Access Statistics for George J. Mailath

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version 0 0 0 21 1 1 3 61
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games 0 0 0 68 1 1 1 123
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games 0 0 0 49 3 3 3 136
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory 0 0 0 13 1 3 3 101
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory 0 0 0 2 3 3 4 51
A positive analysis of bank closure 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 476
A positive analysis of bank closure 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 693
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives 0 0 0 187 0 0 1 896
Buying Locally 0 0 0 41 1 2 4 264
Buying Locally 0 0 0 35 1 1 1 86
Buying Locally 0 0 0 50 0 2 4 115
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 419
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms 0 0 0 39 0 1 1 207
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms' 0 0 0 91 1 2 3 524
Class systems and the enforcement of social norms 0 0 0 164 0 0 1 1,191
Common Learning 0 0 0 89 0 0 1 313
Common Learning 0 0 0 24 1 4 6 138
Common Learning 0 0 0 27 1 1 1 105
Common Learning 0 0 0 63 1 2 2 202
Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence 0 0 0 15 0 1 2 80
Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria 0 0 0 70 2 3 3 266
Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria 0 0 0 30 2 2 5 197
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 187
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 34 0 2 3 160
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 64 0 2 3 248
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 37 2 2 2 282
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 35 0 0 2 239
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 28 2 2 4 151
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 43 1 1 7 171
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions 0 0 0 63 2 3 4 258
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions 0 0 0 22 3 4 7 125
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions 0 0 0 158 1 1 4 615
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions' 0 0 0 58 1 1 2 243
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships 0 0 0 30 1 2 3 98
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships 0 0 0 79 1 1 3 300
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships 0 0 0 34 3 3 3 146
Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships 0 0 0 21 0 2 3 132
Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory' 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 973
Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection? 0 0 0 105 1 1 2 365
EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 296
EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 325
EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL GAMES 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 590
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments 0 0 0 23 4 4 4 157
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 0 1 1 3 3 306
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 0 26 2 3 5 172
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 0 53 1 2 3 318
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy 0 0 0 21 0 2 3 124
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy 0 0 0 54 0 2 5 367
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments' 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 214
Efficient non-contractible investments 0 0 0 97 4 5 6 769
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 185
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search' 0 0 0 73 0 0 1 249
Endogenous Interactions 0 0 0 121 2 5 6 439
Endogenous inequality in integrated markets with two-sided research 0 0 0 66 1 1 1 698
Evolution and Endogenous Interactions 0 0 0 291 2 2 3 974
Evolution and Endogenous Interations 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 202
Extensive form reasoning in normal form games 0 0 0 0 3 3 4 7
Extensive form reasoning in normal form games 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 30
Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown 0 0 0 34 2 3 4 170
Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown 0 0 0 3 2 3 13 91
Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown 0 0 0 158 1 5 6 1,186
FINANCING LOSERS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 363
Financing Losers in Competitive Markets 0 0 0 0 3 4 4 472
Financing Losers in Competitive Markets 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 212
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 20 2 3 3 164
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version 0 0 0 25 0 2 6 112
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version 0 0 0 2 1 4 4 37
Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 47 4 5 7 231
Fragile Financial Coalitions: the interaction between real returns and social capital 0 0 0 38 0 1 3 80
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 369
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 298
How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium 0 0 0 200 0 0 1 1,216
How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 14 0 0 2 114
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 0 0 0 8 1 2 5 125
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 0 0 0 120 2 2 4 423
Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations 0 0 0 105 2 2 3 352
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications 0 0 0 45 0 1 1 71
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications 0 0 0 59 0 1 1 159
Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models' 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 423
Investment and Concern for Relative Position 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 162
Investment and Concern for Relative Position 0 0 0 21 2 2 2 135
Investment and Concern for Relative Position 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 271
Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form? 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 170
Laws and Authority 0 0 0 41 0 1 3 49
Laws and Authority 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 41
Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference 0 0 0 15 3 4 4 27
Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference 0 0 0 33 1 2 3 42
Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games 0 2 4 106 1 9 24 458
Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games 0 0 0 1 2 3 10 914
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 160 0 1 1 455
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 73 1 1 1 142
Market Selection and Asymmetrick Information 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 292
Matching with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 32 0 1 1 66
Matching with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 63 0 1 5 123
Matching with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 32 0 3 6 121
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games 0 0 0 211 1 1 2 1,694
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 239
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 19 0 1 1 49
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 76
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 25
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 23 0 2 2 63
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 38 2 2 3 26
Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 38 0 1 4 92
Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 17 1 1 4 76
Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 41
Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 13 1 3 5 86
Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 121 1 1 2 184
Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 35 0 1 1 55
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 28 0 0 3 135
Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 0 0 0 29 0 0 3 192
Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 58 1 3 5 284
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 39 1 3 3 346
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 58 0 2 2 326
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma 0 0 0 41 0 2 2 311
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 147
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 34
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 73
Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 733
Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring 0 0 0 37 0 1 1 248
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 77 1 2 2 443
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 65 3 3 5 327
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 54
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 50 3 3 4 241
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 49 9 9 10 317
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 0 5 2 2 3 127
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring' 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 252
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective 0 0 0 201 1 1 2 702
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective 0 0 0 53 1 1 2 211
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective' 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 196
Reputation Effects 0 0 0 375 2 2 3 1,028
Reputations in Repeated Games 0 0 1 62 1 4 8 90
Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 1 125 1 1 5 78
Social Assets 0 0 0 52 3 3 6 285
Social Assets 0 0 0 90 0 2 5 413
Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword 0 0 0 17 2 2 2 37
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version 0 0 1 8 1 6 9 86
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version 0 0 0 16 0 0 2 80
Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 237
Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 199
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 148
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 153
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version) 0 0 0 13 1 2 3 149
Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices 0 0 0 18 0 1 1 188
Surplus Sharing and Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 164
The Curse of Long Horizons 0 0 0 3 2 3 4 19
The Curse of Long Horizons 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 22
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 1 70 0 0 3 295
The Social Context of Economic Decisions 0 0 0 15 0 1 4 70
The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference 0 0 0 9 1 2 3 33
The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd:Model-Based Inference 0 0 0 18 0 0 4 25
The curse of long horizons 0 0 0 37 0 2 5 52
Time CVonsistency, Reputation, and the Importance of Perpetual Uncertainty: Implications for Macroeconomics 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 18
Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword 0 0 0 5 1 1 3 16
Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword 0 0 0 31 3 4 5 36
Trust in risk sharing: A double-edged sword 0 0 0 19 1 2 4 13
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime 0 0 0 8 0 0 2 78
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime 0 0 0 55 0 0 6 82
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime 0 0 0 31 1 1 2 49
When and how the punishment must fit the crime 0 0 0 68 0 1 3 60
When do regulators close banks? When should they? 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 336
When do regulators close banks? When should they? 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 316
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games 0 0 0 37 0 0 1 280
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 505
Who Wants a Good Reputation? 0 0 0 117 1 2 3 339
Who Wants a Good Reputation? 0 0 1 349 2 3 5 1,057
Who Wants a Good Reputation?' 0 0 0 2 2 2 5 394
Who wants a good reputation? 0 0 0 297 2 4 5 775
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be 0 0 0 67 1 2 3 257
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be 0 1 2 392 0 1 9 1,099
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be' 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 343
Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be 0 1 1 280 1 3 4 828
extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 299
Total Working Papers 0 4 12 8,589 166 300 568 47,331

