| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Rational Jurisprudence |
0 |
1 |
1 |
117 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
537 |
| Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
49 |
| Auctions in which losers set the price |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
111 |
| Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations |
2 |
4 |
7 |
112 |
2 |
5 |
13 |
198 |
| Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
143 |
| Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
212 |
| Common Agency with Horizontally Differentiated Principals |
0 |
0 |
3 |
90 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
244 |
| Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
280 |
| Domestic unionization and import competition |
1 |
2 |
2 |
216 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
466 |
| Dynamic incentive regulation of diffuse pollution |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
31 |
| Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
| Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection By Larry Samuelson. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997. Pp. ix, 309. $40.00 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
66 |
| Gathering information before signing a contract with a privately informed principal |
1 |
2 |
2 |
55 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
173 |
| Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
120 |
| Incentive Auctions and Information Revelation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
306 |
| Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions By H. Peyton Young. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998; Pp. xiii, 189. $35.00 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Intellectual property disclosure as threat |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
72 |
| Learning in Games by Random Sampling |
0 |
1 |
1 |
157 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
610 |
| Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
128 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
403 |
| Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction |
0 |
1 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
129 |
| On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
| Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
90 |
| Politicians' decision making with re-election concerns |
0 |
1 |
2 |
124 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
335 |
| Principals Competing for an Agent in the Presence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard |
0 |
1 |
2 |
269 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
459 |
| Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1,316 |
| Random belief equilibrium in normal form games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
137 |
| Rawlsian distributive justice and rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
76 |
| Repeated Nash implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
| Sequential Auctions with Informational Externalities and Aversion to Price Risk: Decreasing and Increasing Price Sequences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
92 |
| Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
97 |
| The Possibility of Efficient Mechanisms for Trading an Indivisible Object |
1 |
1 |
3 |
103 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
201 |
| The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
22 |
| Total Journal Articles |
6 |
15 |
32 |
1,856 |
14 |
34 |
151 |
7,263 |
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