Access Statistics for George J. Mailath

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version 0 0 0 21 1 6 7 67
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games 0 0 0 68 0 5 6 128
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games 0 0 0 49 2 13 16 149
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory 0 0 0 2 0 3 7 54
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory 0 0 0 13 0 3 6 104
A positive analysis of bank closure 0 0 0 0 0 7 10 700
A positive analysis of bank closure 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 481
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives 0 0 0 187 2 11 12 907
Buying Locally 0 0 0 35 0 3 4 89
Buying Locally 0 0 0 50 5 16 20 131
Buying Locally 0 0 0 41 0 1 4 265
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms 0 0 0 61 0 6 6 425
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms 0 0 0 39 1 6 7 213
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms' 0 0 0 91 1 4 6 528
Class systems and the enforcement of social norms 0 0 0 164 1 7 8 1,198
Common Learning 0 0 0 89 1 5 5 318
Common Learning 0 0 0 24 0 5 9 143
Common Learning 0 0 0 63 1 9 11 211
Common Learning 0 0 0 27 1 5 6 110
Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence 0 0 0 15 0 9 10 89
Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria 0 0 0 70 0 3 6 269
Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria 0 0 0 30 8 15 19 212
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 35 0 4 5 243
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 64 1 5 8 253
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 28 3 10 14 161
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 37 6 21 23 303
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 34 1 3 5 163
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 31 0 6 6 193
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 43 0 7 11 178
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions 0 0 0 158 1 3 5 618
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions 0 0 0 63 0 3 6 261
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions 0 0 0 22 0 5 12 130
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions' 0 0 0 58 3 6 8 249
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships 0 0 0 30 0 4 7 102
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships 0 0 0 34 0 3 6 149
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships 0 0 0 79 0 2 5 302
Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships 0 0 0 21 1 3 6 135
Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory' 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 975
Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection? 0 0 0 105 2 6 8 371
EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 328
EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 0 0 0 0 2 7 9 303
EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL GAMES 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 592
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments 0 0 0 23 0 4 8 161
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 307
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 0 53 0 6 9 324
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 0 26 1 7 12 179
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy 0 0 0 21 5 14 17 138
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy 0 0 0 54 0 8 12 375
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments' 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 219
Efficient non-contractible investments 0 0 0 97 1 6 12 775
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search 0 0 0 48 1 6 6 191
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search' 0 0 0 73 1 2 3 251
Endogenous Interactions 0 0 0 121 1 6 12 445
Endogenous inequality in integrated markets with two-sided research 0 0 0 66 1 5 6 703
Evolution and Endogenous Interactions 0 0 0 291 1 5 8 979
Evolution and Endogenous Interations 0 0 0 0 1 10 13 212
Extensive form reasoning in normal form games 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 34
Extensive form reasoning in normal form games 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 10
Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown 0 0 0 158 1 8 14 1,194
Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown 0 0 0 34 2 12 15 182
Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown 0 0 0 3 5 8 18 99
FINANCING LOSERS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 366
Financing Losers in Competitive Markets 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 475
Financing Losers in Competitive Markets 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 213
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 20 0 6 9 170
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version 0 0 0 25 0 3 8 115
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version 0 0 0 2 1 2 6 39
Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 47 2 6 13 237
Fragile Financial Coalitions: the interaction between real returns and social capital 0 0 0 38 2 5 8 85
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 0 1 5 7 374
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 0 1 5 7 303
How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium 0 0 0 200 0 7 8 1,223
How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 14 1 5 6 119
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 0 0 0 8 2 3 7 128
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 0 0 0 120 0 1 5 424
Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations 0 0 0 105 2 3 6 355
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications 0 0 0 45 10 14 15 85
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications 0 0 0 59 1 12 13 171
Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models' 0 0 0 1 1 4 7 427
Investment and Concern for Relative Position 0 0 0 21 0 3 5 138
Investment and Concern for Relative Position 0 0 0 0 1 5 6 167
Investment and Concern for Relative Position 0 0 0 55 3 9 9 280
Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form? 0 0 0 9 1 2 2 172
Laws and Authority 0 0 0 35 1 6 6 47
Laws and Authority 0 0 0 41 1 8 11 57
Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference 0 0 0 15 8 15 19 42
Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference 0 0 0 33 1 7 10 49
Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games 0 0 4 106 2 16 33 474
Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games 0 0 0 1 0 4 11 918
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 73 4 5 6 147
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 160 4 14 15 469
Market Selection and Asymmetrick Information 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 295
Matching with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 32 0 3 4 69
Matching with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 32 1 4 10 125
Matching with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 63 0 3 5 126
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games 0 0 0 211 0 3 4 1,697
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games 0 0 0 0 1 5 7 244
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 23 0 5 7 68
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 1 0 10 12 35
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 19 0 7 8 56
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 29 0 8 9 84
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 38 3 5 8 31
Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 17 5 9 12 85
Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 38 0 0 3 92
Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 13 0 4 8 90
Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 35 0 9 10 64
Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 121 0 2 4 186
Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 1 7 9 12 50
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 28 0 6 8 141
Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 0 0 0 29 2 7 9 199
Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 58 2 5 10 289
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 58 0 4 6 330
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 39 2 8 11 354
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma 0 0 0 41 1 5 7 316
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version 0 0 0 30 4 6 7 153
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma 0 0 0 2 0 3 4 37
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version 0 0 0 3 1 5 7 78
Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 737
Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring 0 0 0 37 1 10 11 258
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 65 2 11 15 338
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 5 0 5 8 132
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 2 1 6 8 60
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 49 4 12 21 329
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 77 0 5 7 448
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 50 1 3 7 244
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring' 0 0 0 0 1 8 13 260
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective 1 1 1 54 5 6 8 217
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective 0 0 0 201 0 4 6 706
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective' 0 0 0 0 1 5 9 201
Reputation Effects 0 0 0 375 1 6 9 1,034
Reputations in Repeated Games 0 1 2 63 1 6 14 96
Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 1 125 3 7 11 85
Social Assets 0 0 0 90 5 18 21 431
Social Assets 0 0 0 52 2 10 16 295
Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword 0 0 0 17 2 5 7 42
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version 0 0 0 16 0 4 6 84
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version 0 0 0 8 0 4 11 90
Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 17 0 2 2 239
Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 203
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices 0 0 0 30 0 5 5 158
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices 0 0 0 10 0 4 5 152
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version) 0 0 0 13 1 3 6 152
Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices 0 0 0 18 0 4 5 192
Surplus Sharing and Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 167
The Curse of Long Horizons 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 19
The Curse of Long Horizons 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 25
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 1 70 1 8 9 303
The Social Context of Economic Decisions 0 0 0 15 0 8 10 78
The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference 0 0 0 9 2 4 7 37
The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd:Model-Based Inference 0 0 0 18 0 2 5 27
The curse of long horizons 0 0 0 37 1 12 14 64
Time CVonsistency, Reputation, and the Importance of Perpetual Uncertainty: Implications for Macroeconomics 0 0 0 0 1 8 11 26
Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword 0 0 0 31 0 5 10 41
Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword 1 1 1 6 1 6 8 22
Trust in risk sharing: A double-edged sword 0 0 0 19 2 6 9 19
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime 0 0 0 31 0 5 7 54
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime 0 0 0 55 1 5 11 87
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime 0 0 0 8 0 3 5 81
When and how the punishment must fit the crime 0 0 0 68 3 7 9 67
When do regulators close banks? When should they? 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 321
When do regulators close banks? When should they? 0 0 0 0 2 6 8 342
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games 0 0 0 63 0 3 3 508
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games 0 0 0 37 8 13 14 293
Who Wants a Good Reputation? 0 0 0 349 0 5 9 1,062
Who Wants a Good Reputation? 0 0 0 117 0 2 5 341
Who Wants a Good Reputation?' 0 0 0 2 0 4 8 398
Who wants a good reputation? 0 0 0 297 0 5 9 780
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be 0 4 6 396 1 13 20 1,112
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be 0 0 0 67 0 2 5 259
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be' 0 0 0 0 2 6 12 349
Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be 0 0 1 280 2 19 23 847
extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 0 4 7 7 306
Total Working Papers 2 7 17 8,596 210 1,028 1,507 48,359

