| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Journey for Your Beautiful Mind: Economics Graduate Study and Research |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
4 |
4 |
7 |
116 |
| A Journey for your Beautiful Mind: Economics Graduate Study and Research |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
308 |
| A Signaling Theory of Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
1,778 |
| A Signaling Theory of Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
205 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
919 |
| Asymmetric Information from Physician Agency: Optimal Payment and Healthcare Quantity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
166 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
542 |
| Asymmetric Information from Physician Agency:Optimal Payment and Healthcare Quantity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
3 |
7 |
12 |
393 |
| Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
131 |
| Capacity Constraint and Monopoly Regulation under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
298 |
| Changing Preferences: An Experiment and Estimation of Market-Incentive E§ects on Altruism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
162 |
| Competition, Gatekeeping, and Health Care Access |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
190 |
| Competition, Gatekeeping, and Health Care Access |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
65 |
| Cost and Incentives in a Mental Health and Substance Abuse Carve Out |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
9 |
337 |
| Cost and Quality Incentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
430 |
| Cost and Quantity Invcentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
1,077 |
| Costs and Incentives in a Mental Health and Substance Abuse Carve Out |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
1,009 |
| Experience Benefits and Firm Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
108 |
| Experience Benefits and Firm Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
3 |
3 |
10 |
88 |
| Experience Benefits and Firm Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
109 |
| Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
1,489 |
| Health Insurance, Cost Expectations, and Adverse Job Turnover |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
290 |
| Health Insurance, Expectations, and Job Turnover |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
511 |
| Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
17 |
1,179 |
| Health Insurance, Treatment Plan, and Delegation to Altruistic Physician |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
113 |
| Health Insurance, Treatment Plan, and Delegation to Altruistic Physician |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
104 |
| Immigrants`s acculturation and chanes in body mass index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
5 |
6 |
10 |
115 |
| Immigrants’ acculturation and changes in Body Mass Index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
62 |
| Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
39 |
| Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
84 |
| Information Acquisition, Referral, and Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
110 |
| Information Acquisition, Referral, and Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
7 |
18 |
73 |
| Information Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
11 |
40 |
| Information Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
2 |
6 |
16 |
220 |
| Insurance, Vertical Restraints, and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
155 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
435 |
| Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
659 |
| Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
10 |
143 |
| Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
688 |
| Long Run Monetary Neutrality in Three Samples: The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Small |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
159 |
| Market Conditions and General Practitioners' Referrals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
122 |
| Market Conditions and General Practitioners’ Referrals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
147 |
| Market conditions and general practitioners’ referrals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
8 |
21 |
137 |
| Moonlighting: Public Service and Private Practice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
145 |
3 |
5 |
16 |
955 |
| Moonlighting: Public Service and Private Practice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
3 |
9 |
20 |
331 |
| Moral Hazard, Insurance and Some Collusion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
189 |
4 |
4 |
12 |
1,162 |
| Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
610 |
| Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
523 |
3 |
5 |
15 |
2,171 |
| Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
16 |
16 |
| Network Incentives in Managed Health Care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
806 |
| Network Incentives in Managed Health Care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
13 |
275 |
| Noncontractible Inputs and Health Insurance-Payment Systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
207 |
| Optimal Health Care Contract under Physician Agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
105 |
| Optimal Health Care Contracts under Physician Agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
502 |
| Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
569 |
| Optimal Public Rationing and Price Response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
4 |
10 |
17 |
110 |
| Optimal public rationing and price response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
5 |
5 |
7 |
82 |
| Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
218 |
| PUBLIC SECTOR RATIONING AND PRIVATE SECTOR SELECTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
72 |
| Paying for Joint Costs in Health Care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
202 |
| Price and Quality Competition under Adverse Selection: Market Organization and Efficiency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
717 |
| Product Differentiation with Multiple Qualities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
73 |
| Product Differentiation with Multiple Qualities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
46 |
| Progress and Compliance in Alcohol Abuse Treatment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
107 |
| Public Report, Price, and Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
90 |
| Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
155 |
| Quality Competition, Welfare, and Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
331 |
| Quality and Competition between Public and Private Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
93 |
| Quality and Competition between Public and Private Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
89 |
| Regulating a Dominant Firm: Quality, Private Informatio, and Industry Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
313 |
