Access Statistics for Benny Moldovanu

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Nazi 'Killer' Amendment 0 0 0 18 0 0 8 43
A Nazi †Killer†Amendment 0 0 0 27 0 1 9 63
A Note on Revenue Maximization and Efficiency in Multi-Object Auctions 0 0 0 199 2 2 9 1,143
A Stylized Model of the German UMTS Auction 0 0 0 141 0 0 12 480
A Theory of Auctions With Endogenous Valuations 0 0 1 15 3 4 15 68
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations 0 0 0 26 0 1 7 32
A note on revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions 0 0 0 2 1 1 10 36
A stylized model of the German UMTS auction 0 0 0 4 0 0 10 30
Abortions, Brexit and Trees 0 0 0 7 0 0 8 39
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 62 0 2 18 242
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 118 2 5 15 461
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 115 0 2 13 364
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 90 1 2 10 247
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 0 1 1 11 29
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 132 0 0 12 510
Auctions with Downstream Interaction 0 0 0 29 0 0 7 209
Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 473
Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation Revisited 0 0 0 56 0 0 8 146
Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps 0 0 0 70 1 1 11 331
Bid costs and endogenous bid caps 0 0 0 4 0 0 6 39
Brexit: Dynamic Voting with an Irreversible Option 0 0 0 12 0 0 7 23
CONTESTS FOR STATUS 1 1 2 3 4 7 25 70
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 41 0 0 14 244
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 12 2 2 10 158
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 58 0 0 14 255
Coarse Matching and Price Discrimination 0 0 0 121 2 3 11 373
Contest Architecture 0 0 0 115 1 1 15 777
Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu) 0 0 0 125 0 0 8 485
Contest architecture 0 0 0 5 2 3 17 49
Contests for Status 0 0 0 106 1 3 14 340
Dynamic Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 88 0 0 8 174
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 98 1 2 35 712
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 586
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 220 0 2 7 785
Efficient design with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 5 1 1 14 61
Ex-post Implementation with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 82 0 0 6 239
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 62
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 17
Ex-post implementation with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 13
Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications 0 0 2 21 4 7 30 101
Goethe 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 609
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 183 1 1 14 869
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 341 1 1 8 1,199
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 2 0 0 13 42
License auctions and market structure 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 38
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 0 4 4 13 16
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 14
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 0 13 13 28 33
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 55
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 63 68 87 570 1,067
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 49 1 1 17 419
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 92 4 5 18 346
Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting 0 0 0 10 1 1 9 26
Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 20
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 0 0 1 1 17 863
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 41
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation 0 0 1 51 0 1 15 230
Optimal Mechanism Design without Money 1 1 1 173 1 1 16 458
Optimal Search, Learning and Implementation 0 0 0 43 0 0 16 127
Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments 0 0 0 117 0 1 21 475
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 0 43 1 3 41 117
Optimal Voting Rules 1 1 1 92 2 3 14 172
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments 0 0 0 0 0 1 29 95
Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade 0 0 0 0 0 2 12 623
Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade 0 0 0 143 0 0 13 514
Partnerships, lemons and efficient trade 0 0 0 8 0 0 5 48
Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 336
Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors 0 0 0 0 1 1 17 28
Posterior Implementation Versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 20 1 2 15 146
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 60 0 0 4 169
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 14
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 27
Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines that Depend on Processing Time 0 0 0 67 0 1 12 390
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 71 1 1 9 540
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 538
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 29
Revenue Maximization in the Dynamic Knapsack Problem 0 0 0 30 1 2 13 252
Search Committees 0 0 0 24 1 1 9 89
The Art of Compromising: Voting with Interdependent Values and the Flag of the Weimar Republic 0 0 0 17 1 2 14 63
The Dimensions of Consensus 0 0 0 20 0 1 10 71
The Dynamic Assignment of Heterogenous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 57 0 0 11 193
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 Licence Auctions 0 0 0 168 1 1 9 727
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 License Auctions 0 0 0 370 1 1 12 1,132
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 license auctions 0 0 1 1 0 0 7 34
The Feedback Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 29 0 2 8 91
The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory 0 0 0 210 0 0 9 808
The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory 0 0 0 88 0 0 8 375
The German UMTS design: insights from multi-object auction theory 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 14
