Access Statistics for Silvia Marchesi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A firm level approach on the effects of IMF programs 0 0 0 14 7 18 23 53
Adoption of an IMF Programme and Debt Rescheduling. An Empirical Analysis 0 0 1 97 1 6 8 391
Adoption of an IMF Programme and Debt Rescheduling. An Empirical Analysis 0 0 0 43 2 6 7 229
Adoption of an IMF Programme and Debt Rescheduling. An empirical test of their relationship 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 25
Agency and Communication in IMF Conditional Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence 0 0 0 18 1 5 7 164
Agency and Communication in IMF Conditional Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence 0 0 1 18 2 8 12 123
Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence 0 0 0 13 1 5 9 143
Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence 0 0 0 191 3 12 16 866
Agency and communicaton in IMF conditional lending: Theory and empirical evidence 0 0 0 25 2 12 15 164
Allocation of Implementing Power: Evidence from World Bank Projects 0 0 1 27 1 5 12 58
Allocation of implementing power: Evidence from World Bank projects 0 0 0 29 0 11 14 62
Buybacks of Domestic Debt in Public Debt Management 0 0 2 92 0 2 13 556
Buybacks of domestic debt in public debt management 0 0 0 9 2 8 12 66
Communication and performance in Bank-Fund joint participation 0 0 0 8 0 6 8 64
Did high debts distort loans and grants allocation to IDA countries? 0 0 0 45 1 12 17 198
Do IMF Programs Stimulate Private Sector Investment? 0 0 0 7 1 5 9 20
Do IMF Programs Stimulate Private Sector Investment? 0 0 0 17 1 3 7 40
Does it Take Two to Tango? Improving Cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank: Theory and Empirical Evidence 0 0 0 16 0 7 9 53
Does it take two to tango? How to improve cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank 0 0 2 27 0 3 9 144
Does it take two to tango? Improving cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank: theory and empirical evidence 0 0 0 29 0 4 4 85
Does it take two to tango? Improving cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank: theory and empirical evidence 0 0 0 13 0 5 7 56
How defensive were lending and aid to HIPC? 0 0 0 35 0 8 12 254
How defensive were lending and aid to HIPC? 0 0 0 23 0 4 5 125
IMF Concern for Reputation and Conditional Lending Failure: Theory and Empirics 0 0 0 68 5 12 13 504
IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics 0 0 0 89 3 14 18 549
IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics 0 0 1 92 6 9 14 1,332
IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 110
IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics 0 0 0 42 1 11 13 353
Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs 0 0 0 5 0 9 12 86
Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs 0 0 0 27 2 12 16 105
Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures: Theory and Evidence 0 0 0 16 0 1 6 75
Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures: Theory and Evidence 0 0 0 21 2 8 11 71
Information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs 0 0 0 34 0 6 8 163
Information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs 0 0 0 9 4 13 14 68
Information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs 0 0 0 18 1 8 16 57
Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: Theory and evidence 0 0 0 21 3 8 11 51
Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: Theory and evidence 0 0 0 42 0 2 11 112
International Lending Channel, Bank Heterogeneity and Capital Inflows (Mis)Allocation 0 0 0 7 0 16 25 52
Is to Forgive to Forget? Sovereign Risk in the Aftermath of a Default 0 0 0 16 1 6 11 52
Is two better than one? Effects on growth of Bank-Fund interaction 0 0 1 42 0 6 10 143
Knockin' on H(e)aven's door. Financial crises and hidden wealth 0 0 0 19 1 11 14 29
Liberalizing Art Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 0 28 2 13 17 77
Liberalizing Art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 0 20 1 4 8 87
Liberalizing Art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 0 28 1 9 13 118
Liberalizing Art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 0 26 2 7 11 53
Liberalizing Art: Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 0 46 1 8 14 99
Liberalizing Art: Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 1 21 0 5 12 58
