 0 0 1 269
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R & D Spending: Evidence From I taly 0 0 0 23 0 1 4 87
Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures 0 0 1 10 0 1 4 22
Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 20
Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts 0 1 3 177 1 3 9 542
Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 75
Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory 0 1 3 284 0 1 5 862
Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information 0 1 2 9 0 1 3 59
From Inefficient Behind-the-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model 0 0 0 6 1 2 7 26
From Inside The Firm to the Growth Process 0 0 0 33 0 1 1 103
Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance 0 1 5 26 0 4 13 105
HOW TO DESIGN INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS IN A WARMING WORLD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS* 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 11
How much discretion for risk regulators? 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 107
Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition 0 0 0 58 0 0 4 198
In memoriam Jean-Jacques Laffont 0 0 0 18 0 0 1 46
Incitations explicites et implicites dans les universités en concurrence. Quelques pistes de réflexion 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 53
Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent 0 1 3 151 0 2 7 461
Introduction to the Special Issue on Frontiers in Environmental Economics 0 0 0 11 0 0 3 64
Introduction to the Special Issue on Public-Private Partnerships 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 87
Jean-Jacques Laffont et la théorie desincitations de groupes 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 72
La Nouvelle Micro-Économie Et L'analyse Du Secteur Agro-Alimentaire: Quelques Développements Récents 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 13
La nouvelle micro-économie et l'analyse du secteur agro-alimentaire: quelques développements récents 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 27
Le citoyen, l'expert et le politique: une rationalité complexe pour une régulation excessive du risque 0 1 1 3 0 1 3 24
Le partage public-privé dans le financement de l'économie 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 74
Les limites à la discrimination par les prix 0 0 1 10 0 0 2 31
Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games 0 0 1 60 0 0 2 187
Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 724
Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 28
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting 0 0 0 33 0 0 1 122
Multi-principaux avec anti-sélection 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 28
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias 0 1 3 15 0 3 5 55
On some agency costs of intermediated contracting 1 1 2 33 1 1 4 96
On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability 0 1 2 44 0 1 13 183
Optimal Taxation and Strategic Budget Deficit Under Political Regime Switching 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 269
Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions 0 1 1 47 0 1 6 175
Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 58
Optimal regulation design of airports: Investment incentives and impact of commercial services 0 0 1 13 0 0 1 23
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 50
Partenariats public-privé. Quelques réflexions 0 0 0 21 0 1 1 81
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 6
Pessimistic information gathering 0 0 0 17 0 1 3 106
Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 55 0 1 1 169
Regulatory Inertia 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 210
Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators 0 0 0 107 0 0 2 223
Renégociation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 109
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency 0 0 1 20 0 0 2 83
Resale price maintenance under asymmetric information 0 0 1 52 0 1 2 166
Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion 0 0 0 105 0 0 0 397
Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships 0 0 0 86 1 9 11 281
Selecting equilibria in common agency games 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 139
Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior 0 1 2 219 0 2 6 895
Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory 2 2 2 2 6 8 8 8
Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities 0 0 0 13 0 1 1 77
Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help! 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 17
Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help! 0 0 0 49 0 0 4 157
Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts 0 0 0 64 0 0 2 210
Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts Corrigendum 0 0 0 27 0 0 1 108
Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers 0 0 0 56 0 0 1 228
The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth 0 0 1 108 1 6 19 494
The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector 0 1 1 70 0 3 7 301
The Firm as a Multicontract Organization 2 3 4 116 2 3 4 246
The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth 0 0 1 177 0 0 4 976
The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs 1 1 3 245 3 5 14 765
The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 49
The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games 0 0 0 160 0 1 3 589
The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships 1 1 8 200 2 12 54 725
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 212
The benefits of central bank's political independence 0 0 0 88 1 1 4 278
The benefits of extended liability 0 0 2 10 0 1 3 74
The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries 0 0 2 103 0 1 4 269
The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing 0 0 0 37 0 0 1 121
The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics 0 0 0 82 0 0 1 218
The multiprincipal nature of government 0 0 2 238 0 0 5 468
The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry 0 0 0 36 0 0 1 360
The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors 0 1 2 58 0 1 7 198
To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships 0 1 6 272 1 2 16 729
Transaction Costs and Incentive Theory 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 135
Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers 0 0 3 78 0 1 9 230
Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies 0 0 0 5 0 1 2 29
Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: “How to regulate regulated prices?” 0 0 2 13 1 1 4 35
Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism 0 0 1 83 0 0 3 290
Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines 0 0 1 10 0 0 2 39
“When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?”: New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82
Total Journal Articles 9 26 102 6,103 29 109 419 24,020
1 registered items for which data could not be found


Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Reform for Sale 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Total Books 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2


Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector 0 0 0 41 0 1 3 137
Total Chapters 0 0 0 41 0 1 4 138


Statistics updated 2025-02-05