| Regulating a Dominant Firm: Quality, Private Information, and Industry Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
139 |
| Regulation, Quality Competition, and Price in the Hospital Industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
7 |
344 |
| Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
127 |
| Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
163 |
| Risk Selection and Matching in Performance-Based Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
548 |
| SERVICE MOTIVES AND PROFIT INCENTIVES AMONG PHYSICIANS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
3 |
5 |
14 |
246 |
| Service motives and profit incentives among physicans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
181 |
| Stopping Agents Cheat (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, vol.46, No.2, (Dec.1988), pp.355-372.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
191 |
| Subsidy Design and Asymmetric Information: Wealth versus Benefits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
183 |
| Technology Adoption in Primary Health Care |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
56 |
| Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LV (1988), pp.555-572.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
99 |
| Uterus at a Price: Disability Insurance and Hysterectomy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
67 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2,875 |
144 |
268 |
755 |
27,730 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A signaling theory of unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
154 |
1 |
7 |
21 |
756 |
| Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
233 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
744 |
| Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
305 |
| Changing preferences: An experiment and estimation of market-incentive effects on altruism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
12 |
23 |
| Competition, gatekeeping, and health care access |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
173 |
| Efficient allocation of a "prize"-King Solomon's dilemma |
0 |
0 |
1 |
123 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
338 |
| Equilibrium information in credence goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
18 |
24 |
| Equity and sustainability in the health care market: Socio-economic analysis of governance and reforms |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
16 |
| Experience Benefits and Firm Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
111 |
| Health Care Economics and Policy: An Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
146 |
| Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives |
0 |
0 |
3 |
20 |
7 |
14 |
34 |
3,818 |
| Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care |
0 |
0 |
1 |
300 |
5 |
11 |
21 |
1,074 |
| Health insurance, cost expectations, and adverse job turnover |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
171 |
| Health insurance, treatment plan, and delegation to altruistic physician |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
130 |
| Health‐Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
199 |
| Immigrants’ acculturation and changes in Body Mass Index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
59 |
| Implementation in dynamic job transfers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
41 |
| Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
15 |
44 |
| Information acquisition, referral, and organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
3 |
4 |
16 |
68 |
| Information disclosure and the equivalence of prospective payment and cost reimbursement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
4 |
4 |
15 |
82 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
115 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
39 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
| Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
169 |
| Managed care and shadow price |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
129 |
| Market conditions and general practitioners’ referrals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
6 |
10 |
16 |
151 |
| Moonlighting: public service and private practice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
4 |
8 |
15 |
109 |
| Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion |
0 |
1 |
1 |
85 |
1 |
7 |
19 |
330 |
| Network Incentives in Managed Health Care |
0 |
1 |
3 |
105 |
2 |
3 |
16 |
406 |
| Optimal Health Care Contract under Physician Agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
5 |
9 |
22 |
110 |
| Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment |
1 |
1 |
5 |
408 |
8 |
14 |
42 |
1,823 |
| Optimal public rationing and price response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
6 |
8 |
12 |
123 |
| Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
112 |
| Paying For Joint Costs in Health Care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
297 |
| Price and Quality Competition under Adverse Selection: Market Organization and Efficiency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
14 |
578 |
| Product differentiation with multiple qualities |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
79 |
| Progress and compliance in alcohol abuse treatment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
145 |
| Provider-client interactions and quantity of health care use |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
131 |
| Public Report, Price, and Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
52 |
| Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
111 |
| Public rationing and private cost incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
4 |
5 |
10 |
132 |
| Quality and competition between public and private firms |
0 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
6 |
6 |
21 |
140 |
| Quality competition, welfare, and regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
294 |
| Regulating a Dominant Firm: Unknown Demand and Industry Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
136 |
| Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
230 |
| Risk selection and matching in performance‐based contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
185 |
| Service motives and profit incentives among physicians |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
4 |
4 |
9 |
300 |
| Stopping agents from "cheating" |
0 |
0 |
1 |
154 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
326 |
| Subsidy design: wealth versus benefits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
3 |
4 |
12 |
98 |
| Technology adoption by primary care physicians |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
19 |
| Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents |
0 |
0 |
1 |
86 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
280 |
| Uterus at a price: Disability insurance and hysterectomy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
72 |
| Vaccination equilibrium: Externality and efficiency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
22 |
| Total Journal Articles |
1 |
3 |
25 |
2,645 |
119 |
206 |
634 |
15,625 |
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