| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Model of Private Equity Fund Compensation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
131 |
| A Revealed Preference Ranking of U.S. Colleges and Universities |
0 |
0 |
1 |
969 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
2,783 |
| Banking-Crisis Interventions Across Time and Space |
0 |
1 |
2 |
96 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
115 |
| Bayesian Performance Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
376 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
1,481 |
| Conflicts and Choices in Biodiversity Preservation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,442 |
| Consumption-Wealth Comovement of the Wrong Sign |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
4 |
4 |
5 |
286 |
| Corporate Governance and Equity Prices |
0 |
2 |
4 |
781 |
1 |
7 |
24 |
1,816 |
| Corporate Governance and Equity Prices |
2 |
4 |
6 |
1,429 |
7 |
11 |
37 |
4,239 |
| Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, and the Path of Least Resistance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
200 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
1,166 |
| Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, and the Path of Least Resistance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
193 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
1,248 |
| Does the Internet Increase Trading? Evidence from Investor Behavior in 401(K) Plans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
239 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
675 |
| Does the Internet Increase Trading? Evidence from Investor Behavior in 401(k) Plans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
256 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
1,057 |
| Employees' Investment Decisions about Company Stock |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
505 |
| Estimating the Returns to Insider Trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
395 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
1,179 |
| For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
215 |
1 |
9 |
16 |
904 |
| For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
215 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
1,456 |
| Getting up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-Reader's Guide |
1 |
1 |
3 |
435 |
4 |
5 |
12 |
899 |
| Haircuts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
172 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
388 |
| Haircuts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
| How Are Large Institutions Different from Other Investors? Why Do These Differences Matter? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
2,128 |
| Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class Companies |
1 |
1 |
1 |
332 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
935 |
| Institutional Investors and Equity Prices |
1 |
1 |
2 |
579 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
2,373 |
| Institutional Investors and Equity Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
375 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
944 |
| Large Blocks of Stock: Prevalence, Size, and Measurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
137 |
| Large Blocks of Stock: Prevalence, Size, and Measurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
456 |
| Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
4 |
5 |
11 |
487 |
| Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
157 |
| Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
229 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
1,093 |
| Passive Decisions and Potent Defaults |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
374 |
| Patterns of behavior in biodiversity preservation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
444 |
| Performance Evaluation with Transactions Data: The Stock Selection of Investment Newsletters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
246 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,655 |
| Price Versus Quanitity: Market Cleaning Mechanisms When Sellers Differ in Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1,283 |
| Price versus Quantity: Market Clearing Mechanisms When Sellers Differ in Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
281 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
1,808 |
| Reinforcement Learning and Savings Behavior |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
170 |
| Reinforcement Learning and Savings Behavior |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
10 |
| Reinforcement Learning in Investment Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
195 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
557 |
| Saving or Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
230 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
731 |
| Securitization |
0 |
1 |
4 |
294 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
433 |
| Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo |
3 |
3 |
8 |
964 |
6 |
7 |
25 |
2,911 |
| Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
12 |
20 |
| Should Investors Avoid All Actively Managed Mutual Funds? A Study in Bayesian Performance Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
485 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
1,178 |
| The Equity Performance of Investment Newsletters |
0 |
0 |
1 |
101 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
687 |
| The Federal Reserve and Financial Regulation: The First Hundred Years |
0 |
0 |
0 |
147 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
123 |
| The Flight from Maturity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
125 |
| The March 2023 Bank Interventions in Long-Run Context – Silicon Valley Bank and beyond |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
72 |
| The Profits to Insider Trading: A Performance-Evaluation Perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,132 |
| The Profits to Insider Trading: A Performance-Evaluation Perspective |
0 |
1 |
1 |
532 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
1,906 |
| The Run on Repo and the Fed's Response |
0 |
0 |
2 |
71 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
118 |
| The Safe-Asset Share |
0 |
2 |
3 |
80 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
200 |
| Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A Survey |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
56 |
| Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A Survey |
1 |
1 |
4 |
221 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
443 |
| Who Ran on Repo? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
113 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
197 |
| Total Working Papers |
11 |
21 |
57 |
12,204 |
83 |
148 |
402 |
47,124 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Natural Experiment in "Jeopardy!" |
0 |
0 |
1 |
348 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
988 |
| A Revealed Preference Ranking of U.S. Colleges and Universities |
0 |
2 |
11 |
439 |
1 |
8 |
41 |
1,468 |
| A Special Project: Inside the CDO Machine |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
| Account Guarantee Survey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Bank Debt Guarantee Programs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
| Basel III A: Regulatory History |
0 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
29 |
| Basel III B: Basel III Overview |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
27 |
| Basel III C: Internal Risk Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
| Basel III D: Swiss Finish to Basel III |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
43 |
| Basel III E: Synthetic Financing by Prime Brokers |
2 |
3 |
8 |
15 |
5 |
11 |
29 |
66 |
| Basel III F: Callable Commercial Paper |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
22 |
| Basel III G: Shadow Banking and Project Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
| Blanket Guarantees Survey |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
12 |
12 |
20 |
| Broad-Based Asset Management Programs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
| Broad-Based Capital Injection Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
| Broad-Based Emergency Liquidity Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
| Central Bank Foreign Currency Swaps and Repo Facilities Survey |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
| Conflicts and Choices in Biodiversity Preservation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
477 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
1,147 |
| Congruent Financial Regulation |
2 |
3 |
7 |
11 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
18 |
| Corporate Governance and Equity Prices |
4 |
6 |
26 |
398 |
13 |
23 |
112 |
1,431 |
| Correspondence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
67 |
