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"When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making |
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0 |
1 |
48 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
76 |
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
288 |
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
'Build It or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
497 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1,776 |
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
100 |
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
81 |
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
56 |
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
143 |
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
139 |
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement |
0 |
1 |
2 |
85 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
134 |
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
108 |
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
38 |
A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
680 |
A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,170 |
A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
269 |
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
A necessary and sufficient condition for non-smooth linear-state optimal control problems |
0 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
78 |
A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
Accords environnementaux. Le marché peut-il réussir l'arbitrage entre incitations et participation ? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
Accords environnementaux. Le marché peut-il réussir l'arbitrage entre incitations et participation ? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
Acting in the Darkness: Towards some Foundations for the Precautionary Principle |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games |
0 |
2 |
3 |
90 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
196 |
Agir face aux dérèglements du monde |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
29 |
Agir face aux dérèglements du monde |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
61 |
Agir face aux dérèglements du monde |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
137 |
An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
186 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
511 |
Auctioning Long-Term Projects under Financial Constraints |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
Collusion Under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
941 |
Collusion and Delegation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
275 |
Collusion and Delegation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
769 |
Collusion under asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
247 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
667 |
Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
237 |
Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
22 |
Common agency with informed principals |
0 |
1 |
2 |
146 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
416 |
Communication by Interest Groups and the Organization of Lobbying |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
229 |
Competing Mechanisms in a Commun Value Environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
294 |
Competition Under Nonlinear Pricing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
547 |
Competition under Nonlinear Pricing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
311 |
Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
98 |
Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
153 |
Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
348 |
Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
253 |
Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer's Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer's Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
228 |
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
99 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
293 |
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
145 |
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
125 |
Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
156 |
Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
79 |
Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
Delegated Monitoring versus Arm's Length Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
1 |
5 |
24 |
478 |
Delegation and R&D Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Italy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
184 |
Delegation and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
382 |
Delegation, Capture and Endogenous Information Structures |
0 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence From Italy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence From Italy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation When Sellers Provide Expert Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation When Sellers Provide Expert Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice |
0 |
0 |
3 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
109 |
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
49 |
Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
21 |
Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
82 |
Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America: Welfare Effects and Beliefs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
110 |
Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America: Welfare Effects and Beliefs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
77 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
231 |
Environmental Risk Regulation and Liability under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard |
0 |
1 |
2 |
171 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
471 |
Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
382 |
Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Thoery |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
404 |
Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
49 |
Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
94 |
From Inefficient Behind-The-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
From Inefficient Behind-The-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
From Inside the Firm to the Growth Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
From inside the firm to the growth process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
199 |
Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
48 |
Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
20 |
Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
70 |
Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance |
1 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
78 |
Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
170 |
Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
32 |
Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
251 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
4,074 |
How much discretion for risk regulators? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
How much discretion for risk regulators? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
2 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
161 |
How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
152 |
How to Design Public-Private Partnerships in a Warming World? - When Infrastructure Becomes a Really “Hot” Topic |
0 |
0 |
2 |
62 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
153 |
How to design infrastructure contracts in a warning world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
How to design infrastructure contracts in a warning world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
254 |
Incitations explicites et implicites dans les universités en concurrence. Quelques pistes de réflexion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
Incitations explicites et implicites dans les universités en concurrence. Quelques pistes de réflexion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
International Trade with Domestic Regulation under Asymmetric Information: A Simple General Equilibrium Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
319 |
Interoperability and Quality Provision in Digital Payments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
Interoperability and Quality Provision in Digital Payments |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
La Nouvelle Micro-Economie et l'Analyse du Secteur Agro-Alimentaire: Quelques Développements Récents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
346 |
Les limites a la discrimination par les prix |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,030 |
Les limites à la discrimination par les prix |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
220 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
495 |
Mechanism Design with Private Communication |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
123 |
Mechanism design with private communication |
0 |
1 |
2 |
103 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
289 |
Media Mergers in Nested Markets |
0 |
1 |
3 |
39 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
Menu Auctions Under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
12 |
12 |
12 |
1 |
31 |
31 |
31 |
Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
108 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
121 |
Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
397 |
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
245 |
Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization and Schumpeterian Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
