Access Statistics for Hitoshi Matsushima

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"4G Spectrum Auction in Japan: Japanese Package Auction (JPA)" (in Japanese) 0 0 0 140 3 3 14 556
"Experiments of Multi-Object Auction: Sequential First Price Auction, Clock Auction, and VCG Mechanisms" (in Japanese) 0 0 0 15 2 5 7 110
"New Progress in Repeated Games: Implicit Collusion with Private Monitaring" (in Japanese) 0 0 0 67 2 2 4 489
"Note on Combinatorial Auction Design: Efficient Slot Allocation for Domestic Airline Regular Services in Haneda Airport" (in Japanese) 0 0 0 17 2 3 6 66
Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments 0 0 0 13 6 6 12 52
Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments 0 0 0 10 3 5 15 42
Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433) 0 0 0 5 1 4 11 37
Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory 0 0 0 25 2 5 6 49
Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory 0 0 0 43 4 5 8 93
Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory 0 0 0 41 2 4 11 68
Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (Revised version of F-381) 0 0 0 35 2 5 9 159
Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory 0 0 0 22 1 2 10 34
Assignments with Ethical Concerns 0 0 0 5 5 9 12 20
Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 53
Auctions with Ethical Concerns 0 0 0 10 1 2 7 34
Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity 0 0 0 1 6 8 18 47
Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 59 4 5 11 123
Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 27 0 3 13 70
Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes 0 0 0 7 3 7 12 77
Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes 0 0 0 6 2 4 11 66
Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes 0 0 0 50 2 3 7 153
Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes 0 0 0 41 4 8 15 177
Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory 0 0 1 91 1 2 7 482
Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory ( The further revision was subsequently published in "Economics Letters". ) 0 0 0 11 0 0 7 96
Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy 0 1 3 51 3 5 18 100
Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics) 1 1 1 31 3 5 11 68
Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance 0 0 0 10 2 4 7 38
Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance 0 0 0 19 3 4 10 66
Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View 0 1 1 745 6 9 12 2,100
Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer's Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction 0 0 0 3 1 1 6 45
Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretionin VCG Combinatorial Auction (Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 18 (1), 2018.) 0 0 0 4 7 7 11 47
Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies 0 0 0 23 1 3 9 155
Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies ( Revised version of CARF-F-007(2004) and CARF-F-062(2005); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal of Economic Theory" as a regular article. ) 0 0 0 1 4 4 12 55
Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness 0 0 0 35 5 5 10 195
Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection 0 0 0 13 3 3 8 33
Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection 0 0 0 16 1 5 17 48
Effects of Reputation in Bubbles and Crashes 0 0 0 40 2 2 3 136
Effects of Reputation in Bubbles and Crashes ( Revised in April 2008 ) 0 0 0 8 3 3 14 53
Efficiency in partnerships 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 73
Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges 0 0 0 20 3 5 15 57
Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges 0 0 0 0 1 3 7 23
Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges with Opt-Out Types (Revised version of CARF-F-258)(Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 19 (1), 2019.) 0 0 0 6 4 4 9 41
Efficient Entrepreneurship 0 0 0 134 2 2 5 458
Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions 0 0 0 13 3 4 12 29
Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496) 0 0 0 35 6 6 12 73
FREE-RIDER PROBLEM AND SOVEREIGNTY PROTECTION 0 0 0 6 8 8 21 37
Financing Harmful Bubbles 0 0 0 14 0 0 6 53
Financing Harmful Bubbles 0 0 0 61 4 6 8 82
Financing Harmful Bubbles 0 0 0 56 1 7 14 125
Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments 0 0 0 56 4 5 9 281
Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract 0 0 0 17 3 4 8 50
Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract 0 0 0 15 1 2 4 61
Framing Game Theory 0 0 0 24 1 2 8 229
Framing Game Theory 0 0 0 63 3 4 8 260
Framing Game Theory 0 0 0 48 2 2 10 61
Framing Game Theory 0 0 0 72 5 7 11 55
Free-Rider Problem and Sovereignty Protection 0 0 1 4 3 4 7 27
Free-Rider Problem and Sovereignty Protection 0 0 0 3 2 2 8 16
Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 19 3 5 18 33
Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 11 0 7 18 20
Honesty-Proof Implementation 0 0 0 58 2 2 3 329
Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity 0 0 0 9 2 3 6 65
Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity 0 0 0 26 4 4 11 92
Implementation and Mind Control 0 0 0 39 2 8 16 93
Implementation and Mind Control 0 0 0 8 3 4 9 62
Implementation and Preference for Honesty 0 0 0 52 3 3 6 214
Implementation and Social Influence 0 0 0 5 2 2 7 51
