| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Partial Identification Approach to Identifying the Determinants of Human Capital Accumulation: An Application to Teachers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
13 |
15 |
36 |
| A Partial Identification Approach to Identifying the Determinants of Human Capital Accumulation: An Application to Teachers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
7 |
13 |
15 |
28 |
| An Economic Approach to Generalize Findings from Regression-Discontinuity Designs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
68 |
| Competition in Public School Districts: Charter School Entry, Student Sorting, and School Input Determination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
240 |
| Competition in Public School Districts: Charter School Entry, Student Sorting, and School Input Determination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
19 |
88 |
| Competition in Public School Districts: Charter School Entry, Student Sorting, and School Input Determination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
4 |
9 |
16 |
152 |
| How social interactions determine input choices and outcomes in equilibrium: Evidence from a model of study time and academic achievement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
75 |
| Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of "Shrinkage" Estimators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
7 |
10 |
33 |
| Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of "Shrinkage" Estimators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
14 |
33 |
| Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of “Shrinkage” Estimators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
21 |
| Optimal Contracting with Altruistic Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
20 |
| Optimal Contracting with Altruistic Agents: A Structural Model of Medicare Payments for Dialysis Drugs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
49 |
| Primary Care Access and Emergency Department Utilization: Theory and Evidence from Canada |
0 |
1 |
1 |
55 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
112 |
| Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence From a Model of Study Time and Academic Achievement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
66 |
| Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence from a Model of Study Time and Academic Achievement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
158 |
| Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence from a Model of Study Time and Academic Achievement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
3 |
15 |
21 |
50 |
| Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence from a Model of Study Time and Academic Achievement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
58 |
| Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence from a Model of Study Time and Academic Achievement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
91 |
| Targeting the Wrong Teachers: Estimating Teacher Quality for Use in Accountability Regimes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
77 |
| Targeting the Wrong Teachers? Linking Measurement with Theory to Evaluate Teacher Incentive Schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
54 |
| The Potential Output Gains from Using Optimal Teacher Incentives: An Illustrative Calibration of a Hidden Action Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
33 |
| The Potential Output Gains from Using Optimal Teacher Incentives: An Illustrative Calibration of a Hidden Action Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
30 |
| The Potential Output Gains from Using Optimal Teacher Incentives: An Illustrative Calibration of a Hidden Action Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
7 |
12 |
33 |
| Time-Use and Academic Peer Effects in College |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
38 |
| Time-Use and Academic Peer Effects in College |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
55 |
| Time-Use and Academic Peer Effects in College |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
60 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
1 |
2 |
635 |
32 |
166 |
282 |
1,758 |
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