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory -super-* 0 0 0 15 2 5 11 112
A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure 0 1 2 419 3 7 10 893
An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling--Existence of separating equilibria 0 0 1 116 0 2 4 332
Aristocratic Equilibria: Response 0 0 0 29 0 4 8 168
Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents 0 0 3 378 2 4 12 868
BUYING LOCALLY 0 0 0 1 2 5 7 22
Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games 0 2 3 299 2 13 22 562
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives 0 0 0 170 0 4 12 717
Class systems and the enforcement of social norms 0 0 1 91 1 9 13 727
Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders 0 1 3 410 4 7 17 736
Common Learning 0 0 0 94 0 6 11 291
Common learning with intertemporal dependence 0 0 0 6 0 4 7 46
Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria 0 0 0 25 1 8 9 115
Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring 0 0 0 68 6 8 13 289
Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*) 0 0 0 0 3 3 7 350
Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory] 0 0 2 92 1 5 7 433
Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships 0 0 0 56 1 3 3 186
Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory 0 0 0 915 0 3 7 3,048
Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection? 0 0 0 45 6 9 14 265
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies 0 0 0 52 1 6 8 283
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 0 82 0 6 7 290
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search 0 0 1 65 1 5 8 301
Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions 0 0 1 167 1 8 11 308
Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 155 0 4 8 806
Financing Losers in Competitive Markets 0 0 0 51 2 3 6 175
Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring 0 0 0 25 1 9 13 142
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 34 0 4 10 137
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 0 0 0 140 1 6 9 503
Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types 0 3 11 670 1 13 24 1,455
Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications 0 0 0 22 1 6 11 99
Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models 0 0 0 92 2 8 19 381
Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory 0 0 0 289 0 2 4 667
Laws and authority 0 0 0 15 1 6 11 101
Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference 0 0 1 26 2 5 15 164
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games 1 3 10 1,372 7 14 59 5,357
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 95 0 6 11 336
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games 0 0 0 72 1 4 7 222
On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval 0 0 0 17 3 5 7 69
Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics 0 0 0 12 0 2 3 60
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 4 0 8 13 42
Pricing and investments in matching markets 0 0 0 16 2 14 16 103
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 105 1 10 12 472
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 81 6 14 17 508
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 1 80 2 6 11 234
Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series 0 0 0 0 2 5 8 117
SOCIAL ASSETS 0 0 0 146 1 4 10 3,307
Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model 0 0 0 121 1 2 7 326
Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth 0 0 4 545 1 12 25 2,222
Stable Matching With Incomplete Information 0 0 1 19 0 2 8 125
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices 0 0 0 32 2 7 12 211
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 63 1 7 15 195
The Social Context of Economic Decisions 0 0 0 42 1 6 8 190
The curse of long horizons 0 0 0 6 3 9 12 34
The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example 0 0 0 42 1 6 7 180
WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME 0 0 0 4 1 5 8 20
Who Wants a Good Reputation? 1 2 4 39 4 14 31 763
Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value 0 0 0 35 2 9 16 165
original papers: Investment and concern for relative position 0 0 0 38 0 7 10 217
Total Journal Articles 2 12 49 8,100 90 378 691 31,447

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Modeling Strategic Behavior:A Graduate Introduction to Game Theory and Mechanism Design 0 0 5 156 0 5 20 459
Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships 0 0 0 0 1 10 25 1,294
Total Books 0 0 5 156 1 15 45 1,753

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A First Look at Equilibrium 0 0 0 13 0 2 4 27
Appendices 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 5
Bargaining 0 0 0 7 1 2 4 24
Bayesian Mechanism Design 0 0 0 5 0 1 4 13
Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design 0 0 0 3 0 3 6 14
Games with Nature 0 0 1 8 1 2 5 30
George J. Mailath on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 0 0 0 0 1 6 8 11
Introduction to Mechanism Design 0 0 1 10 1 4 9 28
Nash Equilibrium Refinements in Dynamic Games 1 2 2 8 2 4 5 19
Nash Equilibrium: Existence and Foundations 0 0 0 9 0 2 4 23
Normal and Extensive Form Games 0 0 0 17 0 3 8 58
Principal Agency 0 0 0 3 0 4 5 20
Repeated Games 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 36
Reputations in Repeated Games 0 1 2 78 2 17 27 225
Signaling 0 1 1 11 0 5 7 44
Topics in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 5 1 2 5 18
Total Chapters 1 4 7 180 9 59 105 595

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04