Implementation and Social Influence 1 1 1 31 1 1 2 82
Implementation without Expected Utility: Ex-Post Verifiability 0 0 0 12 1 3 10 30
Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge 0 0 0 15 4 7 13 43
Implementation, Verification, and Detection 0 0 0 9 1 2 7 52
Incentives in Hedge Funds 0 0 0 95 3 3 9 102
Incentives in Hedge Funds 0 0 0 28 3 5 11 44
Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries 0 0 0 27 4 8 14 47
Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries 0 0 0 36 0 2 5 49
Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries 0 0 0 22 2 4 16 57
Institutional Design for social common capitals 0 0 0 13 1 2 9 32
Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy 0 0 0 19 2 2 9 86
Investment and Ultimatum Games: Experiments 0 0 0 30 4 5 15 172
Investment and Ultimatum Games: Experiments 0 0 0 3 0 2 6 59
Large Auction Design in Dominance 0 0 0 0 4 5 7 36
Large Auction Design in Dominance 0 0 0 32 0 0 2 133
Large Market Design in Dominance 0 0 0 24 3 3 4 129
Large Market Design in Dominance 0 0 0 2 0 2 6 46
Learning about Stochastic Payoff Structures 0 0 0 96 2 2 4 476
Learning as the Dynamics of Emotions and Strength of Confidence 0 0 0 90 1 1 4 482
Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves 0 0 0 13 3 3 13 70
Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves 0 0 0 39 3 5 17 131
Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG 0 0 0 22 2 3 10 76
Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG (Revised version of F-386) 0 0 0 17 2 4 11 153
Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement 0 0 1 101 3 7 27 362
Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement 0 0 1 18 2 4 15 72
Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement 2 4 5 54 10 21 27 93
Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement 0 0 1 23 3 15 22 54
Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments 0 0 0 8 1 2 6 25
Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments (Revised version of F415 ) 0 0 0 31 4 6 12 106
Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance 0 0 0 67 2 6 10 271
Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance 0 0 0 46 2 3 10 195
Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance ( Published in "Journal of Economic Theory" (as a regular article). ) 0 0 0 14 3 9 13 82
Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Theory and Experiments 0 0 0 22 2 4 6 92
Moral Decision and Information Aversion 0 0 0 125 1 2 5 572
Multi-Group Incentives 0 0 0 76 2 2 6 264
Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion 0 1 1 208 1 3 13 729
Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems 0 0 0 30 1 1 8 538
Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems ( Revised as CARF-F-062(2006) ) 0 0 0 7 2 3 6 100
On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality 0 0 0 19 3 10 21 130
On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality 0 0 0 103 1 2 7 298
Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings 0 0 0 4 2 2 7 38
Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings (Published in the Japanese Economic Review 69 (4), 2018.) 0 0 0 34 2 2 9 48
Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design 0 0 0 3 3 4 6 34
Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design 0 0 0 17 4 8 15 68
Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design with Single-Dimensionality 0 0 0 21 3 3 6 134
Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions 0 0 0 8 0 6 10 35
Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare) 0 0 1 17 4 6 15 65
Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness 0 0 0 31 3 3 8 206
Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations 0 0 0 23 3 3 5 87
Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations 0 0 0 4 2 2 5 36
Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations 0 0 0 2 5 5 11 45
Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations 0 0 0 5 1 2 4 70
Private observation and Communication and Collusion 0 0 0 313 4 6 12 803
Procedural Rationality and Inductive Learning I: Towards a Theory of Subjective Games 0 0 0 0 3 4 6 820
Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation 0 0 1 24 1 1 9 51
Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation 0 0 0 5 1 3 9 52
Psychological Aspect of Monitoring Accuracy in Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma 0 0 0 14 3 3 7 63
Recurrent Preemption Games 0 0 0 5 3 5 14 30
Recurrent Preemption Games 0 0 0 6 2 2 9 29
Recurrent Preemption Games 0 0 0 29 6 9 11 26
Recurrent Preemption Games 0 0 0 17 1 2 7 43
Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents 0 0 0 41 2 2 4 146
Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents 0 0 0 17 4 6 11 72
Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts 0 0 0 94 0 3 8 327
Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players 0 0 0 106 0 2 8 376
Role of Credit Default Swap in Bubbles and Crashes 0 0 0 14 4 4 8 67
Role of Credit Default Swap in Bubbles and Crashes 0 0 0 20 5 5 6 62
Role of Honesty in Full Implementation 0 0 0 33 1 2 11 178
Role of Honesty in Full Implementation 0 1 2 19 0 2 10 117
Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-015(2004) ) 0 0 0 1 3 5 8 38
Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-062(2006); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal of Economic Theory" as a short article. ) 0 0 0 1 3 6 11 60
