Access Statistics for Silvia Marchesi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A firm level approach on the effects of IMF programs 0 0 0 14 2 14 30 60
Adoption of an IMF Programme and Debt Rescheduling. An Empirical Analysis 0 0 1 97 0 2 9 392
Adoption of an IMF Programme and Debt Rescheduling. An Empirical Analysis 0 0 0 43 1 3 8 230
Adoption of an IMF Programme and Debt Rescheduling. An empirical test of their relationship 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 27
Agency and Communication in IMF Conditional Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence 0 0 0 18 2 4 13 125
Agency and Communication in IMF Conditional Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence 0 0 0 18 5 7 13 170
Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence 0 0 0 13 4 6 14 148
Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence 0 0 0 191 2 7 20 870
Agency and communicaton in IMF conditional lending: Theory and empirical evidence 0 0 0 25 2 4 17 166
Allocation of Implementing Power: Evidence from World Bank Projects 0 0 1 27 4 5 16 62
Allocation of implementing power: Evidence from World Bank projects 0 0 0 29 1 2 16 64
Buybacks of Domestic Debt in Public Debt Management 0 0 2 92 0 3 8 559
Buybacks of domestic debt in public debt management 0 0 0 9 1 3 13 67
Communication and performance in Bank-Fund joint participation 0 0 0 8 1 3 10 67
Did high debts distort loans and grants allocation to IDA countries? 0 0 0 45 1 4 18 201
Do IMF Programs Stimulate Private Sector Investment? 0 0 0 17 0 1 7 40
Do IMF Programs Stimulate Private Sector Investment? 0 1 1 8 2 4 12 23
Does it Take Two to Tango? Improving Cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank: Theory and Empirical Evidence 0 0 0 16 3 5 14 58
Does it take two to tango? How to improve cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank 0 0 2 27 2 2 11 146
Does it take two to tango? Improving cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank: theory and empirical evidence 0 0 0 29 3 5 9 90
Does it take two to tango? Improving cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank: theory and empirical evidence 0 0 0 13 2 3 10 59
How defensive were lending and aid to HIPC? 0 0 0 35 5 6 18 260
How defensive were lending and aid to HIPC? 0 0 0 23 1 3 8 128
IMF Concern for Reputation and Conditional Lending Failure: Theory and Empirics 0 0 0 68 0 7 15 506
IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics 0 0 0 3 4 5 8 115
IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics 0 0 1 92 5 11 18 1,337
IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics 0 0 0 42 3 4 16 356
IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics 0 0 0 89 4 8 23 554
Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs 0 0 0 5 3 5 15 91
Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs 0 0 0 27 5 8 19 111
Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures: Theory and Evidence 0 0 0 16 1 2 8 77
Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures: Theory and Evidence 0 0 0 21 2 6 15 75
Information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs 0 0 0 34 3 6 14 169
Information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs 0 0 0 9 2 7 17 71
Information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs 0 0 0 18 2 3 18 59
Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: Theory and evidence 0 0 0 21 1 4 11 52
Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: Theory and evidence 0 0 0 42 1 1 10 113
International Lending Channel, Bank Heterogeneity and Capital Inflows (Mis)Allocation 0 1 1 8 3 4 29 56
Is to Forgive to Forget? Sovereign Risk in the Aftermath of a Default 0 0 0 16 2 5 14 56
Is two better than one? Effects on growth of Bank-Fund interaction 0 0 1 42 2 2 10 145
Knockin' on H(e)aven's door. Financial crises and hidden wealth 0 1 1 20 2 4 17 32
Liberalizing Art Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 0 28 4 8 23 83
Liberalizing Art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 0 28 3 4 15 121
Liberalizing Art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 0 20 0 3 9 89
Liberalizing Art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 0 26 0 4 12 55
Liberalizing Art: Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 0 21 0 0 10 58
Liberalizing Art: Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 0 46 4 6 19 104
