| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
85 |
| "When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
298 |
| "When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
52 |
| "When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
| 'Build It or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
497 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
1,788 |
| A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
68 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
109 |
| A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
7 |
13 |
94 |
| A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
63 |
| A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements |
0 |
0 |
1 |
85 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
148 |
| A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
2 |
6 |
20 |
164 |
| A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
61 |
| A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
17 |
| A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
1 |
7 |
21 |
155 |
| A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
50 |
| A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
12 |
20 |
| A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
119 |
| A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
1,180 |
| A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
280 |
| A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
687 |
| A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
| A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
30 |
| A necessary and sufficient condition for non-smooth linear-state optimal control problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
83 |
| A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
7 |
14 |
59 |
| Accords environnementaux. Le marché peut-il réussir l'arbitrage entre incitations et participation ? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
| Accords environnementaux. Le marché peut-il réussir l'arbitrage entre incitations et participation ? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
| Acting in the Darkness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
23 |
| Acting in the darkness: towards some foundations for the precautionary principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
9 |
| Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
2 |
9 |
15 |
211 |
| Agir face aux dérèglements du monde |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
73 |
| Agir face aux dérèglements du monde |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
39 |
| Agir face aux dérèglements du monde |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
147 |
| An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
186 |
3 |
13 |
19 |
530 |
| Auctioning Long-Term Projects under Financial Constraints |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
2 |
6 |
17 |
33 |
| Auctioning Long-Term Projects under Financial Constraints |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
14 |
22 |
27 |
| Auctioning long-term projects under financial constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
17 |
17 |
| Buying Components |
0 |
28 |
28 |
28 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Collusion Under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
13 |
954 |
| Collusion and Delegation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
279 |
| Collusion and Delegation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
777 |
| Collusion in Bidding Markets: The Case of the French Public Transport Industry |
0 |
0 |
26 |
26 |
3 |
9 |
54 |
54 |
| Collusion in Bidding Markets: The Case of the French Public Transport Industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
| Collusion in Bidding Markets: The Case of the French Public Transport Industry |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
10 |
12 |
12 |
| Collusion in bidding markets: The case of the French public transport industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
| Collusion in bidding markets: The case of the French public transport industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
9 |
| Collusion under asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
27 |
| Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
248 |
0 |
18 |
28 |
697 |
| Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
241 |
| Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
31 |
| Common agency with informed principals |
0 |
0 |
1 |
147 |
1 |
7 |
15 |
433 |
| Communication by Interest Groups and the Organization of Lobbying |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
234 |
| Competing Mechanisms in a Commun Value Environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
299 |
| Competition Under Nonlinear Pricing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
553 |
| Competition under Nonlinear Pricing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
316 |
| Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
16 |
| Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
| Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
32 |
| Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
148 |
| Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
109 |
| Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
| Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
46 |
| Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
260 |
| Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
156 |
| Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
359 |
| Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer's Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
15 |
22 |
26 |
| Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer's Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
| Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
34 |
| Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
17 |
| Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
1 |
8 |
16 |
309 |
| Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
237 |
| Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition |
0 |
0 |
1 |
54 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
155 |
| Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
16 |
| Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
18 |
| Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
86 |
| Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
1 |
75 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
82 |
| Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
0 |
9 |
13 |
170 |
| Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
136 |
| Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
12 |
49 |
| Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
11 |
17 |
| Delegated Monitoring versus Arm's Length Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
486 |
| Delegation and R&D Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Italy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
195 |
| Delegation and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
2 |
7 |
14 |
404 |
| Delegation, Capture and Endogenous Information Structures |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
1 |
6 |
12 |
23 |
| Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence From Italy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
18 |
| Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence From Italy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
13 |
| Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
| Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
16 |
| Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
19 |
| Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
22 |
| Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation When Sellers Provide Expert Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
55 |
| Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation When Sellers Provide Expert Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
| Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
11 |
20 |
80 |
| Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
15 |
| Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
116 |
| Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
59 |
| Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
26 |
| Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
90 |
| Economics of Procurement and Organizational Design: A review of selected literature |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Economics of Procurement and Organizational Design: A review of selected literature |
0 |
0 |
18 |
18 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
15 |
| Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
16 |
| Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
| Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America: Welfare Effects and Beliefs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
119 |
| Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America: Welfare Effects and Beliefs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
239 |
| Environmental Risk Regulation and Liability under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
484 |
| Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
