| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
69 |
| A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
130 |
| A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
3 |
5 |
19 |
152 |
| A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
4 |
5 |
11 |
109 |
| A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
12 |
59 |
| A positive analysis of bank closure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
15 |
705 |
| A positive analysis of bank closure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
483 |
| Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
187 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
908 |
| Buying Locally |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
4 |
9 |
23 |
135 |
| Buying Locally |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
4 |
4 |
8 |
93 |
| Buying Locally |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
268 |
| Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
215 |
| Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
429 |
| Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
530 |
| Class systems and the enforcement of social norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
164 |
4 |
7 |
14 |
1,204 |
| Common Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
320 |
| Common Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
213 |
| Common Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
112 |
| Common Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
146 |
| Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
2 |
2 |
12 |
91 |
| Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
273 |
| Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
2 |
12 |
23 |
216 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
3 |
10 |
27 |
307 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
197 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
254 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
166 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
2 |
9 |
19 |
167 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
245 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
5 |
6 |
15 |
184 |
| Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
263 |
| Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
3 |
3 |
15 |
133 |
| Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
620 |
| Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
250 |
| Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
302 |
| Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
150 |
| Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
104 |
| Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
137 |
| Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
976 |
| Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
372 |
| EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
329 |
| EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
305 |
| EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
592 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
164 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
180 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
3 |
4 |
12 |
328 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
309 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
5 |
10 |
22 |
143 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
3 |
3 |
14 |
378 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
221 |
| Efficient non-contractible investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
777 |
| Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
191 |
| Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
254 |
| Endogenous Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
448 |
| Endogenous inequality in integrated markets with two-sided research |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
705 |
| Evolution and Endogenous Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
291 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
981 |
| Evolution and Endogenous Interations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
213 |
| Extensive form reasoning in normal form games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
11 |
| Extensive form reasoning in normal form games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
35 |
| Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
3 |
6 |
19 |
186 |
| Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
2 |
4 |
17 |
1,197 |
| Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
10 |
21 |
104 |
| FINANCING LOSERS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
367 |
| Financing Losers in Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
12 |
480 |
| Financing Losers in Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
214 |
| Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
172 |
| Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
118 |
| Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
40 |
| Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
7 |
11 |
22 |
246 |
| Fragile Financial Coalitions: the interaction between real returns and social capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
88 |
| How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
375 |
| How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
305 |
| How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
200 |
4 |
5 |
13 |
1,228 |
| How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
122 |
| Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
120 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
427 |
| Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
130 |
| Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
3 |
8 |
12 |
361 |
| Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
3 |
15 |
20 |
90 |
| Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
173 |
| Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
12 |
434 |
| Investment and Concern for Relative Position |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
167 |
| Investment and Concern for Relative Position |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
2 |
6 |
12 |
283 |
| Investment and Concern for Relative Position |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
139 |
| Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
176 |
| Laws and Authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
3 |
5 |
10 |
51 |
| Laws and Authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
7 |
8 |
18 |
64 |
| Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
3 |
4 |
13 |
52 |
| Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
2 |
13 |
24 |
47 |
| Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games |
0 |
0 |
4 |
106 |
10 |
13 |
42 |
485 |
| Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
17 |
26 |
935 |
| Market Selection and Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
149 |
| Market Selection and Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
160 |
0 |
5 |
16 |
470 |
| Market Selection and Asymmetrick Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
297 |
| Matching with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
128 |
| Matching with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
129 |
| Matching with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
74 |
| Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
246 |
| Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
211 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
1,699 |
| Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
32 |
| Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
38 |
| Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
57 |
| Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
86 |
| Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
68 |
| Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
94 |
| Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
5 |
10 |
17 |
90 |
| Pricing in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
65 |
| Pricing in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
3 |
11 |
93 |
| Pricing in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
189 |
| Pricing in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
14 |
52 |
| Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
143 |
| Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
200 |
| Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
3 |
5 |
12 |
292 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
8 |
8 |
14 |
338 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
5 |
7 |
16 |
359 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
319 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
153 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
39 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
81 |
| Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
740 |
| Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
7 |
8 |
18 |
265 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
5 |
6 |
12 |
249 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
4 |
9 |
26 |
334 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
3 |
4 |
12 |
136 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
2 |
5 |
12 |
453 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
