Access Statistics for Ian A. MacKenzie

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Permit Allocation Contest for a Tradable Pollution Permit Market 0 0 0 117 1 1 9 521
A Secret Worth Keeping? Bid Cap Design in Budget-Constrained Procurement Auctions 1 18 18 18 6 38 38 38
A model of benchmarking regulation: revisiting the efficiency of environmental standards 0 0 0 37 3 10 18 97
Adjustable Quantities 0 0 8 16 0 7 29 52
An efficient and implementable auction for environmental rights 0 0 0 51 1 4 16 140
Caps on Coasean Transfers 0 0 0 33 1 2 9 204
Coasean Bargaining in the Presence of Pigouvian Taxation: Revisiting the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem 0 0 0 341 2 3 8 823
Consignment auctions 0 0 0 35 3 5 15 110
Contests with general preferences 0 0 0 55 2 3 13 79
Controlling externalities in the presence of rent seeking 0 0 0 62 1 4 21 353
Cost containment in pollution auctions 0 1 1 45 4 6 20 93
Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence’ in carbon sequestration 0 0 0 1 1 3 11 74
Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring �permanence� in carbon sequestration 0 0 1 8 1 4 20 110
Environmental policy diffusion and lobbying 0 1 1 75 6 8 18 218
Income and the (eventual) rise of democracy 0 0 4 61 4 22 41 173
Initially contestable property rights and Coase: evidence from the lab 0 0 1 18 3 4 13 49
Life’s a breach! Ensuring ‘permanence’ in forest carbon sinks under incomplete contract enforcement 0 0 0 56 2 2 6 242
Mind your Ps and Qs! An Experiment on Variable Allowance Supply in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 0 0 1 44 3 5 11 115
Non-linear revenue evaluation in oligopoly 0 0 0 25 1 1 4 51
On the Sequential Choice of Tradable Permit Allocations 0 0 1 25 1 5 16 140
Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information 0 0 1 64 3 3 15 219
Permit Market Auctions with Allowance Reserves 0 0 0 53 1 4 24 176
Permit markets with political and market distortions 0 0 1 49 4 7 19 89
Permit markets with political and market distortions 0 0 1 10 1 1 12 35
Precaution with endogenous litigation choices 0 0 0 32 3 4 10 97
Prices versus Quantities versus Bankable Quantities 0 0 0 44 2 5 20 175
Prices versus Quantities versus Bankable Quantities 0 0 0 101 2 3 11 297
Prices versus quantities with distributional rent seeking 0 0 0 37 0 6 15 116
Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes 0 0 0 1 3 4 10 43
Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes 0 0 0 15 4 4 16 97
Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes 0 0 0 6 4 14 24 83
Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes 0 0 0 1 0 4 8 37
Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes 0 0 0 14 2 3 7 99
Rent dissipation in share contests 0 1 1 14 1 6 15 47
Restricted Coasean Bargaining 0 0 0 30 2 2 10 146
Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms 0 0 0 43 2 3 9 118
Sharing contests with general preferences 0 0 0 39 4 8 19 172
Strategic trade in pollution permits 0 0 0 72 1 6 14 144
Strategic trade in pollution permits 0 0 0 21 1 11 17 110
The effects of rent seeking over tradable pollution permits 0 0 0 33 2 2 11 172
The effects of rent seeking over tradable pollution permits 0 0 0 37 1 1 6 121
The effects of rent seeking over tradable pollution permits 0 0 0 54 5 6 26 279
The role of markets and preferences on resource conflicts 0 0 0 49 8 8 13 133
Using contests to allocate pollution rights 0 0 0 32 0 1 10 137
Total Working Papers 1 21 40 1,974 102 253 677 6,824

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Model of Benchmarking Regulation: Revisiting the Efficiency of Environmental Standards 0 0 1 10 0 4 8 71
A study of expressive choice and strikes 0 1 1 12 1 5 14 72
An allocatively efficient auction for pollution permits 0 0 0 12 1 2 7 55
Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict 0 0 1 88 4 6 11 285
Caps on Coasean transfers 0 0 0 2 4 6 15 103
Coasean bargaining in the presence of Pigouvian taxation 0 0 2 37 2 8 25 174
Consignment auctions 0 0 0 19 1 1 8 139
Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring 'permanence' in carbon sequestration 0 0 0 14 1 1 8 87
Income and the (eventual) rise of democracy 0 0 0 0 3 4 17 17
Initially contestable property rights and Coase: Evidence from the lab 0 0 0 1 1 3 9 21
Mind your Ps and Qs! Variable allowance supply in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 0 0 0 6 2 3 16 38
Non‐linear revenue evaluation 0 0 0 0 4 4 11 22
Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information 0 0 0 6 2 3 8 55
Permit Markets with Political and Market Distortions 0 0 1 4 4 6 12 27
Permit market auctions with allowance reserves 0 0 1 6 2 3 18 86
Political Economy and Instruments of Environmental Politics, by Friedrich Schneider, Andrea Kollman and Johannes Reichl ( MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2015 ), pp. 285 0 0 0 7 2 3 4 42
Prices versus quantities versus bankable quantities 0 0 0 47 0 2 15 251
Rent Dissipation in Simple Tullock Contests 0 0 3 6 2 4 21 26
Rent creation and rent seeking in environmental policy 1 1 4 24 6 6 25 115
Rent-seeking incentives in share contests 0 1 2 9 1 4 20 66
Restricted Coasean bargaining 0 0 0 15 1 2 14 126
Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms 0 0 0 8 2 3 13 42
Strategic trade in pollution permits 0 0 0 23 4 7 11 131
The Effects of Rent Seeking over Tradable Pollution Permits 1 2 2 38 5 7 19 198
The Evolution of Pollution Auctions 0 0 3 44 1 1 10 73
The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach 0 0 0 94 1 1 15 340
The role of markets on resource conflicts 0 0 1 3 2 4 11 28
Tradable permit allocations and sequential choice 0 0 1 27 0 7 20 131
Using contests to allocate pollution rights 0 0 0 18 4 5 12 110
Total Journal Articles 2 5 23 580 63 115 397 2,931

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06