Access Statistics for Debasis Mishra

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Characterization of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 21
A Characterization of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
A Characterization of the average tree solution for tree games 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
A Foundation for Dominant Strategy Voting Mechanisms 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 27
A Foundation for dominant strategy voting mechanisms 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 13
A characterization of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 15
Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations 0 0 0 30 0 1 2 182
Balanced ranking mechanisms 0 0 1 2 0 1 5 33
Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 20
Characterization of the walrasian equilibria of the assignment model 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 7
Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms 0 0 1 26 0 0 1 63
Continuity and incentive compatibility 0 0 1 16 0 0 1 38
Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem 0 0 0 40 1 1 3 187
Deterministic single object auctions with private values 0 1 1 3 0 1 3 9
Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 17
Implementation in multidimensional domains with ordinal restrictions 0 0 0 5 0 2 3 16
Implementation with Securities 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 108
Implementation with contingent contracts 0 0 1 3 0 3 8 31
Implementation with securities 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 10
Local incentive compatibility with transfers 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 17
Mechanism design for multiple item procurement using a distributed ellipsoid algorithm 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 71
Mechanism design with two alternatives in Quasi-linear environment 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 10
Mechanism design without quasilinearity 0 0 0 65 0 0 0 100
Mechanism design without quasilinearity 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 17
Minimum Cost Arborescences 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 20
Minimum Cost Arborescences 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 206
Minimum cost arborescences 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9
Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 8
Optimal mechanisms for single machine scheduling 0 0 0 37 0 0 1 114
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model 1 1 1 25 1 1 3 100
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model 0 0 0 9 0 1 3 25
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 17
Overdemand and Underdemand in Economies with Indivisible Goods and Unit Demands 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 128
Overdemand and Underdemand in Economies with Indivisible Goods and Unit Demands 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6
Overdemand and underdemand in economies with indivisible goods and unit demand 0 0 0 2 1 1 4 34
Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 24
Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity 0 0 0 14 0 1 2 23
Roberts' theorem with neutrality: A Social welfare ordering approach 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 9
Selling Two Identical Objects 0 0 0 15 0 2 2 26
Selling Two Identical Objects 1 1 1 23 2 5 9 72
Selling to a naive agent with two rationales 0 0 0 12 1 1 3 42
Separability and aggregation of equivalence relations 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6
Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage 0 0 0 12 0 0 5 39
Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 15
Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences 0 0 0 15 0 2 2 26
Strategy-proof partitioning 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8
Total Working Papers 2 3 7 497 6 23 82 1,979
18 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games 0 0 0 12 1 1 1 53
A simple budget-balanced mechanism 0 0 0 3 0 3 3 38
Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations 0 0 0 42 0 0 7 165
Balanced ranking mechanisms 0 0 1 5 0 0 4 145
Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model 1 1 2 41 2 2 5 145
Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms 1 3 3 10 1 6 6 47
Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem 0 0 0 18 0 0 1 128
Descending price multi-item auctions 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 392
Implementation With Contingent Contracts 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 60
Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains 0 0 0 10 0 1 5 140
Local incentive compatibility with transfers 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 31
Mechanism design and incentive compatibility 0 0 0 21 0 0 3 75
Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 40
Mechanism design without quasilinearity 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 72
Minimum cost arborescences 0 0 0 14 1 1 1 56
Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions 0 0 0 38 0 1 2 155
Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 66
Non-bossy single object auctions 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 21
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains 0 0 0 11 2 2 3 49
Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 66
Separability and aggregation of equivalence relations 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 49
Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 41
Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 40
Strategy-proof partitioning 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 39
The characterization of affine maximizers on restricted domains with two alternatives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items 0 0 0 16 0 1 1 71
Total Journal Articles 2 4 6 335 9 21 55 2,197
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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Statistics updated 2025-03-03