| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "4G Spectrum Auction in Japan: Japanese Package Auction (JPA)" (in Japanese) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
546 |
| "Experiments of Multi-Object Auction: Sequential First Price Auction, Clock Auction, and VCG Mechanisms" (in Japanese) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
104 |
| "New Progress in Repeated Games: Implicit Collusion with Private Monitaring" (in Japanese) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
485 |
| "Note on Combinatorial Auction Design: Efficient Slot Allocation for Domestic Airline Regular Services in Haneda Airport" (in Japanese) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
62 |
| Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
28 |
| Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
44 |
| Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
28 |
| Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
58 |
| Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
| Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
85 |
| Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (Revised version of F-381) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
153 |
| Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
28 |
| Assignments with Ethical Concerns |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
| Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
51 |
| Auctions with Ethical Concerns |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
28 |
| Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
32 |
| Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
116 |
| Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
61 |
| Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
66 |
| Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
165 |
| Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
57 |
| Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
147 |
| Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
91 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
476 |
| Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory ( The further revision was subsequently published in "Economics Letters". ) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
92 |
| Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy |
1 |
1 |
5 |
50 |
4 |
7 |
17 |
91 |
| Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
59 |
| Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
32 |
| Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
58 |
| Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View |
0 |
0 |
1 |
744 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
2,089 |
| Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer's Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
| Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretionin VCG Combinatorial Auction (Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 18 (1), 2018.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
38 |
| Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
147 |
| Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies ( Revised version of CARF-F-007(2004) and CARF-F-062(2005); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal of Economic Theory" as a regular article. ) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
45 |
| Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
188 |
| Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
33 |
| Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
26 |
| Effects of Reputation in Bubbles and Crashes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
133 |
| Effects of Reputation in Bubbles and Crashes ( Revised in April 2008 ) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
41 |
| Efficiency in partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
| Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
46 |
| Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
| Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges with Opt-Out Types (Revised version of CARF-F-258)(Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 19 (1), 2019.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| Efficient Entrepreneurship |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
454 |
| Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
| Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
62 |
| FREE-RIDER PROBLEM AND SOVEREIGNTY PROTECTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
| Financing Harmful Bubbles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
| Financing Harmful Bubbles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
112 |
| Financing Harmful Bubbles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
| Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
273 |
| Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
| Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
44 |
| Framing Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
253 |
| Framing Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
56 |
| Framing Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
224 |
| Framing Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
45 |
| Free-Rider Problem and Sovereignty Protection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
| Free-Rider Problem and Sovereignty Protection |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
| Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
3 |
7 |
11 |
23 |
| Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
| Honesty-Proof Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
327 |
| Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
82 |
| Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
61 |
| Implementation and Mind Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
80 |
| Implementation and Mind Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
55 |
| Implementation and Preference for Honesty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
209 |
| Implementation and Social Influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
| Implementation and Social Influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
| Implementation without Expected Utility: Ex-Post Verifiability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
23 |
| Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
31 |
| Implementation, Verification, and Detection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
49 |
| Incentives in Hedge Funds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
34 |
| Incentives in Hedge Funds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
96 |
| Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
| Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
43 |
| Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
36 |
| Institutional Design for social common capitals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
| Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
80 |
| Investment and Ultimatum Games: Experiments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
160 |
| Investment and Ultimatum Games: Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
55 |
| Large Auction Design in Dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
132 |
| Large Auction Design in Dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
| Large Market Design in Dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
42 |
| Large Market Design in Dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
126 |
| Learning about Stochastic Payoff Structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
473 |
| Learning as the Dynamics of Emotions and Strength of Confidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
479 |
| Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
116 |
| Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
59 |
| Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
67 |
| Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG (Revised version of F-386) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
146 |
| Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
69 |
| Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
339 |
| Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
59 |
| Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
| Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments (Revised version of F415 ) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
97 |
| Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
263 |
| Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
187 |
| Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance ( Published in "Journal of Economic Theory" (as a regular article). ) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
71 |
| Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Theory and Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
| Moral Decision and Information Aversion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
568 |
| Multi-Group Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
259 |
| Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
207 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
722 |
| Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
534 |
| Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems ( Revised as CARF-F-062(2006) ) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
94 |
| On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
113 |
| On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
294 |
| Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
| Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings (Published in the Japanese Economic Review 69 (4), 2018.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
41 |
| Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
29 |
| Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
54 |
| Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design with Single-Dimensionality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
129 |
| Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
| Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
55 |
| Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
199 |
| Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
32 |
| Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
| Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
| Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
67 |
| Private observation and Communication and Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
313 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
794 |
| Procedural Rationality and Inductive Learning I: Towards a Theory of Subjective Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
814 |
| Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
44 |
| Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
| Psychological Aspect of Monitoring Accuracy in Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
56 |
| Recurrent Preemption Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
| Recurrent Preemption Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
22 |
| Recurrent Preemption Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
37 |
| Recurrent Preemption Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
| Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
143 |
| Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
| Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
320 |
| Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
370 |
| Role of Credit Default Swap in Bubbles and Crashes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
61 |
| Role of Credit Default Swap in Bubbles and Crashes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
57 |
| Role of Honesty in Full Implementation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
110 |
| Role of Honesty in Full Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
168 |
| Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-015(2004) ) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
| Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-062(2006); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal of Economic Theory" as a short article. ) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
| Role of Leverage in Bubbles and Crashes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
49 |
| Role of Leverage in Bubbles and Crashes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
52 |
| Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
114 |
| Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
60 |
| Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
433 |
| Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information ( Revised as CARF-F-209(2010) ) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
34 |
| Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
143 |
| Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
827 |
| Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
364 |
| Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
448 |
| Stable Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
231 |
| The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
1 |
163 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
437 |
| The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
4 |
5 |
5 |
513 |
| The Role of Mobility among Regions in Coordination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
359 |
| Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
31 |
| Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims (Revised version of CARF-F-306)(Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
38 |
| Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
552 |
| Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
360 |
| Towards a Theory of Subjective Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
165 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
553 |
| Trading Information Goods on a Network: An Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
| Unique Information Elicitation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
23 |
| Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
138 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
1 |
16 |
6,226 |
115 |
202 |
390 |
24,795 |
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