| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Journey for Your Beautiful Mind: Economics Graduate Study and Research |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
100 |
| A Journey for your Beautiful Mind: Economics Graduate Study and Research |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
281 |
| A Signaling Theory of Unemployment |
0 |
1 |
2 |
197 |
1 |
4 |
22 |
840 |
| A Signaling Theory of Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
1,748 |
| Asymmetric Information from Physician Agency: Optimal Payment and Healthcare Quantity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
166 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
502 |
| Asymmetric Information from Physician Agency:Optimal Payment and Healthcare Quantity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
371 |
| Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
117 |
| Capacity Constraint and Monopoly Regulation under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
292 |
| Changing Preferences: An Experiment and Estimation of Market-Incentive E§ects on Altruism |
2 |
3 |
25 |
25 |
5 |
8 |
39 |
39 |
| Competition, Gatekeeping, and Health Care Access |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
38 |
| Competition, Gatekeeping, and Health Care Access |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
169 |
| Cost and Incentives in a Mental Health and Substance Abuse Carve Out |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
323 |
| Cost and Quality Incentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
409 |
| Cost and Quantity Invcentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
1,055 |
| Costs and Incentives in a Mental Health and Substance Abuse Carve Out |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
997 |
| Experience Benefits and Firm Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
91 |
| Experience Benefits and Firm Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
65 |
| Experience Benefits and Firm Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
80 |
| Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
1,459 |
| Health Insurance, Cost Expectations, and Adverse Job Turnover |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
269 |
| Health Insurance, Expectations, and Job Turnover |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
488 |
| Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1,134 |
| Health Insurance, Treatment Plan, and Delegation to Altruistic Physician |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
82 |
| Health Insurance, Treatment Plan, and Delegation to Altruistic Physician |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
77 |
| Immigrants`s acculturation and chanes in body mass index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
100 |
| Immigrants’ acculturation and changes in Body Mass Index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
51 |
| Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
19 |
| Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
69 |
| Information Acquisition, Referral, and Organization |
0 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
44 |
| Information Acquisition, Referral, and Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
55 |
| Information Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
17 |
| Information Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
126 |
| Insurance, Vertical Restraints, and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
155 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
418 |
| Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
674 |
| Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
631 |
| Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
130 |
| Market Conditions and General Practitioners' Referrals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
111 |
| Market Conditions and General Practitioners’ Referrals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
128 |
| Market conditions and general practitioners’ referrals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
109 |
| Moonlighting: Public Service and Private Practice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
290 |
| Moonlighting: Public Service and Private Practice |
0 |
1 |
1 |
138 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
887 |
| Moral Hazard, Insurance and Some Collusion |
0 |
1 |
1 |
188 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
1,131 |
| Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion |
1 |
1 |
1 |
523 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
2,140 |
| Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
586 |
| Network Incentives in Managed Health Care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
255 |
| Network Incentives in Managed Health Care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
787 |
| Noncontractible Inputs and Health Insurance-Payment Systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
193 |
| Optimal Health Care Contract under Physician Agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
77 |
| Optimal Health Care Contracts under Physician Agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
446 |
| Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
548 |
| Optimal Public Rationing and Price Response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
85 |
| Optimal public rationing and price response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
64 |
| Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
200 |
| PUBLIC SECTOR RATIONING AND PRIVATE SECTOR SELECTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
51 |
| Paying for Joint Costs in Health Care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
179 |
| Price and Quality Competition under Adverse Selection: Market Organization and Efficiency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
703 |
| Product Differentiation with Multiple Qualities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
50 |
| Product Differentiation with Multiple Qualities |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
24 |
| Progress and Compliance in Alcohol Abuse Treatment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
62 |
| Public Report, Price, and Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
72 |
| Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
144 |
| Quality Competition, Welfare, and Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
300 |
| Quality and Competition between Public and Private Firms |
0 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
68 |
| Quality and Competition between Public and Private Firms |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
