| Working Paper |
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Abstract Views |
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3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A gibbad-satterthwaite theorem for public good economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
6 |
7 |
7 |
145 |
| A note on price caps with demand uncertainty, quantity precommitment and disposal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
48 |
| An experimental study of communication and cooperation in noncooperative games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
24 |
| Auctions with heterogeneous entry costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
2 |
7 |
10 |
193 |
| CONTINUITY AND ROBUSTNESS OF BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA IN TULLOCK CONTESTS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
5 |
8 |
9 |
22 |
| Capacity precommitment and price competition yield cournot outcomes |
0 |
1 |
1 |
85 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
247 |
| Coalition-proof equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
6 |
10 |
15 |
110 |
| Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
4 |
9 |
11 |
51 |
| Competencia vía funciones de oferta en el mercado español de producción de energía eléctrica |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
31 |
| Consideraciones sobre el empleo |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
24 |
| Continuity and Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria in Tullock Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
39 |
| Cooperación y renegociación en juegos no cooperativos |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
7 |
37 |
| Decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
204 |
| Dynamic Markets for Lemons: Performance, Liquidity, and Policy Intervention |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
4 |
10 |
12 |
90 |
| Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
5 |
8 |
10 |
119 |
| Empleo, crecimiento y política económica |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
4 |
4 |
6 |
54 |
| Existence and equivalence of competitive and core allocations in large exchange economies with differential information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
10 |
18 |
| Fine value allocations in large exchange economies with differential information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
12 |
| Homenaje a Juan Urrutia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
587 |
| INFORMATION IN TULLOCK CONTESTS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
9 |
15 |
16 |
55 |
| Information Advantage in Common-Value Classic Tullock Contests |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
4 |
9 |
15 |
93 |
| Information advantage in common-value classic Tullock contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
52 |
| Information advantage in cournot oligopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
5 |
11 |
12 |
122 |
| Information in Tullock contest |
0 |
1 |
2 |
28 |
10 |
12 |
17 |
115 |
| On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
148 |
| On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
99 |
| On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
6 |
10 |
11 |
114 |
| On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
6 |
7 |
9 |
146 |
| On the core of an economy with differential information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
8 |
19 |
| On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
8 |
9 |
12 |
208 |
| Optimal bank transparency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
137 |
| Precision of public information disclosures, banks' stability and welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
20 |
| Price caps regulation with capacity precommitment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
91 |
| Prices, delay and the dynamics of trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
20 |
| R&D investments fostering horizontal mergers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
82 |
4 |
7 |
13 |
99 |
| Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric informattion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
8 |
20 |
| Relaciones de propiedad cruzadas en mercados oligopolísticos |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
158 |
| Reserve Prices in Auctions with Entry when the Seller in Risk Averse |
1 |
1 |
1 |
32 |
6 |
8 |
9 |
49 |
| Strategic Incentives for Keeping One Set of Books under the Arm's Length Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
44 |
| Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
89 |
| Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
24 |
| Strategy-proof mechanisms with monotonic preferences: The case of pure public goods economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
8 |
9 |
16 |
| TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
108 |
| The Non-Neutrality of the Arm's Length Principle with Imperfect Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
52 |
| The Value of Public Information in Common-Value Tullock Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
47 |
| The asymptotic nucleolus of large monopolistic games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
8 |
13 |
| The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
15 |
| The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
22 |
| The efficiency of decentralized and centralized markets for lemons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
4 |
4 |
9 |
326 |
| The least core, kernel, and bargaining sets of large games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
16 |
| The non-neutrality of the arm's length principle with imperfect competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
139 |
| The value of public information in a cournot duopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
223 |
| The value of public information in common value Tullock contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
52 |
| The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
11 |
| Tullock Contests Reward Information Advantages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
63 |
| Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
104 |
| Tullock contests with asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
17 |
19 |
26 |
237 |
| Uniform Continuity of the Value of Zero-Sum Games with Differential Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
8 |
85 |
| Uniform continuity of the value of zero-sum games with differential information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
7 |
8 |
8 |
482 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
3 |
10 |
1,645 |
223 |
361 |
476 |
5,988 |
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