| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras |
0 |
0 |
0 |
198 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
1,052 |
| Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability |
0 |
2 |
3 |
911 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
3,251 |
| Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
439 |
| Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators |
0 |
0 |
6 |
608 |
16 |
27 |
71 |
2,823 |
| Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
293 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
1,695 |
| Characterizing the Borda ranking rule for a fixed population |
0 |
0 |
4 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
52 |
| Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
442 |
| Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core |
0 |
3 |
7 |
203 |
2 |
7 |
31 |
913 |
| Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
774 |
| Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
202 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
992 |
| Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
437 |
| Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
163 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
600 |
| The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games |
1 |
2 |
7 |
204 |
6 |
14 |
69 |
1,115 |
| The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma |
1 |
1 |
2 |
219 |
6 |
8 |
45 |
968 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
8 |
29 |
3,320 |
34 |
69 |
292 |
15,553 |
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