Life After Default: Private vs. Official Sovereign Debt Restructurings 0 0 0 66 6 8 16 169
Life after default. Private and Official Deals 0 0 0 9 5 9 26 60
Life after default: Private vs. official sovereign debt restructurings 0 0 1 50 0 1 6 84
Life after default? Private vs. official sovereign debt restructurings 0 0 0 29 1 2 8 84
Project Aid and Firm Performance 0 0 1 31 2 3 34 63
Project Aid and Firm Performance 0 0 2 21 4 9 19 51
Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating IMF Responsibility 0 0 0 26 1 7 13 158
Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating the IMF Responsibility 0 0 1 117 2 6 14 583
Read my Lips: the Role of Information Transmission in multilateral reform design 0 0 0 24 2 8 139 280
Read my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform design 0 0 0 29 3 4 19 175
Read my lips: the role of information transmission in multilateral reform design 0 0 0 10 4 6 15 129
Reversing the Political Resource Curse: Accountability and Regional Favoritism under Capital Windfalls 0 1 5 5 3 7 26 26
Sovereign risk after sovereign restructuring. Private and official default 0 0 0 19 6 12 31 78
The Labor Market in the Art Sector of Baroque Rome 0 0 0 90 2 2 14 235
The Labor Market in the Seventeenth-Century Italian Art Sector 0 0 0 58 2 3 11 172
The Labor Market in the Seventeenth-Century Italian Art Sector 0 0 0 117 1 2 8 457
The Politics of IMF Forecasts 0 1 3 226 1 5 16 1,046
The Politics of IMF Forecasts 0 0 0 45 2 3 10 202
The Politics of IMF Forecasts 0 0 1 84 3 5 16 219
The Price of Haircuts: Private and Official Default 0 0 0 29 2 4 11 72
The cost of default: private vs. official sovereign debt restructurings 0 0 0 16 2 2 9 78
The cost of defaults: the impact of haircuts on economic growth 0 0 0 46 1 2 9 208
The price of haircuts: private and official default 0 0 1 35 3 4 19 94
Wedded to Prosperity? Informal Influence and Regional Favoritism 0 0 2 2 3 6 19 24
What does motivate lending and aid to the HIPCs? 0 0 0 22 2 6 13 135
What does motivate lending and aid to the HIPCs? 0 0 0 123 4 8 12 383
Total Working Papers 0 5 28 2,868 168 349 1,197 13,762
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A firm level approach on the effects of IMF programs 0 0 0 12 2 5 14 55
Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling. An empirical analysis 0 0 1 102 2 6 15 358
Aid Projects and Firm Performance 0 0 3 3 0 2 8 8
Buybacks of domestic debt in public debt management 0 0 2 83 3 4 17 285
Communication and performance in Bank–Fund joint participation 0 0 0 2 2 3 8 42
Delegation of implementation in project aid 0 0 1 2 2 3 11 22
Did High Debts Distort Loan and Grant Allocation to IDA Countries? 0 0 0 21 2 4 12 108
From Economic Crisis to Reform. IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe 0 0 0 5 0 3 10 37
IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device 0 0 0 82 1 2 10 372
IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics 0 0 1 87 5 9 28 431
IMF lending and firm investment decisions 0 0 0 0 2 2 9 9
INFORMATION TRANSMISSION AND OWNERSHIP CONSOLIDATION IN AID PROGRAMS 0 0 0 3 4 4 11 80
Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: theory and evidence 0 0 0 3 1 4 8 43
International lending channel, bank heterogeneity and capital inflows (Mis)allocation 0 1 1 1 2 5 5 5
Is to Forgive to Forget? Sovereign Risk in the Aftermath of Private or Official Debt Restructurings 0 0 1 4 5 8 26 44
Is two better than one? The effects of IMF and World Bank interaction on growth 0 0 0 81 4 5 10 265
Knockin’ on H(e)aven’s door. Financial crises and offshore wealth 0 1 2 2 4 10 22 22
Liberalizing art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon 0 0 0 10 4 10 23 69
Life after default. Private and official deals 0 1 2 23 3 4 15 74
Read my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform design 0 0 0 31 5 9 19 268
Riacquisto di debito pubblico: estero e interno 0 0 0 16 0 0 3 76
Sovereign rating after private and official restructuring 0 0 1 13 1 2 16 47
THE LABOR MARKET IN THE ART SECTOR OF BAROQUE ROME 0 0 1 12 4 5 16 110
The political economy of IMF forecasts 0 0 1 47 0 2 14 153
Total Journal Articles 0 3 17 645 58 111 330 2,983
1 registered items for which data could not be found
logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-05-06