Access Statistics for Enrico Minelli

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on the incentive compatible core 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 138
A note on the incentive compatible core 0 0 1 5 0 0 3 14
Afriat's Theorem for General Budget Sets 0 0 1 97 0 0 3 302
Afriat's theorem for generalized budget sets 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 47
Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets 0 0 2 156 1 2 20 895
Arbitrage and equilibrium with exchangeable risks 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 409
Aspiration Traps 0 0 0 90 0 0 7 344
Competitive Markets with Private Information on Both Sides 0 0 0 28 0 0 2 122
Corrigendum to “Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations” 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 16
Credit Market Failures and Policy 0 0 1 83 0 2 11 316
Credit market failures and policy 0 0 1 28 0 0 1 84
Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 360
Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economies 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 274
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 109
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 12
Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey 0 0 0 221 0 0 5 633
Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey 0 0 1 46 0 0 2 158
Information at a Competitive Equilibrium 0 0 1 8 0 0 4 449
Information at equilibrium 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 198
Informational Smallness in Rational Expectations Equilibria 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 248
Informational Smallness in Rational Expectations Equilibria 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 297
Knowledge at Equilibrium 0 0 0 6 0 1 1 122
Liberal parentalism 0 0 2 13 0 0 4 28
Liberal parentalism 0 0 1 12 2 2 27 50
Markets and Contracts 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 151
Markets and contracts 0 0 0 93 1 1 6 206
Nash-Walras equilibria of a large economy 0 0 0 24 1 1 2 418
Nash-walras Equilibria of a Large Economy 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 18
Production and Financial Policies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 174
Production and financial policies under asymmetric information 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 121
Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 407
Rules transparency and political accountability 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 14
Rules transparency and political accountability 0 0 0 176 0 0 1 559
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 668
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations 0 0 0 8 0 1 5 76
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 319
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 0 1 1 4 0 2 4 45
Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 126
Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 265
Shareholder-efficient production plans in a multi-period economy 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 58
Shareholder-efficient production plans in a multi-period economy 0 0 0 8 0 0 4 42
Shareholder-efficient production plans in a multi-period economy 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 22
Shareholder-efficient production plans in a multi-period economy 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 207
Shareholder-efficient production plans in multi-period economy 0 0 1 29 0 0 2 158
Stock Prices, Anticipations and Investment in General Equilibrium 0 0 0 11 0 0 4 80
Stock prices, anticipations and investment in general equilibrium 0 0 0 58 0 0 2 172
Trade and Welfare 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 221
Trade and welfare 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
Two remarks on the inner core 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 15
Two remarks on the inner core 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 55
Two-person bargaining with verifiable information 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 55
Two-person bargaining with verifiable information 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 12
Total Working Papers 1 2 15 1,448 6 15 202 10,305

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Francesco Ferrara's Cost of Reproduction 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 25
A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 83
A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 39 0 0 4 93
AN ECONOMIC THEORISTS' READING OF SIMONE WEIL* 0 1 1 15 1 3 7 59
Afriat's theorem for general budget sets 0 0 2 93 1 3 13 296
Aspiration Traps 0 0 0 8 3 3 9 86
Competitive markets with private information on both sides 0 0 0 13 0 0 4 52
Consumer Theory and Axiomatics: A Note on an Early Contribution by Luigi Amoroso 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 11
Credit Market Failures and Policy 0 0 1 40 0 0 4 112
Efficienza delle regole e responsabilizzazione dei politici 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 32
Flourishing as Productive Tension: Theory and Model 0 0 2 2 0 0 5 6
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies 1 1 1 31 1 1 3 225
Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey 1 1 2 73 1 1 6 213
Information at equilibrium 0 0 0 46 0 1 4 201
Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 71
Liberal parentalism 0 0 1 1 0 0 5 5
Markets and contracts 0 1 2 20 0 2 5 103
Merit and rent in a growing economy 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 40
Production and financial policies under asymmetric information 0 0 0 45 0 1 7 139
Rules transparency and political accountability 0 0 2 67 0 2 12 196
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations 0 0 1 48 0 2 4 146
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games 0 0 0 24 0 0 4 112
Two remarks on the inner core 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 125
Two-person bargaining with verifiable information 0 0 0 24 0 1 1 89
Total Journal Articles 2 4 16 669 7 21 103 2,520

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 6
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 6

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2022-06-07