5 |
8 |
21 |
344 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
15 |
67 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
17 |
266 |
| Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective |
0 |
1 |
1 |
54 |
1 |
7 |
9 |
219 |
| Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
201 |
4 |
5 |
10 |
711 |
| Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
204 |
| Reputation Effects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
375 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
1,035 |
| Reputations in Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
63 |
2 |
5 |
18 |
100 |
| Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
85 |
| Social Assets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
1 |
9 |
24 |
435 |
| Social Assets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
297 |
| Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
46 |
| Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
92 |
| Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
86 |
| Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
241 |
| Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
207 |
| Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
159 |
| Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
155 |
| Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
154 |
| Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
194 |
| Surplus Sharing and Pricing in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
167 |
| The Curse of Long Horizons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
21 |
| The Curse of Long Horizons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
25 |
| The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
305 |
| The Social Context of Economic Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
3 |
3 |
13 |
81 |
| The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
39 |
| The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd:Model-Based Inference |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
30 |
| The curse of long horizons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
5 |
7 |
20 |
70 |
| Time CVonsistency, Reputation, and the Importance of Perpetual Uncertainty: Implications for Macroeconomics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
26 |
| Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
23 |
| Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
3 |
3 |
13 |
44 |
| Trust in risk sharing: A double-edged sword |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
6 |
13 |
23 |
| When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
55 |
| When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
87 |
| When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
84 |
| When and how the punishment must fit the crime |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
2 |
7 |
13 |
71 |
| When do regulators close banks? When should they? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
343 |
| When do regulators close banks? When should they? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
321 |
| When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
509 |
| When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
2 |
11 |
17 |
296 |
| Who Wants a Good Reputation? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
349 |
7 |
7 |
15 |
1,069 |
| Who Wants a Good Reputation? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
10 |
10 |
15 |
351 |
| Who Wants a Good Reputation?' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
9 |
15 |
407 |
| Who wants a good reputation? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
297 |
3 |
3 |
12 |
783 |
| Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be |
0 |
0 |
6 |
396 |
3 |
5 |
22 |
1,116 |
| Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
261 |
| Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
350 |
| Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be |
0 |
0 |
1 |
280 |
3 |
5 |
26 |
850 |
| extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
306 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
3 |
17 |
8,597 |
395 |
725 |
1,964 |
48,874 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory -super-* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
4 |
7 |
15 |
117 |
| A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure |
0 |
0 |
2 |
419 |
2 |
7 |
12 |
897 |
| An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling--Existence of separating equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
335 |
| Aristocratic Equilibria: Response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
3 |
3 |
11 |
171 |
| Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents |
0 |
0 |
1 |
378 |
2 |
5 |
13 |
871 |
| BUYING LOCALLY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
22 |
| Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games |
0 |
0 |
3 |
299 |
0 |
4 |
24 |
564 |
| Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
170 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
719 |
| Class systems and the enforcement of social norms |
0 |
0 |
1 |
91 |
5 |
7 |
18 |
733 |
| Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders |
1 |
1 |
2 |
411 |
2 |
8 |
16 |
740 |
| Common Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
2 |
4 |
15 |
295 |
| Common learning with intertemporal dependence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
47 |
| Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
115 |
| Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
3 |
10 |
15 |
293 |
| Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
11 |
355 |
| Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory] |
0 |
0 |
1 |
92 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
434 |
| Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
187 |
| Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory |
1 |
1 |
1 |
916 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
3,050 |
| Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
3 |
9 |
17 |
268 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
286 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
291 |
| Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
2 |
6 |
12 |
306 |
| Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
167 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
310 |
| Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
155 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
808 |
| Financing Losers in Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
177 |
| Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
3 |
4 |
16 |
145 |
| How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
139 |
| Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
506 |
| Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types |
2 |
2 |
10 |
672 |
7 |
11 |
30 |
1,465 |
| Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
3 |
6 |
15 |
104 |
| Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models |
1 |
1 |
1 |
93 |
7 |
12 |
26 |
391 |
| Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
289 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
668 |
| Laws and authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
103 |
| Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
3 |
5 |
17 |
167 |
| Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games |
0 |
3 |
11 |
1,374 |
13 |
29 |
76 |
5,379 |
| Market Selection and Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
337 |
| Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
224 |
| On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
70 |
| Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
61 |
| Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
45 |
| Pricing and investments in matching markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
105 |
| Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
472 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
8 |
15 |
25 |
517 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
1 |
80 |
3 |
8 |
15 |
240 |
| Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
117 |
| SOCIAL ASSETS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
3,310 |
| Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
330 |
| Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth |
0 |
0 |
4 |
545 |
13 |
17 |
40 |
2,238 |
| Stable Matching With Incomplete Information |
0 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
127 |
| Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
2 |
5 |
13 |
214 |
| The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
3 |
4 |
17 |
198 |
| The Social Context of Economic Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
191 |
| The curse of long horizons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
3 |
8 |
17 |
39 |
| The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
180 |
| WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
24 |
| Who Wants a Good Reputation? |
0 |
2 |
4 |
40 |
4 |
13 |
36 |
772 |
| Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
2 |
6 |
20 |
169 |
| original papers: Investment and concern for relative position |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
217 |
| Total Journal Articles |
5 |
11 |
46 |
8,109 |
138 |
298 |
847 |
31,655 |