577 |
Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization and Schumpeterian Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
239 |
Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
510 |
Multi-Principaux avec Anti-Sélection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
198 |
Multi-principaux avec anti-selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
247 |
Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
271 |
Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
Non-Manipulable Mechanisms: A Brief Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
104 |
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
On the Optimal Use of Ex Ante Regulation and Ex Post Liability |
1 |
1 |
1 |
136 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
406 |
Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
Optimal Domestic Regulation and the Pattern of Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
181 |
Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
Optimal regulation design of airports: Investment incentives and impact of commercial services |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
Optimal regulation design of airports: Investment incentives and impact of commercial services |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
Partenariats Public-Privés: quelques réflexions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
Participation Constraints in Discontinuous Adverse Selection Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
Pessimistic information gathering |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
Pessimistic information gathering |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
Politics, transaction costs, and the design of regulatory institutions |
0 |
1 |
1 |
451 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,175 |
Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation:Implications for Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
156 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
371 |
Precaution, Information and Time-Inconsistency: On The Value of the Precautionary Principle |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
Privatization and Changes in Corruption Patterns: The Roots of Public Discontent |
0 |
0 |
2 |
445 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1,236 |
Promotional Allowances: Loss Leading as an Incentive Device |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
Promotional Allowances: Loss Leading as an Incentive Device |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
Promotional Allowances: Loss Leading as an Incentive Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
174 |
Reform for Sale: A Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
Reform for Sale: a Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
Renégotiation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
Resale Price Maintenance under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
170 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
645 |
Risk Allocation and the Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships |
2 |
2 |
4 |
318 |
2 |
2 |
21 |
736 |
Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
Risk averse supervisors and the efficiency of collusion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
73 |
Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
383 |
Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory |
1 |
3 |
10 |
37 |
2 |
6 |
21 |
45 |
Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management Contracts for Public Utilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management for Public Utilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
333 |
Solving the GlobalWarming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help! |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
267 |
Solving the GlobalWarming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help! |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
113 |
Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help! |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help! |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletely Informed Policymakers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
595 |
Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
205 |
Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletly Informed Policymakers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletly Informed Policymakers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth |
0 |
1 |
2 |
72 |
2 |
5 |
15 |
271 |
The Benefits of Central Bank's Political Independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
850 |
The Benefits of Extended Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
159 |
The Benefits of Extended Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
617 |
The Collective Wisdom of Beauty Contests |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
137 |
The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
119 |
The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
128 |
The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
235 |
The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
200 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
471 |
The Firm as a Multicontact Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
672 |
The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
217 |
The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
570 |
The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
682 |
The Organization of Delegated Expertise |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
207 |
The Organization of Delegated Expertise |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
216 |
The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
291 |
The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
64 |
The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
146 |
The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in TheControl of Environmental Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
106 |
The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in the Control of Environmental Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
The Regulatory State: The Power of Not Having the Power to Act |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
The Regulatory State: The Power of Not Having the Power to Act |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
196 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
583 |
The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
1 |
2 |
755 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
2,026 |
The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
6 |
317 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
774 |
The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
37 |
The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
66 |
The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
486 |
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
223 |
The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
157 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
447 |
The benefits of central bank's political independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
30 |
The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
The multiprincipal nature of government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
19 |
The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
38 |
The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
103 |
Transaction Costs and Contract Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
28 |
Transaction Costs and Incentie Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
677 |
Transaction Costs and Incentive Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
22 |
Transaction costs, politics, regulatory institutions and regulatory outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
71 |
Two-Tier Asymmetric Information as a Motive for Trade, Trade Policies and Inefficient Trade Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
122 |
Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
Use and Abuse of Regulated Prices in Electricity Markets: "How to Regulate Regulated Prices?" |
0 |
0 |
1 |
69 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
119 |
Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: “How to regulate regulated prices?” |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: “How to regulate regulated prices?” |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? |
0 |
0 |
20 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
12 |
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? * |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
“When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
“When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
Total Working Papers |
6 |
33 |
110 |
10,721 |
32 |
134 |
556 |
48,078 |
Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH TO CLIMATE-CHANGE AGREEMENTS |
0 |
1 |
3 |
57 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
144 |
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements |
0 |
0 |
4 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
63 |
A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
135 |
A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
279 |
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
52 |
Accords environnementaux. Le marché peut-il réussir l'arbitrage entre incitations et participation ? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
37 |
An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization |
1 |
1 |
2 |
115 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
304 |
