Access Statistics for Alejandro Manelli

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approximate Competitive Equilibria in Large Economies 0 0 0 42 4 6 10 301
Comparative Statics, English Auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 0 0 0 29 2 5 16 210
Comparative Statics, English Auctions, and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 0 0 0 64 1 4 7 429
Comparative Statics, English Auctions, and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 0 0 0 106 5 6 10 790
Core Convergence Without Monotone Preferences or Free Disposal 0 0 0 47 2 3 9 252
English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 0 0 0 52 1 2 19 175
Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence 0 0 0 16 4 7 13 183
Multi-Unit Auctions: A Comparison of Static and Dynamic Mechanisms 0 0 1 145 2 4 7 550
Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly 0 0 0 42 5 6 12 132
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms 0 0 1 81 3 6 21 403
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria 0 0 1 32 3 5 9 183
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk 0 0 0 47 2 6 12 363
Total Working Papers 0 0 3 703 34 60 145 3,971

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approximately Competitive Equilibria in Large Finite Economies 0 0 1 43 0 2 12 207
Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 153
Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist 0 0 1 150 3 5 24 359
Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games 0 0 0 128 1 2 8 392
Core convergence without monotone preferences and free disposal 0 0 0 16 1 1 6 87
Duality in procurement design 0 0 0 22 1 1 5 82
English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 0 0 0 36 0 2 10 263
Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence 0 0 0 55 4 5 9 765
Multi-unit auctions: A comparison of static and dynamic mechanisms 0 0 0 33 2 4 10 120
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly 0 0 3 150 5 7 16 433
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum 0 0 2 74 4 4 9 170
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms 0 0 1 388 2 4 15 974
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Stage Games 0 0 0 13 3 4 6 131
The Convergence of Equilibrium Strategies of Approximating Signaling Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 104
The Never-a-Weak-Best-Response Test in Infinite Signaling Games 0 0 0 49 3 5 11 186
The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games (*) 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 196
Total Journal Articles 0 0 8 1,157 30 48 156 4,622

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06