13 |
395 |
| Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Thoery |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
411 |
| Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
14 |
42 |
| Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
| Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
102 |
| Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
5 |
19 |
26 |
| Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information |
1 |
1 |
3 |
44 |
3 |
5 |
10 |
59 |
| From Inefficient Behind-The-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
19 |
| From Inefficient Behind-The-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
21 |
| From Inside the Firm to the Growth Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
124 |
| From inside the firm to the growth process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
206 |
| Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
58 |
| Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance |
0 |
1 |
1 |
54 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
179 |
| Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
82 |
| Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
28 |
| Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
38 |
| Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
92 |
| Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design |
2 |
3 |
5 |
256 |
5 |
17 |
39 |
4,113 |
| Highway to Sell |
0 |
0 |
13 |
13 |
1 |
8 |
21 |
21 |
| Highway to Sell |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
14 |
14 |
| How much discretion for risk regulators? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
16 |
| How much discretion for risk regulators? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
21 |
| How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
1 |
21 |
28 |
190 |
| How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
1 |
50 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
161 |
| How to Design Public-Private Partnerships in a Warming World? - When Infrastructure Becomes a Really “Hot” Topic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
7 |
11 |
165 |
| How to design infrastructure contracts in a warning world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
52 |
| How to design infrastructure contracts in a warning world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
16 |
| Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
5 |
14 |
269 |
| Incitations explicites et implicites dans les universités en concurrence. Quelques pistes de réflexion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
| Incitations explicites et implicites dans les universités en concurrence. Quelques pistes de réflexion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
9 |
| International Trade with Domestic Regulation under Asymmetric Information: A Simple General Equilibrium Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
325 |
| Interoperability and Quality Provision in Digital Payments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
9 |
12 |
| Interoperability and Quality Provision in Digital Payments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
| La Nouvelle Micro-Economie et l'Analyse du Secteur Agro-Alimentaire: Quelques Développements Récents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
352 |
| Les limites a la discrimination par les prix |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
1,034 |
| Les limites à la discrimination par les prix |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
27 |
| Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
222 |
1 |
6 |
16 |
515 |
| Mechanism Design with Private Communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
131 |
| Mechanism design with private communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
0 |
7 |
11 |
300 |
| Media Mergers in Nested Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
25 |
| Media Mergers in Nested Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
| Media Mergers in nested Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
9 |
| Menu Auctions Under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
1 |
8 |
19 |
50 |
| Menu Auctions Under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
10 |
| Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
129 |
| Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
| Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
35 |
| Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
| Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting |
0 |
1 |
1 |
117 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
406 |
| Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
251 |
| Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
89 |
| Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization and Schumpeterian Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
245 |
| Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization and Schumpeterian Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
596 |
| Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
517 |
| Multi-Principaux avec Anti-Sélection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
208 |
| Multi-principaux avec anti-selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
251 |
| Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
23 |
| Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
277 |
| Non-Manipulable Mechanisms: A Brief Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
114 |
| Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
21 |
| Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
26 |
| On the Optimal Use of Ex Ante Regulation and Ex Post Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
136 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
415 |
| Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Limited Liability |
0 |
1 |
18 |
21 |
3 |
12 |
34 |
40 |
| Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Limited Liability |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
7 |
21 |
21 |
| Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
10 |
15 |
| Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
20 |
| Optimal Domestic Regulation and the Pattern of Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
185 |
| Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
| Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
| Optimal regulation design of airports: Investment incentives and impact of commercial services |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
18 |
| Optimal regulation design of airports: Investment incentives and impact of commercial services |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
24 |
| Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
34 |
| Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
| Partenariats Public-Privés: quelques réflexions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
34 |
| Participation Constraints in Discontinuous Adverse Selection Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
8 |
13 |
32 |
| Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
9 |
11 |
| Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
| Pessimistic information gathering |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
15 |
| Pessimistic information gathering |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
20 |
48 |
| Politics, transaction costs, and the design of regulatory institutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
452 |
1 |
6 |
14 |
1,190 |
| Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation:Implications for Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
1 |
157 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
379 |
| Precaution, Information and Time-Inconsistency: On The Value of the Precautionary Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
7 |
11 |
33 |
| Privatization and Changes in Corruption Patterns: The Roots of Public Discontent |
0 |
0 |
1 |
446 |
1 |
8 |
15 |
1,251 |
| Promotional Allowances: Loss Leading as an Incentive Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
9 |
| Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
8 |
11 |
185 |
| Reform for Sale: A Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
| Reform for Sale: a Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
3 |
14 |
22 |
43 |
| Renégotiation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
58 |
| Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
7 |
18 |
| Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
14 |
| Resale Price Maintenance under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
171 |
2 |
7 |
11 |
658 |
| Risk Allocation and the Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships |
1 |
2 |
3 |
321 |
6 |
16 |
31 |
773 |
| Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
19 |
| Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
15 |
| Risk averse supervisors and the efficiency of collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
81 |
| Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
9 |
393 |
| Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
11 |
| Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory |
1 |
2 |
7 |
44 |
5 |
15 |
40 |
89 |
| Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
20 |
20 |
| Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management Contracts for Public Utilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
41 |
| Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management for Public Utilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
337 |
| Solving the GlobalWarming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help! |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
1 |
11 |
13 |
126 |
| Solving the GlobalWarming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help! |
0 |
0 |
2 |
98 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
278 |
| Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help! |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
| Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help! |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
12 |
23 |
| Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletely Informed Policymakers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
602 |
| Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
215 |
| Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletly Informed Policymakers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
16 |
| Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletly Informed Policymakers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
46 |
| The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
8 |
16 |
291 |
| The Benefits of Central Bank's Political Independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
855 |
| The Benefits of Extended Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
161 |
| The Benefits of Extended Liability |
0 |
1 |
1 |
100 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
621 |
| The Collective Wisdom of Beauty Contests |
0 |
0 |
1 |
77 |
2 |
7 |
16 |
153 |
| The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
127 |
| The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
3 |
3 |
10 |
138 |
| The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
244 |
| The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
200 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
481 |
| The Firm as a Multicontact Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
680 |
| The Incentive Virtues of Performance-Based Trade Allowances and Loss Leading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
9 |
16 |
22 |
| The Incentive Virtues of Performance-Based Trade Allowances and Loss Leading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
11 |
17 |
234 |
| The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
575 |
| The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
689 |
| The Organization of Delegated Expertise |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
223 |
| The Organization of Delegated Expertise |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
213 |
| The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
296 |
| The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
11 |
21 |
86 |
| The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
18 |
22 |
39 |
| The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
153 |
| The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in TheControl of Environmental Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
113 |
| The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in the Control of Environmental Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
31 |
| The Regulatory State: The Power of Not Having the Power to Act |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
28 |
| The Regulatory State: The Power of Not Having the Power to Act |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
19 |
| The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
196 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
594 |
| The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
755 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
2,039 |
| The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
1 |
318 |
1 |
7 |
19 |
794 |
| The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
13 |
50 |
| The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
78 |
| The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
106 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
497 |
| The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
31 |
| The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
0 |
17 |
24 |
473 |
| The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector |
0 |
0 |
1 |
77 |
2 |
9 |
14 |
240 |
| The benefits of central bank's political independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
21 |
| The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
13 |
| The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
35 |
| The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
95 |
| The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
31 |
| The multiprincipal nature of government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
31 |
| The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
12 |
| The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
42 |
| The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
| The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
114 |
| The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
21 |
| The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
59 |
| To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
112 |
| Transaction Costs and Contract Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
32 |
| Transaction Costs and Incentie Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
684 |
| Transaction Costs and Incentive Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
27 |
| Transaction costs, politics, regulatory institutions and regulatory outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
79 |
| Two-Tier Asymmetric Information as a Motive for Trade, Trade Policies and Inefficient Trade Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
| Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
130 |
| Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
| Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
| Use and Abuse of Regulated Prices in Electricity Markets: "How to Regulate Regulated Prices?" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
1 |
9 |
11 |
130 |
| Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: “How to regulate regulated prices?” |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
26 |
| Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: “How to regulate regulated prices?” |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
19 |
| Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
44 |
| Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
| Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
| Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
42 |
| Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
19 |
| Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
10 |
| Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
| “When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
29 |
| “When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
32 |
| Total Working Papers |
5 |
41 |
162 |
10,896 |
173 |
1,268 |
2,575 |
50,807 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH TO CLIMATE-CHANGE AGREEMENTS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
1 |
9 |
17 |
161 |
| A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
1 |
9 |
14 |
78 |
| A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
| A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
11 |
35 |
172 |
| A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
1 |
11 |
16 |
295 |
| A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
61 |
| Accords environnementaux. Le marché peut-il réussir l'arbitrage entre incitations et participation ? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
40 |
| An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization |
0 |
1 |
1 |
116 |
0 |
8 |
12 |
316 |
| An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision |
0 |
0 |
1 |
168 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
519 |
| CONTRACTING FOR AN INNOVATION UNDER BILATERAL ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
100 |
| Collusion and Delegation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
173 |
2 |
13 |
21 |
669 |
| Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise |
1 |
1 |
1 |
76 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
248 |
| Collusion in bidding markets: The case of the French public transport industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Collusion under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
13 |
887 |
| Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
171 |
1 |
9 |
25 |
699 |
| Collusion‐Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
530 |
| Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
1 |
6 |
14 |
234 |
| Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
13 |
753 |
| Competition under Nonlinear Pricing |
0 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
0 |
5 |
13 |
65 |
| Continuity in mechanism design without transfers |
0 |
0 |
