| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory Of Discrimination Based On Signalling And Strategic Information Acquisition |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
306 |
| A Theory of Discrimination Based on Signaling and Strategic Information Acquisition |
0 |
0 |
1 |
146 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
440 |
| Activism, Separation of Powers and Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
47 |
| COVID lockdown, how people managed and impact of welfare schemes on informal sector workers: Evidence from Delhi slums |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
45 |
| Corruption and Competition in the Presence of Inequality and Market Imperfections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
71 |
| Corruption and Competition in the Presence of Inequality and Market Imperfections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
225 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
612 |
| Corruption and Hold-Up: The Role of Intermediaries |
1 |
1 |
2 |
38 |
2 |
6 |
34 |
121 |
| Corruption: A Review |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
179 |
| Do Debtor-favored Contracts Necessarily Benefit The Debtor? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
38 |
| Does Higher Inequality Lead to Conflict? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
58 |
| Does Inequality Lead to Conflict? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
150 |
| Does Inequality lead to Conflict? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
106 |
| Does it matter who extorts? Extortion by competent and incompetent enforcers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
22 |
44 |
| Enforcement And Efficiency In A Model With Corruption |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
25 |
| Group Inequality and Conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
115 |
| HIERARCHIES, INCENTIVES AND COLLUSION IN A MODEL OF ENFORCEMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
35 |
| HIERARCHIES, INCENTIVES AND COLLUSION IN MODEL OF ENFORCEMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
52 |
| Hierarchies, Incentives And Collusion In A Model Of Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
63 |
| High-powered incentives and communication failure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
77 |
| Identifying the Vulnerable: Concepts and Measurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
59 |
| Identifying the Vulnerable: Concepts and Measurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
25 |
| Incentives, Norms and the Persistence of Corruption |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
50 |
| Inequality, Corruption, and Competition in the Presence of Market Imperfections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
115 |
| Inequality, Corruption, and Competition in the Presence of Market Imperfections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
135 |
| Informality, Corruption, and Inequality |
0 |
1 |
1 |
92 |
6 |
10 |
26 |
338 |
| Measuring Vulnerability Using the Counting Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
52 |
| Measuring Vulnerability to Poverty: A Unified Framework |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
32 |
| On Measuring Vulnerability to Poverty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
152 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
445 |
| On Measuring Vulnerability to Poverty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
52 |
| Optimal Enforcement Policies Under the Threat of Collusion and Extortion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
121 |
| Preemptive Bribery with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
53 |
| Provider Incentives and Delivery of Developmental Goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
41 |
| Separation of Powers and Activism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
26 |
| Trust and Public Policy: Lessons from the Pandemic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
38 |
| What sustains informality?: A study of the interactions between formal- and informal-sector firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
57 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
2 |
6 |
1,169 |
14 |
80 |
386 |
4,223 |
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