Access Statistics for George J. Mailath

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version 0 0 0 21 4 5 6 65
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games 0 0 0 49 3 6 6 139
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games 0 0 0 68 0 1 1 123
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory 0 0 0 2 2 5 6 53
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory 0 0 0 13 0 3 3 101
A positive analysis of bank closure 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 478
A positive analysis of bank closure 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 694
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives 0 0 0 187 3 3 4 899
Buying Locally 0 0 0 50 0 2 4 115
Buying Locally 0 0 0 41 0 2 4 264
Buying Locally 0 0 0 35 1 2 2 87
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms 0 0 0 61 3 3 3 422
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms 0 0 0 39 2 3 3 209
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms' 0 0 0 91 1 3 4 525
Class systems and the enforcement of social norms 0 0 0 164 0 0 1 1,191
Common Learning 0 0 0 63 3 5 5 205
Common Learning 0 0 0 89 0 0 1 313
Common Learning 0 0 0 24 4 8 10 142
Common Learning 0 0 0 27 0 1 1 105
Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 80
Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria 0 0 0 70 0 3 3 266
Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria 0 0 0 30 1 3 6 198
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 34 0 2 3 160
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 43 2 3 9 173
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 35 1 1 3 240
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 28 3 5 7 154
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 37 2 4 4 284
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 31 3 3 3 190
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 64 3 5 6 251
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions 0 0 0 158 1 2 5 616
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions 0 0 0 63 0 3 4 258
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions 0 0 0 22 1 5 8 126
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions' 0 0 0 58 0 1 2 243
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships 0 0 0 30 0 2 3 98
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships 0 0 0 34 1 4 4 147
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships 0 0 0 79 0 1 3 300
Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships 0 0 0 21 1 3 4 133
Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory' 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 973
Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection? 0 0 0 105 1 2 3 366
EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 325
EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 297
EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL GAMES 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 591
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments 0 0 0 23 1 5 5 158
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 0 53 2 4 5 320
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 307
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 0 26 3 5 8 175
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy 0 0 0 54 2 4 7 369
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy 0 0 0 21 3 5 6 127
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments' 0 0 0 0 3 4 5 217
Efficient non-contractible investments 0 0 0 97 0 5 6 769
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 185
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search' 0 0 0 73 0 0 1 249
Endogenous Interactions 0 0 0 121 3 6 9 442
Endogenous inequality in integrated markets with two-sided research 0 0 0 66 0 1 1 698
Evolution and Endogenous Interactions 0 0 0 291 2 4 5 976
Evolution and Endogenous Interations 0 0 0 0 5 7 8 207
Extensive form reasoning in normal form games 0 0 0 0 2 5 6 9
Extensive form reasoning in normal form games 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 31
Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown 0 0 0 34 0 3 3 170
Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown 0 0 0 3 0 3 12 91
Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown 0 0 0 158 4 7 10 1,190
FINANCING LOSERS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 364
Financing Losers in Competitive Markets 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 472
Financing Losers in Competitive Markets 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 213
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 20 3 6 6 167
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version 0 0 0 25 3 5 9 115
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version 0 0 0 2 1 5 5 38
Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 47 0 5 7 231
Fragile Financial Coalitions: the interaction between real returns and social capital 0 0 0 38 1 2 4 81
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 299
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 0 2 4 4 371
How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium 0 0 0 200 2 2 3 1,218
How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 14 1 1 3 115
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 0 0 0 120 0 2 4 423
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 0 0 0 8 0 2 5 125
Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations 0 0 0 105 0 2 3 352
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications 0 0 0 45 1 2 2 72
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications 0 0 0 59 2 2 3 161
Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models' 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 424
Investment and Concern for Relative Position 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 164
Investment and Concern for Relative Position 0 0 0 21 0 2 2 135
Investment and Concern for Relative Position 0 0 0 55 3 3 3 274
Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form? 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 170
Laws and Authority 0 0 0 35 1 1 2 42
Laws and Authority 0 0 0 41 4 4 7 53
Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference 0 0 0 33 1 3 4 43
Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference 0 0 0 15 2 6 6 29
Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games 0 2 4 106 4 11 27 462
Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games 0 0 0 1 2 5 12 916
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 160 4 4 5 459
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 73 0 1 1 142
Market Selection and Asymmetrick Information 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 292
Matching with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 32 1 2 2 67
Matching with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 32 0 3 6 121
Matching with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 63 1 2 5 124
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games 0 0 0 211 1 2 3 1,695
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 239
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 23 3 5 5 66
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 29 2 2 3 78
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 38 0 2 3 26
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 19 2 3 3 51
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 1 5 6 7 30
Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 17 0 1 4 76
Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 38 0 1 3 92
Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 121 0 1 2 184
Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 35 0 1 1 55
Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 13 0 3 5 86
Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 41
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 28 1 1 4 136
Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 0 0 0 29 2 2 5 194
Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 58 0 3 5 284
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 39 3 5 6 349
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 58 1 2 3 327
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma 0 0 0 41 2 3 4 313
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 147
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma 0 0 0 2 2 3 4 36
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version 0 0 0 3 1 2 3 74
Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 733
Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring 0 0 0 37 1 2 2 249
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 5 2 4 5 129
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 65 0 3 5 327
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 49 2 11 12 319
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 2 1 3 3 55
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 77 2 4 4 445
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 50 0 3 4 241
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring' 0 0 0 0 2 4 7 254
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective 0 0 0 201 1 2 3 703
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective 0 0 0 53 0 1 2 211
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective' 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 197
Reputation Effects 0 0 0 375 4 6 7 1,032
Reputations in Repeated Games 1 1 2 63 1 4 9 91
Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 1 125 1 2 6 79
Social Assets 0 0 0 52 3 6 9 288
Social Assets 0 0 0 90 2 3 7 415
Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword 0 0 0 17 1 3 3 38
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version 0 0 1 8 1 6 10 87
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version 0 0 0 16 2 2 4 82
Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 200
Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 237
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 149
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices 0 0 0 30 3 3 4 156
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version) 0 0 0 13 0 2 3 149
Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices 0 0 0 18 1 2 2 189
Surplus Sharing and Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 165
The Curse of Long Horizons 0 0 0 3 0 3 3 19
The Curse of Long Horizons 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 22
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 1 70 2 2 5 297
The Social Context of Economic Decisions 0 0 0 15 2 2 5 72
The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference 0 0 0 9 0 1 3 33
The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd:Model-Based Inference 0 0 0 18 0 0 4 25
The curse of long horizons 0 0 0 37 1 3 6 53
Time CVonsistency, Reputation, and the Importance of Perpetual Uncertainty: Implications for Macroeconomics 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 19
Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword 0 0 0 31 0 4 5 36
Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword 0 0 0 5 4 5 7 20
Trust in risk sharing: A double-edged sword 0 0 0 19 0 1 3 13
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime 0 0 0 8 1 1 3 79
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime 0 0 0 31 2 3 4 51
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime 0 0 0 55 3 3 9 85
When and how the punishment must fit the crime 0 0 0 68 3 3 6 63
When do regulators close banks? When should they? 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 317
When do regulators close banks? When should they? 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 336
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games 0 0 0 37 2 2 3 282
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 505
Who Wants a Good Reputation? 0 0 1 349 0 3 5 1,057
Who Wants a Good Reputation? 0 0 0 117 1 2 4 340
Who Wants a Good Reputation?' 0 0 0 2 0 2 5 394
Who wants a good reputation? 0 0 0 297 2 6 7 777
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be 1 1 3 393 1 1 10 1,100
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be 0 0 0 67 1 3 4 258
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be' 0 0 0 0 2 2 9 345
Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be 0 0 1 280 0 2 4 828
extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 300
Total Working Papers 2 4 14 8,591 217 487 770 47,548

