Access Statistics for Ian A. MacKenzie

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Permit Allocation Contest for a Tradable Pollution Permit Market 0 0 0 117 0 0 4 512
A model of benchmarking regulation: revisiting the efficiency of environmental standards 0 0 0 37 1 1 2 80
Adjustable Quantities 2 3 13 13 2 4 29 29
An efficient and implementable auction for environmental rights 0 0 0 51 0 0 3 125
Caps on Coasean Transfers 0 0 0 33 0 0 10 195
Coasean Bargaining in the Presence of Pigouvian Taxation: Revisiting the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem 0 0 0 341 0 0 3 815
Consignment auctions 0 0 0 35 0 1 2 96
Contests with general preferences 0 0 0 55 0 0 1 66
Controlling externalities in the presence of rent seeking 0 0 1 62 1 1 2 333
Cost containment in pollution auctions 0 0 0 44 0 1 4 75
Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence’ in carbon sequestration 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 64
Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring �permanence� in carbon sequestration 0 0 0 7 0 1 3 92
Environmental policy diffusion and lobbying 0 0 0 74 1 1 3 201
Income and the (eventual) rise of democracy 1 1 16 59 2 2 43 135
Initially contestable property rights and Coase: evidence from the lab 0 0 2 18 0 0 3 38
Life’s a breach! Ensuring ‘permanence’ in forest carbon sinks under incomplete contract enforcement 0 0 0 56 1 1 5 237
Mind your Ps and Qs! An Experiment on Variable Allowance Supply in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 0 0 2 43 0 0 4 105
Non-linear revenue evaluation in oligopoly 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 47
On the Sequential Choice of Tradable Permit Allocations 0 0 1 25 0 0 2 125
Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information 0 0 0 63 1 2 2 206
Permit Market Auctions with Allowance Reserves 0 0 0 53 1 1 1 153
Permit markets with political and market distortions 0 0 0 48 0 0 3 71
Permit markets with political and market distortions 0 0 1 10 0 0 3 25
Precaution with endogenous litigation choices 0 0 0 32 0 0 1 87
Prices versus Quantities versus Bankable Quantities 0 0 0 44 0 0 1 156
Prices versus Quantities versus Bankable Quantities 0 0 0 101 0 0 0 286
Prices versus quantities with distributional rent seeking 0 0 0 37 0 0 1 101
Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes 0 0 0 15 1 1 2 82
Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 59
Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 30
Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 33
Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 92
Rent dissipation in share contests 0 0 0 13 0 1 2 33
Restricted Coasean Bargaining 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 136
Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms 0 0 0 43 0 0 1 110
Sharing contests with general preferences 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 153
Strategic trade in pollution permits 0 0 0 21 0 0 3 94
Strategic trade in pollution permits 0 0 0 72 0 1 2 131
The effects of rent seeking over tradable pollution permits 0 0 0 33 0 0 4 161
The effects of rent seeking over tradable pollution permits 0 0 0 37 1 1 3 116
The effects of rent seeking over tradable pollution permits 0 0 0 54 2 4 6 257
The role of markets and preferences on resource conflicts 0 0 2 49 0 0 3 120
Using contests to allocate pollution rights 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 127
Total Working Papers 3 4 38 1,944 14 26 165 6,189

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Model of Benchmarking Regulation: Revisiting the Efficiency of Environmental Standards 0 1 1 10 0 1 2 64
A study of expressive choice and strikes 0 0 0 11 0 0 2 58
An allocatively efficient auction for pollution permits 0 0 1 12 0 0 3 48
Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict 0 0 2 88 0 1 4 276
Caps on Coasean transfers 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 89
Coasean bargaining in the presence of Pigouvian taxation 0 0 0 35 0 1 4 151
Consignment auctions 0 0 1 19 0 1 5 133
Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring 'permanence' in carbon sequestration 0 0 1 14 1 1 2 80
Initially contestable property rights and Coase: Evidence from the lab 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 14
Mind your Ps and Qs! Variable allowance supply in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 0 0 0 6 0 1 2 23
Non‐linear revenue evaluation 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 13
Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information 0 0 0 6 1 1 2 48
Permit Markets with Political and Market Distortions 0 0 0 3 1 1 3 16
Permit market auctions with allowance reserves 0 0 0 5 2 2 3 70
Political Economy and Instruments of Environmental Politics, by Friedrich Schneider, Andrea Kollman and Johannes Reichl ( MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2015 ), pp. 285 0 0 0 7 0 0 3 38
Prices versus quantities versus bankable quantities 0 0 0 47 0 0 2 237
Rent Dissipation in Simple Tullock Contests 0 0 3 6 0 0 4 9
Rent creation and rent seeking in environmental policy 0 1 5 22 2 6 19 98
Rent-seeking incentives in share contests 0 0 1 7 1 4 7 50
Restricted Coasean bargaining 0 0 0 15 0 1 3 113
Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms 0 0 0 8 1 1 6 30
Strategic trade in pollution permits 0 0 0 23 0 1 1 121
The Effects of Rent Seeking over Tradable Pollution Permits 0 0 0 36 0 0 1 179
The Evolution of Pollution Auctions 0 1 7 42 0 1 12 64
The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach 0 0 0 94 0 0 0 325
The role of markets on resource conflicts 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 17
Tradable permit allocations and sequential choice 0 0 1 27 0 2 3 114
Using contests to allocate pollution rights 0 0 0 18 1 1 2 99
Total Journal Articles 0 3 24 566 12 30 110 2,577

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Statistics updated 2025-09-05