Access Statistics for Benny Moldovanu

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Nazi 'Killer' Amendment 0 0 0 18 2 4 5 38
A Nazi †Killer†Amendment 0 0 0 27 1 2 4 55
A Note on Revenue Maximization and Efficiency in Multi-Object Auctions 0 0 0 199 0 0 2 1,134
A Stylized Model of the German UMTS Auction 0 0 0 141 1 1 1 469
A Theory of Auctions With Endogenous Valuations 0 0 1 14 1 1 4 54
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations 0 0 0 26 1 1 1 26
A note on revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 26
A stylized model of the German UMTS auction 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 20
Abortions, Brexit and Trees 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 31
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 62 0 0 2 224
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 2 118 1 3 10 448
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 90 1 2 3 238
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 115 0 0 1 351
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 132 0 0 1 498
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 20
Auctions with Downstream Interaction 0 0 0 29 0 0 2 202
Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 466
Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation Revisited 0 0 0 56 1 1 1 139
Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps 0 0 0 70 0 0 0 320
Bid costs and endogenous bid caps 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 34
Brexit: Dynamic Voting with an Irreversible Option 0 0 0 12 1 2 2 17
CONTESTS FOR STATUS 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 46
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 58 2 2 2 243
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 41 0 1 4 230
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 12 1 1 4 149
Coarse Matching and Price Discrimination 0 0 0 121 0 0 2 362
Contest Architecture 0 0 0 115 1 1 2 763
Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu) 0 0 0 125 0 0 1 477
Contest architecture 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 32
Contests for Status 0 0 0 106 2 3 5 329
Dynamic Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 88 0 1 2 166
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 574
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 220 0 0 0 778
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 98 0 0 2 677
Efficient design with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 5 1 1 1 48
Ex-post Implementation with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 82 1 2 3 234
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 54
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 14
Ex-post implementation with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications 0 0 3 19 1 1 10 72
Goethe 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 602
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 183 1 1 3 856
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 29
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 341 0 1 2 1,191
License auctions and market structure 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 28
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 1 92 0 2 9 330
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 6
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 1 49 2 3 145 404
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 63 48 60 218 552
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 47
Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting 0 0 0 10 0 1 1 17
Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 14
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 32
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 847
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation 0 0 0 50 1 3 6 218
Optimal Mechanism Design without Money 0 1 5 172 1 4 14 444
Optimal Search, Learning and Implementation 0 0 0 43 3 5 7 114
Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments 0 0 0 117 1 2 2 455
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 0 43 0 0 2 76
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 0 91 0 1 2 158
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 66
Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade 0 0 0 143 1 1 6 502
Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 611
Partnerships, lemons and efficient trade 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 43
Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 13
Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 332
Posterior Implementation Versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 20 0 0 2 131
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 5
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 60 0 0 1 165
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines that Depend on Processing Time 0 0 0 67 1 2 3 379
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 71 0 0 3 531
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 18
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 529
Revenue Maximization in the Dynamic Knapsack Problem 0 0 0 30 0 1 3 240
Search Committees 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 80
The Art of Compromising: Voting with Interdependent Values and the Flag of the Weimar Republic 0 0 0 17 0 0 3 49
The Dimensions of Consensus 0 0 0 20 0 1 3 62
The Dynamic Assignment of Heterogenous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 57 1 1 1 183
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 Licence Auctions 0 0 0 168 0 2 3 719
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 License Auctions 0 0 0 370 1 1 2 1,121
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 license auctions 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 27
The Feedback Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 29 0 2 4 83
The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory 0 0 0 88 0 0 0 367
The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory 0 0 0 210 1 1 3 800
The German UMTS design: insights from multi-object auction theory 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 211
