| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Natural Experiment in "Jeopardy!" |
0 |
0 |
3 |
348 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
988 |
| A Revealed Preference Ranking of U.S. Colleges and Universities |
1 |
4 |
14 |
437 |
4 |
12 |
54 |
1,460 |
| A Special Project: Inside the CDO Machine |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
| Account Guarantee Survey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Bank Debt Guarantee Programs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
| Basel III A: Regulatory History |
0 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
25 |
| Basel III B: Basel III Overview |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
27 |
| Basel III C: Internal Risk Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| Basel III D: Swiss Finish to Basel III |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
43 |
| Basel III E: Synthetic Financing by Prime Brokers |
1 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
3 |
5 |
27 |
55 |
| Basel III F: Callable Commercial Paper |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
21 |
| Basel III G: Shadow Banking and Project Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| Blanket Guarantees Survey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| Broad-Based Asset Management Programs |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
| Broad-Based Capital Injection Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
| Broad-Based Emergency Liquidity Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
| Central Bank Foreign Currency Swaps and Repo Facilities Survey |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
| Conflicts and Choices in Biodiversity Preservation |
1 |
1 |
1 |
477 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
1,146 |
| Congruent Financial Regulation |
0 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
14 |
| Corporate Governance and Equity Prices |
1 |
5 |
27 |
392 |
4 |
26 |
126 |
1,408 |
| Correspondence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
67 |
| Editors' Note: Fighting the COVID-19 Pandemic Financial Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| Entérese rápidamente de la crisis financiera: guía de lectura para un fin de semana |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
105 |
| Estimating the Returns to Insider Trading: A Performance-Evaluation Perspective |
7 |
12 |
46 |
451 |
15 |
42 |
165 |
1,489 |
| European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
| European Banking Union B: The Single Resolution Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
12 |
| European Banking Union C: Cross-Border Resolution-Fortis Group |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
18 |
| European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution--Dexia Group |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
| European Central Bank Tools and Policy Actions A: Open Market Operations, Collateral Expansion and Standing Facilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
| European Central Bank Tools and Policy Actions B: Asset Purchase Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States |
1 |
3 |
9 |
207 |
4 |
14 |
39 |
582 |
| Fictitious Play in 2 x 2 Games: A Geometric Proof of Convergence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
345 |
| Getting Up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-Reader's Guide |
0 |
0 |
6 |
424 |
0 |
4 |
27 |
1,111 |
| Guarantees and Capital Infusions in Response to Financial Crises A: Haircuts and Resolutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
| Guarantees and Capital Infusions in Response to Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During the Global Financial Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| Haircuts |
0 |
0 |
4 |
147 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
539 |
| How does the Internet affect trading? Evidence from investor behavior in 401(k) plans |
0 |
0 |
1 |
119 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
490 |
| Institutional Investors and Equity Prices |
0 |
0 |
2 |
665 |
2 |
5 |
24 |
2,010 |
| Ireland and Iceland in Crisis A: Increasing Risk in Ireland |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Ireland and Iceland in Crisis B: Decreasing Loan Loss Provisions in Ireland |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
| Ireland and Iceland in Crisis C: Iceland's Landsbanki Icesave |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
| Ireland and Iceland in Crisis D: Similarities and Differences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
| Irreversible Investment and Strategic Interaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
107 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale A: Risky Business |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale B: Derivatives Valuation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, and Models |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
17 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale D: Risk-Management Practices |
0 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
22 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale E: Supervisory Oversight |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
| JPMorgan Chase London Whale Z: Background & Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
20 |
| Large blocks of stock: Prevalence, size, and measurement |
0 |
1 |
1 |
144 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
522 |
| Lessons Learned: A Conversation with Paul A. Volcker |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| Lessons Learned: Ray Dalio |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
| March madness? Strategic behavior in NCAA basketball tournament betting pools |
0 |
0 |
3 |
260 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1,514 |
| Market Liquidity Programs: GFC and Before |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Market Support Programs: COVID-19 Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
| Optimal Defaults |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
360 |
| Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions |
0 |
0 |
8 |
112 |
3 |
5 |
23 |
513 |
| Patterns of Behavior in Endangered Species Preservation |
1 |
1 |
5 |
33 |
1 |
5 |
19 |
191 |
| Performance Evaluation with Transactions Data: The Stock Selection of Investment Newsletters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
303 |
| Price versus Quantity: Market-Clearing Mechanisms When Consumers Are Uncertain about Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
240 |
| Regulating the Shadow Banking System |
1 |
3 |
8 |
476 |
3 |
8 |
27 |
1,650 |
| Regulatory Reform |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
37 |
| Reinforcement Learning and Savings Behavior |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
248 |
| Reserve Requirements Survey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
| Restructuring and Forgiveness in Financial Crises A: The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-95 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| Restructuring and Forgiveness in Financial Crises B: The Asian Crisis of 1997 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| Restructuring and Forgiveness in Financial Crises C: The Swedish Banking Crisis of 1990-94 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| Restructuring and Forgiveness in Financial Crises D: The Japanese Financial Crisis of the 1990s |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Securitized banking and the run on repo |
5 |
12 |
67 |
1,067 |
11 |
55 |
233 |
3,250 |
| Should Investors Avoid All Actively Managed Mutual Funds? A Study in Bayesian Performance Evaluation |
1 |
1 |
4 |
79 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
366 |
| Stress Tests and Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
| Survey of Resolution and Restructuring in Europe: Pre- and Post-BRRD |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
14 |
| The Economics of Private Equity Funds |
0 |
1 |
6 |
184 |
3 |
5 |
22 |
663 |
| The Failure of Silicon Valley Bank and the Panic of 2023 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
17 |
2 |
5 |
43 |
74 |
| The Federal Reserve and Panic Prevention: The Roles of Financial Regulation and Lender of Last Resort |
0 |
0 |
1 |
59 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
266 |
| The Federal Reserve's Financial Crisis Response A: Lending & Credit Programs for Depository Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
| The Federal Reserve's Financial Crisis Response B: Lending & Credit Programs For Primary Dealers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| The Federal Reserve's Financial Crisis Response C: Providing U.S. Dollars to Foreign Central Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
| The Federal Reserve's Financial Crisis Response D: Commercial Paper Market Facilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| The Federal Reserve's Financial Crisis Response E: The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview |
1 |
1 |
11 |
26 |
1 |
2 |
31 |
119 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy B: Risk Limits and Stress Tests |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy C: Managing the Balance Sheet Through the Use of Repo 105 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
12 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy D: The Role of Ernst & Young |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
27 |
49 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E: The Effects on Lehman's U.S. Broker-Dealer |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy F: Introduction to the ISDA Master Agreement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy G: The Special Case of Derivatives |
0 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
35 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy H: The Global Contagion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
22 |
| The Rescue of American International Group Module Z: Overview |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
| The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - Module Z: Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module Z:Overview |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
14 |
| The Safe-Asset Share |
0 |
0 |
2 |
161 |
3 |
5 |
15 |
669 |
| The economics of private equity funds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
252 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
748 |
| The flight from maturity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
| The run on repo and the Fed’s response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
63 |
| Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: a Survey |
0 |
1 |
7 |
28 |
3 |
9 |
26 |
131 |
| Who Ran on Repo? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
39 |
| Total Journal Articles |
23 |
57 |
295 |
7,079 |
98 |
287 |
1,235 |
24,605 |
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