Access Statistics for Benny Moldovanu

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Nazi 'Killer' Amendment 0 0 0 18 1 1 8 42
A Nazi †Killer†Amendment 0 0 0 27 0 0 9 62
A Note on Revenue Maximization and Efficiency in Multi-Object Auctions 0 0 0 199 1 4 8 1,141
A Stylized Model of the German UMTS Auction 0 0 0 141 2 8 11 479
A Theory of Auctions With Endogenous Valuations 0 0 2 15 3 3 14 64
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations 0 0 0 26 0 2 5 30
A note on revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions 0 0 0 2 0 1 6 31
A stylized model of the German UMTS auction 0 0 0 4 2 2 10 30
Abortions, Brexit and Trees 0 0 0 7 1 5 8 39
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 90 1 1 10 245
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 115 2 3 11 362
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 62 2 4 15 239
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 118 2 4 11 456
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 0 3 7 12 28
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 132 1 6 11 509
Auctions with Downstream Interaction 0 0 0 29 3 3 6 208
Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 473
Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation Revisited 0 0 0 56 2 2 6 144
Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps 0 0 0 70 3 4 9 329
Bid costs and endogenous bid caps 0 0 0 4 1 4 7 39
Brexit: Dynamic Voting with an Irreversible Option 0 0 0 12 1 2 8 23
CONTESTS FOR STATUS 0 0 1 2 2 4 17 62
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 58 5 7 13 254
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 12 2 3 9 156
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 41 5 5 14 243
Coarse Matching and Price Discrimination 0 0 0 121 5 5 8 370
Contest Architecture 0 0 0 115 3 8 14 776
Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu) 0 0 0 125 1 3 8 485
Contest architecture 0 0 0 5 1 5 16 46
Contests for Status 0 0 0 106 1 4 10 335
Dynamic Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 88 2 2 9 174
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 220 0 2 5 783
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 98 7 11 33 709
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 0 2 4 14 586
Efficient design with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 5 1 4 12 59
Ex-post Implementation with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 82 1 1 8 239
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 0 3 3 8 61
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 17
Ex-post implementation with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 12
Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications 1 1 3 21 3 8 26 94
Goethe 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 609
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 341 3 4 9 1,198
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 183 4 6 12 867
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 2 2 7 13 42
License auctions and market structure 0 0 0 0 2 4 10 38
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 0 3 4 8 11
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 11
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 0 3 5 15 20
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 49 4 8 17 418
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 1 92 1 5 17 341
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 63 79 176 543 918
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 0 2 3 8 54
Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting 0 0 0 10 0 1 9 25
Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting 0 0 0 5 1 1 3 17
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 0 0 2 6 16 861
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 39
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation 0 1 1 51 2 4 14 228
Optimal Mechanism Design without Money 0 0 2 172 4 6 22 457
Optimal Search, Learning and Implementation 0 0 0 43 3 4 19 126
Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments 0 0 0 117 7 7 18 471
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 0 91 4 8 12 168
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 0 43 7 14 38 114
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments 0 0 0 0 1 3 25 90
Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade 0 0 0 143 2 2 14 514
Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade 0 0 0 0 2 4 10 621
Partnerships, lemons and efficient trade 0 0 0 8 0 1 5 48
Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 335
Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors 0 0 0 0 2 3 16 27
Posterior Implementation Versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 20 1 4 14 144
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 60 2 2 3 168
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 27
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 2 3 10 13
Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines that Depend on Processing Time 0 0 0 67 1 3 12 389
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 0 1 2 11 29
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 0 2 3 11 538
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 71 2 3 8 539
Revenue Maximization in the Dynamic Knapsack Problem 0 0 0 30 1 4 9 248
Search Committees 0 0 0 24 1 3 8 88
The Art of Compromising: Voting with Interdependent Values and the Flag of the Weimar Republic 0 0 0 17 1 4 10 59
The Dimensions of Consensus 0 0 0 20 2 3 10 70
The Dynamic Assignment of Heterogenous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 57 3 3 10 192
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 Licence Auctions 0 0 0 168 1 2 7 724
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 License Auctions 0 0 0 370 2 2 8 1,128
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 license auctions 0 0 1 1 0 0 8 34
The Feedback Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 29 1 4 9 89
The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory 0 0 0 88 2 2 7 374
The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory 0 0 0 210 4 4 9 808
The German UMTS design: insights from multi-object auction theory 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 13
