| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Partial Identification Approach to Identifying the Determinants of Human Capital Accumulation: An Application to Teachers |
1 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
| A Partial Identification Approach to Identifying the Determinants of Human Capital Accumulation: An Application to Teachers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
| An Economic Approach to Generalize Findings from Regression-Discontinuity Designs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
64 |
| Competition in Public School Districts: Charter School Entry, Student Sorting, and School Input Determination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
72 |
| Competition in Public School Districts: Charter School Entry, Student Sorting, and School Input Determination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
231 |
| Competition in Public School Districts: Charter School Entry, Student Sorting, and School Input Determination |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
137 |
| How social interactions determine input choices and outcomes in equilibrium: Evidence from a model of study time and academic achievement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
| Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of "Shrinkage" Estimators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
21 |
| Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of "Shrinkage" Estimators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
| Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of “Shrinkage” Estimators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
| Optimal Contracting with Altruistic Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
| Optimal Contracting with Altruistic Agents: A Structural Model of Medicare Payments for Dialysis Drugs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
45 |
| Primary Care Access and Emergency Department Utilization: Theory and Evidence from Canada |
0 |
0 |
1 |
54 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
102 |
| Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence From a Model of Study Time and Academic Achievement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
58 |
| Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence from a Model of Study Time and Academic Achievement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
31 |
| Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence from a Model of Study Time and Academic Achievement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
48 |
| Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence from a Model of Study Time and Academic Achievement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
149 |
| Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence from a Model of Study Time and Academic Achievement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
82 |
| Targeting the Wrong Teachers: Estimating Teacher Quality for Use in Accountability Regimes |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
73 |
| Targeting the Wrong Teachers? Linking Measurement with Theory to Evaluate Teacher Incentive Schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
| The Potential Output Gains from Using Optimal Teacher Incentives: An Illustrative Calibration of a Hidden Action Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
22 |
| The Potential Output Gains from Using Optimal Teacher Incentives: An Illustrative Calibration of a Hidden Action Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
| The Potential Output Gains from Using Optimal Teacher Incentives: An Illustrative Calibration of a Hidden Action Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
25 |
| Time-Use and Academic Peer Effects in College |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
53 |
| Time-Use and Academic Peer Effects in College |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
29 |
| Time-Use and Academic Peer Effects in College |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
49 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
1 |
6 |
634 |
9 |
19 |
55 |
1,505 |
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