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory -super-* 0 0 1 15 1 1 8 107
A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure 0 0 1 418 0 0 4 886
An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling--Existence of separating equilibria 0 0 1 116 0 0 4 330
Aristocratic Equilibria: Response 0 0 1 29 0 1 5 164
Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents 0 0 5 378 2 3 11 864
BUYING LOCALLY 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 17
Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games 0 0 1 297 4 6 10 549
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives 0 0 0 170 4 5 8 713
Class systems and the enforcement of social norms 0 1 1 91 0 1 6 718
Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders 0 0 2 409 2 4 12 729
Common Learning 0 0 0 94 1 3 6 285
Common learning with intertemporal dependence 0 0 0 6 1 1 3 42
Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 107
Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring 0 0 0 68 2 2 5 281
Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*) 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 347
Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory] 0 0 2 92 0 0 2 428
Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 183
Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory 0 0 4 915 0 4 9 3,045
Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection? 0 0 0 45 1 3 6 256
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies 0 0 0 52 0 0 2 277
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 1 82 1 1 4 284
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search 0 0 1 65 1 1 4 296
Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions 1 1 1 167 2 2 3 300
Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 155 3 3 5 802
Financing Losers in Competitive Markets 0 0 0 51 0 0 3 172
Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring 0 0 0 25 0 3 6 133
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 34 3 4 7 133
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 0 0 0 140 1 2 4 497
Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types 1 3 10 667 1 5 13 1,442
Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications 0 0 1 22 2 2 6 93
Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models 0 0 0 92 2 6 11 373
Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory 0 0 0 289 1 1 3 665
Laws and authority 0 0 0 15 0 1 6 95
Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference 0 0 2 26 4 5 11 159
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games 0 4 11 1,369 6 20 69 5,343
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 95 1 2 5 330
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games 0 0 0 72 1 1 4 218
On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval 0 0 0 17 0 1 2 64
Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 58
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets 0 0 0 4 0 3 5 34
Pricing and investments in matching markets 0 0 0 16 1 1 3 89
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 105 0 0 2 462
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 81 1 1 3 494
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 2 80 0 1 7 228
Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 112
SOCIAL ASSETS 0 0 0 146 2 2 8 3,303
Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model 0 0 0 121 1 1 5 324
Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth 1 3 5 545 1 6 19 2,210
Stable Matching With Incomplete Information 0 0 2 19 1 1 10 123
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices 0 0 0 32 1 2 5 204
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 63 3 5 9 188
The Social Context of Economic Decisions 0 0 0 42 0 1 2 184
The curse of long horizons 0 0 0 6 0 1 4 25
The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example 0 0 0 42 0 0 1 174
WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME 0 0 0 4 1 2 3 15
Who Wants a Good Reputation? 1 1 7 37 3 8 23 749
Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value 0 0 0 35 2 3 7 156
original papers: Investment and concern for relative position 0 0 0 38 0 2 4 210
Total Journal Articles 4 13 62 8,088 66 139 400 31,069

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Modeling Strategic Behavior:A Graduate Introduction to Game Theory and Mechanism Design 1 1 8 156 4 6 22 454
Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships 0 0 0 0 3 5 21 1,284
Total Books 1 1 8 156 7 11 43 1,738

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A First Look at Equilibrium 0 0 1 13 1 1 3 25
Appendices 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4
Bargaining 0 0 1 7 1 1 4 22
Bayesian Mechanism Design 0 0 2 5 0 0 5 12
Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design 0 0 1 3 1 2 5 11
Games with Nature 0 0 1 8 0 0 4 28
George J. Mailath on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5
Introduction to Mechanism Design 0 0 1 10 0 1 6 24
Nash Equilibrium Refinements in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 6 0 1 2 15
Nash Equilibrium: Existence and Foundations 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 21
Normal and Extensive Form Games 0 0 1 17 0 0 8 55
Principal Agency 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 16
Repeated Games 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 35
Reputations in Repeated Games 1 1 1 77 6 8 12 208
Signaling 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 39
Topics in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 5 0 1 3 16
Total Chapters 1 1 9 176 11 18 63 536

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2025-12-06