Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
A Theory of Rational Jurisprudence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
547 |
A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
53 |
Auctions in which losers set the price |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
113 |
Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations |
0 |
0 |
2 |
123 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
217 |
Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
152 |
Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
218 |
Common Agency with Horizontally Differentiated Principals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
247 |
Contracting over persistent information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
18 |
Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
301 |
Domestic unionization and import competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
217 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
472 |
Dynamic incentive regulation of diffuse pollution |
1 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
41 |
Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
176 |
Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection By Larry Samuelson. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997. Pp. ix, 309. $40.00 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
Gathering information before signing a contract with a privately informed principal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
181 |
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium |
0 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
133 |
Incentive Auctions and Information Revelation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
310 |
Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions By H. Peyton Young. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998; Pp. xiii, 189. $35.00 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
Intellectual property disclosure as threat |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
73 |
Learning in Games by Random Sampling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
159 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
627 |
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency |
0 |
0 |
1 |
130 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
406 |
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
94 |
Politicians' decision making with re-election concerns |
0 |
1 |
2 |
133 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
356 |
Principals Competing for an Agent in the Presence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard |
0 |
0 |
3 |
279 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
489 |
Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,322 |
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
144 |
Rawlsian distributive justice and rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
Repeated Nash implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
Sequential Auctions with Informational Externalities and Aversion to Price Risk: Decreasing and Increasing Price Sequences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
96 |
Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
109 |
Shuttle diplomacy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
18 |
The Possibility of Efficient Mechanisms for Trading an Indivisible Object |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
203 |
The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
When Walras meets Vickrey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
Total Journal Articles |
1 |
3 |
14 |
1,929 |
9 |
26 |
105 |
7,570 |