Life After Default: Private vs. Official Sovereign Debt Restructurings 0 0 0 66 2 7 11 163
Life after default. Private and Official Deals 0 0 0 9 3 16 20 54
Life after default: Private vs. official sovereign debt restructurings 0 0 1 50 1 5 6 84
Life after default? Private vs. official sovereign debt restructurings 0 0 1 29 1 5 8 83
Project Aid and Firm Performance 0 0 1 31 1 28 33 61
Project Aid and Firm Performance 0 0 2 21 3 9 15 45
Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating IMF Responsibility 0 0 0 26 6 10 12 157
Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating the IMF Responsibility 0 0 1 117 3 8 11 580
Read my Lips: the Role of Information Transmission in multilateral reform design 0 0 0 24 3 132 134 275
Read my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform design 0 0 0 29 1 12 17 172
Read my lips: the role of information transmission in multilateral reform design 0 0 0 10 2 5 11 125
Reversing the Political Resource Curse: Accountability and Regional Favoritism under Capital Windfalls 0 0 4 4 1 8 20 20
Sovereign risk after sovereign restructuring. Private and official default 0 0 0 19 4 18 23 70
The Labor Market in the Art Sector of Baroque Rome 0 0 1 90 0 6 14 233
The Labor Market in the Seventeenth-Century Italian Art Sector 0 0 0 58 1 7 9 170
The Labor Market in the Seventeenth-Century Italian Art Sector 0 0 2 117 1 4 11 456
The Politics of IMF Forecasts 1 1 3 226 2 7 14 1,043
The Politics of IMF Forecasts 0 0 0 45 0 4 8 199
The Politics of IMF Forecasts 0 1 1 84 2 11 13 216
The Price of Haircuts: Private and Official Default 0 0 0 29 1 7 8 69
The cost of default: private vs. official sovereign debt restructurings 0 0 0 16 0 3 7 76
The cost of defaults: the impact of haircuts on economic growth 0 0 0 46 0 3 8 206
The price of haircuts: private and official default 0 0 1 35 0 8 15 90
Wedded to Prosperity? Informal Influence and Regional Favoritism 0 2 2 2 0 9 14 18
What does motivate lending and aid to the HIPCs? 0 0 0 123 3 7 7 378
What does motivate lending and aid to the HIPCs? 0 0 0 22 3 10 13 132
Total Working Papers 1 4 30 2,864 105 705 1,001 13,518
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A firm level approach on the effects of IMF programs 0 0 0 12 2 6 11 52
Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling. An empirical analysis 0 0 1 102 2 8 12 354
Aid Projects and Firm Performance 0 1 3 3 1 4 7 7
Buybacks of domestic debt in public debt management 0 1 3 83 1 6 15 282
Communication and performance in Bank–Fund joint participation 0 0 0 2 0 3 5 39
Delegation of implementation in project aid 0 0 1 2 1 5 9 20
Did High Debts Distort Loan and Grant Allocation to IDA Countries? 0 0 0 21 1 6 9 105
From Economic Crisis to Reform. IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe 0 0 0 5 2 7 9 36
IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device 0 0 0 82 1 7 10 371
IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics 0 0 1 87 2 13 22 424
IMF lending and firm investment decisions 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 7
INFORMATION TRANSMISSION AND OWNERSHIP CONSOLIDATION IN AID PROGRAMS 0 0 0 3 0 4 8 76
Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: theory and evidence 0 0 0 3 2 4 6 41
International Lending Channel, Bank Heterogeneity and Capital Inflows (Mis)Allocation 0 0 0 0 4 10 16 16
Is to Forgive to Forget? Sovereign Risk in the Aftermath of Private or Official Debt Restructurings 0 0 2 4 0 5 19 36
Is two better than one? The effects of IMF and World Bank interaction on growth 0 0 1 81 0 4 9 260
Knockin’ on H(e)aven’s door. Financial crises and offshore wealth 1 2 2 2 5 16 17 17
Liberalizing art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 2 10 3 8 18 62
Life after default. Private and official deals 1 1 4 23 1 6 16 71
Read my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform design 0 0 0 31 4 10 14 263
Riacquisto di debito pubblico: estero e interno 0 0 0 16 0 3 3 76
Sovereign rating after private and official restructuring 0 0 1 13 1 5 15 46
THE LABOR MARKET IN THE ART SECTOR OF BAROQUE ROME 0 0 1 12 1 5 14 106
The political economy of IMF forecasts 0 0 1 47 1 8 13 152
Total Journal Articles 2 5 23 644 35 156 284 2,919

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04