| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
| A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
122 |
| A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
133 |
| A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
| A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
100 |
| A positive analysis of bank closure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
475 |
| A positive analysis of bank closure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
691 |
| Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
187 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
896 |
| Buying Locally |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
115 |
| Buying Locally |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
| Buying Locally |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
263 |
| Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
419 |
| Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
207 |
| Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
523 |
| Class systems and the enforcement of social norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
164 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,191 |
| Common Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
201 |
| Common Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
137 |
| Common Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
313 |
| Common Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
| Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
80 |
| Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
264 |
| Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
195 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
248 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
149 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
170 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
239 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
160 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
187 |
| Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
280 |
| Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
614 |
| Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
122 |
| Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
256 |
| Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
242 |
| Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
97 |
| Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
143 |
| Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
299 |
| Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
132 |
| Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
973 |
| Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
364 |
| EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
294 |
| EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
325 |
| EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
588 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
153 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
317 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
305 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
170 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
367 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
124 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
214 |
| Efficient non-contractible investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
765 |
| Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
185 |
| Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
249 |
| Endogenous Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
437 |
| Endogenous inequality in integrated markets with two-sided research |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
697 |
| Evolution and Endogenous Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
291 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
972 |
| Evolution and Endogenous Interations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
202 |
| Extensive form reasoning in normal form games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| Extensive form reasoning in normal form games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
| Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
89 |
| Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
1,185 |
| Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
168 |
| FINANCING LOSERS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
363 |
| Financing Losers in Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
469 |
| Financing Losers in Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
211 |
| Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
162 |
| Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
112 |
| Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
36 |
| Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
227 |
| Fragile Financial Coalitions: the interaction between real returns and social capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
80 |
| How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
367 |
| How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
297 |
| How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
200 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,216 |
| How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
114 |
| Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
120 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
421 |
| Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
124 |
| Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
350 |
| Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
71 |
| Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
159 |
| Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
423 |
| Investment and Concern for Relative Position |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
133 |
| Investment and Concern for Relative Position |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
162 |
| Investment and Concern for Relative Position |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
271 |
| Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
170 |
| Laws and Authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
49 |
| Laws and Authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
| Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
41 |
| Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
| Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games |
2 |
3 |
4 |
106 |
6 |
9 |
23 |
457 |
| Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
912 |
| Market Selection and Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
160 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
455 |
| Market Selection and Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
| Market Selection and Asymmetrick Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
292 |
| Matching with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
121 |
| Matching with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
66 |
| Matching with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
123 |
| Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
211 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,693 |
| Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
239 |
| Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
63 |
| Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
| Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
| Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
| Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
49 |
| Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
75 |
| Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
92 |
| Pricing in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
183 |
| Pricing in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
40 |
| Pricing in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
85 |
| Pricing in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
55 |
| Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
135 |
| Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
192 |
| Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
283 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
326 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
345 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
311 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
147 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
72 |
| Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
733 |
| Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
248 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
125 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
308 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
442 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
238 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
324 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
252 |
| Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
210 |
| Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
201 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
701 |
| Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
195 |
| Reputation Effects |
0 |
0 |
1 |
375 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,026 |
| Reputations in Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
89 |
| Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version |
0 |
0 |
1 |
125 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
77 |
| Social Assets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
413 |
| Social Assets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
282 |
| Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
| Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
80 |
| Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
85 |
| Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
199 |
| Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
237 |
| Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
148 |
| Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
153 |
| Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
148 |
| Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
188 |
| Surplus Sharing and Pricing in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
164 |
| The Curse of Long Horizons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
22 |
| The Curse of Long Horizons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
| The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
295 |
| The Social Context of Economic Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
70 |
| The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
32 |
| The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd:Model-Based Inference |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
25 |
| The curse of long horizons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
52 |
| Time CVonsistency, Reputation, and the Importance of Perpetual Uncertainty: Implications for Macroeconomics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
| Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
33 |
| Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
| Trust in risk sharing: A double-edged sword |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
| When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
| When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
82 |
| When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
78 |
| When and how the punishment must fit the crime |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
60 |
| When do regulators close banks? When should they? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
335 |
| When do regulators close banks? When should they? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
316 |
| When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
280 |
| When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
505 |
| Who Wants a Good Reputation? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
349 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1,055 |
| Who Wants a Good Reputation? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
338 |
| Who Wants a Good Reputation?' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
392 |
| Who wants a good reputation? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
297 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
773 |
| Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
256 |
| Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be |
0 |
1 |
3 |
392 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
1,099 |
| Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
343 |
| Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be |
0 |
1 |
2 |
280 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
827 |
| extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
299 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
5 |
16 |
8,589 |
104 |
182 |
433 |
47,165 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory -super-* |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
106 |
| A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure |
0 |
1 |
1 |
418 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
886 |
| An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling--Existence of separating equilibria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
116 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
330 |
| Aristocratic Equilibria: Response |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
164 |
| Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents |
0 |
0 |
6 |
378 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
862 |
| BUYING LOCALLY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
| Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
297 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
545 |
| Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
170 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
709 |
| Class systems and the enforcement of social norms |
1 |
1 |
1 |
91 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
718 |
| Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders |
0 |
0 |
2 |
409 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
727 |
| Common Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
284 |
| Common learning with intertemporal dependence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
41 |
| Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
107 |
| Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
279 |
| Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
346 |
| Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory] |
0 |
0 |
2 |
92 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
428 |
| Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
183 |
| Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
5 |
915 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
3,045 |
| Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
255 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
277 |
| Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
283 |
| Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
295 |
| Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
166 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
298 |
| Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
155 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
799 |
| Financing Losers in Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
172 |
| Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
133 |
| How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
130 |
| Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
496 |
| Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types |
0 |
3 |
9 |
666 |
2 |
5 |
12 |
1,441 |
| Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
91 |
| Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
4 |
4 |
9 |
371 |
| Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
289 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
664 |
| Laws and authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
95 |
| Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
155 |
| Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games |
3 |
5 |
11 |
1,369 |
10 |
18 |
64 |
5,337 |
| Market Selection and Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
329 |
| Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
217 |
| On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
64 |
| Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
58 |
| Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
34 |
| Pricing and investments in matching markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
88 |
| Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
462 |
| Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
493 |
| Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
2 |
80 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
228 |
| Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
112 |
| SOCIAL ASSETS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
3,301 |
| Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
323 |
| Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth |
1 |
2 |
4 |
544 |
3 |
7 |
20 |
2,209 |
| Stable Matching With Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
122 |
| Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
203 |
| The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
185 |
| The Social Context of Economic Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
184 |
| The curse of long horizons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
25 |
| The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
174 |
| WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
| Who Wants a Good Reputation? |
0 |
0 |
7 |
36 |
5 |
5 |
22 |
746 |
| Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
154 |
| original papers: Investment and concern for relative position |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
210 |
| Total Journal Articles |
5 |
12 |
62 |
8,084 |
55 |
94 |
348 |
31,003 |