Access Statistics for Richard P. McLean

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Non-direct Implementation Mechanism for Interdependent Value Problems, Second Version 0 0 0 0 1 4 11 25
A Very Robust Auction Mechanism 0 0 0 20 3 3 10 40
Aggregation of Expert Opinions 0 0 0 79 2 4 8 257
Aggregation of Expert Opinions 0 0 0 119 1 6 20 549
Alternative Mothods for Cost Allocation in Stochastic Service Systems 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 401
An Application of the Khachian-Shor Algorithm to a Class of Linear Complementary Problems 0 0 0 46 1 4 7 316
An Approach to the Pricing of Broadband Telecommunications Services 0 0 0 0 3 5 11 963
An Assignment Problem with Interdependent Valuations and Externalities 0 0 0 14 1 2 4 13
Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement 0 0 0 25 5 6 9 80
Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement 0 0 0 0 3 3 6 50
Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 37 4 9 15 169
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 62 0 1 6 254
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 26 0 3 8 145
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Second Version 0 0 0 0 3 4 9 38
Informational Size and Efficient Auctions 0 0 0 52 1 4 14 218
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility 0 0 0 38 9 11 22 199
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility 0 0 0 62 6 8 13 259
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty 0 0 0 33 4 7 12 202
Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 7 2 4 8 64
Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 0 3 1 2 9 51
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 28 3 5 12 191
Informational size and two-stage mechanisms 0 0 0 28 8 10 19 77
On Equilibrium Refinement in Supermodular Games 0 0 0 61 2 4 12 118
On Price-Taking Behavior in Asymmetric Information Economies 0 0 0 66 1 5 11 360
On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games 0 0 1 70 1 4 17 132
On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games 0 0 0 0 2 3 15 93
Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games 0 1 1 41 2 5 15 146
Some Relationships Between Discrete and Continuous Models of an Urban Economy 0 0 0 11 2 4 6 146
The Compromise Value for NTU-Games 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 130
The compromise value for NTU-games 0 0 0 0 4 6 8 13
The compromise value for NTU-games 0 0 0 2 0 1 9 40
The compromise value for NTU-games 0 0 0 1 2 2 9 36
The compromise value for NTU-games 0 0 0 0 1 2 11 19
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 0 0 4 6 13 20
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 0 8 6 6 12 20
Total Working Papers 0 1 2 939 90 155 386 5,834

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems 0 0 0 3 0 1 8 70
Aggregation of expert opinions 0 0 0 29 3 6 15 145
Alternative Methods for Cost Allocation in Stochastic Service Systems 0 0 0 275 1 3 6 1,177
An Axiomatization of the Weighted NTU Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 57
An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities 0 0 0 2 7 9 20 24
Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement 0 0 0 3 4 7 19 61
Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions 0 0 0 13 0 0 2 81
Axiomatizations of the Euclidean compromise solution 0 0 0 7 3 4 9 50
Core convergence with asymmetric information 0 0 0 12 2 3 8 110
Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies 0 0 0 11 0 0 3 324
Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions 0 0 1 1,055 4 7 18 2,354
Industry structure with sequential technology choice 0 0 0 49 0 2 11 178
Informational Size and Efficient Auctions 0 0 0 50 1 2 10 265
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility 0 0 0 75 8 12 21 506
Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty 0 0 0 15 2 3 9 84
Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information 0 0 0 7 0 2 10 82
Nash and Bayes–Nash equilibria in strategic-form games with intransitivities 0 0 0 3 2 5 13 43
On constrained generalized games with action sets in non-locally-convex and non-Hausdorff topological vector spaces 0 0 0 3 1 3 8 16
On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games 0 0 0 5 1 1 2 36
Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent 0 1 1 680 7 8 22 1,412
Random Order Coalition Structure Values 0 0 0 0 1 5 10 75
Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems 0 0 0 44 2 5 10 405
Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games 0 0 0 32 1 3 16 136
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring 0 0 0 8 0 4 14 58
Subjective evaluations of n-person games 0 0 0 14 2 2 11 62
The Compromise Value for NTU-Games 0 0 0 0 3 4 10 112
Weighted Aumann-Shapley pricing 0 0 0 157 3 3 10 510
Weighted coalition structure values 0 0 1 45 1 3 6 97
Total Journal Articles 0 1 3 2,597 59 107 303 8,530

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
On Price-Taking Behavior in Asymmetric Information Economies 0 0 0 0 3 4 12 18
Values of non-transferable utility games 0 0 2 344 6 8 21 1,137
Total Chapters 0 0 2 344 9 12 33 1,155

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06