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 65
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 1 1 105 2 3 8 341
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 24 1 5 10 221
The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets With Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 23 3 3 6 51
The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 29 0 1 4 55
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 0 0 0 280 6 6 20 999
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 97 3 5 11 370
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 151 1 1 13 481
The Trade-off Between Fast Learning and Dynamic Efficiency 0 0 0 6 2 2 6 46
The multiplier effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 0 0 13 4 7 14 42
The multiplier effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 0 0 12 3 4 9 29
The optimal allocation of prizes in contests 0 1 1 10 7 20 33 128
Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honour of Reinhard Selten 0 0 0 2 4 4 6 14
Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice 0 1 1 25 2 5 13 46
Voting on Multiple Issues: What to Put on the Ballot? 0 0 0 30 2 2 11 74
William Vickrey und die Auktionstheorie - Anmerkungen zum Nobelpreis 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 965
Total Working Papers 1 5 14 5,678 293 562 1,687 28,703
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on a Theorem of Aumann and Dreze [Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures] 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 195
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations 0 0 2 19 2 3 19 110
A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions 0 0 1 237 3 6 19 920
Abstimmungen im Bundestag und in der Weimarer Republik: Gewissen oder Strategie? 0 0 0 7 0 1 2 18
An economic perspective on auctions 0 0 0 89 1 2 6 294
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 49 2 10 26 194
Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among Buyers 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 387
Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps 0 0 0 1 2 6 20 296
Book reviews 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 37
Book reviews 0 0 0 1 2 3 9 35
CARROTS AND STICKS: PRIZES AND PUNISHMENTS IN CONTESTS 0 0 0 16 2 10 22 144
Coalition-proof nash equilibria and the core in three-player games 0 0 1 116 3 5 16 301
Coarse matching with incomplete information 0 1 2 32 3 5 21 129
Competing auctions with endogenous quantities 0 0 0 48 3 4 15 209
Content-Based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting 0 0 0 11 2 4 27 164
Contest architecture 1 1 1 155 1 4 12 478
Contests for Status 0 0 2 237 5 7 20 735
Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation 0 0 0 33 3 3 9 123
Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities 0 0 0 60 1 1 10 222
Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 94 1 4 19 320
Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach 0 0 0 85 2 4 13 249
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 2 2 3 19 607
Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information 0 1 1 31 3 4 9 129
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 32 0 1 8 114
Goethe's Second-Price Auction 0 0 1 157 1 1 12 401
How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons 0 1 5 591 3 6 24 2,221
How to Dissolve a Partnership 0 0 0 8 2 6 9 1,517
Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency 0 0 0 71 0 1 15 334
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 1 121 3 6 12 322
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 13 2 2 7 71
Mixed bundling auctions 0 0 0 64 2 11 23 230
Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting 0 0 0 0 2 5 48 59
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 0 304 3 5 15 636
Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation 0 0 0 118 3 5 10 561
Non-Bayesian optimal search and dynamic implementation 0 0 0 9 1 1 4 86
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation 0 0 0 21 1 1 8 138
On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching 0 0 0 8 5 5 11 132
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 0 32 1 7 17 184
Optimal search, learning and implementation 0 0 0 24 2 6 12 100
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments 0 0 0 18 12 13 19 118
Order Independent Equilibria 0 0 0 57 1 1 2 163
Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade 0 0 0 88 1 2 4 252
Patent licensing to Bertrand competitors 0 0 0 53 3 7 18 171
Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation 0 0 0 22 4 6 12 95
Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities 0 0 0 17 1 1 3 67
Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time 0 0 0 7 2 2 12 61
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 88 2 2 7 642
Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem 0 1 1 43 1 3 5 271
Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand 0 0 1 2 2 6 16 29
Reviews and Comments 0 0 0 2 1 2 4 40
Specialization and partisanship in committee search 0 0 0 17 5 8 19 143
Stable Bargained Equilibria for Assignment Games without Side Payments 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 84
Strategic Nonparticipation 0 0 0 127 4 6 9 364
The Design of an Efficient Private Industry 0 0 0 22 2 3 10 125
The Limits of ex post Implementation 0 0 0 166 1 4 13 580
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 0 0 5 340 5 13 41 1,151
The Production and Cost-Sharing of an Excludable Public Good 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 236
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 1 1 76 1 11 41 315
The failure of a Nazi “killer” amendment 0 0 0 4 3 3 13 49
The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 0 1 5 4 4 16 64
The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good (*) 0 0 0 0 2 5 10 237
Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot? 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 20
William Vickrey und die Auktionstheorie: Anmerkungen zum Nobelpreis 1996 0 0 0 3 0 1 5 18
Total Journal Articles 1 6 26 4,056 135 269 861 18,697

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06