57 |
| Regulating a Dominant Firm: Quality, Private Informatio, and Industry Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
305 |
| Regulating a Dominant Firm: Quality, Private Information, and Industry Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
132 |
| Regulation, Quality Competition, and Price in the Hospital Industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
32 |
333 |
| Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
111 |
| Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
150 |
| Risk Selection and Matching in Performance-Based Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
535 |
| SERVICE MOTIVES AND PROFIT INCENTIVES AMONG PHYSICIANS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
216 |
| Service motives and profit incentives among physicans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
151 |
| Stopping Agents Cheat (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, vol.46, No.2, (Dec.1988), pp.355-372.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
173 |
| Subsidy Design and Asymmetric Information: Wealth versus Benefits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
164 |
| Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LV (1988), pp.555-572.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
85 |
| Uterus at a Price: Disability Insurance and Hysterectomy |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
40 |
| Total Working Papers |
3 |
10 |
38 |
2,777 |
25 |
107 |
590 |
25,502 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A signaling theory of unemployment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
147 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
702 |
| Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard |
0 |
1 |
1 |
232 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
717 |
| Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control |
0 |
1 |
2 |
76 |
2 |
4 |
17 |
262 |
| Competition, gatekeeping, and health care access |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
128 |
| Efficient allocation of a "prize"-King Solomon's dilemma |
0 |
0 |
1 |
110 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
302 |
| Experience Benefits and Firm Organization |
0 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
92 |
| Health Care Economics and Policy: An Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
116 |
| Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
3,719 |
| Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
295 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
1,024 |
| Health insurance, cost expectations, and adverse job turnover |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
149 |
| Health insurance, treatment plan, and delegation to altruistic physician |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
95 |
| Health-Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives-Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
182 |
| Immigrants’ acculturation and changes in Body Mass Index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
| Implementation in dynamic job transfers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
| Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
17 |
| Information acquisition, referral, and organization |
0 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
30 |
| Information disclosure and the equivalence of prospective payment and cost reimbursement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
45 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
42 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
109 |
| Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
149 |
| Managed care and shadow price |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
108 |
| Market conditions and general practitioners’ referrals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
128 |
| Moonlighting: public service and private practice |
0 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
67 |
| Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion |
0 |
2 |
3 |
83 |
1 |
5 |
19 |
295 |
| Network Incentives in Managed Health Care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
370 |
| Optimal Health Care Contract under Physician Agency |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
5 |
19 |
48 |
| Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment |
1 |
3 |
13 |
370 |
3 |
8 |
43 |
1,669 |
| Optimal public rationing and price response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
101 |
| Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
88 |
| Paying for Joint Costs in Health Care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
269 |
| Price and Quality Competition under Adverse Selection: Market Organization and Efficiency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
551 |
| Product differentiation with multiple qualities |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
22 |
| Progress and compliance in alcohol abuse treatment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
109 |
| Provider-client interactions and quantity of health care use |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
117 |
| Public Report, Price, and Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
29 |
| Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
97 |
| Public rationing and private cost incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
114 |
| Quality and competition between public and private firms |
0 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
0 |
3 |
23 |
54 |
| Quality competition, welfare, and regulation |
0 |
1 |
4 |
107 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
213 |
| Regulating a Dominant Firm: Unknown Demand and Industry Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
118 |
| Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
215 |
| Risk selection and matching in performance‐based contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
174 |
| Service motives and profit incentives among physicians |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
260 |
| Stopping agents from "cheating" |
0 |
0 |
1 |
143 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
292 |
| Subsidy design: wealth versus benefits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
82 |
| Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents |
1 |
1 |
1 |
83 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
260 |
| Uterus at a price: Disability insurance and hysterectomy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
34 |
34 |
| Total Journal Articles |
2 |
14 |
47 |
2,399 |
20 |
88 |
450 |
13,868 |
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