Role of Leverage in Bubbles and Crashes 0 0 0 14 1 2 6 54
Role of Leverage in Bubbles and Crashes 0 0 0 6 3 3 10 59
Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information 0 0 0 29 2 3 7 120
Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information 0 0 0 49 1 2 8 439
Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information 0 0 0 8 4 7 14 72
Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information ( Revised as CARF-F-209(2010) ) 0 0 0 3 1 2 8 40
Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition 0 0 0 22 1 1 5 146
Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition 0 0 0 85 3 6 13 838
Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships 0 0 0 69 1 1 6 367
Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments 0 0 0 54 2 3 4 452
Stable Implementation 0 0 0 0 2 4 6 237
The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring 0 0 1 163 4 6 12 445
The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability 0 0 0 137 7 8 15 523
The Role of Mobility among Regions in Coordination 0 0 0 86 1 1 3 362
Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims 0 0 0 20 2 2 7 34
Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims (Revised version of CARF-F-306)(Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.) 0 0 0 19 0 2 6 43
Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring 0 0 1 29 6 7 13 368
Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 62 3 3 10 560
Towards a Theory of Subjective Games 0 0 0 165 3 3 8 561
Trading Information Goods on a Network: An Experiment 0 0 0 9 1 7 12 19
Unique Information Elicitation 0 0 0 14 2 3 13 32
Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation 0 0 0 28 9 12 17 153
Total Working Papers 4 10 23 6,241 405 655 1,552 26,062
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information] 0 0 0 36 3 5 11 280
A new approach to the implementation problem 0 3 3 160 0 3 7 326
A-Mメカニズム・デザインの合理性, Rationality in Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 3 3 7 27
Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments 0 0 0 2 0 2 11 30
Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments 0 0 0 84 3 4 7 265
Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy 0 0 0 5 5 10 19 45
Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes 0 0 0 31 1 2 9 123
Behavioral aspects of implementation theory 0 0 0 43 4 5 10 153
Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View 0 0 0 6 2 4 7 27
Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 59
Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction 0 0 0 5 4 6 12 49
Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games: Two-principal case 0 0 0 15 1 1 3 116
Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies 0 0 0 38 1 1 9 230
Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 99
Efficiency in partnerships 0 0 0 211 0 1 4 422
Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring 0 0 0 68 2 4 7 129
Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability 0 0 2 8 3 4 10 38
Epistemological implementation of social choice functions 0 0 0 1 3 4 11 14
Exact Implementation 0 0 0 115 0 1 6 303
FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH SMALL FINES: THE PENANCE CONTRACT 0 0 0 3 2 5 8 61
Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability 0 0 0 1 0 2 7 17
Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability 0 0 0 35 0 1 4 100
Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy 0 0 0 5 3 5 14 51
Long-term partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching 0 0 1 44 1 2 6 116
Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance 0 0 1 65 3 7 13 220
Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion 0 0 0 74 6 7 13 266
ON DETAIL‐FREE MECHANISM DESIGN AND RATIONALITY* 0 0 0 35 2 5 13 162
On the theory of repeated games with private information: Part I: anti-folk theorem without communication 0 0 1 130 1 2 6 262
On the theory of repeated games with private information: Part II: revelation through communication 0 0 0 48 0 0 2 152
Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings 0 0 0 0 3 3 5 25
Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type‐Independent Preference Orderings 0 0 0 3 3 3 8 66
Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 15
Private Observation, Communication and Collusion 0 0 0 1 8 11 21 939
Process manipulation in unique implementation 0 0 0 9 0 1 8 44
ROLE OF RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS IN INTERGROUP COMPETITION 0 0 0 21 1 3 9 120
Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players 0 0 0 159 2 6 13 813
Role of honesty in full implementation 0 0 0 71 2 4 15 287
Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information 0 0 0 14 2 5 17 197
SYMPOSIUM ON DECENTRALIZATION 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 25
Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims 0 0 0 6 2 3 6 45
Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information 0 1 2 237 3 7 28 844
Total Journal Articles 0 4 10 1,814 83 146 374 7,562

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Dilip Abreu on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 0 0 0 0 2 3 11 21
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 2 3 11 21

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06