2 |
79 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
202 |
| Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners |
0 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
74 |
| Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
25 |
| Contracts as a barrier to entry: Impact of Buyer’s asymmetric information and bargaining power |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
10 |
16 |
45 |
| Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks |
0 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
75 |
| Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
208 |
1 |
8 |
15 |
610 |
| Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
46 |
| Corrigendum to "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
196 |
| Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness |
1 |
1 |
1 |
65 |
4 |
8 |
14 |
232 |
| Corruption in Public-Private Partnerships, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
| Delegated monitoring versus arm's-length contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
278 |
| Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R & D Spending: Evidence From I taly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
7 |
13 |
100 |
| Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
8 |
11 |
34 |
| Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
8 |
15 |
36 |
| Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
178 |
1 |
6 |
20 |
563 |
| Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
84 |
| Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
284 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
868 |
| Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
8 |
11 |
70 |
| From Inefficient Behind-the-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
33 |
| From Inside The Firm to the Growth Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
110 |
| Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance |
2 |
2 |
5 |
31 |
2 |
8 |
31 |
136 |
| HOW TO DESIGN INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS IN A WARMING WORLD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS* |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
9 |
11 |
23 |
| How much discretion for risk regulators? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
117 |
| Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
207 |
| In memoriam Jean-Jacques Laffont |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
47 |
| Incitations explicites et implicites dans les universités en concurrence. Quelques pistes de réflexion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
57 |
| Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent |
0 |
0 |
1 |
153 |
1 |
8 |
14 |
477 |
| Introduction to the Special Issue on Frontiers in Environmental Economics |
1 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
3 |
9 |
12 |
76 |
| Introduction to the Special Issue on Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
92 |
| Jean-Jacques Laffont et la théorie desincitations de groupes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
77 |
| La Nouvelle Micro-Économie Et L'analyse Du Secteur Agro-Alimentaire: Quelques Développements Récents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
18 |
| La nouvelle micro-économie et l'analyse du secteur agro-alimentaire: quelques développements récents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
32 |
| Le citoyen, l'expert et le politique: une rationalité complexe pour une régulation excessive du risque |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
26 |
| Le partage public-privé dans le financement de l'économie |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
75 |
| Les limites à la discrimination par les prix |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
36 |
| Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
1 |
7 |
9 |
196 |
| Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
736 |
| Media Mergers in Nested Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
19 |
19 |
| Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
35 |
| Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
9 |
16 |
139 |
| Multi-principaux avec anti-sélection |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
38 |
| Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias |
1 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
3 |
4 |
12 |
68 |
| On some agency costs of intermediated contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
104 |
| On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
196 |
| Optimal Taxation and Strategic Budget Deficit Under Political Regime Switching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
278 |
| Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
8 |
13 |
188 |
| Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
62 |
| Optimal regulation design of airports: Investment incentives and impact of commercial services |
0 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
1 |
10 |
14 |
38 |
| Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
7 |
12 |
62 |
| Partenariats public-privé. Quelques réflexions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
84 |
| Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
15 |
22 |
| Pessimistic information gathering |
1 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
116 |
| Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
179 |
| Regulatory Inertia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
220 |
| Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
232 |
| Renégociation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
116 |
| Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
3 |
5 |
10 |
94 |
| Resale price maintenance under asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
176 |
| Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
402 |
| Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
1 |
6 |
12 |
294 |
| Selecting equilibria in common agency games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
149 |
| Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior |
0 |
1 |
2 |
221 |
1 |
7 |
16 |
913 |
| Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory |
0 |
6 |
15 |
19 |
1 |
20 |
47 |
61 |
| Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
85 |
| Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help! |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
23 |
| Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help! |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
163 |
| Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
6 |
13 |
224 |
| Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts Corrigendum |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
32 |
54 |
162 |
| Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
239 |
| The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
1 |
9 |
23 |
521 |
| The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector |
0 |
0 |
1 |
71 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
310 |
| The Firm as a Multicontract Organization |
0 |
2 |
2 |
118 |
1 |
20 |
28 |
274 |
| The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
177 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
983 |
| The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs |
0 |
1 |
10 |
255 |
0 |
7 |
26 |
795 |
| The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
56 |
| The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
160 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
598 |
| The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
11 |
211 |
5 |
18 |
57 |
785 |
| The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
222 |
| The benefits of central bank's political independence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
89 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
288 |
| The benefits of extended liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
81 |
| The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
276 |
| The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
131 |
| The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
1 |
7 |
13 |
231 |
| The multiprincipal nature of government |
1 |
2 |
3 |
242 |
2 |
6 |
12 |
483 |
| The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
369 |
| The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
4 |
15 |
214 |
| To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
6 |
278 |
0 |
5 |
27 |
757 |
| Transaction Costs and Incentive Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
143 |
| Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
80 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
242 |
| Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
36 |
| Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: “How to regulate regulated prices?” |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
11 |
21 |
56 |
| Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
303 |
| Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
52 |
| “When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?”: New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
94 |
| Total Journal Articles |
8 |
23 |
92 |
6,207 |
74 |
615 |
1,330 |
25,451 |
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