Access Statistics for Antonin Macé

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Co-construction" in Deliberative Democracy: Lessons from the French Citizens’ Convention for Climate 0 1 2 9 0 1 2 19
"Co-construction" in Deliberative Democracy: Lessons from the French Citizens’ Convention for Climate 1 1 2 9 1 1 4 13
"Co-construction" in Deliberative Democracy: Lessons from the French Citizens’ Convention for Climate 0 0 1 2 1 2 6 8
Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 7
Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games 0 0 1 31 1 1 3 46
Computing the Optimal Weights in a Utilitarian Model of Apportionment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Convention Citoyenne pour le Climat: Les citoyens de la Convention comparés à des échantillons représentatifs de la population française. Note de travail 1 1 1 7 1 1 5 24
Convention Citoyenne pour le Climat: Les citoyens de la Convention comparés à des échantillons représentatifs de la population française. Note de travail 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 13
Convention Citoyenne pour le Climat: Les citoyens de la Convention comparés à des échantillons représentatifs de la population française. Note de travail 0 1 7 45 0 2 11 164
Democracy for Polarized Committees. The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 37
Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants 0 0 0 53 0 1 5 60
Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants 0 0 0 12 0 1 1 8
Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants 0 0 2 3 0 1 4 37
Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 27
Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare? 0 0 0 5 0 1 5 20
Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare? 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 7
Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare? 0 0 0 44 0 1 1 30
Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare? 0 1 1 6 0 1 1 4
Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality and Majority Runoff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality and Majority Runoff 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 53
Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality and Majority Runoff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality and Majority Runoff 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 9
Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power 0 0 0 20 0 3 3 46
Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 17
Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 53
Measuring Influence in Science: Standing on the Shoulders of Which Giants? 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 42
Optimal Apportionment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46
Optimal Apportionment 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 122
Optimal Voting Rules under Participation Constraints 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 30
Political Brinkmanship and Compromise 0 1 1 1 0 2 9 31
Political Brinkmanship and Compromise 0 0 0 3 1 2 7 28
Public Information as a Source of Disagreement 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 5
Public Information as a Source of Disagreement 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 5
Public Information as a Source of Disagreement Among Shareholders 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 12
Public Information as a Source of Disagreement Among Shareholders 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
Repeated Majority Voting 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3
Repeated Majority Voting 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2
The Limits of Citation Counts 0 0 0 13 0 1 3 18
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting 0 0 1 8 0 0 1 19
Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting 0 0 0 9 1 3 6 16
Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation 0 0 0 10 0 0 4 16
Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 23
Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 11
Voting in Shareholders Meetings 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 10
Voting with Evaluations: When Should We Sum? What Should We Sum? 1 1 1 21 1 1 2 67
Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Total Working Papers 4 8 21 534 10 37 112 1,282

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 77
Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 36
Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare? 0 1 1 3 0 7 10 24
Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 19
Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 37
Optimal Apportionment 0 0 0 50 1 1 8 354
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting 0 0 0 10 0 1 2 26
“Co-construction” in deliberative democracy: lessons from the French Citizens’ Convention for Climate 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 17
Total Journal Articles 0 1 1 88 2 10 32 591

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Statistics updated 2024-09-04