| Editors' Note: Fighting the COVID-19 Pandemic Financial Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
| Entérese rápidamente de la crisis financiera: guía de lectura para un fin de semana |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
107 |
| Estimating the Returns to Insider Trading: A Performance-Evaluation Perspective |
3 |
12 |
50 |
463 |
14 |
44 |
175 |
1,533 |
| European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
| European Banking Union B: The Single Resolution Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
| European Banking Union C: Cross-Border Resolution-Fortis Group |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
19 |
| European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution--Dexia Group |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
| European Central Bank Tools and Policy Actions A: Open Market Operations, Collateral Expansion and Standing Facilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
| European Central Bank Tools and Policy Actions B: Asset Purchase Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
| Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States |
1 |
3 |
11 |
210 |
1 |
10 |
42 |
592 |
| Fictitious Play in 2 x 2 Games: A Geometric Proof of Convergence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
349 |
| Getting Up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-Reader's Guide |
0 |
2 |
6 |
426 |
1 |
6 |
26 |
1,117 |
| Guarantees and Capital Infusions in Response to Financial Crises A: Haircuts and Resolutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
| Guarantees and Capital Infusions in Response to Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During the Global Financial Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
| Haircuts |
0 |
0 |
3 |
147 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
539 |
| How does the Internet affect trading? Evidence from investor behavior in 401(k) plans |
0 |
2 |
2 |
121 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
492 |
| Institutional Investors and Equity Prices |
1 |
2 |
4 |
667 |
4 |
9 |
27 |
2,019 |
| Ireland and Iceland in Crisis A: Increasing Risk in Ireland |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| Ireland and Iceland in Crisis B: Decreasing Loan Loss Provisions in Ireland |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
| Ireland and Iceland in Crisis C: Iceland's Landsbanki Icesave |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
14 |
| Ireland and Iceland in Crisis D: Similarities and Differences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
| Irreversible Investment and Strategic Interaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
107 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale A: Risky Business |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale B: Derivatives Valuation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, and Models |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
19 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale D: Risk-Management Practices |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
4 |
8 |
13 |
30 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale E: Supervisory Oversight |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale Z: Background & Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
| Large blocks of stock: Prevalence, size, and measurement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
144 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
524 |
| Lessons Learned: A Conversation with Paul A. Volcker |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
| Lessons Learned: Ray Dalio |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| March madness? Strategic behavior in NCAA basketball tournament betting pools |
0 |
1 |
4 |
261 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
1,516 |
| Market Liquidity Programs: GFC and Before |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Market Support Programs: COVID-19 Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
| Optimal Defaults |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
365 |
| Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions |
0 |
1 |
8 |
113 |
2 |
4 |
25 |
517 |
| Patterns of Behavior in Endangered Species Preservation |
0 |
0 |
4 |
33 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
193 |
| Performance Evaluation with Transactions Data: The Stock Selection of Investment Newsletters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
305 |
| Price versus Quantity: Market-Clearing Mechanisms When Consumers Are Uncertain about Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
241 |
| Regulating the Shadow Banking System |
0 |
0 |
6 |
476 |
2 |
4 |
23 |
1,654 |
| Regulatory Reform |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
38 |
| Reinforcement Learning and Savings Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
249 |
| Reserve Requirements Survey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
| Restructuring and Forgiveness in Financial Crises A: The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-95 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
| Restructuring and Forgiveness in Financial Crises B: The Asian Crisis of 1997 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
| Restructuring and Forgiveness in Financial Crises C: The Swedish Banking Crisis of 1990-94 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| Restructuring and Forgiveness in Financial Crises D: The Japanese Financial Crisis of the 1990s |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Securitized banking and the run on repo |
7 |
15 |
65 |
1,082 |
31 |
66 |
248 |
3,316 |
| Should Investors Avoid All Actively Managed Mutual Funds? A Study in Bayesian Performance Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
3 |
79 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
368 |
| Stress Tests and Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| Survey of Resolution and Restructuring in Europe: Pre- and Post-BRRD |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
16 |
| The Economics of Private Equity Funds |
1 |
5 |
9 |
189 |
5 |
14 |
29 |
677 |
| The Failure of Silicon Valley Bank and the Panic of 2023 |
4 |
10 |
16 |
27 |
9 |
22 |
53 |
96 |
| The Federal Reserve and Panic Prevention: The Roles of Financial Regulation and Lender of Last Resort |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
267 |
| The Federal Reserve's Financial Crisis Response A: Lending & Credit Programs for Depository Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
| The Federal Reserve's Financial Crisis Response B: Lending & Credit Programs For Primary Dealers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| The Federal Reserve's Financial Crisis Response C: Providing U.S. Dollars to Foreign Central Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
| The Federal Reserve's Financial Crisis Response D: Commercial Paper Market Facilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
| The Federal Reserve's Financial Crisis Response E: The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview |
0 |
0 |
5 |
26 |
1 |
6 |
24 |
125 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy B: Risk Limits and Stress Tests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy C: Managing the Balance Sheet Through the Use of Repo 105 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
14 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy D: The Role of Ernst & Young |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
25 |
54 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E: The Effects on Lehman's U.S. Broker-Dealer |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy F: Introduction to the ISDA Master Agreement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy G: The Special Case of Derivatives |
3 |
4 |
7 |
13 |
4 |
8 |
18 |
43 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy H: The Global Contagion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
24 |
| The Rescue of American International Group Module Z: Overview |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
| The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - Module Z: Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module Z:Overview |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
14 |
| The Safe-Asset Share |
0 |
0 |
1 |
161 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
673 |
| The flight from maturity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
73 |
| The run on repo and the Fed’s response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
64 |
| Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: a Survey |
0 |
0 |
6 |
28 |
3 |
6 |
26 |
137 |
| Who Ran on Repo? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
40 |
| Total Journal Articles |
29 |
78 |
304 |
6,905 |
166 |
369 |
1,310 |
24,226 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.