| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Method for Identifying the Public Good Allocation Process Within a Group |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
106 |
| A New Approach to Group Structure, Burden Sharing, and the Equilibrium Provision of Public Goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
| A Quantitative Study of the Strategic Arms Race in the Missile Age |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
| A Quantitative Study of the Strategic Arms Race in the Missile Age: A Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
| A method for estimating the effect of a subsidy on the receiver's resource constraint: with an application to U.S. local governments 1964-1971 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
81 |
| AGENDA FOR DEFENSE AND PEACE ECONOMICS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
109 |
| Collective Risk Control and Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
| Concepts of defense economics for the 21st century |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
123 |
| Crisis Bargaining and the Arms Race: A Theoretical Model. By Pierre Allan. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1983. Pp. xxii + 155. $22.50.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
25 |
| Economic Analysis and International Security |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
86 |
| Economics of strategic defense and the global public good |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
162 |
| Efficiency and Equity in the Optimal Supply of a Public Good |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
235 |
| Factor Taxes, Factor Migration, and Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
| Group Composition, Collective Consumption, and Collaborative Production |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
461 |
| Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
69 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
251 |
| Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
47 |
| Identifying the free riders: A simple algorithm for determining who will contribute to a public good |
0 |
0 |
1 |
133 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
305 |
| Implicit Mercantilism, Oligopoly, and Trade* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
176 |
| International Security, Multiple Public Good Provisions, and The Exploitation Hypothesis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
| MEMORIAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JACK HIRSHLEIFER |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
| Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. 1932-1998 Personal Recollections |
0 |
0 |
4 |
130 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
551 |
| National self-insurance and self-protection against adversity: bureaucratic management of security and moral hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
| Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. By Paul R. Pillar. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. 272. $25.00.) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
| Notes on Grants-in-Aid and Economic Interactions among Governments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
| Paying to Improve Your Chances: Gambling or Insurance? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
260 |
| Planning Techniques for Regional Development Policy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
47 |
| Problems in the Cooperative Allocation of Public Expenditures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
220 |
| Property distribution and configurations of sovereign states: A rational economic model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
158 |
| Provision for Adversity |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
| Public Goods and Income Distribution |
1 |
1 |
4 |
266 |
2 |
3 |
27 |
807 |
| REVERSAL OF MISFORTUNE WHEN PROVIDING FOR ADVERSITY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
| Regulation, factor rewards, and international trade |
1 |
1 |
8 |
160 |
1 |
3 |
21 |
486 |
| Reply to Geoffrey Brennan, "The Distributional Implications of Public Goods." |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
161 |
| The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1,126 |
0 |
2 |
22 |
4,032 |
| The Integration of Equity and Efficiency Criteria in Public Project Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
223 |
| The Integration of Equity and Efficiency Criteria in Public Project Selection: A Reply |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
84 |
| The Natural Economic Advantage of Dictatorship over Democracy: A “Gresham's Law” of Governance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
181 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2,145 |
| The Revolution in International Security |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
| Trade and the predatory state: Ricardian exchange with armed competition for resources—a diagrammatic exposition |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
28 |
| U.S. Assistance, Israeli Allocation, and the Arms Race in the Middle East |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
| UNCERTAINTY, RISK AVERSION, AND OPTIMAL DEFENSE AGAINST INTERRUPTIONS IN SUPPLY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
| Total Journal Articles |
3 |
4 |
36 |
2,731 |
10 |
25 |
133 |
12,383 |
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