Access Statistics for Claudio Mezzetti

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dominant Strategy, Double Clock Auction with Estimation-Based Tatonnement 0 0 2 28 0 2 12 37
A Theory of Rational Jurisprudence 0 1 1 50 2 3 17 163
Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition 0 0 0 66 0 0 4 260
Auctions in which Losers Set the Price 0 0 0 49 0 0 2 162
Auctions in which Losers Set the Price 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 10
Auctions in which Losers Set the Price 0 0 0 54 0 0 1 237
Aversion to Price Risk and the Afternoon Effect 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 11
Aversion to Price Risk and the Afternoon Effect 0 0 1 80 0 0 1 319
Common Agency with Horizontally Differentiated Principals: Regulating a Multinational Firm to extract Rent from Abroad 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 198
Contracting over persistent information 0 1 1 10 0 1 5 21
DOMESTIC UNIONIZATION AND IMPORT COMPETITION 0 0 0 2 1 2 6 438
INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES: A NONCOOPERATIVE SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING APPROACH 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 248
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 24 0 0 5 77
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 26 0 0 1 153
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 17
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 100 0 1 3 361
Intellectual Property Disclosure as "Threat" 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 15
Intellectual Property Disclosure as 'Threat' 0 0 0 85 0 0 3 204
Intellectual Property Disclosure as “Threat” 0 0 1 84 0 0 3 266
LABOR CONTRACTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WHEN WORKERS HAVE POSITIVE BARGAINING POWER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 298
Manipulative Disclosure 0 0 6 38 1 2 20 42
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction 0 0 0 98 0 2 5 369
Mediation Design 1 1 10 58 3 7 43 111
On the Lowest-Winning-Bid and the Highest-Losing-Bid Auctions 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 195
On the Lowest-Winning-Bid and the Highest-Losing-Bid Auctions 0 0 0 69 1 1 2 527
On the Lowest-Winning-Bid and the Highest-Losing-Bid Auctions 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 67
Procurement under default risk: auctions or lotteries? 0 0 0 68 0 1 3 157
Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions 0 0 0 80 0 0 3 314
Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions 0 0 2 103 0 1 6 482
THE POSSIBILITY OF EFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR TRADING IN INDIVISIBLE OBJECT 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 299
Trust-Based Mechanisms for Robust and Efficient Task Allocation in the Presence of Execution Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 9
Trust-Based Mechanisms for Robust and Efficient Task Allocation in the Presence of Execution Uncertainty 0 0 0 47 0 0 2 172
Total Working Papers 1 3 24 1,256 9 27 174 6,239


Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Rational Jurisprudence 0 1 1 117 0 1 10 537
Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders 0 0 0 8 1 1 7 49
Auctions in which losers set the price 0 0 0 27 0 0 3 111
Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations 2 4 7 112 2 5 13 198
Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games 0 0 0 60 0 0 2 143
Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations 0 0 1 82 0 0 4 212
Common Agency with Horizontally Differentiated Principals 0 0 3 90 0 0 4 244
Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race 0 0 2 6 4 5 9 280
Domestic unionization and import competition 1 2 2 216 1 4 7 466
Dynamic incentive regulation of diffuse pollution 0 0 1 8 0 1 6 31
Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions 0 0 0 72 0 0 0 172
Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection By Larry Samuelson. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997. Pp. ix, 309. $40.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements 0 0 1 8 0 0 2 66
Gathering information before signing a contract with a privately informed principal 1 2 2 55 1 2 5 173
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium 0 0 0 20 1 1 13 120
Incentive Auctions and Information Revelation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 306
Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions By H. Peyton Young. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998; Pp. xiii, 189. $35.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Intellectual property disclosure as threat 0 0 1 15 0 0 2 72
Learning in Games by Random Sampling 0 1 1 157 1 4 6 610
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency 0 0 0 128 0 0 2 403
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction 0 1 1 37 0 1 5 129
On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 81
Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach 0 0 0 21 0 0 3 90
Politicians' decision making with re-election concerns 0 1 2 124 0 3 13 335
Principals Competing for an Agent in the Presence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 0 1 2 269 0 2 6 459
Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 1,316
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games 0 0 0 47 0 0 4 137
Rawlsian distributive justice and rights 0 0 0 22 0 0 2 76
Repeated Nash implementation 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 35
Sequential Auctions with Informational Externalities and Aversion to Price Risk: Decreasing and Increasing Price Sequences 0 0 0 15 0 0 4 92
Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions 0 0 0 16 0 0 2 97
The Possibility of Efficient Mechanisms for Trading an Indivisible Object 1 1 3 103 1 2 5 201
The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap 1 1 2 3 1 1 6 22
Total Journal Articles 6 15 32 1,856 14 34 151 7,263


Statistics updated 2022-05-04