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory -super-* 0 0 1 15 0 1 8 107
A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure 1 1 2 419 2 2 5 888
An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling--Existence of separating equilibria 0 0 1 116 0 0 4 330
Aristocratic Equilibria: Response 0 0 1 29 0 1 5 164
Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents 0 0 5 378 0 3 11 864
BUYING LOCALLY 0 0 0 1 1 3 5 18
Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games 2 2 3 299 4 8 14 553
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives 0 0 0 170 2 7 10 715
Class systems and the enforcement of social norms 0 1 1 91 3 4 9 721
Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders 0 0 2 409 0 4 12 729
Common Learning 0 0 0 94 2 3 7 287
Common learning with intertemporal dependence 0 0 0 6 1 2 4 43
Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria 0 0 0 25 1 1 2 108
Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring 0 0 0 68 0 2 5 281
Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*) 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 347
Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory] 0 0 2 92 2 2 4 430
Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships 0 0 0 56 1 1 1 184
Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory 0 0 4 915 1 4 10 3,046
Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection? 0 0 0 45 0 3 6 256
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies 0 0 0 52 1 1 3 278
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 0 82 3 4 5 287
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search 0 0 1 65 0 1 4 296
Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions 0 1 1 167 1 3 4 301
Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 155 1 4 6 803
Financing Losers in Competitive Markets 0 0 0 51 0 0 3 172
Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring 0 0 0 25 3 5 9 136
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 34 1 5 8 134
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 0 0 0 140 2 3 6 499
Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types 1 2 11 668 4 7 17 1,446
Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications 0 0 1 22 0 2 6 93
Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models 0 0 0 92 0 6 11 373
Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory 0 0 0 289 0 1 3 665
Laws and authority 0 0 0 15 0 0 6 95
Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference 0 0 2 26 1 6 12 160
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games 0 3 10 1,369 1 17 64 5,344
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 95 3 5 8 333
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games 0 0 0 72 2 3 5 220
On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval 0 0 0 17 0 1 2 64
Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics 0 0 0 12 1 1 2 59
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 4 1 4 6 35
Pricing and investments in matching markets 0 0 0 16 4 5 7 93
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 105 1 1 3 463
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 81 3 4 6 497
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 2 80 1 2 8 229
Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 113
SOCIAL ASSETS 0 0 0 146 0 2 7 3,303
Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model 0 0 0 121 0 1 5 324
Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth 0 2 4 545 5 9 22 2,215
Stable Matching With Incomplete Information 0 0 1 19 0 1 9 123
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices 0 0 0 32 3 5 8 207
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 63 2 7 11 190
The Social Context of Economic Decisions 0 0 0 42 0 1 2 184
The curse of long horizons 0 0 0 6 1 1 5 26
The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example 0 0 0 42 1 1 2 175
WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME 0 0 0 4 1 3 4 16
Who Wants a Good Reputation? 0 1 7 37 3 11 26 752
Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value 0 0 0 35 1 4 8 157
original papers: Investment and concern for relative position 0 0 0 38 2 3 6 212
Total Journal Articles 4 13 62 8,092 74 195 459 31,143

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Modeling Strategic Behavior:A Graduate Introduction to Game Theory and Mechanism Design 0 1 8 156 4 10 23 458
Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships 0 0 0 0 4 9 23 1,288
Total Books 0 1 8 156 8 19 46 1,746

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A First Look at Equilibrium 0 0 0 13 0 1 2 25
Appendices 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4
Bargaining 0 0 1 7 0 1 4 22
Bayesian Mechanism Design 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 12
Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design 0 0 0 3 1 2 5 12
Games with Nature 0 0 1 8 0 0 4 28
George J. Mailath on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 7
Introduction to Mechanism Design 0 0 1 10 1 2 7 25
Nash Equilibrium Refinements in Dynamic Games 1 1 1 7 1 2 3 16
Nash Equilibrium: Existence and Foundations 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 21
Normal and Extensive Form Games 0 0 0 17 1 1 8 56
Principal Agency 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 17
Repeated Games 0 0 0 3 1 1 3 36
Reputations in Repeated Games 1 2 2 78 11 18 22 219
Signaling 0 0 0 10 1 2 3 40
Topics in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 5 0 1 3 16
Total Chapters 2 3 6 178 20 36 77 556

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2026-01-09