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 104 0 1 2 334
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 40
The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets With Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 46
The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 29 0 1 2 52
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 0 0 0 280 2 5 7 985
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 1 151 1 3 6 472
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 97 1 1 2 360
The Trade-off Between Fast Learning and Dynamic Efficiency 0 0 0 6 1 1 3 41
The multiplier effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 29
The multiplier effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 20
The optimal allocation of prizes in contests 0 0 1 9 0 0 4 96
Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honour of Reinhard Selten 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 9
Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice 0 0 0 24 0 2 4 36
Voting on Multiple Issues: What to Put on the Ballot? 0 0 0 30 0 2 2 65
William Vickrey und die Auktionstheorie - Anmerkungen zum Nobelpreis 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 961
Total Working Papers 1 2 16 5,670 102 162 617 27,345
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on a Theorem of Aumann and Dreze [Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures] 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 190
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations 0 1 4 19 0 2 12 99
A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions 0 0 1 237 3 3 7 905
Abstimmungen im Bundestag und in der Weimarer Republik: Gewissen oder Strategie? 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 16
An economic perspective on auctions 0 0 0 89 0 0 3 289
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 49 0 0 4 170
Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 381
Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 277
Book reviews 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 34
Book reviews 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 26
CARROTS AND STICKS: PRIZES AND PUNISHMENTS IN CONTESTS 0 0 0 16 0 0 3 124
Coalition-proof nash equilibria and the core in three-player games 0 0 1 116 1 1 3 287
Coarse matching with incomplete information 0 0 0 30 4 5 6 114
Competing auctions with endogenous quantities 0 0 0 48 0 0 5 198
Content-Based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting 0 0 0 11 3 4 12 148
Contest architecture 0 0 0 154 1 2 5 470
Contests for Status 0 0 1 236 4 4 12 721
Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation 0 0 0 33 0 0 5 116
Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities 0 0 0 60 0 0 5 215
Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 94 6 7 9 309
Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach 0 0 0 85 1 1 6 239
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 2 2 3 4 591
Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information 0 0 0 30 0 1 7 124
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 32 0 0 1 106
Goethe's Second-Price Auction 0 0 0 156 0 0 5 391
How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons 1 2 4 589 5 6 18 2,207
How to Dissolve a Partnership 0 0 0 8 1 1 2 1,509
Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency 0 0 0 71 4 5 10 327
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 120 0 1 4 311
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 13 0 0 3 64
Mixed bundling auctions 0 0 0 64 2 2 11 210
Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 13
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 2 304 1 1 9 624
Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation 0 0 1 118 0 0 3 551
Non-Bayesian optimal search and dynamic implementation 0 0 0 9 1 1 3 84
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation 0 0 0 21 0 0 4 131
On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching 0 0 0 8 1 2 5 125
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 1 32 2 2 12 172
Optimal search, learning and implementation 0 0 1 24 0 1 2 89
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments 0 0 0 18 1 1 2 100
Order Independent Equilibria 0 0 0 57 0 0 1 161
Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade 0 0 1 88 0 0 4 249
Patent licensing to Bertrand competitors 0 0 0 53 0 0 1 153
Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation 0 0 0 22 1 1 3 85
Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities 0 0 1 17 1 1 4 65
Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time 0 0 0 7 0 3 3 52
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 88 0 0 4 637
Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem 0 0 0 42 0 0 3 267
Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand 0 0 0 1 0 5 6 18
Reviews and Comments 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 36
Specialization and partisanship in committee search 0 0 0 17 2 2 3 126
Stable Bargained Equilibria for Assignment Games without Side Payments 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 78
Strategic Nonparticipation 0 0 0 127 0 1 2 356
The Design of an Efficient Private Industry 0 0 0 22 1 2 4 117
The Limits of ex post Implementation 0 0 0 166 0 2 5 570
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 0 0 5 339 5 8 21 1,125
The Production and Cost-Sharing of an Excludable Public Good 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 230
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 75 0 0 5 278
The failure of a Nazi “killer” amendment 0 0 0 4 1 1 3 38
The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 1 1 1 5 2 2 4 52
The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good (*) 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 229
Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot? 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 17
William Vickrey und die Auktionstheorie: Anmerkungen zum Nobelpreis 1996 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 13
Total Journal Articles 2 4 24 4,043 59 89 308 18,009

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Statistics updated 2025-11-08