Access Statistics for Benny Moldovanu

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Nazi 'Killer' Amendment 0 0 0 18 2 4 6 40
A Nazi †Killer†Amendment 0 0 0 27 0 3 6 57
A Note on Revenue Maximization and Efficiency in Multi-Object Auctions 0 0 0 199 0 0 2 1,134
A Stylized Model of the German UMTS Auction 0 0 0 141 0 1 1 469
A Theory of Auctions With Endogenous Valuations 0 1 2 15 0 5 8 58
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations 0 0 0 26 1 2 2 27
A note on revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 28
A stylized model of the German UMTS auction 0 0 0 4 2 2 2 22
Abortions, Brexit and Trees 0 0 0 7 0 2 3 33
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 2 118 0 1 8 448
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 115 0 4 5 355
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 62 5 8 8 232
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 90 0 2 4 239
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 132 2 4 5 502
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 21
Auctions with Downstream Interaction 0 0 0 29 2 2 4 204
Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 467
Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation Revisited 0 0 0 56 1 2 2 140
Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps 0 0 0 70 1 1 1 321
Bid costs and endogenous bid caps 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 34
Brexit: Dynamic Voting with an Irreversible Option 0 0 0 12 0 1 2 17
CONTESTS FOR STATUS 0 1 1 2 2 6 7 51
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 12 0 2 4 150
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 58 0 2 2 243
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 41 4 4 8 234
Coarse Matching and Price Discrimination 0 0 0 121 0 0 1 362
Contest Architecture 0 0 0 115 2 4 5 766
Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu) 0 0 0 125 1 2 3 479
Contest architecture 0 0 0 5 3 5 7 37
Contests for Status 0 0 0 106 1 4 7 331
Dynamic Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 88 2 3 5 169
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 98 13 16 18 693
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 220 1 1 1 779
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 0 1 8 8 580
Efficient design with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 5 0 4 4 51
Ex-post Implementation with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 82 0 1 3 234
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 57
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 14
Ex-post implementation with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 10
Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications 0 0 3 19 4 6 13 77
Goethe 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 604
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 2 0 3 3 32
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 183 1 4 5 859
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 341 0 1 3 1,192
License auctions and market structure 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 31
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 1 92 2 3 12 333
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 7 8 12
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 63 79 152 322 656
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 49 1 5 147 407
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 50
Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 18
Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting 0 0 0 5 1 2 2 16
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 34
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 849
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation 0 0 0 50 0 3 7 220
Optimal Mechanism Design without Money 0 0 4 172 2 4 16 447
Optimal Search, Learning and Implementation 0 0 0 43 2 7 11 118
Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments 0 0 0 117 5 8 9 462
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 0 43 11 11 12 87
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 0 91 0 0 2 158
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 68
Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 613
Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade 0 0 0 143 2 7 9 508
Partnerships, lemons and efficient trade 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 43
Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors 0 0 0 0 5 8 8 19
Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 333
Posterior Implementation Versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 20 3 4 6 135
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 60 0 0 1 165
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 8
Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines that Depend on Processing Time 0 0 0 67 2 5 7 383
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 530
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 71 3 4 6 535
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 0 4 4 5 22
Revenue Maximization in the Dynamic Knapsack Problem 0 0 0 30 0 1 3 241
Search Committees 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 80
The Art of Compromising: Voting with Interdependent Values and the Flag of the Weimar Republic 0 0 0 17 2 3 6 52
The Dimensions of Consensus 0 0 0 20 1 2 5 64
The Dynamic Assignment of Heterogenous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 57 0 2 2 184
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 Licence Auctions 0 0 0 168 1 1 3 720
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 License Auctions 0 0 0 370 2 3 4 1,123
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 license auctions 1 1 1 1 2 5 6 32
The Feedback Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 29 0 0 3 83
The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory 0 0 0 88 0 2 2 369
The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory 0 0 0 210 0 2 3 801
The German UMTS design: insights from multi-object auction theory 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 10
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 16 21 24 61
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 104 1 1 3 335