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 1 105 0 0 7 341
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 66
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 24 1 1 11 222
The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets With Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 23 0 0 5 51
The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 29 0 0 5 56
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 0 0 0 280 3 4 20 1,003
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 151 0 1 13 483
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 97 0 1 12 371
The Trade-off Between Fast Learning and Dynamic Efficiency 0 0 0 6 0 0 6 46
The multiplier effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 0 0 12 0 0 9 29
The multiplier effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 0 0 13 0 0 14 43
The optimal allocation of prizes in contests 0 0 1 10 3 5 39 135
Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honour of Reinhard Selten 0 0 0 2 1 1 6 15
Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice 0 0 1 25 1 1 12 47
Voting on Multiple Issues: What to Put on the Ballot? 0 0 0 30 1 1 11 76
William Vickrey und die Auktionstheorie - Anmerkungen zum Nobelpreis 1996 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 967
Total Working Papers 3 3 12 5,681 152 220 1,820 29,042
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on a Theorem of Aumann and Dreze [Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures] 0 0 0 1 1 2 7 197
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations 0 0 0 19 1 3 15 114
A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions 0 0 0 237 0 0 18 920
Abstimmungen im Bundestag und in der Weimarer Republik: Gewissen oder Strategie? 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 18
An economic perspective on auctions 0 0 0 89 0 1 6 295
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 1 1 50 0 1 25 195
Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 387
Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps 0 0 0 1 1 2 23 300
Book reviews 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 37
Book reviews 0 0 0 1 0 0 9 35
CARROTS AND STICKS: PRIZES AND PUNISHMENTS IN CONTESTS 0 0 0 16 1 2 23 147
Coalition-proof nash equilibria and the core in three-player games 0 0 0 116 1 1 16 302
Coarse matching with incomplete information 0 0 2 32 0 0 22 131
Competing auctions with endogenous quantities 0 0 0 48 1 2 13 211
Content-Based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting 0 0 0 11 0 0 20 164
Contest architecture 0 1 2 156 0 2 14 482
Contests for Status 0 0 1 237 0 1 21 738
Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation 0 0 0 33 0 0 7 123
Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities 0 0 0 60 0 1 8 223
Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 94 0 2 20 323
Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach 0 0 0 85 0 1 12 250
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 2 0 0 18 607
Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information 0 0 1 31 0 0 6 130
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 32 1 1 10 116
Goethe's Second-Price Auction 0 0 1 157 0 1 11 402
How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons 0 0 4 591 2 6 29 2,230
How to Dissolve a Partnership 0 0 0 8 0 0 9 1,517
Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency 0 1 1 72 1 2 14 337
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 1 121 0 1 13 323
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 13 0 1 9 73
Mixed bundling auctions 0 0 0 64 2 2 25 233
Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 60
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 0 304 1 3 16 639
Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation 0 0 0 118 0 0 10 561
Non-Bayesian optimal search and dynamic implementation 0 0 0 9 0 1 4 87
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation 0 0 0 21 0 0 7 138
On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching 0 0 0 8 0 1 11 134
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 0 32 0 4 18 188
Optimal search, learning and implementation 0 0 0 24 0 0 11 100
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments 0 0 0 18 1 5 28 127
Order Independent Equilibria 0 0 0 57 0 1 4 165
Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade 0 0 0 88 0 1 5 254
Patent licensing to Bertrand competitors 0 0 0 53 0 0 18 171
Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation 0 0 0 22 0 0 11 95
Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities 0 0 0 17 0 0 4 68
Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time 0 0 0 7 0 1 10 62
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 88 0 1 7 644
Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem 0 0 1 43 0 2 6 273
Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand 0 0 2 3 0 2 15 32
Reviews and Comments 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 40
Specialization and partisanship in committee search 0 0 0 17 0 0 20 144
Stable Bargained Equilibria for Assignment Games without Side Payments 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 84
Strategic Nonparticipation 0 0 0 127 2 3 14 370
The Design of an Efficient Private Industry 0 0 0 22 0 0 9 125
The Limits of ex post Implementation 0 0 0 166 0 2 13 583
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 0 0 1 340 2 8 42 1,160
The Production and Cost-Sharing of an Excludable Public Good 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 238
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 1 76 0 2 41 319
The failure of a Nazi “killer” amendment 0 0 0 4 0 0 13 50
The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 1 1 2 6 3 4 19 69
The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good (*) 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 237
Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot? 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 21
William Vickrey und die Auktionstheorie: Anmerkungen zum Nobelpreis 1996 0 0 0 3 0 1 6 19
Total Journal Articles 1 4 21 4,061 21 78 876 18,817

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Statistics updated 2026-09-10