An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision |
0 |
0 |
1 |
167 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
505 |
CONTRACTING FOR AN INNOVATION UNDER BILATERAL ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
Collusion and Delegation |
0 |
1 |
3 |
171 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
643 |
Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise |
1 |
1 |
3 |
75 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
237 |
Collusion under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
872 |
Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
674 |
Collusion‐Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
522 |
Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
77 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
219 |
Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
738 |
Competition under Nonlinear Pricing |
0 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
48 |
Continuity in mechanism design without transfers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
192 |
Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
64 |
Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
Contracts as a barrier to entry: Impact of Buyer’s asymmetric information and bargaining power |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
28 |
Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
72 |
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
207 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
593 |
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
Corrigendum to "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment" |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
190 |
Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
1 |
64 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
216 |
Corruption in Public-Private Partnerships, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
Delegated monitoring versus arm's-length contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
269 |
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R & D Spending: Evidence From I taly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
87 |
Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
22 |
Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
1 |
3 |
177 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
542 |
Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
75 |
Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory |
0 |
1 |
3 |
284 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
862 |
Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
59 |
From Inefficient Behind-the-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
26 |
From Inside The Firm to the Growth Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
103 |
Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance |
0 |
1 |
5 |
26 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
105 |
HOW TO DESIGN INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS IN A WARMING WORLD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
How much discretion for risk regulators? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
198 |
In memoriam Jean-Jacques Laffont |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
Incitations explicites et implicites dans les universités en concurrence. Quelques pistes de réflexion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent |
0 |
1 |
3 |
151 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
461 |
Introduction to the Special Issue on Frontiers in Environmental Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
64 |
Introduction to the Special Issue on Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
87 |
Jean-Jacques Laffont et la théorie desincitations de groupes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
La Nouvelle Micro-Économie Et L'analyse Du Secteur Agro-Alimentaire: Quelques Développements Récents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
La nouvelle micro-économie et l'analyse du secteur agro-alimentaire: quelques développements récents |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
Le citoyen, l'expert et le politique: une rationalité complexe pour une régulation excessive du risque |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
Le partage public-privé dans le financement de l'économie |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
Les limites à la discrimination par les prix |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
31 |
Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
187 |
Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
724 |
Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
122 |
Multi-principaux avec anti-sélection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias |
0 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
55 |
On some agency costs of intermediated contracting |
1 |
1 |
2 |
33 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
96 |
On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability |
0 |
1 |
2 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
183 |
Optimal Taxation and Strategic Budget Deficit Under Political Regime Switching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
269 |
Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions |
0 |
1 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
175 |
Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
Optimal regulation design of airports: Investment incentives and impact of commercial services |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
50 |
Partenariats public-privé. Quelques réflexions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
81 |
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
Pessimistic information gathering |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
106 |
Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
169 |
Regulatory Inertia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
210 |
Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
223 |
Renégociation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
109 |
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
83 |
Resale price maintenance under asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
52 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
166 |
Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
397 |
Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
1 |
9 |
11 |
281 |
Selecting equilibria in common agency games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior |
0 |
1 |
2 |
219 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
895 |
Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
8 |
8 |
Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
77 |
Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help! |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help! |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
157 |
Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
210 |
Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts Corrigendum |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
108 |
Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
228 |
The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth |
0 |
0 |
1 |
108 |
1 |
6 |
19 |
494 |
The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector |
0 |
1 |
1 |
70 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
301 |
The Firm as a Multicontract Organization |
2 |
3 |
4 |
116 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
246 |
The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth |
0 |
0 |
1 |
177 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
976 |
The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs |
1 |
1 |
3 |
245 |
3 |
5 |
14 |
765 |
The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
49 |
The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
160 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
589 |
The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships |
1 |
1 |
8 |
200 |
2 |
12 |
54 |
725 |
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
212 |
The benefits of central bank's political independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
278 |
The benefits of extended liability |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
74 |
The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries |
0 |
0 |
2 |
103 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
269 |
The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
121 |
The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
218 |
The multiprincipal nature of government |
0 |
0 |
2 |
238 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
468 |
The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
360 |
The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors |
0 |
1 |
2 |
58 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
198 |
To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships |
0 |
1 |
6 |
272 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
729 |
Transaction Costs and Incentive Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers |
0 |
0 |
3 |
78 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
230 |
Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
29 |
Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: “How to regulate regulated prices?” |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
35 |
Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
83 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
290 |
Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
39 |
“When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?”: New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
Total Journal Articles |
9 |
26 |
102 |
6,103 |
29 |
109 |
419 |
24,020 |