| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Bank Capital, Loan Liquidity, and Credit Standards since the Global Financial Crisis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
66 |
| Bank Integration and Business Volatility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
635 |
| Bank Integration and Business Volatility in the U.S |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
124 |
| Bank Integration and State Business Cycles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
611 |
| Bank Integration and State Business Cycles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
514 |
| Bank Loan Commitment and the Lending Channel of Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
947 |
| Bank Monitoring Mitigates Agency Problems: New Evidence Using the Financial Covenants in Bank Loan Commitments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,456 |
| Bank commitment relationships, cash flow constraints, and liquidity management |
0 |
0 |
0 |
467 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2,253 |
| Bank credit commitments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
202 |
| Bank credit commitments and credit rationing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
280 |
| Bank integration and business volatility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
348 |
| Bank leverage limits and regulatory arbitrage: new evidence on a recurring question |
1 |
1 |
1 |
50 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
116 |
| Bank loan commitments and the lending view of monetary policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
323 |
| Bank monitoring mitigates agency problems: new evidence using the financial covenants in bank loan commitments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
407 |
| Banking Deserts, Branch Closings, and Soft Information |
3 |
4 |
29 |
160 |
6 |
13 |
59 |
342 |
| Banks versus Hurricanes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
| Banks versus Hurricanes: A Case Study of Puerto Rico after Hurricanes Irma and Maria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
11 |
| Bond market discipline of banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
| Bond market discipline of banks: is the market tough enough? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
305 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
955 |
| COVID Response: The Main Street Lending Program |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
| Climate Change and Financial Stability: The Weather Channel |
0 |
0 |
4 |
46 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
72 |
| Climate-related Financial Stability Risks for the United States: Methods and Applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
56 |
| Crisis Chronicles – The California Gold Rush and the Gold Standard |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
85 |
| Crisis Chronicles: Railway Mania, the Hungry Forties, and the Commercial Crisis of 1847 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
41 |
| Crisis Chronicles: The British Export Bubble of 1810 and Pegged versus Floating Exchange Rates |
1 |
1 |
1 |
40 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
53 |
| Crisis Chronicles: The Cotton Famine of 1862-63 and the U.S. One-Dollar Note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
| Crisis Chronicles: The Crisis of 1816, the Year without a Summer, and Sunspot Equilibira |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
23 |
| Crisis Chronicles: The Gold Panic of 1869, America’s First Black Friday |
1 |
1 |
4 |
64 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
162 |
| Crisis Chronicles: The Hamburg Crisis of 1799 and How Extreme Winter Weather Still Disrupts the Economy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
83 |
| Crisis Chronicles: The Panic of 1819—America’s First Great Economic Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
31 |
| Crisis Chronicles: The Panic of 1825 and the Most Fantastic Financial Swindle of All Time |
1 |
2 |
6 |
79 |
1 |
2 |
25 |
168 |
| Defining and detecting predatory lending |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
447 |
| Did interstate banking deregulation reduce state business cycle fluctuations? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
| Do Payday Lenders Target Minorities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
74 |
| Fear of $10 Billion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
17 |
| Foreign Bank Entry and Business Volatility: Evidence from U.S. States and Other Countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
353 |
| Foreign Bank Entry and Business Volatility: Evidence from U.S. States and Other Countries |
0 |
0 |
1 |
194 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
502 |
| Getting More from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
49 |
| Hold the Check: Overdrafts, Fee Caps, and Financial Inclusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
55 |
| How Bad Are Weather Disasters for Banks? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
3 |
6 |
15 |
209 |
| How household fare after payday credit banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
46 |
| Imperfect information and financial constraints: new evidence using bank loan commitments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
| Information problems and deposit constraints at banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
167 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
895 |
| Introducing a Series on Large and Complex Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
| Is the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Working? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
| Judging the risk of banks: what makes banks opaque? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
471 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,619 |
| Learning by Bouncing: Overdraft Experience and Salience |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
| Leverage Ratio Arbitrage All Over Again |
1 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
37 |
| Leverage Rule Arbitrage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
59 |
| Nonconforming Preferences: Jumbo Mortgage Lending and Large Bank Stress Tests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
| Parting Reflections on the Series on Large and Complex Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| Payday holiday: how households fare after payday credit bans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
417 |
| Piggy Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
| Piggy banks: financial intermediaries as a commitment to save |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
776 |
| Price-increasing competition: the curious case of overdraft versus deferred deposit credit |
0 |
1 |
1 |
76 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
268 |
| Rating risks: risk and uncertainty in an opaque industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
357 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
785 |
| Reframing the Debate about Payday Lending |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
28 |
| Risk and the democratization of credit cards |
0 |
0 |
0 |
594 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1,690 |
| Seismic effects of the bankruptcy reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
243 |
| Stress Test Success and Bank Opacity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
| The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: means-testing or mean spirited? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
605 |
| The Benefits of Intrastate and Interstate Geographic Diversification in Banking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
79 |
| The Credit Cycle and the Business Cycle: New Findings Using the Loan Officer Opinion Survey |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1,590 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
5,625 |
| The Final Crisis Chronicle: The Panic of 1907 and the Birth of the Fed |
1 |
1 |
1 |
50 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
47 |
| The Main Street Lending Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
| The Role of Bank Credit Enhancements in Securitization |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
36 |
| The changing mix of bank card borrowers and the rising rate of charge-offs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
| The credit cycle and the business cycle: new findings using the \"lost\" series on commercial credit standards |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
38 |
| The information value of the stress test and bank opacity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
110 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
368 |
| The ‘Banking Desert’ Mirage |
1 |
1 |
5 |
36 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
93 |
| Too big to fail after all these years |
0 |
0 |
2 |
252 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
762 |
| Up on Main Street |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
| What’s Driving Up Money Growth? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
| Whether and why banks are opaque |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
| Who Pays the Price? Overdraft Fee Ceilings and the Unbanked |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
| Who’s Paying Those Overdraft Fees? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Why Large Bank Failures Are So Messy and What to Do about It? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
| Total Working Papers |
11 |
15 |
68 |
6,596 |
39 |
88 |
345 |
27,083 |
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