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 24 2 2 3 213
The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets With Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 46
The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 29 1 2 4 54
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 0 0 0 280 1 3 8 986
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 97 1 3 4 362
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 151 1 3 7 474
The Trade-off Between Fast Learning and Dynamic Efficiency 0 0 0 6 2 4 6 44
The multiplier effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 0 0 12 0 2 3 22
The multiplier effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 0 0 13 0 2 3 31
The optimal allocation of prizes in contests 0 0 0 9 2 8 11 104
Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honour of Reinhard Selten 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 10
Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice 0 0 0 24 1 2 6 38
Voting on Multiple Issues: What to Put on the Ballot? 0 0 0 30 3 5 7 70
William Vickrey und die Auktionstheorie - Anmerkungen zum Nobelpreis 1996 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 962
Total Working Papers 1 3 14 5,672 234 477 966 27,720
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on a Theorem of Aumann and Dreze [Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures] 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 191
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations 0 0 3 19 2 5 16 104
A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions 0 0 1 237 1 6 9 908
Abstimmungen im Bundestag und in der Weimarer Republik: Gewissen oder Strategie? 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 16
An economic perspective on auctions 0 0 0 89 0 0 3 289
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 49 0 1 5 171
Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among Buyers 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 382
Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps 0 0 0 1 3 7 9 284
Book reviews 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 27
Book reviews 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 34
CARROTS AND STICKS: PRIZES AND PUNISHMENTS IN CONTESTS 0 0 0 16 3 4 6 128
Coalition-proof nash equilibria and the core in three-player games 0 0 1 116 6 8 10 294
Coarse matching with incomplete information 1 1 1 31 4 8 10 118
Competing auctions with endogenous quantities 0 0 0 48 2 5 9 203
Content-Based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting 0 0 0 11 2 5 14 150
Contest architecture 0 0 0 154 0 3 7 472
Contests for Status 0 0 1 236 2 6 10 723
Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation 0 0 0 33 3 3 8 119
Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities 0 0 0 60 1 1 6 216
Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 94 1 10 13 313
Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach 0 0 0 85 0 4 7 242
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 2 1 5 7 594
Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information 0 0 0 30 0 0 6 124
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 32 2 5 6 111
Goethe's Second-Price Auction 0 1 1 157 1 4 8 395
How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons 0 1 4 589 1 8 18 2,210
How to Dissolve a Partnership 0 0 0 8 0 2 3 1,510
Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency 0 0 0 71 1 6 11 329
License Auctions and Market Structure 1 1 1 121 1 2 6 313
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 13 1 3 5 67
Mixed bundling auctions 0 0 0 64 0 2 11 210
Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting 0 0 0 0 16 16 20 29
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 2 304 3 4 11 627
Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation 0 0 1 118 0 0 3 551
Non-Bayesian optimal search and dynamic implementation 0 0 0 9 1 2 4 85
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation 0 0 0 21 1 3 6 134
On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching 0 0 0 8 0 2 6 126
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 0 32 1 4 10 174
Optimal search, learning and implementation 0 0 1 24 2 2 4 91
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments 0 0 0 18 2 4 5 103
Order Independent Equilibria 0 0 0 57 0 0 1 161
Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade 0 0 1 88 0 0 4 249
Patent licensing to Bertrand competitors 0 0 0 53 1 2 3 155
Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation 0 0 0 22 1 2 4 86
Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities 0 0 1 17 0 1 4 65
Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time 0 0 0 7 3 5 8 57
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 88 0 2 6 639
Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem 0 0 0 42 0 0 3 267
Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand 1 1 1 2 3 4 9 22
Reviews and Comments 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 37
Specialization and partisanship in committee search 0 0 0 17 1 8 8 132
Stable Bargained Equilibria for Assignment Games without Side Payments 0 0 0 0 3 5 6 82
Strategic Nonparticipation 0 0 0 127 0 0 2 356
The Design of an Efficient Private Industry 0 0 0 22 2 4 7 120
The Limits of ex post Implementation 0 0 0 166 1 1 6 571
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 1 1 6 340 6 12 28 1,132
The Production and Cost-Sharing of an Excludable Public Good 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 231
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 75 3 11 16 289
The failure of a Nazi “killer” amendment 0 0 0 4 2 6 8 43
The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 1 1 5 1 4 6 54
The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good (*) 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 231
Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot? 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 17
William Vickrey und die Auktionstheorie: Anmerkungen zum Nobelpreis 1996 0 0 0 3 0 2 2 15
Total Journal Articles 4 7 27 4,048 95 228 446 18,178

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Statistics updated 2026-01-09